宗鏡錄 46.3.1

46.3.1

答。 不達唯識真性。 邪執蓋多。 宗鏡所明。 正為於此。 如唯識論云。 復有迷謬唯識理者。 或執外境如識非無。 或執內識如境非有。 或執諸識用別體同。 或執離心無別心所。 古德云。 或執外境如識非無者。 此即有宗。 依十二處教。 執心境俱有。 是第一義。 論云。 或執內識如境非有者。 釋曰。 此破清辯依密意空教。 撥識亦無。 論云。 或執識用別體同者。 釋曰。 即大乘一類菩薩。 言八識體唯是一也。 如一水鏡。 多波像生。 論云。 或執離心無別心所者。 釋曰。 此即經部覺天所計。 以經言士夫六界。 染淨由心。 無心所故。 雖於蘊中亦有心所。 但於識上分位假立。 無別實有。 慈恩大師釋護法菩薩唯識論中。 略有四種。 一清辯順世。 有境無心。 二中道大乘。 有心無境。 三小乘多部。 有境有心。 四邪見一說。 都無心境。 又四句分別。 一有見無相。 謂正量師。 不作相分而緣境也。 二有相無見。 謂清辯師。 三相見俱有。 餘部及大乘等。 四相見俱無。 即安慧等。 大乘起信論云。 對治邪執者。 一切邪執。 皆依我見。 若離於我。 則無邪執。 是我見有二種。 云何為二。 一者人我見。 二者法我見。 人我見者。 依諸凡夫說有五種。 云何為五。 一者聞脩多羅說如來法身。 畢竟寂寞。 猶如虛空。 以不知為破著故。 即謂虛空是如來性。 云何對治。 明虛空相是其妄法。 體無不實。 以對色故。 有是可見相。 令心生滅。 以一切色法本來是心實無外色。 若無色者。 則無虛空之相。 所謂一切境界。 唯心妄起故有。 若心離於妄動。 則一切境界滅。 唯一真心。 無所不遍。 此謂如來廣大性智究竟之義。 非如虛空相故。 二者聞脩多羅說世間諸法。 畢竟體空。 乃至涅槃真如之法。 亦畢竟空。 從本已來自空。 離一切相。 以不知為破著故。 即謂真如涅槃之性。 唯是其空。 云何對治。 明真如法身自體不空。 具足無量性功德故。 三者聞脩多羅之藏無有增減。 體備一切功德之法。 以不解故。 即謂如來之藏。 有色心法自相差別。 云何對治。 以唯依真如義說故。 因生滅故。 染義。 示現說差別故。 四者聞脩多羅說一切世間生死染法。 皆依如來藏而有。 一切諸法。 不離真如。 以不解故。 謂如來藏自體具有一切世間生死等法。 云何對治。 以如來藏從本已來。 唯有過恒沙等諸淨功德。 不離不斷。 不異真如義故。 以過恒沙等煩惱染法唯是妄有。 性自本無。 從無始世來。 未曾與如來藏相應故。 若如來藏體有妄法。 而使證會永息妄者。 則無是處故。 五者聞脩多羅說。 依如來藏。 故有生死。 依如來藏。 故得涅槃。 以不解故。 謂眾生有始。 以見始故。 復為如來所得涅槃。 有其終盡。 還作眾生。 云何對治。 以如來藏。 無前後際故。 無明之相。 亦無有始。 若說三界外。 更有眾生始起者。 即是外道經說。 又如來藏無有後際。 諸佛所得涅槃。 與之相應。 則無後際故。 法我見者。 依二乘鈍根故。 如來但為說人無我。 以說不究竟。 見有五陰生滅之法。 怖畏生死。 妄取涅槃。 云何對治。 以五陰法自性不生。 則無有滅。 本來涅槃故。 復次究竟離妄執者。 當知染法淨法。 皆悉相待。 無有自相可說。 是故一切法從本已來。 非色非心。 非智非識。 非有非無。 畢竟不可說相。 而有言說者。 當知如來善巧方便。 假以言說。 引導眾生。 得其旨趣者。 皆為離念歸於真如。 以念一切法。 令心生滅。 不入實智故。 但是不了正因緣。 皆成外道。 所執。 有四。 一不知有情業緣。 執之為道。 或執自然。 二不知共業所感空劫。 執為渾沌之氣。

Answer: For those who do not fathom the true nature of consciousness-only, erroneous attachments are exceedingly numerous. What the Mirror of the Source clarifies is precisely for this reason. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: "Furthermore, there are those who are confused and erroneous about the principle of consciousness-only: some cling to external objects as being non-existent just like consciousness; some cling to internal consciousness as being non-existent just like objects; some cling to the various consciousnesses as having distinct functions but the same substance; some cling to there being no separate mental factors apart from the mind." An ancient worthy says: "Some cling to external objects as being non-existent just like consciousness"—this refers to the Sarvāstivāda school, which, relying on the teaching of the twelve āyatanas, clings to both mind and objects as existing, claiming this to be the primary truth. The śāstra says: "Some cling to internal consciousness as being non-existent just like objects"—Explanation: this refutes Bhāviveka, who, relying on the teaching of emptiness with hidden intent, negates consciousness as also being non-existent. The śāstra says: "Some cling to the consciousnesses as having distinct functions but the same substance"—Explanation: this refers to a certain class of Mahāyāna bodhisattvas who say that the substance of the eight consciousnesses is only one, like a single water mirror producing many waves and reflections. The śāstra says: "Some cling to there being no separate mental factors apart from the mind"—Explanation: this is what is asserted by Dharmatrāta of the Sautrāntika, who, because the sūtras state that the six dhātus of a person and defilement and purity depend on the mind, holds there to be no mental factors; although there are mental factors within the skandhas, they are merely nominally posited in states upon consciousness and have no separate real existence. Great Master Ci'en, explaining Dharmapāla Bodhisattva's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, broadly outlines four kinds: first, Bhāviveka and the Cārvākas, who hold there are objects but no mind; second, Middle Way Mahāyāna, which holds there is mind but no objects; third, many schools of the Hīnayāna, which hold there are both objects and mind; fourth, the single school of wrong view, which holds there are neither mind nor objects. Furthermore, distinguishing by four propositions: first, having the darśanabhāga but no nimittabhāga, meaning the Sammatīya masters, who do not form a nimittabhāga when cognizing objects; second, having the nimittabhāga but no darśanabhāga, meaning the master Bhāviveka; third, having both nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga, meaning the other schools, the Mahāyāna, etc.; fourth, having neither nimittabhāga nor darśanabhāga, meaning Sthiramati and others. The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna states: Remedying erroneous attachments—all erroneous attachments depend on the view of self; if one is free from self, then there are no erroneous attachments. This view of self is of two kinds: what are the two? The first is the view of a personal self; the second is the view of a self in dharmas. The view of a personal self is explained as five kinds with respect to ordinary persons. What are the five? First, hearing sūtras say that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is ultimately tranquil like empty space, and because of not knowing this was said to destroy attachments, they then say that empty space is the nature of the Tathāgata. How is this remedied? By clarifying that the characteristic of empty space is a delusive phenomenon, its substance unreal; because it is juxtaposed with matter, there is this visible characteristic causing the mind to arise and cease. Since all material dharmas are fundamentally the mind and there is truly no external matter, if there is no matter, there is no characteristic of empty space. That is to say, all objects exist only because of the delusive arising of the mind; if the mind is free from delusive movement, then all objects cease, and there is only the one true mind, all-pervading. This is called the Tathāgata's vast nature-wisdom, the ultimate meaning, and is not like the characteristic of empty space. Second, hearing sūtras say that the dharmas of the world are ultimately empty of substance, up to the Dharma of nirvāṇa and tathatā being also ultimately empty, fundamentally empty of themselves from the beginning and free from all characteristics, and because of not knowing this was said to destroy attachments, they then say that the nature of tathatā and nirvāṇa is merely emptiness. How is this remedied? By clarifying that the intrinsic substance of the dharmakāya of tathatā is not empty, because it is replete with immeasurable virtues of nature. Third, hearing sūtras say that the Tathāgatagarbha has neither increase nor decrease and its substance is equipped with all dharmas of virtue, and because of not understanding, they then say that the Tathāgatagarbha has distinct characteristics of material and mental dharmas. How is this remedied? Because it is spoken of only in reliance on the meaning of tathatā; because of arising and ceasing, with defiled meaning, distinctions are spoken of through manifestation. Fourth, hearing sūtras say that all defiled dharmas of worldly saṃsāra exist in dependence on the Tathāgatagarbha and all dharmas are not separate from tathatā, and because of not understanding, they say that the intrinsic substance of the Tathāgatagarbha itself possesses all dharmas of worldly saṃsāra, etc. How is this remedied? Because from the beginning, the Tathāgatagarbha has only pure virtues exceeding the sands of the Ganges, which are not separate, not cut off, and not different from the meaning of tathatā; and defiled dharmas of kleśa exceeding the sands of the Ganges exist only delusively, fundamentally lacking nature of their own, and from beginningless time have never been associated with the Tathāgatagarbha. If the substance of the Tathāgatagarbha possessed delusive dharmas, and one could cause its realization to eternally end delusion, that would be impossible. Fifth, hearing sūtras say that in dependence on the Tathāgatagarbha there is saṃsāra, and in dependence on the Tathāgatagarbha one attains nirvāṇa, and because of not understanding, they say that sentient beings have a beginning; seeing a beginning, they furthermore hold that the nirvāṇa attained by the Tathāgata has an end, and one turns back into a sentient being. How is this remedied? Because the Tathāgatagarbha has neither a prior nor a posterior limit; the characteristic of avidyā is also without beginning. If one says that outside the three realms there is a first arising of sentient beings, that is the teaching of externalist scriptures. Furthermore, the Tathāgatagarbha has no posterior limit; the nirvāṇa attained by all Buddhas is associated with it, and therefore has no posterior limit. The view of a self in dharmas: in dependence on the dull faculties of the two vehicles, the Tathāgata only taught selflessness of persons for them; because the exposition was not ultimate, they see the arising and ceasing of the five skandhas, dread saṃsāra, and falsely grasp nirvāṇa. How is this remedied? Because the intrinsic nature of the five skandhas is unarisen, there is no cessation; they are fundamentally nirvāṇa. Furthermore, as for ultimately leaving erroneous attachments, one should know that defiled dharmas and pure dharmas are all mutually dependent, having no intrinsic characteristic that can be spoken of. Therefore, from the beginning, all dharmas are neither matter nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither existent nor non-existent, ultimately inexpressible in their characteristics. That there is verbal explanation: one should know that the Tathāgata's skillful expedients provisionally employ verbal explanations to guide sentient beings; for those who grasp their purport, it is entirely to abandon conceptual thought and return to tathatā. Because thinking upon all dharmas causes the mind to arise and cease, one does not enter real wisdom. It is simply that failing to understand correct causes and conditions, they all become externalists. What is clung to has four types: first, not knowing the karma and conditions of sentient beings, they cling to this as the Way or cling to spontaneity; second, not knowing the kalpa of emptiness induced by shared karma, they cling to it as chaotic primordial energy.