宗鏡錄 46.3.2

46.3.2

三不知空後成劫。 執為清濁兩分。 四不知上界有情下生。 執為天地變化。 故知見網難出。 邪解易生。 如止觀細推。 觀諸見境者。 非一曰諸。 邪解稱見。 又解知是見義。 推理不當。 而偏見分明。 作決定解。 名之為見。 夫聽學人。 誦得名相。 齊文作解。 心眼不開。 全無理觀。 據文者生。 無證者死。 夫習禪人。 唯尚理觀。 觸處心融。 闇於名相。 一句不識。 誦文者守株。 情通者妙悟。 兩家互闕。 論評皆失。 大約邪見有三。 一佛法外外道者。 本原有三。 一迦毘羅外道。 此翻黃頭。 計因中有果。 二漚樓僧佉。 此翻休睺。 計因中無果。 三勒沙婆。 此翻苦行。 計因中亦有果亦無果。 又入大乘論。 迦羅所說。 有計一過。 作者與作一。 相與相者一。 分與有分一。 如是等名為計一。 優樓佉計異。 迦羅鳩馱計一異。 若提子計非一非異。 一切外道。 及摩迦羅等計異。 皆不離此四。 從三四外道。 派出枝流。 至佛出時。 有六大師。 所謂富蘭那。 迦葉姓也。 計不生不滅。 末伽梨拘賒梨子。 計眾生苦樂。 無有因緣。 自然而爾。 刪闍夜毘羅胝子。 計眾生時熟得道。 八萬劫苦盡自解脫。 如縷丸。 線盡自止。 阿耆多翅舍欽婆羅。 欽婆羅。 麁衣也。 計罪報之苦。 以投巖拔髮代之。 迦羅鳩馱迦旃延。 計亦有亦無。 尼犍陀若提子。 計業所作。 定不可改。 二附佛法外道者。 起自犢子方廣。 自以聰明讀佛經書。 而生一見。 附佛法起。 故得此名。 犢子讀舍利弗毘曇。 自制別義。 言我在四句外。 第五不可說藏中。 云何四句。 外道計。 色即是我。 離色有我。 色中有我。 我中有色。 四陰亦如是。 合二十身見。 大論云。 破二十身見。 成須陀洹。 即此義也。 今犢子計我。 異於六師。 復非佛法。 論諸皆推不受。 便是附佛法邪人法也。 或云。 三世及無為法。 為四句也。 又方廣道人。 自以聰明讀佛十喻。 自作義云。 不生不滅。 如幻如化。 空幻為宗。 龍樹斥云。 非佛法理。 方廣所作。 亦是邪人法也。 三學佛法成外道。 執佛教門而生煩惱。 不得入理。 大論云。 若不得般若方便。 入阿毘曇。 即墮有中。 入空。 即墮無中。 入毘勒。 墮亦有亦無中。 中論云。 執非有非無。 名愚癡論。 倒執正法。 還成邪人法也。 若學摩訶衍四門。 既失般若意。 為邪見火所燒。 四成邪人法。 乃至若於觀支。 忽解。 無明轉。 即變為明。 明具一切法。 或謂無明不可得。 變為明。 明何可得。 此不可得。 亦具一切法。 或謂法性之明。 亦可得亦不可得。 非可得非不可得。 一門即三門。 三門即一門。 此解明利。 所破無不壞。 所存無不立。 無能踰勝。 亦復自謂是無生忍。 如此解者。 是圓教四門見發也。 又大乘四門皆成見者。 實語是虛妄。 生語見故。 涅槃是生死。 起貪著故。 多服甘露。 傷命早夭。 失方便門。 墮於邪執。 故稱內邪見也。 又此土振旦。 亦有其義。 周弘正釋三玄云。 易判八卦陰陽吉凶。 此約有明玄。 老子虛融。 此約無明玄。 莊子自然。 約有無明玄。 自外枝派。 祖原出此。 今且約此以明得失。 如莊子云。 貴賤苦樂。 是非得失。 皆其自然。 若言自然。 是不破果。 不辯先業。 即是破因。 禮制仁義。 衛身安國。 若不行用。 滅族亡家。 但現世立德。 不招後世報。 是為破果不破因。 若言慶流後世。 并前。 則是亦有果亦無果也。 約一計即有三行。 一謂計有行善。 二計有行惡。 三計有行無記。 如玄理分。 應爾。 富貴不可企求。 貧賤不可怨避。 生無足欣。 死何勞畏。 將此虛心。 令居貴莫憍。

Third, not knowing the kalpa of formation after the voidness, they grasp it as the two separations of the clear and the turbid. Fourth, not knowing that sentient beings of higher realms are born below, they grasp it as the transformations of heaven and earth. Thus one knows that the net of views is difficult to escape, and heterodox interpretations easily arise. As minutely investigated in the *Zhiguan*: Regarding observing the objects of various views, 'not one' is called 'various'; heterodox interpretation is called 'view'. Furthermore, to understand and know is the meaning of 'view'. Reason is improperly investigated, yet a biased view is distinct; forming a definitive understanding is termed a 'view'. Now, students of listening and learning memorize names and characteristics, forming interpretations aligned with the letter of the text. Their mind's eye does not open, completely lacking contemplation of principle. Those who rely on the letter survive, yet without realization they die. Now, practitioners of dhyāna only value contemplation of principle; encountering anything, their minds blend, yet they are dark regarding names and characteristics, not recognizing a single sentence. Those who recite the texts guard the stump; those who comprehend through sensibility attain wondrous awakening. Both sides are mutually deficient; upon critical examination, both are mistaken. Broadly speaking, there are three types of heterodox views: First, non-Buddhists outside the Buddha Dharma. Originally there were three: First, the Kapila non-Buddhists, translated here as 'Yellow-head', who assert that the effect exists within the cause. Second, the Ulūka [non-Buddhists], translated here as 'Xiuhou', who assert that the effect does not exist within the cause. Third, the Ṛṣabha [non-Buddhists], translated here as 'Asceticism', who assert that the effect both exists and does not exist within the cause. Furthermore, according to the *Introduction to the Mahāyāna*, what Kāla taught had the fault of asserting oneness: the agent and the action are one; the characteristic and that which possesses the characteristic are one; the part and that which possesses parts are one. Such views are called asserting oneness. Ulūka asserted difference; Kakuda asserted oneness and difference; Jñātiputra asserted neither oneness nor difference. All non-Buddhists, as well as Makkhali and others who assert difference, never depart from these four. Branching streams derived from these three or four non-Buddhist teachings. By the time the Buddha appeared in the world, there were six great masters: namely, Pūraṇa, of the Kāśyapa clan, who asserted neither arising nor cessation; Makkhali Gosāla, who asserted that the suffering and pleasure of sentient beings have no cause or condition, being spontaneously so; Sañjaya Vairāṭīputra, who asserted that sentient beings attain the Way when their time ripens, and that when the suffering of eighty thousand kalpas is exhausted, they spontaneously attain liberation—like a ball of thread that comes to rest on its own when the string is spent; Ajita Keśakambala—'kambala' meaning coarse garment—who asserted that the suffering of karmic retribution is substituted by throwing oneself from cliffs and pulling out one's hair; Kakuda Kātyāyana, who asserted both existence and non-existence; and Nirgrantha Jñātiputra, who asserted that what is produced by karma is definitively unalterable. Second, non-Buddhists附-attached to the Buddha Dharma: These originated with the Vātsīputrīyas and the Fangguang. Relying on their own cleverness, they read the Buddhist scriptures and treatises, yet generated a single view that arose by attaching itself to the Buddha Dharma; hence they received this name. The Vātsīputrīyas read Śāriputra's *Abhidharma* and personally formulated a distinct doctrine, saying that the self exists outside the four propositions, within a fifth, ineffable repository. What are the four propositions? Non-Buddhists assert: form is the self; there is a self apart from form; form is within the self; the self is within form. The other four aggregates are also like this, totaling twenty views of the self. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* states that destroying the twenty views of the self constitutes becoming a srotāpanna—this is precisely the meaning. Now the Vātsīputrīyas' assertion of a self is different from the six masters, yet is also not the Buddha Dharma. The treatises all examine and reject it; it is precisely the teaching of heterodox persons attached to the Buddha Dharma. Alternatively, it is said that the three times and unconditioned phenomena constitute the four propositions. Furthermore, the Daoists of the Fangguang, relying on their own cleverness, read the Buddha's ten metaphors and personally formulated the doctrine, saying that neither arising nor cessation is like an illusion, like a phantom, taking emptiness and illusion as their doctrine. Nāgārjuna rebuked this, saying it is not the principle of the Buddha Dharma; what the Fangguang produced is also the teaching of heterodox persons. Third, those who study the Buddha Dharma and turn into non-Buddhists: They grasp the teachings of the Buddha and generate kleśas, unable to enter the principle. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* states: 'If one does not attain the expedient means of prajñā, entering the *Abhidharma*, one immediately falls into existence; entering emptiness, one immediately falls into non-existence; entering the *Piṭaka* (*Bhelasaṃhitā* / *Peṭaka*), one falls into both existence and non-existence.' The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states: 'Grasping neither existence nor non-existence is called foolish discourse.' Inverting the grasp of the correct Dharma, it turns back into the teaching of heterodox persons. If one studies the four gates of the Mahāyāna, having lost the meaning of prajñā, one is burned by the fire of heterodox views, and all four become the teachings of heterodox persons. Even if, regarding the limbs of contemplation, one suddenly understands that avidyā is transformed into vidyā, and vidyā is endowed with all phenomena; or states that avidyā is unobtainable, transforming into vidyā—how could vidyā be obtained?—and this unobtainability is also endowed with all phenomena; or states that the vidyā of the dharmatā is both obtainable and unobtainable, neither obtainable nor unobtainable; one gate is precisely three gates, and three gates are precisely one gate—this understanding being sharp and piercing, where whatever is refuted is without exception destroyed, and whatever is posited is without exception established, with nothing able to surpass it, and one also personally calls this anutpattikadharmakṣānti—such an understanding is the arising of views concerning the four gates of the Perfect Teaching. Furthermore, when all four gates of the Mahāyāna turn into views, true speech becomes false because of giving rise to views on words; nirvāṇa becomes saṃsāra because of giving rise to greed and attachment. Taking too much amṛta harms life and causes premature death; losing the gate of expedient means, one falls into heterodox grasping, hence it is termed 'internal heterodox views'. Furthermore, in this land of Cīnasthāna, there are also such doctrines. Zhou Hongzheng, in explaining the three mysteries, said: The *Changes* determines the eight trigrams, yin and yang, good fortune and misfortune; this elucidates the mystery in terms of existence. Laozi's emptiness and harmonization elucidates the mystery in terms of non-existence. Zhuangzi's spontaneity elucidates the mystery in terms of both existence and non-existence. The branches and streams derived beyond these originally issued from here. For now, let us explain gain and loss based on this. As Zhuangzi says: 'Nobility and baseness, suffering and pleasure, right and wrong, gain and loss—all are spontaneous.' To speak of spontaneity does not refute the effect, but by not discerning prior karma, it refutes the cause. Ritual codes, humaneness, and righteousness protect the body and bring peace to the state; if not put into practice, one's clan is destroyed and one's family perishes. Simply establishing virtue in the present life without incurring retribution in future lives—this is refuting the effect without refuting the cause. If one says that blessing flows to future generations, combining this with the former, it is then that the effect both exists and does not exist. With respect to a single doctrine, there are three types of practice: first, asserting existence and practicing good; second, asserting existence and practicing evil; third, asserting existence and practicing the indeterminate. Dividing according to the mysterious principle, it should be thus: wealth and nobility cannot be aspired to or sought; poverty and lowliness cannot be resented or avoided. Life is not worth rejoicing over; why should death be feared? Taking this empty mind, let one who dwells in nobility not be arrogant.