宗鏡錄 70.17

70.17

答。論云。心與心所。雖恒俱轉。而相應故。和合似一。不可施設離別殊異故。得互作等無間緣。和合似一者。同一所緣。及同一依。同一時轉。同一性攝。不可離別令其殊異。不同八識行相所緣。及依。各不等故。非互為緣。又但除却入無餘依者外。餘一切心心所。皆是等無間緣。以力用齊等。無自類間隔故。三所緣緣。謂若有法。是帶己相。心。或相應。所慮所託。此體有二。一親。二疎。若與能緣體不相離。是見分等內所慮託。應知彼是親所緣緣。若與能緣體雖相離。為質能起內所慮託。應知彼是疎所緣緣。親所緣緣。能緣皆有。離內所慮託。必不生故。疎所緣緣。能緣或有。離外所慮託。亦得生故。釋云。謂若有法者。謂非遍計所執。所執無體。不能發生能緣之識。故非是緣。緣者。必是依他。今此必是有體方緣。是帶己相者。謂能緣心等。帶此色等己之相也。帶者。是挾帶義。相者。體相。非相狀義。謂正智等生時。挾帶真如之體相起。與真不一不異。非相非非相。若挾帶所緣之己以為境相者。是所緣故。若相言體。即有同時心心所之體相。亦心挾帶而有。相者。分義。或體相義。真如亦名為相。無相之相。所以經言。皆同一相。所謂無相。親所緣緣者。若與見分等體不相離者。簡他識所變。及自八識各各所緣別。唯是見分內所慮託。此有二種。一是有為。即識所變。名內所慮託。二是無為。真如體不離識。名所慮託。即如自證緣見分等。並是此例。此說親緣。疎所緣緣。與能緣心相離法是。謂即他識所變。及自身中別識所變。仗為質者是。又親所緣者。即謂見分。是帶己相。此疎中即影像相分。是帶本質之相。故名所緣。又親所緣緣。但是能緣之心。皆有。離內所慮託之相分。一切心等。必不行故。今大乘中。若緣無法。不生心也。疎所緣緣。能緣之法。或有或無。以是心外法故。如執實我法。雖無本質。然離彼法。心亦生故。又觀所緣緣論頌云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣。許彼相在識。及能生識故。以自內識所變之色。為所緣緣。是依他性。有體法故。不緣心外所執無法故。論云。見託彼生。帶彼相起。見託彼生。即是緣義。然心起時。帶彼相起。名為所緣。帶是挾帶逼附之義。百法云。護法明此所緣。如見相。無定相分。以本智親證如體。不取相故。與如體冥合故。即無相狀之相。即但有體相之相。即挾帶之義。亦所緣緣。

Answer: The treatise says: "Although citta and mental factors constantly evolve together, because they are associated, they are harmoniously united like one, and one cannot posit any separation or difference between them; therefore, they can mutually act as immediately antecedent conditions." "Harmoniously united like one" means having the same cognitive object, the same basis, evolving at the same time, and being subsumed under the same nature; they cannot be separated to make them different. This is unlike the eight consciousnesses, whose active characteristics, cognitive objects, and bases are each unequal, so that they do not mutually serve as conditions. Furthermore, except for those entering the nirvāṇa without remainder, all other cittas and mental factors are immediately antecedent conditions, because their power and function are equal and there is no gap within their own category. Third, the cognitive condition (ālambanapratyaya). This means that if there is a phenomenon that bears its own characteristic, being what is considered and relied upon by citta or associated [mental factors]. Its substance has two kinds: first, direct; second, indirect. If it is not separate from the substance of that which cognizes and is inwardly considered and relied upon by the darśanabhāga and so forth, one should know that it is the direct cognitive condition. If, although separate from the substance of that which cognizes, it acts as a substantive basis that can give rise to what is inwardly considered and relied upon, one should know that it is the indirect cognitive condition. That which cognizes always has the direct cognitive condition, because it certainly does not arise apart from what is inwardly considered and relied upon. That which cognizes may or may not have the indirect cognitive condition, because it can also arise apart from what is outwardly considered and relied upon. The explanation says: "If there is a phenomenon" means that it is not of the conceptualized nature (parikalpita), for the conceptualized lacks substance and cannot generate the cognizing consciousness, and hence is not a condition. A condition must be of the dependent nature (paratantra); here it must have substance before it can be a condition. "Bears its own characteristic" means that the cognizing citta and so forth bear the characteristic belonging to this matter and so forth. "Bearing" has the sense of taking along and holding. "Characteristic" refers to the substance-characteristic, not an imagistic appearance. That is to say, when correct wisdom and so forth arise, they arise taking along the substance-characteristic of tathatā; they are neither one with nor different from reality, neither characteristic nor non-characteristic. If it takes along its own [substance] of what is cognized to be the objective characteristic, that is the cognitive object. If "characteristic" refers to substance, then there are the substance-characteristics of simultaneous citta and mental factors, which are also possessed by being taken along by citta. "Characteristic" (相) means a part, or it means the substance-characteristic. Tathatā is also called a characteristic: the characteristic of non-characteristic. Thus the sūtra says: "They all share the same characteristic, namely, the absence of characteristics." Regarding the direct cognitive condition: if it is not separate from the substance of the darśanabhāga and so forth, this excludes what is transformed by other consciousnesses and the distinct cognitive objects of each of one's own eight consciousnesses; it is solely what is inwardly considered and relied upon by the darśanabhāga. This has two kinds: first, the conditioned, which is transformed by consciousness and called that which is inwardly considered and relied upon; second, the unconditioned, in which the substance of tathatā is not separate from consciousness, and is called that which is considered and relied upon. Just as the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga and so forth, these are all of this category. This refers to the direct condition. The indirect cognitive condition refers to phenomena that are separate from the cognizing citta: that is, what is transformed by another consciousness, or what is transformed by a different consciousness within one's own person, which is relied upon as a substantive basis. Furthermore, the direct cognitive object means that the darśanabhāga bears its own characteristic; in this indirect case, the reflected nimittabhāga bears the characteristic of the original substantive basis, and is therefore called the cognitive object. Moreover, the direct cognitive condition is possessed by any cognizing citta without exception, because all cittas and so forth definitely do not function apart from the nimittabhāga that is inwardly considered and relied upon. In the Mahāyāna now, if a non-existent phenomenon is cognized, citta does not arise. As for the indirect cognitive condition, the cognizing phenomenon may or may not have it, because it is a phenomenon outside the citta; for instance, when grasping at a real self or real dharmas, although there is no substantive basis, citta nonetheless arises apart from that phenomenon. Furthermore, the verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "Internal form appearing as external / serves as the cognitive condition for consciousness; / because its characteristic is admitted to exist in consciousness / and because it is able to generate consciousness." Taking the form transformed by one's own internal consciousness as the cognitive condition, it is of the dependent nature, being an existent phenomenon; it does not cognize non-existent phenomena conceptualized outside the citta. The treatise says: "The seeing relies on that to arise; it arises bearing that characteristic." "The seeing relies on that to arise" is the meaning of condition. However, when the citta arises, it arises bearing that characteristic, which is called the cognitive object. "Bearing" has the sense of taking along and closely adhering. The Baifa says: Dharmapāla explains this cognitive object as follows: like seeing reality, it has no fixed nimittabhāga, because fundamental wisdom directly realizes the substance of reality without grasping at characteristics; because it merges with the substance of reality, there is no imagistic characteristic, but only the characteristic of the substance-characteristic, which is the meaning of taking along, and this is also the cognitive condition.