宗鏡錄 70.17

70.17

Answer: The treatise says: "Although citta and mental factors constantly evolve together, because they are associated, they are harmoniously united like one, and one cannot posit any separation or difference between them; therefore, they can mutually act as immediately antecedent conditions." "Harmoniously united like one" means having the same cognitive object, the same basis, evolving at the same time, and being subsumed under the same nature; they cannot be separated to make them different. This is unlike the eight consciousnesses, whose active characteristics, cognitive objects, and bases are each unequal, so that they do not mutually serve as conditions. Furthermore, except for those entering the nirvāṇa without remainder, all other cittas and mental factors are immediately antecedent conditions, because their power and function are equal and there is no gap within their own category. Third, the cognitive condition (ālambanapratyaya). This means that if there is a phenomenon that bears its own characteristic, being what is considered and relied upon by citta or associated [mental factors]. Its substance has two kinds: first, direct; second, indirect. If it is not separate from the substance of that which cognizes and is inwardly considered and relied upon by the darśanabhāga and so forth, one should know that it is the direct cognitive condition. If, although separate from the substance of that which cognizes, it acts as a substantive basis that can give rise to what is inwardly considered and relied upon, one should know that it is the indirect cognitive condition. That which cognizes always has the direct cognitive condition, because it certainly does not arise apart from what is inwardly considered and relied upon. That which cognizes may or may not have the indirect cognitive condition, because it can also arise apart from what is outwardly considered and relied upon. The explanation says: "If there is a phenomenon" means that it is not of the conceptualized nature (parikalpita), for the conceptualized lacks substance and cannot generate the cognizing consciousness, and hence is not a condition. A condition must be of the dependent nature (paratantra); here it must have substance before it can be a condition. "Bears its own characteristic" means that the cognizing citta and so forth bear the characteristic belonging to this matter and so forth. "Bearing" has the sense of taking along and holding. "Characteristic" refers to the substance-characteristic, not an imagistic appearance. That is to say, when correct wisdom and so forth arise, they arise taking along the substance-characteristic of tathatā; they are neither one with nor different from reality, neither characteristic nor non-characteristic. If it takes along its own [substance] of what is cognized to be the objective characteristic, that is the cognitive object. If "characteristic" refers to substance, then there are the substance-characteristics of simultaneous citta and mental factors, which are also possessed by being taken along by citta. "Characteristic" (相) means a part, or it means the substance-characteristic. Tathatā is also called a characteristic: the characteristic of non-characteristic. Thus the sūtra says: "They all share the same characteristic, namely, the absence of characteristics." Regarding the direct cognitive condition: if it is not separate from the substance of the darśanabhāga and so forth, this excludes what is transformed by other consciousnesses and the distinct cognitive objects of each of one's own eight consciousnesses; it is solely what is inwardly considered and relied upon by the darśanabhāga. This has two kinds: first, the conditioned, which is transformed by consciousness and called that which is inwardly considered and relied upon; second, the unconditioned, in which the substance of tathatā is not separate from consciousness, and is called that which is considered and relied upon. Just as the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga and so forth, these are all of this category. This refers to the direct condition. The indirect cognitive condition refers to phenomena that are separate from the cognizing citta: that is, what is transformed by another consciousness, or what is transformed by a different consciousness within one's own person, which is relied upon as a substantive basis. Furthermore, the direct cognitive object means that the darśanabhāga bears its own characteristic; in this indirect case, the reflected nimittabhāga bears the characteristic of the original substantive basis, and is therefore called the cognitive object. Moreover, the direct cognitive condition is possessed by any cognizing citta without exception, because all cittas and so forth definitely do not function apart from the nimittabhāga that is inwardly considered and relied upon. In the Mahāyāna now, if a non-existent phenomenon is cognized, citta does not arise. As for the indirect cognitive condition, the cognizing phenomenon may or may not have it, because it is a phenomenon outside the citta; for instance, when grasping at a real self or real dharmas, although there is no substantive basis, citta nonetheless arises apart from that phenomenon. Furthermore, the verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "Internal form appearing as external / serves as the cognitive condition for consciousness; / because its characteristic is admitted to exist in consciousness / and because it is able to generate consciousness." Taking the form transformed by one's own internal consciousness as the cognitive condition, it is of the dependent nature, being an existent phenomenon; it does not cognize non-existent phenomena conceptualized outside the citta. The treatise says: "The seeing relies on that to arise; it arises bearing that characteristic." "The seeing relies on that to arise" is the meaning of condition. However, when the citta arises, it arises bearing that characteristic, which is called the cognitive object. "Bearing" has the sense of taking along and closely adhering. The Baifa says: Dharmapāla explains this cognitive object as follows: like seeing reality, it has no fixed nimittabhāga, because fundamental wisdom directly realizes the substance of reality without grasping at characteristics; because it merges with the substance of reality, there is no imagistic characteristic, but only the characteristic of the substance-characteristic, which is the meaning of taking along, and this is also the cognitive condition.