宗鏡錄 70.29

70.29

答。執有二。一有強思分別計度而起執者。即所託外質。有無不定。如第六識獨生散意是也。二者有任運起執。即第七識是。為第七心心所是俱生任運。自無力起。要假外質。自方起執也。故知第七有漏位中疎所緣緣。有無不定。若第六識者。此識身心品。行相猛利。於一切位能自在轉。所仗外質。或有或無。疎所緣緣。有無不定。於因果位中。皆自在轉。或分別起。或俱生故。緣一切法時。有仗質起。有不仗質起。緣境最廣故。疎所緣緣。有無不定。若前五轉識者。未轉依麁觀劣故。必仗外質故。即定有疎所緣緣。若轉依位。此非定有。緣過未等。無外質故。前五轉識因果位中。約諸根互用。亦須仗質而起。定有疎所緣緣。若至果位。有無不定。又諸識互緣者。第八識與前七為所緣緣。即八識相分。與五識為所緣緣。第六識緣第八四分為所緣緣。第七即唯託第八見分為所緣緣。即第八識四分為本質。即前七識見分變相分緣。即第八與前七為所緣義。故八於七有也。即第八與前七為疎所緣緣。七於八無者。即前七不與第八為所緣緣。以第八不緣前七故。不託前七生故。唯緣自三境為所緣緣。又廣釋云。古大乘師立所緣緣義者。彼云。謂若有法者。即有體本質法。名緣。言是帶己相者。即相分。名所緣相。相質合說。名所緣緣。所言帶己相者。帶字屬心。己字屬本質。相即相分。謂能緣心。緣所緣境時。帶起本質家己有之相分。故名是帶己相。被小乘正量部。般若毱多不立相分師。造謗大乘論七百偈。破古大乘師所緣緣義云。汝若言已相是相分。將為所緣者。且如汝大乘宗。無分別智緣真如時。不帶起真如相分。其真如望能緣智見分。應無所緣緣義。必若言本智緣如。亦有相分者。即違汝自宗一切經論。如何通會。古大乘師被此一難。當時絕救。經一十二年。無人救得大乘所緣緣義。唐三藏救云。我宗大乘解帶有二義。一者變帶變。二者挾帶變。若變帶者。即變帶似質之已相起。是相狀之相。令根本智緣如時即無。若挾帶者。即有。根本智親挾帶真如體相。而緣。更不變相分故。亦成所緣緣。三藏云。謂若有法。即真如是有體法。名緣。即此真如。是本智所慮處。又名所緣。二勢合說。名所緣緣。所緣即緣。持業釋。亦如八識見分。各緣自親相分時。皆是挾帶。乃至內二分相緣亦爾。故知本智緣如。雖不變相分。然親挾帶真如體相而緣。亦成所緣緣。古大乘師錯解所緣緣義者。夫所緣緣義者。以有體法是緣。即此有體法。是能緣心所慮處故。便名所緣。今古大乘師。既唯將實相分為所緣者。錯之甚矣。正解所緣緣義者。謂若有法。是帶已相者。謂若有法者。即有實法。簡於假法。及遍計相分無體法。無體法。但是所緣。不成緣。夫為緣者。須是有體實法。有力用故。能牽生識。即實圓成依他。是有體法。言是帶已相者。帶有二義。一者變帶。即八箇識。有疎所緣緣本質。是為託。此有體境為本質。變似質之相起。名為變帶。二者挾帶。即一切親所緣緣實相分是。為此相分十離能緣心故。其能緣心。親挾此相分而緣。名為挾帶。言已相者。亦有二義。且第一於變帶疎所緣緣上說者。即變似質之己相。已者。體也。即相分似本質已體。此是相狀之相。二於挾帶親所緣緣上說者。即能緣心上親挾帶所緣相分之已相。此是境相之相。即不同於疎所緣緣。帶本質家之已相起。忽有人問云。言是帶已相者。未審能緣心。帶誰家之已相而緣。應答云。若疎所緣緣。即變帶本質家之已相緣。若親所緣緣。即挾帶相分家之已相緣。又疎所緣緣。是帶相狀之相。即帶似質之相狀。若親所緣緣。即帶境相之相。以親挾境相而緣故。有人云。帶能緣心之已相者。此人不會所緣義。

Answer: There are two kinds of grasping: First, grasping that arises through forceful thinking, discrimination, and calculation; in this case, the presence or absence of the external archetype relied upon is indefinite, like the solitary, dispersed thought of the sixth consciousness. Second, grasping that arises spontaneously, which is the seventh consciousness; because the seventh citta and caittas are innate and spontaneous, they lack the strength to arise on their own and must depend on an external archetype before they can give rise to grasping. Therefore, one knows that in the tainted stage of the seventh, the remote objective condition is [stated above; but here] indefinite [is clarified for other contexts]. As for the sixth consciousness: the citta-category of this consciousness-aggregate has keen and sharp cognitive characteristics and can operate freely across all stages. The external archetype it relies on may be present or absent; thus its remote objective condition is indefinitely present or absent. In both the causal and fruitional stages, it operates freely throughout, whether arising through discrimination or innately; therefore, when taking all dharmas as objects, it sometimes arises relying on an archetype and sometimes arises without relying on an archetype. Because its objects are the most extensive, the remote objective condition is indefinitely present or absent. As for the preceding five evolving consciousnesses: before the transformation of the basis, because their coarse observation is inferior, they necessarily rely on external archetypes, and hence definitely have the remote objective condition. At the stage of the transformation of the basis, this is not definitely present, because when taking the past, future, and the like as objects, there are no external archetypes. For the preceding five evolving consciousnesses in the causal and fruitional stages, in terms of the mutual functioning of the faculties, they also must rely on archetypes to arise, definitely having the remote objective condition. If arriving at the fruitional stage, its presence or absence is indefinite. Furthermore, regarding the mutual objectification among the consciousnesses: the eighth consciousness serves as the objective condition for the preceding seven. That is, the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness serves as the objective condition for the five consciousnesses; the sixth consciousness takes the four bhāgas of the eighth as objective condition; the seventh consciousness solely relies on the darśanabhāga of the eighth as objective condition. That is, the four bhāgas of the eighth consciousness serve as the archetypes; the darśanabhāgas of the preceding seven consciousnesses then transform nimittabhāgas to take them as objects. This constitutes the meaning of the eighth serving as an object for the preceding seven; therefore, the eighth exists for the seventh. Thus, the eighth serves as the remote objective condition for the preceding seven. That the seventh does not exist for the eighth means that the preceding seven do not serve as objective conditions for the eighth, because the eighth does not take the preceding seven as objects, and does not arise relying on the preceding seven, but solely takes its own three objects as objective conditions. Furthermore, the extensive commentary says: When the ancient Mahāyāna masters established the meaning of the objective condition, they said: 'That which is an existent dharma' refers to a dharma that is an archetype having substance, termed 'condition.' The phrase 'bearing its own characteristic' refers to the nimittabhāga, termed the 'characteristic of the object.' Stated together, the characteristic and archetype are called the 'objective condition.' In saying 'bearing its own characteristic,' the word 'bearing' belongs to the citta, the word 'its own' belongs to the archetype, and 'characteristic' is the nimittabhāga; this means that when the cognizing citta takes the cognized object as condition, it brings forth the nimittabhāga belonging to the archetype itself, hence it is called 'bearing its own characteristic.' They were challenged by the Hīnayāna Sammatīya master Prajñāgupta, who did not posit a nimittabhāga, and who composed a treatise of seven hundred verses refuting the Mahāyāna, refuting the ancient Mahāyāna masters' definition of the objective condition, saying: 'If you say that "its own characteristic" is the nimittabhāga and take it as the object, then in your Mahāyāna school, when non-conceptual cognition takes tathatā as its object, it does not bring forth a nimittabhāga of tathatā. Vis-à-vis the darśanabhāga of that cognizing cognition, tathatā should lack the meaning of an objective condition. If you must say that fundamental cognition taking tathatā as object also has a nimittabhāga, then this contradicts all the sūtras and treatises of your own school. How can this be reconciled?' When the ancient Mahāyāna masters met with this single difficulty, at that time there was no rescue; for twelve years, no one was able to rescue the Mahāyāna definition of the objective condition. The Tang Tripiṭaka Master rescued it, saying: 'In our Mahāyāna school, "bearing" is explained with two meanings: first, transformationally bearing (biandai); second, directly grasping and bearing (xiedai). As for transformationally bearing, it transforms and bears its own characteristic resembling the archetype as it arises—this is a characteristic in the sense of an outward form. When fundamental cognition takes tathatā as object, this is absent. As for directly grasping and bearing, it is present: fundamental cognition directly grasps and bears the substance and characteristic of tathatā to take it as object, without transforming another nimittabhāga; thus it also constitutes an objective condition.' The Tripiṭaka Master said: '"That which is an existent dharma"—tathatā is a dharma that has substance, termed "condition." This tathatā is precisely that which is deliberated upon by fundamental cognition, and is also called "the object." Stated jointly, the two aspects are called the "objective condition." The object is itself the condition: this is a karmadhāraya compound. It is also like the darśanabhāga of each of the eight consciousnesses taking its own immediate nimittabhāga as object: these are all cases of directly grasping and bearing; this extends even to the mutual cognition of the inner two bhāgas. Therefore, we know that although fundamental cognition taking tathatā as object does not transform a nimittabhāga, it directly grasps and bears the substance and characteristic of tathatā to take it as object, and thus also constitutes an objective condition.' The ancient Mahāyāna masters misunderstood the meaning of the objective condition: the meaning of the objective condition is that a dharma having substance is the condition, and because this dharma having substance is precisely that which is deliberated upon by the cognizing citta, it is named the object. Now, since the ancient Mahāyāna masters took only the actual nimittabhāga as the object, their mistake was grave indeed! The correct explanation of the objective condition is: 'That which is an existent dharma bears its own characteristic.' 'That which is an existent dharma' means a real dharma, excluding nominal dharmas and the substanceless dharmas of imagined nimittabhāgas. Substanceless dharmas are merely objects, but do not constitute conditions. To be a condition, it must be a real dharma possessing substance, because having efficacy and function, it can induce the arising of consciousness; that is, the real pariniṣpanna and paratantra are dharmas possessing substance. In saying 'bears its own characteristic,' 'bearing' has two meanings: First, transformationally bearing: the eight consciousnesses have the archetype of the remote objective condition; relying on this existent object as an archetype, they transform an image resembling the archetype to arise, which is called 'transformationally bearing.' Second, directly grasping and bearing: this is the real nimittabhāga of all immediate objective conditions; because this nimittabhāga is not separate from the cognizing citta, the cognizing citta directly grasps this nimittabhāga to take it as object, which is called 'directly grasping and bearing.' In saying 'its own characteristic,' there are also two meanings: First, stated regarding the transformationally borne remote objective condition, it is its own characteristic resembling the archetype; 'its own' means substance, that is, the nimittabhāga resembles the archetype's own substance; this is 'characteristic' in the sense of outward form. Second, stated regarding the directly grasped and borne immediate objective condition, it is the cognizing citta directly grasping and bearing the object-nimittabhāga's own characteristic; this is 'characteristic' in the sense of an objective aspect, which is not the same as the remote objective condition bearing the archetype's own characteristic to arise. If someone suddenly asks: 'In saying "bearing its own characteristic," whose own characteristic does the cognizing citta bear to take as object?' One should answer: 'If it is the remote objective condition, it transformationally bears the archetype's own characteristic to take it as object. If it is the immediate objective condition, it directly grasps and bears the nimittabhāga's own characteristic to take it as object. Furthermore, the remote objective condition is bearing the characteristic of outward form, which is bearing the outward form resembling the archetype. The immediate objective condition is bearing the characteristic of the objective aspect, because it directly grasps the objective aspect to take it as object.' If someone says that it bears the cognizing citta's own characteristic, that person does not understand the meaning of the object.