宗鏡錄 70.29

70.29

Answer: There are two kinds of grasping: First, grasping that arises through forceful thinking, discrimination, and calculation; in this case, the presence or absence of the external archetype relied upon is indefinite, like the solitary, dispersed thought of the sixth consciousness. Second, grasping that arises spontaneously, which is the seventh consciousness; because the seventh citta and caittas are innate and spontaneous, they lack the strength to arise on their own and must depend on an external archetype before they can give rise to grasping. Therefore, one knows that in the tainted stage of the seventh, the remote objective condition is [stated above; but here] indefinite [is clarified for other contexts]. As for the sixth consciousness: the citta-category of this consciousness-aggregate has keen and sharp cognitive characteristics and can operate freely across all stages. The external archetype it relies on may be present or absent; thus its remote objective condition is indefinitely present or absent. In both the causal and fruitional stages, it operates freely throughout, whether arising through discrimination or innately; therefore, when taking all dharmas as objects, it sometimes arises relying on an archetype and sometimes arises without relying on an archetype. Because its objects are the most extensive, the remote objective condition is indefinitely present or absent. As for the preceding five evolving consciousnesses: before the transformation of the basis, because their coarse observation is inferior, they necessarily rely on external archetypes, and hence definitely have the remote objective condition. At the stage of the transformation of the basis, this is not definitely present, because when taking the past, future, and the like as objects, there are no external archetypes. For the preceding five evolving consciousnesses in the causal and fruitional stages, in terms of the mutual functioning of the faculties, they also must rely on archetypes to arise, definitely having the remote objective condition. If arriving at the fruitional stage, its presence or absence is indefinite. Furthermore, regarding the mutual objectification among the consciousnesses: the eighth consciousness serves as the objective condition for the preceding seven. That is, the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness serves as the objective condition for the five consciousnesses; the sixth consciousness takes the four bhāgas of the eighth as objective condition; the seventh consciousness solely relies on the darśanabhāga of the eighth as objective condition. That is, the four bhāgas of the eighth consciousness serve as the archetypes; the darśanabhāgas of the preceding seven consciousnesses then transform nimittabhāgas to take them as objects. This constitutes the meaning of the eighth serving as an object for the preceding seven; therefore, the eighth exists for the seventh. Thus, the eighth serves as the remote objective condition for the preceding seven. That the seventh does not exist for the eighth means that the preceding seven do not serve as objective conditions for the eighth, because the eighth does not take the preceding seven as objects, and does not arise relying on the preceding seven, but solely takes its own three objects as objective conditions. Furthermore, the extensive commentary says: When the ancient Mahāyāna masters established the meaning of the objective condition, they said: 'That which is an existent dharma' refers to a dharma that is an archetype having substance, termed 'condition.' The phrase 'bearing its own characteristic' refers to the nimittabhāga, termed the 'characteristic of the object.' Stated together, the characteristic and archetype are called the 'objective condition.' In saying 'bearing its own characteristic,' the word 'bearing' belongs to the citta, the word 'its own' belongs to the archetype, and 'characteristic' is the nimittabhāga; this means that when the cognizing citta takes the cognized object as condition, it brings forth the nimittabhāga belonging to the archetype itself, hence it is called 'bearing its own characteristic.' They were challenged by the Hīnayāna Sammatīya master Prajñāgupta, who did not posit a nimittabhāga, and who composed a treatise of seven hundred verses refuting the Mahāyāna, refuting the ancient Mahāyāna masters' definition of the objective condition, saying: 'If you say that "its own characteristic" is the nimittabhāga and take it as the object, then in your Mahāyāna school, when non-conceptual cognition takes tathatā as its object, it does not bring forth a nimittabhāga of tathatā. Vis-à-vis the darśanabhāga of that cognizing cognition, tathatā should lack the meaning of an objective condition. If you must say that fundamental cognition taking tathatā as object also has a nimittabhāga, then this contradicts all the sūtras and treatises of your own school. How can this be reconciled?' When the ancient Mahāyāna masters met with this single difficulty, at that time there was no rescue; for twelve years, no one was able to rescue the Mahāyāna definition of the objective condition. The Tang Tripiṭaka Master rescued it, saying: 'In our Mahāyāna school, "bearing" is explained with two meanings: first, transformationally bearing (biandai); second, directly grasping and bearing (xiedai). As for transformationally bearing, it transforms and bears its own characteristic resembling the archetype as it arises—this is a characteristic in the sense of an outward form. When fundamental cognition takes tathatā as object, this is absent. As for directly grasping and bearing, it is present: fundamental cognition directly grasps and bears the substance and characteristic of tathatā to take it as object, without transforming another nimittabhāga; thus it also constitutes an objective condition.' The Tripiṭaka Master said: '"That which is an existent dharma"—tathatā is a dharma that has substance, termed "condition." This tathatā is precisely that which is deliberated upon by fundamental cognition, and is also called "the object." Stated jointly, the two aspects are called the "objective condition." The object is itself the condition: this is a karmadhāraya compound. It is also like the darśanabhāga of each of the eight consciousnesses taking its own immediate nimittabhāga as object: these are all cases of directly grasping and bearing; this extends even to the mutual cognition of the inner two bhāgas. Therefore, we know that although fundamental cognition taking tathatā as object does not transform a nimittabhāga, it directly grasps and bears the substance and characteristic of tathatā to take it as object, and thus also constitutes an objective condition.' The ancient Mahāyāna masters misunderstood the meaning of the objective condition: the meaning of the objective condition is that a dharma having substance is the condition, and because this dharma having substance is precisely that which is deliberated upon by the cognizing citta, it is named the object. Now, since the ancient Mahāyāna masters took only the actual nimittabhāga as the object, their mistake was grave indeed! The correct explanation of the objective condition is: 'That which is an existent dharma bears its own characteristic.' 'That which is an existent dharma' means a real dharma, excluding nominal dharmas and the substanceless dharmas of imagined nimittabhāgas. Substanceless dharmas are merely objects, but do not constitute conditions. To be a condition, it must be a real dharma possessing substance, because having efficacy and function, it can induce the arising of consciousness; that is, the real pariniṣpanna and paratantra are dharmas possessing substance. In saying 'bears its own characteristic,' 'bearing' has two meanings: First, transformationally bearing: the eight consciousnesses have the archetype of the remote objective condition; relying on this existent object as an archetype, they transform an image resembling the archetype to arise, which is called 'transformationally bearing.' Second, directly grasping and bearing: this is the real nimittabhāga of all immediate objective conditions; because this nimittabhāga is not separate from the cognizing citta, the cognizing citta directly grasps this nimittabhāga to take it as object, which is called 'directly grasping and bearing.' In saying 'its own characteristic,' there are also two meanings: First, stated regarding the transformationally borne remote objective condition, it is its own characteristic resembling the archetype; 'its own' means substance, that is, the nimittabhāga resembles the archetype's own substance; this is 'characteristic' in the sense of outward form. Second, stated regarding the directly grasped and borne immediate objective condition, it is the cognizing citta directly grasping and bearing the object-nimittabhāga's own characteristic; this is 'characteristic' in the sense of an objective aspect, which is not the same as the remote objective condition bearing the archetype's own characteristic to arise. If someone suddenly asks: 'In saying "bearing its own characteristic," whose own characteristic does the cognizing citta bear to take as object?' One should answer: 'If it is the remote objective condition, it transformationally bears the archetype's own characteristic to take it as object. If it is the immediate objective condition, it directly grasps and bears the nimittabhāga's own characteristic to take it as object. Furthermore, the remote objective condition is bearing the characteristic of outward form, which is bearing the outward form resembling the archetype. The immediate objective condition is bearing the characteristic of the objective aspect, because it directly grasps the objective aspect to take it as object.' If someone says that it bears the cognizing citta's own characteristic, that person does not understand the meaning of the object.