宗鏡錄 49.28

49.28

Furthermore, an ancient master asked: If according to the previous explanation, what is expressed by nominal cognition only obtains the meaning of the common characteristic and does not obtain the phenomenon-substance of the common characteristic, just as when the mouth speaks of physical matter, the mouth should be obstructed by it, because the self-characteristic of the substance of that physical matter is resistance; since it is not obstructed by physical matter, we know it does not obtain that substance but only obtains that meaning—then take, for instance, when direct perception wisdom arises in the eighth consciousness, the eye consciousness, and the clearly discerning manovijñāna, conditioning fire: since it is said that direct perception obtains the svalakṣaṇa of phenomena, why is the mind not burned? If it is not burned, it should not obtain the svalakṣaṇa of fire, so how could it be called an object of direct perception? If you admit that it is burned, then in the world when one directly sees fire, the eye is not damaged, which would entail the fault of contradicting worldly direct perception.