宗鏡錄 49
English (machine translation) 49
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- English
49.1
Compiled by Chan Master Zhijue, Yanshou, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.
49.2
All conscious minds are named on the basis of grasping and sustaining (upātta). As for the seeds, sense faculties, physical body, and receptacle world of the eighth consciousness, do they entirely possess grasping and sustaining, or do they lack grasping and sustaining?
49.3
Answer: Seeds and the vessel world are conditioned by the eighth [consciousness], but not appropriated. 'Appropriation' (upātta) each comprises two meanings. First, regarding the two meanings of 'holding' (zhi): 1. the meaning of subsuming; 2. the meaning of sustaining. 'Subsuming' means subsuming [them] into its own substance. 'Sustaining' means sustaining [them] so that they do not disperse. Regarding the two meanings of 'experiencing' (shou): 1. the meaning of receiving; 2. the meaning of sensing. 'Receiving' means receiving [them] as an objective realm. 'Sensing' means causing the arising of sensory feeling, sharing wellbeing and peril together. The physical body endowed with sense faculties possesses all four meanings of appropriation: 1. subsuming it into its own substance, because it is equally of an indeterminate nature; 2. sustaining it so that it does not disperse, for the eighth [consciousness] can maintain this body so that it does not rot and decompose; 3. receiving it as an objective realm, for this physical body with sense faculties is the intimate nimittabhāga of the eighth [consciousness]; 4. causing sensory feeling to arise, sharing wellbeing and peril together, for if the eighth [consciousness] is imperilled, the five sense faculties are imperilled, and if the eighth [consciousness] is secure, the five sense faculties are secure. As for the receptacle world, it is merely conditioned, not appropriated; that is, within the two meanings of 'experiencing', it is received as an objective realm. Furthermore, that it is said to be 'not appropriated' means that it lacks the three meanings of being subsumed into its own substance, sustained so as not to disperse, and causing sensory feeling to arise. Because it is unlike the sense-facultied body of others, it is called 'not appropriated'; that is, it lacks experiencing, and among the four meanings it has only the single meaning of being received as an objective realm.
49.4
Question: Why is the receptacle world not like the sense-facultied body, intimately appropriated by the eighth [consciousness]?
49.5
Answer: Because it is distant from the eighth [consciousness], it is therefore not subsumed into its own substance. Moreover, when the receptacle world is damaged, the eighth [consciousness] likewise does not share wellbeing and peril together with it; therefore it is not appropriated. As for hair, fur, nails, teeth, bladder, accumulated urine, and the like, although they are close, they are already subsumed under external receptacle [matter]; therefore the eighth [consciousness] likewise does not appropriate them. Consequently, with respect to the eighth [consciousness] either sustaining or conditioning, four alternatives should be formed: 1. sustaining but not conditioning: namely, the untainted seeds; 2. conditioning but not sustaining: namely, the active manifestations of the receptacle world; 3. both [sustaining and conditioning]: namely, the sense faculties and dusts of the internal body; 4. neither [sustaining nor conditioning]: namely, the active manifestations of the preceding seven [consciousnesses].
49.6
Question: Why does the eighth [consciousness] not condition the active manifestations of the preceding seven [consciousnesses]?
49.7
Answer: There are many faults, so it does not condition [them]. If it conditioned them by manifesting a shadow [image], then the eighth [consciousness] would commit the fault of conditioning what is nominal. If it conditioned them directly, it would commit the fault of failing to establish the meaning of consciousness-only, because it would directly apprehend another's mind. Ximing says: 'If it conditioned them by manifesting a shadow [image], then the realm of sentient beings would have the fault of increasing, because by manifesting and giving rise to the active manifestations of the preceding seven, there would be a duplicate seventh, and so on.' Another explanation says: mental dharmas must be produced from seeds; now the vipāka eighth consciousness is subtle and inferior, so even if it were to condition the preceding seven, it could not perfume seeds; therefore it does not condition them.
49.8
Question: Why does the eighth [consciousness] not condition length and the like?
49.9
Answer: Because they are nominal, it does not condition them.
49.10
Question: The unconditioned is real; why does the eighth [consciousness] not condition it?
49.11
Answer: If it were the real unconditioned, it is not realized in the causal stage. If it were the nominal unconditioned, it is not its objective realm. In differentiating the three epistemic instruments (pramāṇa), if the citta and caittas in the dispersed state possess four characteristics, they are termed direct perception (pratyakṣa): 1. conditioning spontaneously; 2. not entailing names and words; 3. being exclusively a realm of intrinsic nature (vastu-viṣaya); 4. being free from calculative conceptualization. Now that the eighth [consciousness] possesses these four characteristics fully, it is fully established as direct perception. Regarding the distinction between nominal and real: in the causal stage, the darśanabhāga of the eighth [consciousness] definitely does not condition the nominal, because it is exclusively a transformation of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya-pariṇāma). A transformation of causes and conditions possesses two meanings: 1. the meaning of spontaneity; 2. the meaning of seeds. Because the objective realm is produced from seeds and the consciousness conditions it spontaneously, it is called a transformation of causes and conditions. Now the objective realm conditioned by the eighth [consciousness] is definitely produced from seeds distinct from the darśanabhāga; it is a transformation of causes and conditions.
49.12
Question: The eighth [consciousness] and the first five are all transformations of causes and conditions; why is it that when the first five condition an objective realm there is an underlying basis (maula-dravya), while the eighth does not have one?
49.13
Answer: The first five are not the fundamental consciousness; in conditioning an objective realm they must rely on an underlying basis. Now the eighth is the fundamental consciousness; therefore it does not rely on an underlying basis. If, apart from its own three realms, there were further dharmas to serve as a basis for the eighth, then there would be dharmas outside citta. However, if the eighth is viewed in relation to conditioning form born of meditative concentration (samādhi-prabhāva-rūpa), and the supporting matter (upastambha-rūpa) of others or the receptacle world of different realms, having an underlying basis is not precluded. Thus we know that when the eighth [consciousness] conditions the three realms, they are exclusively real and not nominal.
49.14
Question: Do the untainted seeds within consciousness possess these three meanings or not?
49.15
Answer: All tainted seeds possess these three meanings. If they are untainted seeds, they do not follow the eighth to become indeterminate, but are exclusively of a wholesome nature; thus the eighth does not receive them as an objective realm, because they are mutually contrary. Nevertheless, this does not hinder [the eighth] from sustaining them without conditioning them; among the three meanings, they possess only two.
49.16
Question: If it does not receive them as an objective realm, should there not be dharmas outside citta?
49.17
Answer: It merely sustains them so that they do not disperse; because they are not separate from consciousness, it is still consciousness-only.
49.18
Question: Since untainted seeds exist within consciousness without being separate from it, why does it not condition them?
49.19
Answer: Because they possess three characteristics, it does not condition them: 1. because they are an antidote: namely, being untainted, they act as an antidote to defiled dharmas and can also destroy tainted dharmas; 2. because their essential natures are distinct: the eighth is exclusively indeterminate, while untainted seeds are exclusively of a wholesome nature; 3. because they are not mutually compliant: untainted seeds do not comply with the tainted eighth consciousness, for the untainted wholesome nature does not comply with the indeterminate nature. Therefore it does not condition them.
49.20
Question: Are untainted seeds nimittabhāga or not?
49.21
Answer: There are two views. One says: the eighth does not condition them, so they are not subsumed under nimittabhāga. The other says: they are also nimittabhāga; although they are not conditioned in the causal stage, they belong to the same category as the nimittabhāga in the resultant stage.
49.22
Question: Since seeds and the svasaṃvittibhāga are not separate, why does the darśanabhāga of the eighth [consciousness] not condition the svasaṃvittibhāga?
49.23
Answer: Although seeds are not separate from the svasaṃvittibhāga, when the darśanabhāga conditions [them], it only conditions seeds and does not condition the svasaṃvittibhāga. If it conditioned the svasaṃvittibhāga, it would commit the fault of conditioning internally during the causal stage. It is like the salty taste in water, or the gelatinous blue in colors.
49.24
Question: How many appropriations does this eighth consciousness have?
49.25
Answer: There are two kinds. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'When the mind-consciousness of all seeds matures, mutually harmonizing, increasing, and expanding, it relies on two appropriations: first, the appropriation of the material sense faculties and their supports; second, the appropriation of the predispositions (vāsanā) towards the proliferation of conceptual signs, names, discriminations, and speech.'
49.26
Question: It was stated earlier that because the eighth possesses four characteristics, it constitutes direct perception. I do not yet know what the operational aspects (ākāra) of the three epistemic instruments are. Furthermore, how many epistemic instruments does each of the eight consciousnesses possess?
49.27
Answer: Ancient masters explained as follows: As for "direct perception" (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa), "direct" (pratyakṣa) means manifest; that is, clearly verifying the object without involving names and words, free from a deliberating mind, directly apprehending the substance of phenomena, and separated from false conceptual discrimination—hence it is called "direct." As for the word "valid cognition" (pramāṇa), measuring and judging has the meaning of definitive determination. That is, the mind measures and decisively determines the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of a phenomenon with respect to the object, and because it is not erroneous, it is called valid cognition. As for "inference" (anumāna-pramāṇa), "infer" means to compare and classify, and "valid cognition" means measuring and judging; because one knows existence by means of comparing, classifying, measuring, and judging, it is called inference. As for "pseudo-cognition" (apramāṇa), it refers to when the mind conditions an object, it is confused about the object, engages in false discrimination, and cannot know correctly; because the object does not correspond to the mind, it is called pseudo-cognition. The *Xianyang lun* states: Direct perception has three aspects: first, the aspect of not being unseen; second, the aspect of not being produced by thought and construction; third, the aspect of what is seen not being illusory. Regarding the first, the aspect of not being unseen, one should know that there are further four kinds: namely, through the sense faculties not being impaired, when attention is present, [it is characterized by] arising from the same class, arising from a different class, being unimpeded, and not being exceedingly distant. "Arising from the same class" means faculties belonging to desire objects [operating] on objects of desire; faculties of a higher realm [operating] on objects of a higher realm, whether already arisen or arising—this is called arising from the same class. "Arising from a different class" means faculties of a higher realm [operating] on objects of a lower realm, whether already arisen or the like—this is called arising from a different class. "Being unimpeded" again has four kinds: 1. not impeded by being covered and blocked; 2. not impeded by concealment; 3. not impeded by being eclipsed and overwhelmed; 4. not impeded by bewilderment. "Impeded by being covered and blocked" refers to being covered and separated by darkness, the gloom of ignorance, or opaque physical matter. "Impeded by concealment" refers to being hidden by the power of herbs, the power of incantations, or the power of supernormal abilities. "Impeded by being eclipsed and overwhelmed" refers to a small thing being eclipsed and taken over by many things so that it cannot be seen; or food and drink being eclipsed by various poisons; or the tips of hairs being eclipsed by other coarse things; and so forth, immeasurable and boundless. For instance, a small light is eclipsed by a great light so that it cannot be seen, as sunlight eclipses the stars, the moon, and the like; also, as the antidote eclipses the object to be remedied, making it unattainable—that is, the contemplation of impurity eclipses the characteristic of purity, the contemplation of impermanence, suffering, and non-self eclipses the characteristics of permanence, bliss, and self, and the power of the contemplation of signlessness eclipses all characteristics. "Impeded by bewilderment" refers to what is created by illusions, whether differentiated appearances or resembling appearances; or internal states such as dizziness, stupor, dreaming, fainting, intoxication, heedlessness, or madness—such kinds are called the impediment of bewilderment. If not impeded by these four impediments, it is called unimpeded. "Not being exceedingly distant" means not being of three kinds of extreme distance: 1. extreme distance in space; 2. extreme distance in time; 3. extreme distance by analytical reduction. These together are named "not being unseen." Because it is not unseen, it is called direct perception. Regarding the second, the aspect of not being produced by thought and construction, it means when establishing an object and grasping the object upon which it relies, it is accomplished as soon as it is grasped, and is not produced by thought and construction; hence it is called direct perception. Regarding the third, the aspect of what is seen not being illusory, there are seven kinds: 1. illusion of conception; 2. illusion of number; 3. illusion of shape; 4. illusion of color; 5. illusion of activity; 6. illusion of mind; 7. illusion of view. "Illusion of conception" means conceiving that appearance with respect to what is not that appearance, such as giving rise to the conception of water with respect to the appearance of a mirage that thirsts a deer. "Illusion of number" means conceiving the conceit of many with respect to a small number, such as one with cataracts seeing the images of many moons in place of one moon. "Illusion of shape" means conceiving the conceit of another shape with respect to a shape, such as seeing the shape of a wheel in a whirling firebrand. "Illusion of color" means conceiving the conceit of another color with respect to a color, such as when the eye faculty is impaired by jaundice (kāmalā), seeing everything as having a yellow appearance with respect to what is not yellow. "Illusion of activity" means conceiving the conceit of activity with respect to what is without activity, such as holding a scroll and running fast, seeing trees rushing by. "Illusion of mind" means taking delight in the five kinds of illusory meanings. "Illusion of view" means assenting to, proclaiming, establishing, valuing, and falsely obstinately grasping those five kinds of illusory meanings. If it is not what is seen through such illusions, it is called direct perception. It also says: As for direct perception, it is like the physical phenomena of the five sense objects, which are the nimittabhāga transformed by the eighth consciousness. When the first five transforming consciousnesses together with the clearly discerning manovijñāna condition these, at the very first moment of encountering the object, discrimination has not yet arisen, names and words are not involved, and the conditioning cognitive wisdom directly verifies the substance of the object, obtaining the svabhāva of phenomena; this is called obtaining the svalakṣaṇa through direct perception. The first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness are direct perception at all times, obtaining the svalakṣaṇa of phenomena; this does not distinguish between cause and fruition, or contaminated and uncontaminated stages—it is so in all cases. If the sixth consciousness, when conditioning those objects of the five sense-data, gives rise to a discriminating mind with respect to the substance of those phenomena and generates speech, what is reached by speech cannot be directly verified; because it is the object conditioned by nominal cognition, it is called obtaining the common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Without distinguishing between the causal stage and the fruition stage, whenever one gives rise to a discriminating mind with respect to the substance of an object and generates verbal expression, it is in all cases called obtaining the common characteristic. And when the Buddha's subsequently attained wisdom conditions conventional objects, because it gives rise to discrimination and gives rise to speech, it is also nominal cognition; it does not obtain the phenomenon-substance of that common characteristic, but merely obtains the meaning of that common characteristic. For this reason, we further explain the meaning of direct perception based on Pramāṇa (Buddhist logic). According to the commentary on Pramāṇa, there are briefly two explanations: First, "the pramāṇa of the pratyakṣa" (genitive tatpuruṣa compound): this refers to the first five consciousnesses relying on their supporting faculties to condition currently existing objects in the present era. The faculty also illumines the object before it together with the consciousness and has the function of generating consciousness. The meaning of the faculty is prominent and superior, so it receives the name "manifest" (pratyakṣa). Although it illumines the object, because its substance is physical matter and lacks the function of cognitive reflection, it cannot measure and judge; it only possesses the meaning of "manifest" and does not receive the name "pramāṇa." Only the mind and mental factors measure and judge the object; their cognitive reflection function is heightened, their substance possesses the meaning of "manifest," and they also have the ability to measure the object. Now, indicating the generated consciousness from the generating faculty, it is called "the pramāṇa of the pratyakṣa"—this is an interpretation as a dependent tatpuruṣa. Second, "the pratyakṣa that is itself pramāṇa" (karmadhāraya compound): this refers to a portion of the clearly discerning manovijñāna, excluding the remaining scattered manovijñāna and that which arises solitary, and including the manovijñāna in samādhi and the conditioning darśanabhāga of the eighth consciousness, which directly condition present objects so that their function is manifest. However, the substance of the manas sense-faculty realm upon which they rely is not manifest, and therefore it is not included; taking only the conditioning darśanabhāga, the manifest is itself the pramāṇa—this is an interpretation as a karmadhāraya compound.
49.28
Furthermore, an ancient master asked: If according to the previous explanation, what is expressed by nominal cognition only obtains the meaning of the common characteristic and does not obtain the phenomenon-substance of the common characteristic, just as when the mouth speaks of physical matter, the mouth should be obstructed by it, because the self-characteristic of the substance of that physical matter is resistance; since it is not obstructed by physical matter, we know it does not obtain that substance but only obtains that meaning—then take, for instance, when direct perception wisdom arises in the eighth consciousness, the eye consciousness, and the clearly discerning manovijñāna, conditioning fire: since it is said that direct perception obtains the svalakṣaṇa of phenomena, why is the mind not burned? If it is not burned, it should not obtain the svalakṣaṇa of fire, so how could it be called an object of direct perception? If you admit that it is burned, then in the world when one directly sees fire, the eye is not damaged, which would entail the fault of contradicting worldly direct perception.
49.29
Answer: Although it is not burned, it still obtains the svalakṣaṇa, and is called direct perception. Why is this? Because mind is subtle and physical matter is coarse. Mind is subtle and formless, whereas physical matter is coarse and has shape. Therefore, when conditioning that fire, although it obtains the svalakṣaṇa, it is nonetheless not burned, and is also called direct perception. Furthermore, that coarse physical matter in truth also cannot destroy subtle physical matter, not to mention mental phenomena. For example, when the disaster of fire occurs, the fire disaster of the desire realm only burns the desire realm, but cannot burn the exceedingly wondrous, subtle physical matter of the samādhi stages of the form realm; therefore, that form realm itself gives rise to a fire disaster that burns its own stage.
49.30
Question: Since you say that mind is subtle and physical matter is coarse, so that when the mind conditions fire, the mind is not burned, how do you resolve the case of an arhat who manifests fire to incinerate their body, whereupon mental cognition ceases accordingly?
49.31
Answer: When manifesting fire to incinerate the body, it only burns the gross matter that supports the faculties, not the five kinds of pure physical faculties or that mental cognition. Those five kinds of pure physical faculties and that mental cognition, lacking the supporting gross matter as a basis, do not arise due to the deficiency of conditions, attaining cessation through lack of conditions (apratisaṃkhyānirodha). Even though it is the fire of samādhi, it still cannot burn them, because coarse and subtle are different. Although samādhi fire is subtle and wondrous compared to worldly fire, it is still coarse compared to the mind, because it is a physical phenomenon possessing shape and matter. As for inference, this again has five kinds: 1. by characteristic; 2. by substance; 3. by activity; 4. by phenomenon; 5. by cause and effect. 1. Inference by characteristic means in accordance with whatever appearances are associated, or by means of objects inferred in the present or previously—such as by seeing a banner, inferring by comparison that there is a chariot, or by seeing smoke, inferring by comparison that there is fire, and so forth. 2. Inference by substance means by directly seeing its own essential nature, inferring by comparison the unperceived substance of that entity; or directly seeing one portion of its substance, inferring by comparison the remaining portion—such as by means of the present, inferring by comparison the past and future, and so forth. 3. Inference by activity means inferring the basis of an activity by means of its function—such as seeing a distant object that does not move, with birds gathering upon it, and through such things inferring by comparison that it is a tree stump; or if there is movement and the like, inferring by comparison that it is a human, and so forth. 4. Inference by phenomenon means among all associated phenomena, inferring the rest from one—such as, by association with impermanence, inferring by comparison existence; by association with suffering, inferring emptiness and non-self; by association with birth, inferring the phenomenon of aging; by association with aging, inferring the phenomenon of death, and so forth. 5. Inference by cause and effect means comparing cause and effect—such as seeing an object moving, inferring that there is an arrival; seeing an arrival, inferring that there was prior movement; or if seeing someone serving a king according to the law, inferring by comparison that they will obtain vast rank and emolument; seeing a vast rank and emolument, inferring by comparison that they previously served the king according to the law, and so forth. Regarding the differentiation of the three pramāṇas and the eight consciousnesses: The first five transforming consciousnesses are solely direct perception, because the first five consciousnesses manifestly verify the object, do not form a conceptualizing mind, obtain the svabhāva of phenomena, and operate spontaneously. The sixth manovijñāna universally accesses the three pramāṇas and has two kinds: 1. The clearly discerning manovijñāna conditions together with the five [sense consciousnesses] and accesses the three pramāṇas. In the first thought-moment, obtaining the svabhāva of the five sense-data, it is direct perception. In the second thought-moment, when arriving at the mind that forms understanding, if it measures the object without error, it is inference; if the mental factors do not correspond to the knowledge of the object, it is pseudo-cognition. 2. The solitary manovijñāna has three kinds: (1) Solitary in the scattered state also accesses the three pramāṇas, being mostly inference and pseudo-cognition. If it conditions direct perception, this refers to the solitary scattered manovijñāna induced by the five consciousnesses, which is described as conditioning the objects of the five sense-data previously conditioned by the five consciousnesses in the first thought-moment, obtaining their svabhāva, which is called direct perception. (2) Solitary in samādhi is solely direct perception. (3) Solitary in dreams is solely pseudo-cognition. If considering the darśanabhāga, it is solely pseudo-cognition; the inner two parts are direct perception. The seventh manas, in the contaminated stage, is solely pseudo-cognition: it falsely grasps the eighth's darśanabhāga as self and as phenomena; originally, the eighth's darśanabhāga is pure and indeterminate (anivṛtāvyākṛta), and is not a self, yet now it is falsely grasped by the seventh as a self, which does not correspond to the knowledge of the object, and hence is called pseudo-cognition. As for the inner two parts of the seventh, they are solely direct perception. The eighth ālayavijñāna, like the five [sense consciousnesses], is direct perception, as has been explained before.
49.32
Question: How does one distinguish between genuine and pseudo direct perception?
49.33
Answer: Ancient explanations state that direct perception (pratyakṣa) is twofold: first, genuine; second, apparent. As for genuine direct perception, its substance is the bodies of the five consciousnesses, the consciousnesses concurrent with the five, all self-verifying divisions (svasaṃvittibhāga), all minds in absorption (samādhi), as well as the eighth consciousness. These minds and mental factors are called 'direct' (pratyakṣa) on account of six senses: First, 'manifestly existing', which excludes [non-existent things like] hare's horns. Second, 'present', which excludes past and future. Third, 'clearly manifested', which excludes seeds (bīja), because [seeds] lack active function. Fourth, 'directly separated [from conceptualisation] and illuminatingly present' is called 'direct'; that is, the mental mode of the cognitive mind is far removed from all conceptualisation; that is, free from the conceptual minds that engage in recollection, deliberation, conventional designation, categories, and so forth. The Hetuvidyā-śāstra states: 'Herein, direct perception is called non-conceptual.' The commentary states: 'This reveals that the mental mode of the cognitive mind does not calculate or deliberate, but naturally conforms to and matches the preceding object.' Fifth, 'direct' means 'clearly appearing'; that is, all minds in absorption are clear and tranquil, and whatever object they encounter, they clearly witness it; thus, clearly witnessing multiple objects is called direct perception. Sixth, 'direct' means 'intimately present'; that is, intimately merging with the self-substance. Whether in all distracted minds, or when intimately and clearly distinguishing from its self-substance in regard to an object, all are called direct perception. The fifth, 'clearly appearing', and the sixth, 'intimately present'—these two meanings exclude all wrong cognitions and the like, as when diseased eyes see hairs or flowers in the sky: although they are free from conceptualisation and cognise spontaneously, they cannot clearly witness multiple objects or intimately merge with their self-substance; therefore, they are not direct perception. As for apparent direct perception, according to reason, there are five kinds of cognition that are all termed apparent direct perception: 1. A distracted mind apprehending the past; 2. An isolated manovijñāna apprehending the present; 3. A distracted manovijñāna apprehending the future; 4. Cognition of doubt apprehending the three periods of time; 5. Confused and erroneous understandings apprehending the present. Because the cognitive modes of these minds involve calculation and deliberation, and none take the specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) as their object, and also because they operate according to conceptualisations based on prior experiences, they are termed apparent direct perception. Yet there are two kinds: 1. Non-conceptual minds, namely those of foolish humans, or spontaneously seeing flowers in the sky and the like; although without conceptualisation, because they do not clearly and intimately witness the object, they are called apparent direct perception. 2. Conceptual minds, which present conventional designations and fail to attain the specific characteristic of phenomena, yet falsely claim to clearly attain the substance of the object; these are called apparent direct perception. It is also said that seeing a 'unified composite' (piṇḍagrāha) such as man, woman, heaven, earth, and so on is called apparent direct perception. This is because multiple conditions combine, as when aggregating minute particles to form matter, or combining the five aggregates to form a person, which is termed a 'unified composite'. Those who perceive in this way possess conceptual cognition, which operates aberrantly with regard to the object; hence it is called apparent direct perception. As for genuine direct perception, it is like when the 'unified composite' has no apprehendable characteristic. The Diamond Sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata speaks of a unified composite as not being a unified composite.' Because it is combined from conditions, it is devoid of intrinsic nature; the nature of naturelessness is the principle that is realized. To know in this way is the arising of right cognition, which operates in the domain of the specific characteristic; this is called genuine direct perception. Furthermore, brushing away the traces of the cognitive subject and the object of realization constitutes genuine direct perception: if there were a cognition external to tathatā that unified with tathatā, there would still be an apprehension, which is not true realization; only when subject and object are both extinguished is it genuine direct [perception]. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'When the cognition attains nothing whatsoever regarding the object, at that time it abides in vijñaptimātra, because it is free from the characteristics of the two apprehensions.' The sūtra states: 'There is also no cognition outside of tathatā that can realize tathatā'—this is precisely genuine direct perception. Therefore, all deeds and manifestations of the Buddhas are entirely direct perception. As the Dhāraṇī Sūtra on Protecting the Sovereign of the State says: 'The Tathāgata fully knows the inhalations and exhalations of all those sentient beings, their various foods and drinks, their various requisites, their various appearances, their various faculties, their various practices and understandings, their various mental dispositions, dying here and being born there, their momentary flow and continuous arising and ceasing. The Tathāgata fully knows all of this through direct perception, not through inference. What is direct perception? It means knowing truly without moving a single thought, without a fluctuating mind entering the past. When knowing in this way, wisdom is complete, and he preaches various Dharmas in accordance with the minds of sentient beings.'
49.34
Question: When the fundamental consciousness (mūlavijñāna) transforms into what resembles the physical body, the vessel world (bhājanaloka), and so forth, is this an individual transformation or a shared transformation?
49.35
Answer: This has four alternatives: 1. Shared transformation within the shared; 2. Unshared transformation within the shared; 3. Unshared transformation within the unshared; 4. Shared transformation within the unshared. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'That which is called shared transformation refers to the vipākavijñāna, by the maturing force of seeds of shared characteristics, transforming to resemble the vessel world of matter and so forth, namely the external great elements (mahābhūta) and derived matter (upādāyarūpa). Although the transformations of various sentient beings are each distinct, their appearances are similar and their locations do not differ, like the lights of multiple lamps, which each pervade and yet appear as one.' The commentary explains: 'The meaning of this statement is: because one's own seeds serve as the primary cause (hetupratyaya), the fundamental consciousness transforms into the appearance of the vessel world, which is solely external and insentient. These are the creating [elements] and the derived matter located externally, hence called external great elements, but they are not phenomena outside of citta. Moreover, all seeds generally have two kinds: first, shared characteristics; second, unshared characteristics. What are shared characteristics? They are what is karmically induced by multiple persons; although it is known that the transformations of each person are distinct—which is called consciousness-only—nonetheless, because they have the meaning of similar shared enjoyment and use, they are called shared characteristics. In truth, it is not that another person can directly use what one has transformed; if another could use it, this would be apprehending phenomena outside of citta. However, this object of mine acts as an adhipatipratyaya (predominant condition) allowing multiple persons to share in its enjoyment and use; hence it is called shared, like mountains, rivers, and the like. As for unshared characteristics: according to the principle of consciousness-only, that which is transformed solely by one's own citta is called an unshared characteristic; that which is transformed entirely by another is another's object and cannot be used by oneself, which is also called an unshared characteristic. But now, in terms of what can be used by one's own body and cannot be used by others, it is called unshared, like male and female servants. Furthermore, the commentary explains: Within the shared, there are two kinds: 1. Shared within the shared: like mountains, rivers, and so forth, which are not used by only one destiny (gati) while other destinies cannot use them. Also, the Weishi Yijing states: "Shared within the shared means that multiple consciousnesses transform it together, which is called shared; and the consciousnesses also use it together, which is again called shared." Furthermore, the Weishi Chao states: "Matter transformed by the consciousnesses of sentient beings of multiple destinies exists in the same location, mutually interpenetrating, with similar appearances, and being used and enjoyed in common; this is called shared within the shared. The first word 'shared' is in terms of the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya); the second word 'shared' is in terms of the predominant condition (adhipatipratyaya). This refers to unowned mountains, rivers, and the like. If they have an owner, they are subsumed under the unshared within the shared." 2. Unshared within the shared: like one's own fields and houses; and blazing fire and other objects seen by hungry ghosts, which humans see as water, because other destinies and other persons cannot use them. Within unshared characteristics, there are also two kinds: 1. Unshared within the unshared: like the eye and other sense faculties, which are relied upon and used only by one's own consciousness, and not by others. 2. Shared within the unshared: like one's own external support matter (the supporting physical organs), which others can also use and enjoy. Here, the "seeds of shared characteristics" refers to the shared within the shared. As for "like the lights of multiple lamps, which each pervade and yet appear as one," this explains that shared results exist in the same location without obstructing one another. That is, the appearance of the external vessel is like the lights of multiple lamps together in one room: each pervades the room and each is distinct in itself, yet their appearances are similar and their locations do not differ. How is it known that each pervades? When one lamp is removed, its light remains pervasive; if they were combined into one, then after one lamp was removed, the remaining light would not be pervasive. Furthermore, they interpenetrate without mutual obstruction, so they appear as one; because when multiple lamps are placed, a person's shadows are also multiple. Furthermore, it states: 1. Unshared transformation within the unshared: like the five sense faculties such as the eye, which are transformed only by one's own eighth [consciousness] in the intermediate or terminal state of mind at the very first moment when relying on the remains of the parents; it is called unshared because it is transformed solely by one's own eighth [consciousness]. Moreover, because it is used and enjoyed solely by oneself, it is again called unshared; as the visual consciousness arises solely relying on the eye faculty, and so on up to the bodily consciousness relying on the body faculty. 2. Shared transformation within the unshared: namely, the internal supporting gross matter; initially it is transformed solely by one's own eighth [consciousness], so it is called an unshared transformation; after it is produced, other people also share in using and enjoying it, so it is again called shared.'
49.36
Question: If one allows the use and enjoyment of another's supporting matter, how is it vijñaptimātra? That would be apprehending phenomena outside of citta.
49.37
Answer: When using and enjoying another's supporting matter, one's own consciousness first transforms a layer of nimittabhāga upon the body of the other person. When using and enjoying it, one still uses and enjoys one's own nimittabhāga. There are no phenomena outside of citta; thus vijñaptimātra is established.
49.38
Question: If you say that one uses and enjoys one's own nimittabhāga, why does killing another person incur the offense of hell, since one is only killing one's own nimittabhāga?
49.39
Answer: One's own nimittabhāga and the other's nimittabhāga exist in the same location on the other's body. Killing one's own nimittabhāga can also cause the cessation and destruction of the nimittabhāga of the other's five faculties; therefore one incurs the offense. Third, shared transformation within the shared: like mountains, rivers, and the great earth, which are transformed by the collective karma of multiple persons, and are also enjoyed and used in common.
49.40
Question: If the shared transformation by multiple persons is called 'shared', suppose there is a tree that twenty people transform together, so that there are twenty layers of nimittabhāga. If one person suddenly chops down this tree, his own nimittabhāga ceases to exist, which can be called vijñaptimātra; but the nimittabhāga of the remaining nineteen people also ceases to exist, which should not be vijñaptimātra, since they did not chop it down themselves.
49.41
Answer: The nimittabhāga chopped down by the one person is that which is followed; the nimittabhāga of the remaining nineteen people is that which follows. The following nimittabhāga necessarily exists dependent upon that which is followed; therefore, once that which is followed no longer exists, that which follows also perishes. In terms of this meaning, it is also called vijñaptimātra. Hence the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: 'Arising from similar karma, it operates following karma.' That is, when transformed by the collective karma of multiple persons, it is called similar karma; when the nimittabhāga of multiple persons is used by one person, it is called operating following karma. Furthermore, it is because of shared transformation and shared enjoyment. Fourth, unshared transformation within the shared: like fields, houses, wives, and children, which are transformed collectively by the eighth [consciousnesses] of multiple persons, thereby receiving the name 'shared'; yet when used and enjoyed, they are used and enjoyed solely by one's own first six [consciousnesses] and are not accessible to others, hence called 'unshared'. It is also like one [body of] water corresponding to four minds, seen differently according to karma.
49.42
Question: Do the consciousnesses, each transforming their own sense faculties, also transform the sense faculties of others?
49.43
Answer: They only transform to resemble the basis (āśraya) of another's sense faculties, because another's faculties have no utility for oneself. The verse in the treatise says: 'Consciousness arises transforming to resemble objects, sentient beings, the self, and cognitions. These objects do not truly exist; because the objects are non-existent, consciousness is also non-existent.' The commentary explains: 'When the eight consciousnesses arise and transform to resemble objects, this refers to the five sense objects; "objects" means the objective spheres, which, because they are dependent phenomena (paratantra), appear as if truly existent. Transforming to resemble sentient beings refers to the five sense faculties belonging to sentient beings; "sentient" means the faculties, because they are called sattva. Transforming to resemble the self is the transforming capacity of manas. And "cognitions" refers to the cognitive discernment of the six consciousnesses: that is, the eighth consciousness takes the two kinds of matter—faculties and sense objects—as its object; the seventh consciousness takes the self as its object; and the six consciousnesses cognise the meanings of the phenomena of the six sense objects.' The treatise states: 'There is an opinion that it can only transform to resemble the basis, because another's faculties are of no use to oneself. As for the five faculties appearing to resemble one's own and others' bodies, this refers to the meaning that one's own and others' consciousnesses each transform individually; this only transforms the basis of another's faculties, because another's faculties have no utility for oneself.' If it also transformed what is of no utility, why would it not transform the seven consciousnesses, which, being without cognitive activity [for oneself], would nevertheless be cognised? If so, how can the text speaking of the manifestation of one's own and others' faculties be resolved? What is said about one's own and others' ālayavijñānas is that each transforms into its own faculties, not that oneself transforms another's faculties. First, because they are of no utility, it does not transform another's faculties; second, because it is not determinately stated that the fundamental consciousness of one's own body transforms another's faculties, it cannot serve as proof.
49.44
Question: If matter is transformed from consciousness, in the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) where there is no matter, how can one speak of transformation?
49.45
Answer: What is seen by sentient beings of the lower realms is form that is the fruit of karma. The objects manifesting in the formless realm are forms that are the fruit of meditative absorption. Both do not depart from mind. Ci'en states: 'Regarding transformation into another body from within meditative absorption, the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra says: "Devas of the form and formless realms transform their bodies into ten thousand kotis and together stand on the tip of a hair; this is due to an equanimous mind." Since the formless realm lacks supernormal powers, it is solely the power of meditative absorption. The Avataṃsakasūtra says that a bodhisattva's nose organ smells the fragrance of the palaces of the formless realm. The Āgamas say that when Śāriputra entered nirvāṇa, tears fell like a fine spring rain in the palaces of the devas of the form and formless realms; when Mahāprajāpatī entered nirvāṇa, devas of the form and formless realms stood beside the Buddha.' As for the objects of meditative absorption among real forms: is the power of the transformed objects continuous or intermittent? In the case of the internal body, it is mostly continuous and only partly intermittent, because there are instances where after being born for a single thought-moment one immediately dies, or like mayflies and the like, as soon as they are born they die. In the case of transforming the external vessel-world, it mostly lasts for a long time, because it is transformed spontaneously in accordance with the momentum of karma.
49.46
Question: What dharmas does the fundamental consciousness definitely take as object?
49.47
Answer: The consciousness takes real dharmas as object; it does not take nominal dharmas as object.
49.48
Ci'en asks: 'Does the fundamental consciousness not take the four kinds of form, such as the extremely reduced [form] and so forth, as object?'
49.49
Answer: Because they are nominal, it does not take them as object, just as with non-concurrent dharmas. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Extremely reduced and extremely distant [forms] are merely that which the sixth, manovijñāna, can analyze into subtle atoms.' Hence, the eighth does not take them as object. Among forms induced by taking precepts: as for form concurrent with absorption or the path, this [eighth consciousness] does not take them as object, because their substance is solely active intention (cetanā). Form arising from conceptual construction is merely reflections in a mirror or the moon in water; this too it does not take as object, because it arises solely from the conceptual construction of the sixth consciousness. Furthermore, among forms produced by meditative absorption, such as in the contemplation of the ten totalities, it also does not take nominal imagined forms as object. Therefore, the text of this treatise states that it only takes real forms as object and does not take nominal ones, because what is taken as object by the eighth must possess efficacy. Those [nominal forms] lack real efficacy, so the eighth does not take them as object. Now, among the substances of all dharmas, the first are existent dharmas, and the second are non-existent dharmas. Why does the eighth not take non-existent dharmas as object? This [consciousness] takes objects spontaneously, not through conceptualization, because it lacks deliberation. Subsequent wisdom and the like possess deliberation, and the six consciousnesses possess conceptualization. From this, one knows that the substance of the eighth consciousness does not take a self as object. The transformation of the eighth consciousness must have efficacy when it transforms; therefore, it does not take what is without efficacy as object. Being without efficacy, it therefore does not take a self and so forth as object, because they lack substance and efficacy. Among existent dharmas, there are summarily two kinds: first, conditioned; second, unconditioned. Why does this consciousness not take the unconditioned as object? If it were the real unconditioned, it has not yet been realized at the stage of the cause; if it were nominal unconditioned, it lacks substance and efficacy. In neither case can it be taken as object.
49.50
Question: How many kinds of transformation are there in the transformation of defiled consciousness?
49.51
Answer: There are summarily two kinds: first, transformation according to causes and conditions; second, transformation according to conceptualization. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'The transformation of defiled consciousness is summarily of two kinds: first, transformation in accordance with the force of causes and conditions; second, transformation in accordance with the force of conceptualization.' The commentary says: 'That which arises from causes and conditions means: due to past karma and real seeds of verbal designation, which must possess efficacy, only through a spontaneous mind and not through mental advertence does that mind arise; that is, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses. In accordance with their predominant maturational cause as condition and seeds of verbal designation as cause, they transform into objects. Transformation according to conceptualization means: a mind arisen from mental advertence, which is a deliberative mind; that is, the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, because they arise in accordance with their own conceptualization and mental advertence. Consequently, when the sixth and seventh take objects, the image nimittabhāga lacks real substance and does not necessarily possess efficacy. The former, transformation in accordance with causes and conditions, must possess real substance and efficacy; that is, the objects transformed by the fifth and eighth and so forth. The latter, transformation in accordance with conceptualization, can only serve as an object and does not necessarily possess efficacy; that is, the seventh consciousness and so forth.' Another explanation says: 'The former is solely the eighth, because it is the master of maturation, the place where perfuming occurs, and able to uphold seeds; its transformations must possess efficacy. The forms, touches, and so forth transformed by the remaining seven consciousnesses in the latter [category] all lack real efficacy, only resembling the efficacy of the underlying substance, like light in a mirror. Among the three kinds of objects, nature-objects do not conform to the mind and are subsumed under transformation according to causes and conditions; solitary images and those carrying substance are both transformations according to conceptualization.' Furthermore, the treatise states: 'The transformation of the maturational consciousness only conforms to causes and conditions; the forms and so forth it transforms must have real efficacy. If it were to transform mind and so forth, they would lack real efficacy, because mind and so forth as nimittabhāga cannot take objects.' This shows that the transformation of form and so forth arises from real seeds, and thus the transformed dharmas must possess substance and efficacy. If there were mind and mental factors as nimittabhāga, like an illusory mind and the like, it therefore does not take them as object; if it took them as object, they would lack efficacy. The Sandhinirmocanasūtra states: 'All magically transformed minds lack a mind that relies on themselves, but possess a mind that relies on others.' The Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra states: 'They lack a mind that is an actual substance of self-directed deliberation; they possess a mind that resembles deliberation as a nimittabhāga transformed in accordance with the darśanabhāga, like light in a mirror.' This is transformation according to conceptualization. Regarding analysis by the four alternatives: first, transformation according to causes and conditions and not transformation according to conceptualization: namely, the mind and mental factors of the five consciousnesses, and the consciousness-king of the eighth consciousness, which serve as the nimittabhāga taken as object, because they arise from their own seeds. Second, solely transformation according to conceptualization and not transformation according to causes and conditions: namely, the defiled seventh consciousness, and the five mental factors of the eighth; these are the transformed nimittabhāga, because they arise solely from the conceptualizing mind. Third, both: namely, the defiled sixth and the undefiled eight consciousnesses, because they can universally take nominal and real dharmas as object. Fourth, neither: namely, the non-concurrent formations, because they lack real substance and do not arise from the same seed as that which takes them as object.
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- 宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese