宗鏡錄 53
English (machine translation) 53
- Language
- English
53.1
Compiled by Chan Master Zhijue, Yanshou, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.
53.2
Regarding the third transforming consciousness, the verse in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: / 'Next is the third transforming consciousness; / Its distinctions are of six kinds: / Discerning objects is its nature and characteristic; / Wholesome, unwholesome, and neither.' / These three transforming consciousnesses are the consciousnesses that discern objects. The svasaṃvittibhāga is the nature of discerning; the darśanabhāga is the characteristic of discerning. With obscured and indeterminate consciousness, taking the discerning of objects as its own nature, it then further uses that as its mental activity; thus the discerning of objects is the consciousness's own nature and also its mental activity. The mental activity is the function. Therefore, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Because their types differ according to the six faculties and objects, they are called eye-consciousness up to mind-consciousness (dharmavijñāna). Names are established according to the objects, conforming to the meaning of consciousness'—that is, discerning with regard to the six objects is called consciousness. The five consciousnesses of form and so forth discern only form and so forth, while the mind-consciousness (dharmavijñāna) can discern all dharmas universally, or because it can discern dharmas, it alone obtains the name of dharmavijñāna; therefore, among the names of the six consciousnesses, there is no error of mutual confusion.
53.3
Question: If there is no real form outside the mind, then the five consciousnesses of the eye and so forth have no objective condition.
53.4
Answer: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: "Although it is not that there is no form, it is transformed by consciousness. That is, when consciousness arises, through the power of internal causes and conditions, it transforms and appears resembling the characteristics of the eyes and so forth and visible form and so forth. It then takes these characteristics as its support and condition. However, sense-faculties such as the eyes are not apprehended through direct perception (pratyakṣa); because they are capable of producing consciousness, by inference (anumāna) one knows they exist. This is merely a functional capacity, not something produced externally. Since the principle of external, obstructive form is already unestablished, it must therefore merely be the transformation and appearance of internal consciousness."
The explanation states: Although the eyes and so forth have form that serves as their support and perceptual object, they are transformed and manifested by consciousness; it is not that outside of mind there exist separate atoms that form the faculties and their spheres. Rather, when the eight consciousnesses arise, through the force of internal causal seeds and so forth, the eighth consciousness transforms, resembling the five faculties and the five dusts. The five consciousnesses, such as the eye[-consciousness], rely upon the faculties transformed by it and take as objects the dust-spheres that are its original essences (benshi). Although they do not directly apprehend them, they necessarily rely on them to arise. In reality, upon the form-dust of the fundamental consciousness, they transform into the appearance of the five dusts; they thus take those five faculties as their basis of support and take both those and their own two kinds of five dusts as their objective conditions (ālambanapratyaya). If the five consciousnesses did not rely on what is transformed by the eighth consciousness, there would be no objective condition; for within the objective condition there are both direct (intimate) and indirect (distant) aspects.
As for "sense-faculties such as the eyes are not apprehended through direct perception": the five dusts such as visible form are mutually perceived by the worldly and apprehended through direct perception; the five faculties such as the eyes are not apprehended through direct perception. Except for being the objects of the eighth consciousness and the objects of the Tathāgatas and so forth—which are apprehended by direct perception—it is not commonly claimed in the world; within other scattered minds, there is no apprehension through direct perception. Since these merely possess the function of producing consciousness, from this one infers they exist. This is merely a functional capacity; it is not form produced by separate great elements outside the mind.
This word "functional capacity" refers precisely to the operation of producing the five consciousnesses. By observing the function, one knows the substance—just as by observing the sprouting of a shoot, one infers that the substance of the seed exists. Therefore, a verse in the Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
"Taking the eye, visible form, and so forth as conditions,
Consciousness is thereby able to arise.
Just as fire blazes on account of fuel,
So too is the arising of consciousness.
The sphere shifts, following the deluded mind,
Just as iron pursues a lodestone.
Like a city of the gandharvas or a mirage,
Apprehended by the foolish and thirsty:
Inside there is no producing entity;
They merely change and vary following the mind.
Again, like people in a city of the gandharvas,
Whose coming and going are all unreal,
So too are the bodies of sentient beings;
Their advancing and halting are entirely untrue.
They are also like what is seen in a dream:
Upon awakening, it no longer exists.
Falsely seeing dharmas such as the aggregates—
Once awakened, they are originally quiescent.
An accumulation of minute atoms of the four great elements,
Separated from mind, is ungraspable."
The Avataṃsakasūtra says: "The youth Prabhūtaratna said to Sudhana: 'Good son, I also thoroughly understand the eighteen crafts, various technical arts, the sixty-two auxiliary treatises on sciences, the inner science, and all methods for curing internal afflictions.' What are named the afflictions of the internal body? There are four causes and conditions: First, the eye-faculty apprehending visible objects; second, the habit-energy of clinging since beginningless time; third, the own-nature and fundamental nature of that consciousness; fourth, mental application and craving toward visible objects. Due to the power of these four causes and conditions, the storehouse consciousness transforms, and the waves of consciousness arise, just like a torrent flowing in uninterrupted succession.
'Good son, just as the eye-consciousness arises, so too do all the faculty-consciousnesses, fine atoms, and pores arise simultaneously. It is just like a clear mirror instantaneously reflecting many images; all consciousnesses are also like this, sometimes appearing instantaneously. Good son, it is like a fierce wind blowing across the great ocean, where the waves never cease: driven by the wind of objects blowing across the calm sea of the mind, the waves of consciousness arise in uninterrupted succession. Cause and condition interact with one another, never abandoning each other; they are neither one nor different, like water and waves. Because of the characteristics produced by karma, deep bondage arises, and one cannot understand the own-nature of form and so forth, and the collection of five consciousnesses turns. That ālayavijñāna never says of itself, "I produce the seven consciousnesses"; nor do the seven consciousnesses say, "We are produced from the ālayavijñāna." Rather, merely from one's own mind clinging to the characteristics of objects, they arise through conceptual discrimination. Such a profound ālayavijñāna has subtle and minute operational characteristics; its ultimate limits are penetrated only by the Tathāgatas and bodhisattvas residing in the stages. Śrāvakas foolish regarding the Dharma, pratyekabuddhas, ordinary persons, and non-Buddhists are all incapable of knowing it.'"
53.5
Question: Do the eye-consciousness and the others arise relying on the faculties, or do they arise relying on the objects?
53.6
Answer: They definitely arise relying on the faculties. The Baifa says: "The eye-consciousness arises relying on the faculty, and so on up to the mental consciousness." If the eye-faculty undergoes transformation, the eye-consciousness necessarily follows its transformation. For example, when due to an eye disease what is seen as blue appears as yellow: this is not an impairment of the object; it is merely that the faculty is damaged, causing the consciousness that apprehends the object to transform it into yellow. Therefore, we know it derives its name following the faculty.
53.7
Question: When the eye-consciousness takes blue to be yellow, is that not non-valid cognition (apramāṇa)?
53.8
Answer: It is merely the simultaneous, confused mental consciousness. Because the eye-faculty is damaged, it causes the simultaneous mental consciousness to take objects in a confused manner, and so it transforms blue into yellow. In reality, the eye-consciousness does not engage in taking blue or yellow [as conceptual designations]. When the mental faculty is damaged, the mental consciousness is also damaged. For example, upon the first bhūmi the two grasings—at self and at dharmas—immediately become uncontaminated. At this time, the mental faculty is overthrown, lacking those two grasings; the consciousness capable of taking objects is also able to destroy the two grasings. Therefore, we know that because it is produced relying on the faculty, it receives the name "eye-consciousness"; it is established solely in accordance with the faculty. Dharmapāla said: "The substances of the six consciousnesses are each distinct, yet their names are established merely relying on the faculties and spheres. If one clings to a single consciousness being able to perceive the six spheres: if six spheres arrive at the same time, how could a single mental consciousness perceive them all at the same time? If they arose sequentially, it would not be pervasive." Therefore, following the distinct kinds of the six faculties and spheres, they derive their names relying on the faculties.
53.9
Question: Since the six consciousnesses, such as the eye-consciousness, arise relying on the faculties, what constitutes their faculties?
53.10
Answer: Dharmapāla generally takes both actual manifestations and seeds to be the faculties. As this is true of the faculties, so it is of the objects. The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra also states: "They all take the two dharmas of active manifestation and seeds to be the faculties of the eyes and so forth." Because at the time of original perfuming, the mind transformed resembling form, it receives its name from the time of perfuming. Because it is pure form derived from the four great elements, in relation to the resultant consciousness that is produced, active manifestation is provisionally designated as a functional capacity; in reality, it is solely manifest form. That "functional capacity" means the production of consciousness is accepted in common by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna.
53.11
Question: What is the meaning of "faculty" (indriya)?
53.12
Answer: "Faculties" are the five faculties. Because they have the meaning of predominant arising, they are named "faculties." Among them, there are the five pure form-faculties and the five auxiliary form-faculties. The five pure form-faculties take invisible, obstructive, pure form as their substance; they can produce the five consciousnesses and possess the function of illuminating objects. The five auxiliary form-faculties assist the pure faculties so that they can illuminate their objects, while their own substance cannot illuminate objects. Because the auxiliary faculties are coarse and manifest forms, they do not hinder being the support for the pure faculties. The Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa states: "'Faculty' has the meaning of supreme, the meaning of mastery, the meaning of lord, and the meaning of predominant; this is the meaning of faculty. What is the eye-faculty? It takes visible form as its sphere and pure form as its nature. That is, a portion of pure form within the eye, like pure clarified butter (sarpirmaṇḍa); because this nature exists, the eye-consciousness can arise; if it is absent, it does not arise. And so on up to the body-faculty taking tangible objects as its sphere, all taking pure form as their nature; if it is absent, it does not arise."
53.13
Question: Prior to the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti), among the three means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), which pramāṇa do the first five evolving consciousnesses definitely belong to?
53.14
Answer: Ancient masters stated: First, when the eye-consciousness conditions the nimittabhāga of the sense sphere of visible form, each [consciousness] conditions its own respective nimittabhāga. In terms of distinguishing among the three pramāṇas, it is direct perception (pratyakṣa). Direct perception possesses three meanings: first, present, not past or future; second, manifest, not seeds; third, presently existent, excluding non-substantial phenomena. As for calling the conditioning of a directly perceived object 'direct perception,' it means there is no inference (anumāna). That is, by virtue of cultivating and realizing the object, it does not carry nominal expressions (nāmasaṃketa); this is the meaning of spontaneity. That is, when the five consciousnesses condition objects, they attain the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of phenomena, and because there is no intermediary obstruction, it is called direct conditioning. If the nimittabhāga has red color, it immediately attains the nimittabhāga of red color; yet because it does not conceptualize and because it spontaneously does not carry nominal expressions, it is called 'attaining the particular characteristic.' Dharmapāla said: The five consciousnesses only condition the real objects of the five sense spheres and do not condition what is nominal. They merely condition spontaneously, not forming active conceptual understanding, nor carrying nominal expressions, because they are direct perception. For example, when the eye-consciousness conditions the four kinds of real colors—blue, yellow, red, and white—although nominal forms such as long, short, square, and round are not separated from the real colors, the eye-consciousness only conditions the real, not the nominal forms of long and short. The eye-consciousness definitively does not condition forms of length; it is only the manovijñāna that produces the mind of length and conditions it. Just as when the five consciousnesses in their initial moment condition the five dust-objects together with the clarifying manovijñāna, it is exclusively direct perception, attaining the real forms of the five dusts. But when the conceptual manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, within the mind of active understanding it conditions long and short forms, which is conditioning by an inferential mind. Thus the five consciousnesses are exclusively direct perception, conditioning the real and not the nominal. Therefore a treatise states: 'There is no eye-consciousness or other [sensory consciousness] that arises without conditioning a real object.' That is, the five consciousnesses only condition the real, which is the domain of particular characteristics. For example, when the eye-consciousness conditions the particular characteristic of the object blue, it attains the particular characteristic of the color blue. If the conceptual manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it is an understanding of 'not-blue,' which is an inference of common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). As soon as the understanding mind is produced, the mental substance of the color blue is not real, because it carries nominal expressions and resides in nominal characteristics. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Nominal cognition and expression do not attain particular characteristics; they operate only with regard to the common characteristics of phenomena.' 'Nominal cognition' refers to the mind that produces active understanding, called nominal cognition. 'Expression' refers to the names, phrases, and phonemes of understanding in the mind and the names, phrases, and phonemes upon sound; these are the expressers, and none of them attain the particular characteristics that are expressed. Furthermore, an explanation states: 'This reveals that the nominal does not rely on the real, but operates solely relying on common characteristics.' In this real entity, one does not speak of the real substance of the mind-consciousness as 'real,' but rather that the particular entity-characteristic of the phenomenon apprehended by the mind is beyond the reach of verbal explanation and cannot be conditioned by nominal cognition; this is what is called 'real.' This is known only by direct perception's cognition, its nature being free from verbal explanation and intellectual conceptualization. This brings out the real substance, which is not [attained by] cognition and expression, just as the physical phenomenon of form and so forth serves as its own nature, or wetness is the nature of water: it can only be realized and known, beyond the reach of verbal explanation. The sixth manovijñāna, arising after the five consciousnesses, conditions this cognition and thus emits speech and so forth, yet what is conditioned and spoken of are merely the common characteristics of phenomena, not their particular characteristics. Furthermore, negating the attainment of particular characteristics is called attaining common characteristics. If among transformed [objects] there were a phenomenon of common characteristics that could be attained, then one would attain the substance itself, and consequently all phenomena could be spoken of and conditioned; therefore, the phenomenon of common characteristics is also beyond the reach of explanation and conditioning. Yet this is not an attachment (graha), because it is not clung to obstinately. For instance, among the five aggregates, the facts of the five aggregates are the particular characteristics, and the principles such as emptiness and non-self are the common characteristics. Furthermore, when inferred by principle, there is no substance of particular characteristics; for now, we call the ineffable phenomenal substance 'particular characteristic' and what can be expressed 'common characteristic.' Argued according to principle, the common is already not common, and the particular is also not particular; in order to mutually negate each other, they are merely spoken of separately. To say that emptiness, non-self, and so forth are common characteristics is said from the perspective of nominal cognition; here there is only the active understanding of the conditioning [agent], and there is no real, common substance of emptiness that is conditioned. When entering the contemplation of reality, each and every phenomenon is individually understood and not taken as a common understanding. If speech were attached to the particular characteristic, then when one spoke of 'fire,' the fire should burn the mouth, because fire has burning objects as its particular characteristic. Conditioning is also like this: when conditioning fire, the fire should burn the mind. Now, since it does not burn the mind nor burn the mouth, it is clear that both conditioning and speaking attain only the common characteristic. If that is so, then when calling for fire, why does one not obtain water, since one does not attain the particular characteristic of fire, just as when calling for water? This reasoning is incorrect, because of beginningless habitual conventional calling. Now, when conditioning blue and forming the understanding of blue, this inferential cognition does not correspond to the preceding phenomenon. Just as when the eye-consciousness conditions form, because it corresponds to the particular characteristic, it does not form the understanding of form. The subsequently arising manovijñāna, conditioning the common characteristic of form, because it is not attached to form, thereupon forms the understanding of blue, negating the conditioning of non-blue objects, and thereupon forms the understanding of blue; it does not mean that the understanding of blue directly corresponds to the factual blue. Therefore the Triṃśikā verse states: 'Present consciousness is like dreams and so forth; when present consciousness has already arisen, the seeing and the object are already absent—how can direct perception be admitted?' This means that nominal cognition can only arise by conditioning common characteristics, because the particular characteristics of phenomena are free from conceptualization. Speech is also like this: not corresponding to the fundamental phenomenon, it also merely operates at the locus of common characteristics. Now in the Mahāyāna school, there is only the substance of particular characteristics; there is no substance of common characteristics at all. Nominal cognition and expression only attain the common and do not attain the particular characteristic. If one speaks of common characteristics, they exist only in the contemplative mind. Direct perception universally conditions both particular characteristics and common characteristics. If it is the particular characteristic of a phenomenon, it is attained solely by direct perception; common characteristics are also attained through inference. … Therefore it is said: 'It operates only with regard to the common characteristics of phenomena.' This particular characteristic is known by pramāṇa of realization, because it is not an object of verbal explanation and so forth.
53.15
Furthermore, a commentary asks: 'Why are they called particular characteristics and common characteristics?'
53.16
The answer states: 'If the phenomenal substance is known only by realized cognition and is beyond the reach of verbal explanation, it is the particular characteristic. If the essential nature of a phenomenon is reached by verbal explanation and conditioned by nominal cognition, it is the common characteristic.'
53.17
The question asks: 'Given that all phenomena are beyond words, yet you now say that what verbal explanation reaches is the common characteristic—how can this not be contradictory?'
53.18
The answer states: 'The common characteristic is a meaning upon the phenomenal substance itself; there is no separate substance. Furthermore, when this name expresses phenomena such as fire, it negates non-fire and so forth; this meaning then extends to all fire, hence it is called a common characteristic—that is its meaning, not the principle of common characteristics like suffering, emptiness, and so forth. If that were so, then all phenomena would be ineffable, yet "ineffable" also does not correspond to the principle: to negate what is effable, one says "ineffable," not that "ineffable" directly corresponds to the phenomenal substance, for the phenomenal substance is also not ineffable. And now one says that names attain the own-nature of common characteristics; this should now be understood as not being the phenomenal substance, but rather that its meaning is acceptable. Saying that names and so forth express common characteristics does not mean that they directly attain the substance of common characteristics; it merely negates the attainment of particular characteristics, hence it is said that names express common characteristics. Furthermore, the particular characteristic is the substance-characteristic of phenomena themselves. For example, fire has warmth as its particular characteristic; when calling for fire, warmth is not obtained, hence one does not attain the particular characteristic. This particular characteristic of warmth is realized only by the direct perception of the body-consciousness, and is not obtained by names. As for the common characteristic, it is the meaning expressed under the name that is called the common characteristic. Common characteristics are of two kinds: first, common to its own kind; second, common to different kinds. For instance, when one says "fire," it does not include water and so forth, but pervades all instances of fire, hence it is called "common to its own kind." If one speaks of suffering, emptiness, impermanence, and so forth, they are not only upon one class of phenomena, but pervade all phenomena such as water and fire, hence they are called "common to different kinds." Furthermore, particular characteristics are attained only by the five sense faculties, five dusts, and the mind and mental factors. That is, the five sense faculties are directly realized by the eighth [consciousness]; the five dusts are the essential substances directly realized by the direct perception of the fifth and eighth consciousnesses and their mental factors. The solitary, dispersed manovijñāna and so forth do not even attain the essential substance, how much less could verbal expressions attain the essential substance? When the five consciousnesses condition the five dust-objects, because they possess four meanings, they are said to attain the particular characteristics of phenomena: first, because they are spontaneous; second, because they are direct perception; third, because they do not carry nominal expressions; fourth, because they only condition present objects. Thus they are said to attain particular characteristics. The objects conditioned by the manovijñāna are of two kinds: if it is the object conditioned by the solitary manovijñāna, it is subsumed under the dharmāyatana; if it is the object conditioned by the clarifying manovijñāna, it is included under the rūpāyatana. For example, when the eye-consciousness and the clarifying manovijñāna spontaneously condition visible form together in the very first moment, they merely condition the particular characteristic of form. In subsequent moments, the clarifying manovijñāna discriminates nominal forms such as length upon the conditioned form, which are common characteristics. Although nominal forms such as length are the objects conditioned by the clarifying manovijñāna, they are also subsumed under the rūpāyatana; because they are nominal, the eye-consciousness does not condition them. The same applies to sound: for instance, when the ear-consciousness in the initial moment spontaneously conditions sound together with the clarifying manovijñāna, it also attains the particular characteristic of the phenomenon. When the manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it conditions the three—names, phrases, and phonemes—upon sound, having conceptual active understanding and so forth, conditioning the nominal. Now, since the five consciousnesses have no conceptual active understanding, they do not condition the nominal.'
53.19
Question: 'For instance, form has twenty-five kinds: the four manifest colors such as blue and yellow are real, and the rest are nominal. Sound has twelve kinds: only appropriated and unappropriated sounds are real, and the rest are nominal. Touch has twenty-six kinds: the four great elements are real, and the rest are nominal. Among these, the real ones conditioned by the five consciousnesses are subsumed under the five dusts. As for the nominal ones, since the master of the treatise states that the five consciousnesses do not condition them and they are conditioned by the manovijñāna, why are they not subsumed under the dharmāyatana?'
53.20
Answer: 'Because the sixth clarifying manovijñāna conditioning nominal forms such as length has three meanings, they are not subsumed under the dharmāyatana: first, the difference between clarity and obscurity; second, following the real from the nominal; third, following the substance from the image. Because it possesses these three meanings, they are subsumed under the rūpāyatana. The solitary manovijñāna lacks these three, which is why it is subsumed under the dharmāyatana. First, as for the difference between clarity and obscurity: when the clarifying manovijñāna is in the initial spontaneous mind together with the five consciousnesses, it is direct perception and does not condition the nominal. When the discriminatory mind of the clarifying manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it then conditions nominal form. While the five consciousnesses are directly conditioning real form, this manovijñāna generates active understanding regarding the real form conditioned by the five consciousnesses, conditioning its nominal [aspect]; it is the sixth, not arising simultaneously with the five consciousnesses to make discrimination, so this manovijñāna is "clarity." The nominal forms and so forth that it conditions are subsumed under the rūpāyatana and are not included in the dharmāyatana. If it is the solitary manovijñāna, which does not rely on the five consciousnesses to generate discrimination but merely arises alone, it is the "obscure" manovijñāna, and is subsumed under the dharmāyatana. Second, as for following the real from the nominal: because nominal forms such as length are established upon other-dependent real forms, although the manovijñāna conditions them, it subsumes these nominal forms back into real forms, so they are entirely subsumed under the rūpāyatana, not included in the dharmāyatana. Third, as for following the substance from the image: nominal forms such as length are nominal nimittabhāgas that the sixth consciousness transforms and conditions, relying on the real forms of the five dusts as their underlying substance. Taking these nominal nimittabhāgas of length and so forth to be subsumed under the real forms of the five dusts, they are entirely subsumed under the rūpāyatana. The solitary manovijñāna does not necessarily have an underlying substance. Because there are these three meanings, the nominal colors of the five dusts are entirely subsumed under rūpa. If it is the object conditioned by the obscure manovijñāna that arises in solitude, it is subsumed under the dharmāyatana.'
53.21
Question: 'In which teachings is it proven that the five sense faculties are direct perception?'
53.22
Answer: The authoritative proofs are not one. The *Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment* says: 'For example, like the light of the eye illuminating the objective sphere before it, its light being complete, it has no aversion or love.' This can prove that the five sense faculties are direct perception (pratyakṣa) and do not produce conceptual discrimination (vikalpa). Wherever that light of the eye reaches, there is no before or after; it never rejects an enemy and accepts a friend, nor loves the beautiful and detests the ugly. Likewise, for instance, the ear faculty does not distinguish sounds of blame from praise; the nose faculty does not avoid odors whether fragrant or foul; the tongue faculty does not discriminate tastes whether sweet or bitter; the body faculty does not block touches whether rough or smooth. Because at the moment of the spontaneous mind (sadyomind) there is no conceptual discrimination, as soon as it flows in an instant into the mental ground and seeking (vitarka) merely arises, it immediately falls into inference (anumāna); then defiled and pure minds arise, and sentiments of grasping and rejecting are produced.
53.23
Question: When the five sense faculties, such as the eye, take objects as conditions, how many meanings should they possess?
53.24
Answer: 'Conditioning' (pratyaya) has the meaning of relying on conditions. 'Object' (viṣaya) has two meanings: first, the meaning of that which is relied upon; second, the meaning of that which is illuminated. As for 'that which is relied upon,' it is like conditioning an object with substantial entity, relying upon it as the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya). As for 'that which is illuminated,' although one does not rely upon it as an intentional object, nevertheless it is the place illuminated and observed, so it is also called an object. For instance, the five sense faculties, such as the eye, illuminate objects such as form; although these are not intentional objects, nevertheless in relation to these faculties they obtain the name of 'objects,' because they are what is illuminated. Moreover, the eye faculty illuminates form, while the eye consciousness conditions form, and so on up to the body faculty perceiving touch, while the body consciousness apprehends touch, and so forth.
53.25
Again, an ancient master asked: Since the five consciousnesses condition only real form, just as when [shapes such as] long and short appear before one based on the objective sphere of form, and the eye faculty is undamaged, at this time does the eye consciousness condition them or not? If you say it conditions them, one commits the error of the five consciousnesses conditioning nominal [forms]. If it does not condition them, why is it that when one closes one's eyes one does not see them, but when one opens one's eyes one sees them?
53.26
Answer: At this time, the eye consciousness grasps only real forms such as blue; whereas the concurrent manovijñāna, using the eye faculty as a gateway, distinctly and clearly grasps [shapes such as] long and short. According to what is apprehended by the manovijñāna, it properly belongs to the category of mental objects (dharmāyatana); however, because at this time the manovijñāna grasps by relying on the eye faculty, in relation to the faculty relied upon, it is subsumed under the category of forms (rūpāyatana).
53.27
Question: How many functions (karman) do the first five consciousnesses possess to apprehend the objective sphere before them?
53.28
Answer: The first five consciousnesses possess six functions. The *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* says: 'First, discriminating only their own intentional objects; second, discriminating only their own characteristics (svalakṣaṇa); third, discriminating only the present; fourth, discriminating only for a single instant; fifth, operating in accordance with the manovijñāna, operating in accordance with the wholesome or defiled, and operating in accordance with the initiation of karma; sixth, being able to grasp pleasant and unpleasant retributions.'
53.29
Question: The eye consciousness is direct perception and cognizes in accordance with the object. If, at a time of eye disease, one sees blue as yellow, how could this be in accordance with the object? If it is not in accordance with the object, how can it be called direct perception?
53.30
Answer: One master says: Seeing blue as yellow is actually the manovijñāna. That is, due to the diseased faculty, a diseased eye consciousness is induced; due to the diseased eye consciousness, a non-valid cognition (apramāṇa) manovijñāna is then induced, which sees blue as yellow; it is not that the eye consciousness sees blue as yellow. It is because the diseased eye consciousness can give rise to the consciousness seeing yellow that this is said. A second master says: Due to the diseased eye faculty, a diseased eye consciousness is induced; although it sees blue as yellow, it does not form the conceptual understanding of 'yellow,' and therefore it is direct perception. Just as when non-conceptual [wisdom] contemplates the Buddha-nature and tathatā as the self endowed with the eight masteries, although it is not in accordance with the object, because non-conceptual wisdom does not form the conceptual understanding of a 'self,' it qualifies as direct perception. This is also the case here.
53.31
The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* asks: If it is called 'consciousness' because it discriminates form and so forth, why is it only called the 'consciousness of the eye' and so forth, and not called the 'consciousness of form' and so forth?
53.32
Answer: Because the explanation, reason, and establishment are based on the five [faculties], such as the eye, and not on form and so forth. Why is that? The consciousness within the eye is called eye consciousness because consciousness can arise relying upon the base of the eye. Moreover, because the eye exists, consciousness can exist. Why is this? If the eye faculty exists, consciousness necessarily arises, since those who are not blind can see even in the dark; it is not that eye consciousness necessarily arises because form exists, since those who are blind cannot see. Moreover, the consciousness produced by the eye is called eye consciousness because when the eye undergoes modification, consciousness also undergoes modification; even though form does not change, consciousness changes—just as with jaundice (kāmalā), which impairs the eye faculty so that all forms such as blue are seen as yellow. Moreover, the consciousness belonging to the eye is called eye consciousness because the seeds (bīja) of consciousness arise following along with the eye. Moreover, the consciousness that assists the eye is called eye consciousness because it causes benefit or harm to it. Why is this? Because when the faculty unites with consciousness, there is feeling (vedanā) which causes benefit or harm to the faculty, not to the objective sphere. Moreover, the consciousness that is like the eye is called eye consciousness because both are subsumed under the sentient realm; form is not like this, because it is not determinate. Just as this is so for the eye consciousness, the other consciousnesses are also like this.
53.33
Question: Does the eye see form, or does consciousness [see form], and so forth?
53.34
Answer: It is not that the eye sees form, nor that consciousness and so forth [see form], because all dharmas lack active function. It is due to collocation that 'seeing' is metaphorically established. Furthermore, due to six aspects, the eye is supreme in seeing form, not consciousness and so forth; therefore it is said that the eye can see forms. What are the six? First, by being the generating cause (jananahetu), because the eye can generate that [seeing]. Second, by being the locus of reliance (āśraya), because seeing relies upon the eye. Third, by operating without fluctuation, because the eye is always of one uniform category. Fourth, by operating with mastery, because it arises moment to moment without waiting for the combination of conditions. Fifth, by operating as adornment, because this [faculty] adorns the body relied upon. Sixth, by sacred teaching, because it is stated in the sūtras that the eye can see form. The six characteristics stated in this way cannot be found in consciousness and so forth. As for the fluctuation of consciousness, you should know that it arises with multiple distinctions.
53.35
Question: In terms of their formation, how many meanings do the six faculties each possess?
53.36
Answer: An ancient commentary states: Each possesses two meanings. The first is maturation (vipāka); the second is nourishment (aupacayika). Take, for instance, the eye faculty: karma of the past bringing forth the eye of the present life is called the maturation eye; in the present life, making the small grow large and the thin become plump due to food and drink is called the nourished eye. The remaining five faculties are also like this.
53.37
Question: If there are no external objects, there should be no mind capable of perceiving by direct perception. If there is no capable perceiver of direct perception, how do worldly people form such an apprehension, thinking: 'I now directly experience such an object'?
53.38
Answer: An ancient master said: Direct awareness is like a dream. When the five consciousnesses of direct perception are currently arising and experiencing the five objective spheres such as form, they can only experience the experienced objects such as form; they cannot be aware of the mind capable of perceiving by direct perception. Why is this? The dharma that is aware of the capable perceiver is the manovijñāna. At the very moment when the five consciousnesses arise, the manovijñāna is necessarily absent; therefore at this moment one definitely cannot be aware of the mind of direct perception. When in the second moment the manovijñāna properly arises to be aware of the previous moment's five consciousnesses of direct perception, at that time there is nothing to be aware of: the five consciousnesses of direct perception and the objects perceived by direct perception have both already ceased and passed away. Why is this? Because the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously; when the manovijñāna arises, the five consciousnesses of direct perception have already ceased. Furthermore, because conditioned dharmas perish moment by moment, the objects conditioned by the five consciousnesses of direct perception have at this time also already ceased and passed away. If one says that there must be real external objects before mind can arise: take the subsequent moment's manovijñāna conditioning the previous moment's five consciousnesses of direct perception as its object—how could that be a substantially existent dharma? Because the past lacks substantial entity, these past five consciousnesses of direct perception have already ceased; although they now lack substantial entity, they can still serve as an object to give rise to the manovijñāna. Why must the five consciousnesses necessarily arise by conditioning real objects outside the mind? It is like when one is asleep and the dream mind is properly arising, one cannot give rise to the mind aware of the dream; when, after waking from sleep, one gives rise to the mind aware of the dream, the dream mind that is known has already ceased. When the five consciousnesses of direct perception are properly arising, one cannot yet give rise to the manovijñāna mind aware of the direct perception; and by the time the manovijñāna mind capable of being aware of the five consciousnesses of direct perception arises in the second moment, those five consciousnesses of direct perception that are known have already ceased. This is similar to the mind aware of a dream, which is why it is cited as an analogy.
53.39
Again, an objection asks: Is it definitely accepted that there is direct perception? That is to say, when the cognizant manovijñāna capable of perceiving direct perception is properly arising, do those five consciousnesses being perceived definitely exist?
53.40
Answer: At this time, that which is perceived has already ceased. Although it lacks substantial entity, it still generates the mind capable of perceiving. What prevents external objects, though non-existent, from being able to generate consciousness? However, although the five objective spheres in the Mahāyāna appear to exist, they are not outside the mind, which is different from [the view of] ordinary people and the Hīnayāna.
53.41
Question: Among the six consciousnesses, such as the eye, how many [types of] conceptual discrimination are there?
53.42
Answer: Broadly speaking, there are three kinds: first, discrimination of essential nature, which takes only presently conditioned factors as objects, discriminating through their specific mental modes. The conditioned factors that are taken as objects are the five sensory dusts. As for specific mental modes, it is like visible form taking blue as its subjective mode; when the visual consciousness takes it as object, it also spontaneously produces the subjective mode of blue, which is called one's own mode. Furthermore, the specific mental mode is the cognitive subjective mode as distinguished from a common mental mode; for example, when taking blue as object, it does not attach to yellow. Second, discrimination by recollective mindfulness, which discriminates by pursuing mindfulness regarding conditioned factors previously experienced; it takes only the past as object. Third, calculative discrimination, which discriminates through deliberation regarding factors of the past, future, and present that are not immediately present. That is, it calculates what is non-existent as existent, which is an object of non-valid cognition. However, with respect to calculating across the three periods of time, it is not fixed to any single period. Furthermore, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā states that within these three discriminations, there are also seven kinds of discrimination: first, spontaneous discrimination regarding conditions, meaning the five consciousness-bodies, which do not make differential discriminations with respect to the characteristics of the object, because they operate spontaneously within their own objective sphere. Second, discrimination with characteristics, meaning the two kinds of discrimination—essential nature and recollective mindfulness—because they grasp various characteristics of past and present objects. Third, discrimination without characteristics, meaning discrimination consisting of activity aspiring to future objects. Fourth, searching discrimination. Fifth, investigating discrimination. Sixth, defiled discrimination. Seventh, undefiled discrimination. These four discriminations all take calculative discrimination as their essential nature. Why is this? Because by means of deliberation, it sometimes searches, sometimes investigates, is sometimes defiled, or is undefiled in various discriminations. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that there are ten kinds of subtle discrimination regarding faculties and objects. The treatise says: 'Furthermore, subsuming all discriminations, there are summarily ten kinds: first, root discrimination, which is the ālayavijñāna. Second, discrimination of the objective condition's characteristics, which refers to the consciousness of visible forms and so forth. Third, discrimination of manifested characteristics, which refers to the visual consciousness and so forth, along with their supporting consciousness. Fourth, discrimination of the alteration of the objective condition's characteristics, which refers to alterations of old age and so forth; alterations of pleasant feeling and so forth; alterations of rāga and so forth; alterations caused by injury, seasonal changes, and so forth; alterations of the various destinies such as the narakas; and alterations of the various realms such as the desire realm. Fifth, discrimination of the alteration of manifested characteristics, which refers to all alterations corresponding to the alterations previously explained. Sixth, discrimination induced by others, which refers to discrimination upon hearing varieties of non-orthodox Dharma, and upon hearing varieties of orthodox Dharma. Seventh, improper discrimination, which refers to discrimination by non-Buddhists upon hearing varieties of non-orthodox Dharma. Eighth, proper discrimination, which refers to discrimination within the orthodox Dharma upon hearing varieties of orthodox Dharma. Ninth, clinging discrimination, which refers to discrimination associated with the sixty-two views, which are based on satkāyadṛṣṭi and belong to improper attention. Tenth, distracted discrimination, which refers to the ten kinds of discrimination of bodhisattvas.' The commentary explains: 'Root discrimination means the ālayavijñāna, because it is the root of the other discriminations, and its essential nature is also discrimination; thus it is called root discrimination. Discrimination of the objective condition's characteristics means discriminating visible forms and so forth as possessing such objective conditions and characteristics. Discrimination of manifested characteristics means the visual consciousness and so forth along with their supporting consciousness, because they manifest images resembling those objects. Discrimination of the alteration of the objective condition's characteristics means discrimination arising from the alteration of the consciousness-reflections of visible form and so forth. Alterations of old age and so forth mean that the consciousness of visible form and so forth arises with various alterations resembling the characteristics of old age and so forth. Why is this? Because both internal and external forms and so forth possess the characteristics of transition into old age and so forth. "And so forth" includes alterations of sickness and death. Alterations of pleasant feeling and so forth mean that due to pleasant feelings, bodily characteristics alter, just as it is said that one who is happy has a dignified and serene countenance; "and so forth" includes painful feelings and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings. Alterations of rāga and so forth mean that bodily characteristics alter due to rāga and so forth; "and so forth" includes anger, delusion, rage, and so forth, just as it is said that rage and so forth produce unsightly shapes and colors. Alterations caused by injury, seasonal changes, and so forth mean that killing, binding, and so forth cause alterations to arise in bodily characteristics; seasonal changes also cause the shapes and colors of internal bodies and external trees to alter, just as it is said that when pressed by cold and so forth, the body and so forth alter. Alterations of the various destinies such as the narakas: "and so forth" includes all evil destinies; those alterations of unsightly forms and so forth are commonly known. Alterations of the various realms such as the desire realm: "and so forth" includes the form realm; in the formless realm, there are no consciousnesses reflecting images of form and so forth. Among the gods and within concentrations, there are also various alterations of the forms of sentient beings and vessels, just as by the sovereign power of a maṇi jewel, there are various alterations of pure and wondrous radiant forms. Discrimination of the alteration of manifested characteristics means that because of the supporting faculties such as the eye, images resembling visible form and so forth are made to manifest, and consciousnesses such as the visual consciousness undergo various alterations; within this, various discriminations arise. Thus one knows that, as previously explained, alterations of old age and so forth arise appropriately. Why is this? Because it is said that the eye and other faculties can be sharp or dull, and consciousness can be clear or dim. Just as when the basis of unmanifest form alters, it too alters, so too alterations due to pleasant feeling and so forth are likewise: just as it is said that the mind of one who is happy is calm and settled, and it is said that the mind of one who suffers is distracted and agitated. The same applies to rāga and so forth, injury, and seasonal changes. According to the alterations of the body in the narakas and so forth, and in the desire realm and so forth, consciousness also alters, as should be properly understood. In the formless realm, there are also discriminations of various consciousnesses produced by alterations of feelings and so forth. Discrimination induced by others means discrimination that arises from associating with good or bad friends and has as its cause the hearing of orthodox or non-orthodox Dharma. That is, the discriminations of non-Buddhists such as Kapila, and of the Sugatas within the orthodox Dharma, are called improper and proper discrimination respectively. These two kinds, according to their proper application, can give rise to the two kinds of discrimination associated with wrong view and right view. The discriminations associated with the sixty-two views, which have satkāyadṛṣṭi as their cause, are the discriminations regarding the past and future limits in the Brahmajālasūtra—namely, discriminations such as "Did I exist in the past?" These are called clinging discriminations. The expression "view-trends" means categories [of views]. Distracted discrimination means scattered and perturbed, hence called distracted; since this is discrimination, it is called distracted discrimination. This perturbs non-discriminative knowledge. Why is this? Because this perturbs prajñāpāramitā, and non-discriminative knowledge is prajñāpāramitā. The "ten kinds of discrimination of bodhisattvas" refers to the ten kinds of discrimination that bodhisattvas can produce in speech, which turn under the influence of others and do not accord with true reality. Why is this? Because when the realization of true reality is directly manifest, it cannot be spoken of.'
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- 宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese