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宗鏡錄 61

English (machine translation) 61

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61.1

Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.

61.2

Now, as for the meaning of the four aspects, what serves as their essential nature?

61.3

Answer: For the nimittabhāga, transformed matter and mind serve as its essential nature. As for the internal three aspects, active manifestations of citta and caitasikas serve as their substance.

61.4

Question: In the fruit state, when directly realizing tathatā, there are no objective spheres. When the four wisdoms cognize objects, do they possess the four aspects or not?

61.5

Answer: They definitely have a darśanabhāga, because it illuminates the object before it. There is a svasaṃvittibhāga, which thoroughly illuminates the darśanabhāga; and there is also a saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga, because it illuminates the svasaṃvittibhāga. Regarding the nimittabhāga, the Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra states: 'Do the mental states associated with the four wisdoms spoken of in this way possess a nimittabhāga, a darśanabhāga, and so forth? If they lack them, they should lack an object of cognition (ālambana), and they should not be called wisdom.' It answers: 'Because the untainted mental states are unobstructed, they directly illuminate the object before them; there is no manifestation resembling the characteristics of the prior object that changes in accordance with the mind. This is because untainted mind is termed signless (animitta) and non-conceptual (nirvikalpa), and because its cognizing of objects is said to be inconceivable.' Some hold: Truly, untainted mental states also have a nimittabhāga. For all minds and mental factors (caitasika), that they by nature manifest resembling an object is called cognizing (ālambana); it is not like pincers or the like moving to grasp a thing, nor like a lamp or the like extending light to illuminate an object; rather, like a bright mirror or the like, they illuminate an object by reflecting an image. Because they appear resembling the object and clearly illuminate and understand it, this is called unobstructed. Because they do not cling or conceptualize, they are called signless. Also, because they have no distinct [conceptual marks] and their wondrous function is difficult to fathom, they are called inconceivable; it is not that they do not reflect images. If one says that they are signless and therefore lack a nimittabhāga, and says that they are non-conceptual and thus must lack a darśanabhāga, then beholding neither sign nor perception, they would be like empty space or a hare's horn, and should not be called wisdom. Because they lack clinging and conceptualization, it is said that they lack characteristics of grāhaka (apprehender) and grāhya (apprehended), not that they lack the functional capacity of cognizing and illuminating by resembling an object. If the untainted mind entirely lacked a nimittabhāga, the Buddhas should not manifest various reflected images such as bodies and lands. And so forth, such distinctions are made solely according to the principles of conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya). If considered from ultimate truth (paramārtha), which transcends words and cuts off thought: since there are neither signs nor perceptions, one cannot speak of mind, mental factors, and so forth; they transcend all conceptual proliferation (prapañca) and are inconceivable. Some hold: Because non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) is non-conceptual, and its object of cognition, tathatā, is not separate from its substance, it is like illuminating its own substance, having no separate nimittabhāga. If this non-conceptual [wisdom] were to transform a nimittabhāga, it would not directly realize the realm of tathatā. As for the subsequently attained wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), because it involves discrimination, its cognized realm is sometimes separate from its substance; like tainted minds, it appears resembling objective signs and clearly cognizes and illuminates them, which is called cognizing the object before it. Therefore, this subsequently attained wisdom definitely possesses a nimittabhāga.

61.6

Question: Now, Sthiramati taught only one part and did not establish the darśanabhāga, nimittabhāga, and so forth. When Dharmapāla now subsumes the four into one part, he also does not separately establish the darśanabhāga, nimittabhāga, and so forth. Since the doctrinal thrust is the same, why is it said that this is not the view of masters such as Sthiramati?

61.7

Answer: At first glance they appear the same, but upon detailed examination the principle is different. Take Sthiramati, who establishes only a single svasaṃvittibhāga and does not speak of the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga at all. Although he speaks of the two parts of darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, he unequivocally classifies them as the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). This is just one of the four parts; the two parts are empty, having names without substance, and are likewise non-existent; he only establishes a single dependent (paratantra) svasaṃvittibhāga. Now, although Dharmapāla subsumes the four into one, he does not call it the svasaṃvittibhāga, but generally names it the one mind. Although he speaks generally of the one mind-part, he does not forfeit the meaning of the four parts, such as the svasaṃvittibhāga. Merely because they do not definitively exist separate from the mind, he generally designates them as one part. This is different from the meaning of his separately establishing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Furthermore, when subsuming the four into three: although the two internal parts cognize each other, their functions are distinct; yet because that which is cognized does not depart from their own substance, it is merely named svasaṃvitti. Although it is generally named svasaṃvitti, the meaning of the two parts cognizing each other is not lost. It is not like Dignāga's svasaṃvitti, which only has the svasaṃvitti that realizes its own darśanabhāga, lacking the svasaṃvitti that realizes the svasaṃvitti. By this principle, it is not the view of those masters.

61.8

Question: Among that which is transformed, it is the form (rūpa) of the nimittabhāga. Why do the masters call the manifest consciousness (khyātivijñāna) a 'form-consciousness'?

61.9

Answer: Ancient masters said: As for calling the manifest consciousness a 'form-consciousness', this phrase 'form-consciousness' takes its name from the object. Because the darśanabhāga consciousness transforms so as to resemble form, it is called form-consciousness. Its substance is actually consciousness; because it can transform into form, it is called form-consciousness. This takes the darśanabhāga consciousness as the substance; because it can cognize form or transform into form, it is called form-consciousness. Furthermore, because the form of the nimittabhāga is not separate from consciousness, it is called form-consciousness. This takes the form of the nimittabhāga as the substance; the form of the nimittabhāga is not actually consciousness, but because it is transformed from consciousness and is not separate from consciousness, it is called form-consciousness. Or, the nimittabhāga is called form, and the darśanabhāga is called consciousness; this takes both dharmas of consciousness and object together as the substance, because darśana and nimitta share the same seed. This admits the meaning of the nimittabhāga of the preceding moment serving as the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) for the consciousness of the subsequent moment. That is, the nimittabhāga of the consciousness of the preceding moment serves as the object for the consciousness of the subsequent moment; it is produced within the fundamental consciousness, arising in thought by the efficacy of its own fruit, which is the reason why the nimitta of the consciousness of the preceding moment serves as the object for the consciousness of the subsequent moment. That is to say, because of what was cognized in the preceding moment, it perfumes and produces seeds; due to the seeds, the present moment is produced; through continuous transformation, tracing the efficacy back to its source, it is indeed what was cognized in the preceding moment that serves as the condition for the present consciousness. 'Its own fruit' is the active manifestation (samudācāra) of the nimittabhāga; 'efficacy' is the seed. That is, with the nimittabhāga of the consciousness of the preceding moment serving as the perfumer, it perfumes and gives rise to its own seeds; within the fundamental consciousness, they can produce the nimittabhāga form and so forth of the consciousness of the subsequent moment, serving as the object for the consciousness of the subsequent moment. Because the preceding moment's nimitta perfumes seeds, which produce the objective mark of the subsequent moment, the nimittabhāga of the preceding moment is said to be the ālambanapratyaya of the subsequent consciousness.

61.10

Question: How do the seeds of the preceding nimitta produce the present consciousness?

61.11

Answer: Because the darśana and nimitta share the same seed.

61.12

Question: If so, why not simply say that the seed is the condition?

61.13

Answer: A seed is a cause condition (hetupratyaya), not an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). Furthermore, ancient masters asked: when the sixth consciousness cognizes a tortoise's hair, a hare's horn, and the like, does this cognized object exist or not? If one says it exists, the sacred teachings should not point to this as an analogy for the non-existence of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). If one says it does not exist, a non-existent dharma lacks substance, and is not an ālambanapratyaya; if the manovijñāna cognizing this lacks an ālambanapratyaya, how could it arise? If one says that this mind lacks an ālambanapratyaya, why does the treatise state that with the immediate ālambanapratyaya, all cognizing [minds] have it? Although a tortoise originally has no hair and a hare originally has no horns, it is with respect to this original non-existence that they serve as an analogy for the imagined nature, because the grasped self and grasped dharmas are all originally non-existent. When the cognizing mind is about to cognize such non-existent dharmas, due to the power of beginningless perfuming, when arising based on seeds, it transforms from the svasaṃvittibhāga of consciousness a nimittabhāga of tortoise hair and the like, as well as a darśanabhāga cognizing this tortoise hair. This nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga are produced from the same seed as the svasaṃvittibhāga of the consciousness. Since they are produced based on seeds, they are of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) and are not completely devoid of substance, unlike the tortoise hair that is originally devoid of substance; therefore, they successfully constitute an ālambanapratyaya. For this reason, the mind cognizing this can also be said to arise from the four conditions (pratyaya). And so on: conceptualizing an actual self and actual dharmas apart from the skandhas is also like this. Apart from the nature of the skandhas, there is entirely no actual self, nor are there definitively actual dharmas; they are merely falsely grasped as existent by sentient beings. Examined through reasoning, they entirely lack substance, and are thus like the originally substanceless tortoise hair. However, when the mind grasping at self and dharmas cognizes and grasps this, it also, due to the power of beginningless false perfuming, transforms into the marks of a nominal self and dharmas; these marks share the same seed as the darśana and so forth, are also dependently arisen, and constitute the ālambanapratyaya. Therefore the treatise states: 'In this way, the skandhas external to one's own mind grasped as a self may exist or not exist, but the skandhas internal to one's own mind all exist.' 'The skandhas internal to one's own mind' are precisely the nimittabhāga. If one says that the isolated reflected image (dulying jing) is of the parikalpita nature, its substance is non-existent, just like a tortoise's hair and the like; then this single part, the nimittabhāga, would be non-existent—how could the treatise say that the skandhas internal to one's own mind all exist? The above are all the tenets of Dharmapāla. According to Sthiramati, both the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga are of the parikalpita-svabhāva, and their substance is non-existent. Nowadays, many transmissions say that the isolated reflection is of the parikalpita-svabhāva and is not an ālambanapratyaya; this is Sthiramati's school. According to Dharmapāla, all four parts are dependently arisen (paratantra); only when one falsely clings to them as definitively real are they termed parikalpita. Furthermore, even regarding the pariniṣpanna nature and the real objects of the five dusts (viṣaya), if one firmly clings to them as real, they are also called parikalpita. However, tortoise hair, hare horns, and the like, which are originally devoid of substance, are not of the parikalpita nature when not confronted with a clinging mind. Nowadays, there are also many who mistakenly identify tortoise hair and the like as the parikalpita nature; this is incorrect. Furthermore, establishing an analogy to explain the svasaṃvittibhāga, darśanabhāga, and nimittabhāga: consider when the svasaṃvittibhāga gives rise to the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, and one further clings to the two parts as self and dharmas: it is like tying a cloth into a hare. The hand-cloth is existent, analogizing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Tying the hand-cloth into a hare's head: on the hand-cloth there was originally no hare's head, but now it is tied into one, hence it is called non-existent. Similarly, on the svasaṃvittibhāga there were originally no two parts of darśana and nimitta, but because of not realizing the real, they arise resembling two parts, and are hence called non-existent. As tying the hand-cloth into a hare's head is already one layer of nominal designation, tying out two ears is yet another layer of nominal designation; similarly, transforming the two parts of darśana and nimitta from the svasaṃvittibhāga is already one layer of nominal designation, and further clinging to the two parts as self and dharmas is yet another layer of nominal designation. Thus, although the two parts of darśana and nimitta are nominal and seemingly existent, because they arise from seeds, the two graspings of self and dharmas are non-existent, because they are parikalpita false graspings.

61.14

Question: In the principle of mind-only, not even a single part exists; why extensively explain four parts?

61.15

Answer: The four parts constitute the mind; this is received alike by the thousand sages. Only because Bodhisattva Sthiramati clung solely to the single part of the svasaṃvitti mind-substance, he still did not understand the mind, and was refuted by Bodhisattva Nanda. Furthermore, Bodhisattva Dignāga clung to having three parts; although substance and function were complete, he still lacked the result of valid cognition (pramāṇaphala), the fourth, the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga. Only Bodhisattva Dharmapāla made the meaning of vijñaptimātra complete, perfecting all four parts; thereupon he composed the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra in ten fascicles. In both India and this land, this correct teaching has flourished greatly. When he finished composing this treatise, he soon passed away in meditation. Then a divine spirit in the sky announced to the assembly: 'Bodhisattva Dharmapāla is one among the thousand Buddhas of the Bhadrakalpa.' Thus we know that if one were not a great enlightened one of the ten directions, how could one completely realize this mind? If one does not understand how the four parts constitute the mind, one merely repeats nominal terms without knowing the true meaning of how mind is constituted. Having lost both substance and function, and entirely lacking the result of valid cognition, one is ultimately bound by mind and objective conditions, with no way to attain liberation. Scholars of the present day are entirely deficient in learning; relying on their own understanding, they do not draw close to enlightened teachers; clinging to their own views, they fail to open the precious treasury. Therefore, I have recorded this comprehensively to instruct future sages, so that they will not follow former errors and may avoid subsequent regrets.

61.16

Chapter 2: Questions and Answers

61.17

Now, the wondrous gate of the one mind and the correct principle of vijñaptimātra: the transformer and the transformed penetrate both internal and external; citing one illustrates all, gathering them without exception. Like the array of stars and constellations not departing from empty space, or the myriad trees and sprouting plants all returning to the earth, it can uproot the roots of doubt and open the gate of faith, brighten the illumination of wisdom and wash away the dust of passions. If one's faculty of thought hesitates and has not yet achieved superior understanding, one must rely on questions and answers to gradually enter complete penetration. True gold still requires smelting to be perfected; beautiful jade still relies on polishing to emerge. The Private Notes on the Avataṃsaka states: 'Those who contemplate the extremely profound Dharma-gate with right mindfulness are of two kinds of people who can wither the great tree of the twelve links of dependent origination (dvādaśāṅgapratītyasamutpāda): first, reviewing the old without forgetting; second, inquiring into and receiving new dharmas.' This is what it means.

61.18

Question: The dharma of the mind is inconceivable and intrinsically transcends language. Why extensively raise questions and answers to dissect the doctrinal source in all directions?

61.19

Answer: Principle is solely the one mind, while phenomena encompass the myriad dharmas. If one does not thoroughly investigate its import, how can one arrive at the source of awakening? Those of the present day who fail to reach it all suffer from erroneous understanding, superficiality, and feeble correct faith. The profound barrier is subtle and dense—how could discursive consciousness penetrate it? The great purport is silent and fathomless—it is not to be entered in a single period. If one has not yet reached the stage of the Tathāgata, how could one suddenly awaken to the minds of sentient beings? Now, for the sake of those whose own power has not yet reached it, I provide a brief elucidation, relying entirely on the Buddha's words to seal the ordinary mind. Relying on the Buddha's words to accord with them, it is vast and boundless; sealing the ordinary mind so that it is not different, it openly returns to the source. Furthermore, there are two meanings that require explanation: first, if there were no speech, one could not explain to others that all dharmas transcend verbal self-nature; second, speaking is itself non-speaking, because speaking and not speaking are not dual in nature. Moreover, this source considers only seeing nature and personal realization; it does not lie in textual explanations. It is to destroy emotional defilements and assist the generation of correct faith. If one gives rise to views following words and clings to interpretations relying on partial penetrations, then true words become false, because views born of words have arisen. If one illumines the mind by means of teaching, resting solely in grasping the meaning, then false words become true words, because perverse clingings are eliminated. The Awakening of Faith says: 'One should know that all dharmas from the beginningless past are neither matter nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither nonexistence nor existence; ultimately, they are all marks transcending speech. All spoken teachings and instructions are the Tathāgata's skillful means, provisionally using words to guide sentient beings, causing them to abandon letters and enter into reality. If one follows words and clings to literal meanings, increasing deluded discrimination, true wisdom will not arise, and nirvāṇa will not be attained.' Furthermore, if letters reveal the dhāraṇī and one awakens to the Way through words, merely relying on the meaning rather than the words, grasping the meaning without being constrained by the text, then one does not contradict the correct principle. What has it to do with speech or silence? Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'If one complies with letters without contradicting the correct principle and remains forever free of dispute, this is called protecting the true Dharma.'

61.20

Question: A verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'From the tenets that are established, diverse meanings arise; contemplating one's own mental measure with equanimity, speech cannot be found.' Since one has already realized mind-only, what need is there for discourse? As the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'The Buddha told Subhūti: "So it is, so it is. Though bodhisattva-mahāsattvas train in many places, they have nothing to train in. Why is this? There is truly no dharma that can cause the assemblies of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas to cultivate and train in it."' It also says: 'The absence of sentence-meaning is the bodhisattva's sentence-meaning. For example, in space, there are truly no bird tracks.'

61.21

Answer: If one understands one's own mind, one achieves the Buddha's wisdom; ultimately, outside the mind there is no dharma that can be spoken of, nor any phenomenon that can be established. It is only for those who do not turn the light back to introspect themselves, but exclusively follow textual explanations and cling to their external objects, that within that which is without names and marks, one speaks provisionally using names and marks, using that very falsehood to reveal reality. One neither clings to letters nor separates from letters. Therefore, a verse in the Devarājaprajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'The dhāraṇī has no letters; letters reveal the dhāraṇī. By the power of great compassion and skillful means, through transcending speech, letters are spoken.' The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'The Buddha told Mahāmati: "We Buddhas and bodhisattvas do not utter a single word. Why is this? Because the Dharma transcends letters. It is not that speech is made without beneficial meaning. Speech is due to the delusive conceptualization of sentient beings. Mahāmati, if all dharmas were not spoken, the doctrinal teaching would be destroyed. If the doctrinal teaching were destroyed, there would be no Buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, or śrāvakas. If these did not exist, who would speak, and for whom? Therefore, Mahāmati, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas should not cling to speech, but in accord with what is appropriate and expedient, broadly explain the sūtras and teachings."' The Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra says: 'One who expounds the Dharma should expound it in accord with the Dharma... up to: The Dharma accords with emptiness; it follows signlessness; it corresponds with aimlessness. The Dharma transcends good and bad; the Dharma has neither increase nor decrease; the Dharma has neither arising nor ceasing; the Dharma has no place to which it returns. The Dharma transcends eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; the Dharma has neither high nor low; the Dharma is eternally abiding and unmoving; the Dharma transcends all contemplative practice. Indeed, Mahāmaudgalyāyana! The characteristics of the Dharma are such; how could it be spoken? One who expounds the Dharma has nothing to expound and nothing to indicate; one who hears the Dharma has nothing to hear and nothing to attain. Just as an illusory conjurer expounds the Dharma to an illusory person, one should establish this intent and expound the Dharma. One should understand that the faculties of sentient beings are sharp or dull, be skilled in knowledge and vision without obstruction, praise the Great Vehicle with a mind of great compassion, be mindful of repaying the Buddha's benevolence without letting the Three Jewels be cut off, and only then expound the Dharma.' Therefore we know that it is not that expounding the Dharma is forbidden; only if one is without attachment when expounding, expounding is without fault. As the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchāsūtra says: 'You bhikṣus should practice two things: first, noble expounding of the Dharma; second, noble silence.' But at the very time of expounding, completely realizing that nothing can be grasped is itself silence; it does not mean keeping one's mouth shut without speaking. Thus the ancients said: 'An illusory person speaks the Dharma, an illusory person hears; from the beginning, both have no sentiment. While speaking, there is no speaking—speak as you wish; at the place of hearing, there is no hearing—hear as you please.' Furthermore, if one takes the four self-natures, the personally attained dharma, and the fundamentally abiding dharma, from the standpoint of the ultimate truth, it cannot be spoken. If one takes the four siddhāntas, speaking according to the intentions of others, severing deep doubts, and generating correct faith, because there are causes and conditions, it can also be spoken. Moreover, what cannot be spoken is precisely what can be spoken, because the true principle is omnipresent; what can be spoken is precisely what cannot be spoken, because cultivation through conditions lacks self-nature. As the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'Mahāmati again addressed the Buddha, saying: "As the World-Honoured One has said: 'From the night I attained supreme correct awakening until the night I entered parinirvāṇa, in between I did not speak a single word, nor have I spoken, nor will I speak. Non-speaking is the Buddha's speaking.'" Mahāmati addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, for what reason does the Tathāgata, the Arhat, the Fully and Completely Awakened One say that non-speaking is the Buddha's speaking?" The Buddha told Mahāmati: "Because of two dharmas, I make this statement. What are the two dharmas? Namely, the personally attained dharma and the fundamentally abiding dharma. These are called the two dharmas. Because of these two dharmas, I make such a statement. What is the personally attained dharma? What that Tathāgata attained, I have also attained, without increase or decrease. The ultimate realm of the personally attained dharma transcends verbal delusive conceptualization, and transcends the two approaches of letters. What is the fundamentally abiding dharma? It refers to the ancient sages' path of old; like the natures of gold and silver, the dharmadhātu is eternally abiding. Whether a Tathāgata appears in the world or does not appear in the world, the dharmadhātu is eternally abiding. It is like the road leading to that city: for example, a man travelling in a wilderness sees an even, straight road leading to an ancient city, and thereupon follows it into the city, enjoying pleasures as he desires. The verse says: 'From the night I attained the Way, / Until the night of nirvāṇa, / Between these two, / I spoke nothing at all. / Because of the personal and the fundamentally abiding, / I make such a statement; / That Buddha and I / Are completely without difference.'" The commentary says: 'There are two causes here: first, the personally attained dharma—the dharma attained by oneself is the path of realization; when the realized dharma is in oneself, it transcends faults and manifests virtues. Second, the fundamentally abiding dharma—fundamentally abiding refers to the ancient sages' path of old; it is transmitted from the old and not created.' The above is stating that there is no speaking based on principle and realization. If it is only heard by one's own mind, then the Buddha is constantly not speaking. As a verse in the Ratnagotravibhāga says: 'Just as various echoes / Arise relying on the earth, / Spontaneously without discrimination, / Abiding neither within nor without; / The Tathāgata's voice is also like this: / Arising relying on the mind-ground, / Spontaneously without discrimination, / Abiding neither within nor without.' Therefore, since it is neither born from within nor without, nor does it arise from the four propositions, this is according to true wisdom, which should be profoundly comprehended. If according to the provisional gate, skillful means are also not cut off. As the Zhiguan says: 'If one says that wisdom is born of the mind and naturally can illuminate, then the objective realm, the truth, and wisdom do not depend on one another. If one says that wisdom is not wisdom of itself, but is wisdom because of the objective realm, and the objective realm is not the objective realm of itself, but is the objective realm because of wisdom, this is like long and short depending on each other. If one says that the objective realm and wisdom exist because of causes and conditions, this is an appellation derived from combination. If one says they are none of the above three kinds, but are just spontaneously so, then they are without cause. All of these have the fault of the four graspings, and none of them can be spoken. In accordance with the causes and conditions of the four siddhāntas, it can also be spoken. There are only names, and names have no self-nature. Words without self-nature: these words do not abide, nor do they not abide. This is the inconceivable.' The sūtra says: 'Inconceivable wisdom-realm, inconceivable wisdom-illumination'—this is precisely the meaning. If one refutes the four natures of realm and wisdom, this is called real wisdom. If one accords with conditions through the four siddhāntas to speak of the four realms and wisdoms, this is called provisional wisdom. Thus provisional and real operate together, benefiting both oneself and others; only then does one merge with the Buddha's intent and avoid falling into one's own ignorance.

61.22

Question: Mountains, rivers, and the great earth are, one and all, the source; the five natures and three vehicles—everyone is a Buddha. Why must the Mirror of the Source forcefully establish a different teaching?

61.23

Answer: Whenever the Buddhas lay out the traces of teaching, they do not speak for those who already know; when the ancestral masters directly point to the human mind, they speak only for those who are not yet clear. What is recorded here merely instructs beginners, causing them to suddenly awaken to the perfect source and not take detours on lesser paths. If one does not obtain the broad illumination of the Mirror of the Source, by what means could one perceive the subtle depths of one's own nature? Were it not for the light of wisdom, how could one destroy the darkness of ignorance? Like facing an ancient mirror, beauty and ugliness are naturally distinguished; if one encounters this source, the true and the false can be discerned. How could the sun rise without shining, or a lamp be lit without giving light? Therefore, the Huayan Commentary describes ten kinds of illumination of dharmas: 'dharmas' refers to the objective realm, and 'illumination' refers to the mind. Illuminating the dharmas of the two truths with the illumination of wisdom is called 'illumination of dharmas'. Although in dharmas there is no establishing and no destroying—which pertains to the gate of the ultimate truth—the teaching itself has opening and restricting; how could it be without skillful means? As the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says in the chapter on Bodhisattva Noble Demeanour King: because Bodhisattva Vaiḍūryaprabha was about to come and emit light, the Buddha questioned Mañjuśrī. Mañjuśrī at first entered the ultimate truth and answered: 'World-Honoured One, such light is called wisdom. Wisdom is an eternally abiding dharma. An eternally abiding dharma has no causes or conditions. Why did the Buddha ask by what causes and conditions there is this light?' Having broadly explained the absence of causes and conditions, at the very end he said: 'World-Honoured One, there are also causes and conditions. Because ignorance is extinguished, the lamp of anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi is ablaze.' From this we know that clarifying the source by means of teaching is not without reason. Entering the Way through conditions is never in vain; the gate of skillful means must not be abandoned even for a moment. Furthermore, in the Mirror of the Source, as soon as a single word is spoken, it is already discussing the source, with no before or after. Because there is a difference in the time of speaking, the principle remains without discrepancy. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'First discriminate all dharmas, and later speak of ultimate emptiness.' However, it is only the expounding that has before and after; the dharmas are simultaneous. The text is not written all at once, but emptiness is not gradual.

61.24

Question: If one only speaks of skillful means, expounding is unobjectionable. But if one refers to the true source, having words harms its purport.

61.25

Answer: This perfect source of ours is beyond emotional intellection. How could it be like those who cling to expedient teachings, where emptiness and existence do not interfuse, substance and function are cleft in two, and principle and phenomenon become separated? If one speaks of the permanently abiding, it becomes eternalism; if one speaks of impermanence, it lapses into annihilationism. If one rejects the extremes, it becomes clinging to extremes; if one maintains the middle, it attaches to the principle of the middle. Now, in this purport of perfect interfusion, this source of unobstructedness, to speak of the permanent is the permanence of impermanence; to speak of impermanence is the impermanence of the permanent. To state emptiness is the emptiness of the non-empty; to state existence is the existence of illusory existence. To discuss an extreme is the extreme that is identical to the middle; to discuss the middle is the middle that is not merely [the middle]. To establish principle is the principle that accomplishes phenomena; to establish phenomena is the phenomena that manifest principle. Therefore, rolling up and unfurling rest with oneself, concealing and revealing are simultaneous. Speaking does not depart from non-speaking; non-speaking does not depart from speaking. The Baocang lun says: 'Permanently empty, it is not existent; permanently existent, it is not empty. The two do not depend on each other; every phrase is the source. Therefore, the sage speaks of existence following existence, and discourses on emptiness following emptiness. Emptiness does not depart from existence; existence does not depart from emptiness. Neither statement is flawed; both meanings are simultaneously penetrated. Even speaking of the self does not depart from no-self; even if there is no speaking, phenomena are also not discordant with the source.' Why is this? Because one is not turned around by words. The commentary says: 'Permanently empty, it is not existent' means that being permanently empty, it is not empty because of existence. If it were empty because of existence, it would become relative: taking the other as its substance, it would itself lack efficacy, and because it would lack autonomy, it could not be called permanent. 'Permanently existent, it is not empty' means that it is also not existent because of emptiness; thus, one empty, all is empty; one existent, all is existent. Because it is non-relative, every phrase can be the source. If emptiness and existence are like this, so are all phenomena. It can be said that there is no source that is not penetrated, no Way that is not manifested. Why discard phenomena to grasp at sensory dust, generating distinctions on one's own? To 'not be turned around by words' means that because one knows the source, there is not a single phenomenon that does not accord with the real ground, not a single dharma that does not conform to non-arising. The Ancestral Master said: 'In receiving words, you must understand the source; do not set up your own rules.' Why? If you set up rules, you fall into limitations; as soon as limitations are formed, you go against the fundamental source, merely being turned around by words. Therefore, that all sentient beings do not know the real truth is because they are all veiled by words. The Mahāratnakūṭasūtra says: 'If, amid sounds and words, one can avoid being turned around, one then accords in practice with the meaning; such a one is called an inquirer after meaning.' What is called the meaning? You should know that it is the esoteric teaching. The esoteric teaching is the very purport of the Mirror of the Source. It is known only by the Buddha's wisdom; it is not something that emotional views can comprehend. As the Suvikrāntajñānaparipṛcchā-prajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'At that time, there was in the assembly a bodhisattva-mahāsattva named Susthitamati, who addressed King Pravaranṛpa, saying: "Did the Tathāgata bestow a prophecy of enlightenment upon the Great King?" King Pravaranṛpa answered the Bodhisattva Kuvalayamati, saying: "Good son, my prophecy was like a dream-characteristic." He asked further: "Great King, having received such a prophecy, what dharma should you attain?" He replied: "Good son, the Buddha bestowed a prophecy upon me, yet ultimately there was nothing attained." He asked further: "That which is nothing attained—what dharma is it?" He replied: "Sentient beings, lifespan, a self, a person, a nurtured soul, the aggregates, elements, and sense bases are not attained; all are completely unattained. Whether wholesome or unwholesome, defiled or pure, with outflows or without outflows, mundane or supramundane, conditioned or unconditioned, saṃsāra or nirvāṇa—all are completely unattained." He asked further: "If nothing is attained, what use is there in receiving a prophecy?" He replied: "Good son, because nothing is attained, the prophecy is attained." He asked further: "If the meaning is as the Great King states, then there are two wisdoms: first, that nothing is attained; second, that the prophecy is attained." He replied: "If there were two, there would be no prophecy. Why? The Buddha's wisdom is non-dual. The Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones, bestow prophecies upon bodhisattvas with non-dual wisdom." He asked further: "If wisdom is non-dual, how can there be the bestowing of a prophecy and the receiving of a prophecy?" He replied: "Receiving a prophecy and bestowing a prophecy are non-dual in their limit." He asked further: "If their limit is non-dual, how can there be a prophecy?" He replied: "Penetrating the non-dual limit is itself the prophecy."

61.26

He asked further: 'Great King, abiding in what limit did you receive the prophecy?'

61.27

He replied: 'Abiding in the limit of the self, I received the prophecy; abiding in the limit of sentient beings, the limit of lifespan, and the limit of a person, I received the prophecy.' He asked further: 'Where should the limit of the self be sought?' He replied: 'It should be sought in the Tathāgata's limit of liberation.' He asked further: 'Where, again, should the Tathāgata's limit of liberation be sought?' He replied: 'It should be sought in the limit of ignorance and craving for existence.' He asked further: 'Where should ignorance and craving for existence be sought?' He replied: 'They should be sought in the limit of ultimate non-arising.' He asked further: 'Where should the limit of ultimate non-arising be sought?' He replied: 'It should be sought in the limit of unknowing.' He asked further: 'Is unknowing the absence of knowing? How can it be sought in this limit?' He replied: 'If there were something known, seeking could not be accomplished. Because of unknowing, it is sought in this limit.' He asked further: 'This limit is wordless; how can it be sought?' He replied: 'Because words are cut off, it can therefore be sought.' He asked further: 'How are words cut off?' He replied: 'All dharmas rely on meaning, not on words.' He asked further: 'How does one rely on meaning?' He replied: 'By not perceiving the characteristic of meaning.' He asked further: 'How does one not perceive it?' He replied: 'By not generating discrimination. Meaning is that which is relied upon; the self is that which relies. Where these two do not exist, it is named penetration.' He asked further: 'If one does not perceive meaning, what is sought here?' He replied: 'Not perceiving and not grasping is therefore named seeking.' He asked further: 'If a dharma can be sought, that is having seeking.' He replied: 'It is not so. One who seeks the Dharma is one who has nothing to seek. Why? If it could be sought, it would be non-Dharma.' He asked further: 'What is the Dharma?' He replied: 'The Dharma has no letters and is also free from words.' He asked further: 'Amid being free from words and letters, what is the Dharma?' He replied: 'The nature of words and letters is transcendence; the paths of mental activity are extinguished: this is named the Dharma. All dharmas are ineffable, and their being ineffable is also ineffable. Good son, if there is something spoken, it is false; within it there is no real dharma.' He asked further: 'The Buddhas and bodhisattvas constantly have discourses; are these all false?' He replied: 'The Buddhas and bodhisattvas, from beginning to end, do not speak a single word. How could it be false?' He asked further: 'If there is something spoken, what fault is there?' He replied: 'It is called the fault of words.' He asked further: 'What fault do words have?' He replied: 'It is called the fault of deliberation.' He asked further: 'What dharma has no fault?' He replied: 'Non-speaking and speaking, without perceiving the two characteristics—this is faultless.' He asked further: 'What is the root of fault?' He replied: 'Grasping is the root.' He asked further: 'What is the root of grasping?' He replied: 'The mind of attachment is the root.' He asked further: 'What is the root of attachment?' He replied: 'False discrimination.' He asked further: 'What is the root of false discrimination?' He replied: 'Cognitive conditioning is the root.' He asked further: 'What does it condition?' He replied: 'It conditions forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas.' He asked further: 'How does one not condition them?' He replied: 'If one is free from craving and grasping, there is nothing conditioned. For this reason, the Tathāgata constantly says that all dharmas are equal.' Thus, because dharmas are equal, there is no difference in what is taught. The preaching of the Dharma in this land is likewise in the ten Buddha-fields; that is, because one place pervades all places, they simultaneously testify and simultaneously expound, mutually acting as principal and companion. As asked in the Huayan zhigui: 'When the ten abodes are expounded in the Trāyastriṃśa Heaven, since this pervades empty space, is the teaching of the ten abodes also expounded in places such as the Yāma Heaven? If it were, what error would there be? Both options have errors: if it is not expounded there, the places of preaching would not be all-pervading; if it is also expounded there, why does the sūtra only say that Trāyastriṃśa expounds the teaching of the ten abodes, and Yāma expounds the ten practices, and so on?' Answer: 'This preaching of the ten abodes in the realm of Trāyastriṃśa Heaven completely pervades all realms of dust in the ten directions. Therefore, places such as Yāma all contain Trāyastriṃśa. Precisely in such realms of Trāyastriṃśa Heaven that pervade Yāma and the rest, the teaching of the ten abodes is expounded. Therefore, Trāyastriṃśa is everywhere all-pervading, yet it is still not Yāma. When places such as Yāma expound the ten practices and so on, they also entirely pervade Trāyastriṃśa and other realms, yet they are still not Trāyastriṃśa. One should know that the remaining stages are also like this. In terms of the mutual subsumption of the stages of the ten abodes and the ten practices, they are mutually non-existent to each other, each pervading the dharmadhātu. In terms of the stages mutually assisting each other, they are mutually existent with each other, jointly pervading the dharmadhātu.'

61.28

He asked further: 'Do the preaching places of other Buddhas and the preaching place of Vairocana see each other or not? If so, what fault would there be? Both options have faults: if they see each other, it violates mutual pervasion; if they do not see each other, they cannot form principal and companion.'

61.29

Answer: 'They mutually act as principal and companion. If nature pervades the dharmadhātu, they are mutually non-existent to each other, and therefore do not see each other. If characteristics pervade the dharmadhātu, they are mutually existent with each other, and therefore never fail to see each other. For instance, Vairocana is the principal, and the places of testimony are companions; there is no principal that does not possess companions. Therefore, Vairocana and the places of testimony jointly pervade the dharmadhātu. That is, where the testifying dharmas come from in the eastern direction, Vairocana is present there, and there are also those coming from the east to bear witness. Each and every distance and proximity jointly pervade the dharmadhātu, through all realms of dust, unhindered and unobstructed. Reflecting on this, it can be understood.'

61.30

Question: 'Since it is said that contemplating the mind brings self-awakening without relying on external conditions, why do you extensively praise the Buddha's kindness and laud the sūtras and teachings?'

61.31

Answer: 'If not for what the teachings point to, how could one come to recognize one's own mind? Even if one does not realize it through the teachings, one must still rely on the teachings for verification. If it were not so, all would become naturalistic non-Buddhists or blindly practicing meditation masters. Even if someone were born with knowledge of it, this too would be due to having heard the sūtras and perfumed the seeds across many lifetimes, or perhaps the dark assistance of the fundamental vows of the holy ones. Therefore, the Tiantai teaching says: "Those who exclusively cultivate the contemplation of non-arising only believe in the benefit of their own mind, not believing in the benefit of the majestic empowerment of external Buddhas. This falls into the delusion of self-nature. Furthermore, those who exclusively believe in the empowerment of external Buddhas and do not seek benefit within their own mind fall into the delusion of other-nature. The delusions of both and of causelessness can also be understood accordingly. As for people deluded about self-nature: when they see in the world a heavy burden that cannot be moved forward, helped forward by lateral power, why do they not believe? For those whose sinful defilements are heavy, the Buddha's majestic power establishes them, enabling their contemplative wisdom to gain benefit. Moreover, from where did you obtain this internal contemplation of non-arising? From a teacher? From sūtras? Or from self-awakening? A teacher and sūtras are your external conditions; if it was from self-awakening, you must have been aided in secret. You do not recognize kindness, just as trees do not recognize the kindness of the sun, moon, wind, and rain." A sūtra says: "It is neither internal nor external, yet internal and external. Because it is internal, the liberation of the Buddhas is sought within mental activity; because it is external, the Buddhas protect and remember [them]." How could one not believe in external benefit? Furthermore, if we discuss the ultimate principle, there is neither Buddha nor sentient being; how could there be stimulus and response? Yet within the gate of Buddha-activities, stimulus and response are not identical. If there were no stimulus from sentient beings, the Buddhas would not respond. How could one cling to self or cling to other, debating internal and external, and thereby give rise to extreme views?'

61.32

As asked in the Fahua xuanyi: 'Are the stimulus of sentient beings and the response of the sages identical or different? If identical, then they are not stimulus and response; if different, how do they interrelate to be spoken of as stimulus and response?'

61.33

Answer: They are neither one nor different. Considered in terms of reality, they are identical in Suchness (tathatā); therefore they are not different. Considered in terms of phenomena, there are capacity and response; therefore they are not one. For example, father and son are connected by their inborn nature, being of the same flesh and blood; to consider them different is inadmissible. If they were identical, the father would be the son and the son would be the father; identity is also inadmissible. It is only as neither one nor different that father and son are spoken of. The principle-nature of sentient beings is not distinct from that of the Buddha; therefore they are not different. Yet sentient beings are concealed while the Tathāgata is manifest; therefore they are not one. It is as neither one nor different that capacity and response are spoken of. Furthermore, being identical, neither is phenomenon nor principle; thus they are not different. Sentient beings attain phenomena while sages attain principle; and sages attain phenomena while ordinary beings have principle; therefore they are spoken of as different.

61.34

Question: Does one respond by means of the dharmakāya, or respond by means of the response body (nirmāṇakāya)? If by the response body, the response body has no basis—how could it respond? If one responds by means of the dharmakāya, responding is then not the Dharma[-nature].

61.35

Answer: Strictly speaking, all dharmas have no past, future, or present, and are neither responding nor non-responding; yet they are able to have responses. One may also speak of a dharmakāya response, or of a response body's response. A dharmakāya response is an unseen benefit; a response body's response is an apparent benefit. Distinguishing unseen and apparent has four meanings, as will be explained later. In clarifying the characteristics of capacity and response: the characteristics of capacity are explained with reference to good and evil; the characteristics of response are discussed with reference to loving-kindness and compassion. If good and evil constitute capacity, are they solitary or combined? Commentators do not agree. Some say solitary evil constitutes capacity, relying on the sūtra which states: 'I am here to sever the severe sicknesses of boils and tumors of all sentient beings.' And it also says: 'Suppose there are seven sons; yet toward the sick one, the [parent's] heart is especially inclined. The Tathāgata is also like this: toward all sentient beings he is not unequal, yet toward those with transgressions his heart is especially inclined.' It also says: 'The Tathāgata does not dwell in the world for unconditioned sentient beings.' Furthermore, the indeterminate is ignorance, which ultimately belongs to the category of evil. This takes evil alone as capacity. Others take good alone as capacity, relying on the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra which states: 'I regard sentient beings without looking at old, young, or middle-aged, poor, rich, noble, or base; toward those with wholesome minds, I immediately turn with loving-kindness and mindfulness.' This takes good alone as capacity. Others say that good and evil cannot each independently serve as capacity. Why? Just as the mind immediately following the vajra-[like samādhi] is the Buddha, where all goods converge universally and there is no fault of good or evil—how could this serve as capacity? Although it is said that 'Buddha mindfully regards Buddha,' this is a general saying, and there is neither extracting [from suffering] nor bestowing [happiness]; hence we know that solitary good cannot serve as capacity. That solitary evil cannot serve as capacity is seen in the fact that an icchantika, being utterly evil, cannot stimulate the Buddha. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: 'There is only a single hair that cannot sustain the body'—that is, the naturally possessed principle-good; this is a generic capacity, and ultimately does not effect stimulation. Others take the intermixture of good and evil as capacity: from an icchantika giving rise to a repentant mind, up to equal enlightenment (samyaksaṃbodhi), there is always an intermixture of good and evil; hence it can serve as capacity. Therefore, their characteristics are clarified with reference to this good and evil. Next, clarifying the characteristics of response with reference to loving-kindness: some take loving-kindness alone as response. A sūtra says: 'By the power of the wholesome root of loving-kindness, the elephant sees a lion'—as explained at length in the Nirvāṇasūtra. Others take compassion alone as response, as the Sūtra on Invoking Avalokiteśvara states: 'Or playfully sporting in the hells, taking on suffering in their stead with great compassion.' Others employ loving-kindness and compassion combined as response. Why? Truly, because the compassionate mind perfumes wisdom, it can extract others from suffering; because the loving mind perfumes meditation, it can bestow joy upon others. A sūtra says: 'Adorned with the power of meditation and wisdom, through these he crosses sentient beings over.' A treatise says: 'Mercury blended with pure gold can gild all images; merit blended with the dharmakāya responds and manifests everywhere.' Could mercury or pure gold alone coat images? One should know that response is discussed as the combination of loving-kindness and compassion.

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