宗鏡錄 70
English (machine translation) 70
- Language
- English
70.1
Compiled by Chan Master Zhijue, Yanshou, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.
70.2
Question: The genuine intention of the patriarchs and Buddhas was originally to reveal the one mind. Why is it necessary in the teachings to further discuss the skandhas and dhātus?
70.3
Answer: In accordance with the deluded mind, false objects are refuted; this means revealing the emptiness of persons and eliminating deviant attachments, thereby expounding various approaches to achieve liberation through dharmas. Because there is no fixed dharma, it is named anuttarabodhi. When the illness is cured, the medicine is eliminated, just as in the parable of the raft, dharmas should indeed be abandoned.
70.4
In the Vijñānasiddhi, a question is asked: 'Because there is evidence and proof from the Āgamas, if the mind and consciousness merely see external spheres through false discrimination and eye-consciousness and the rest are not produced from external spheres such as forms, then for what reason did the Tathāgata teach the twelve kinds of āyatanas, such as the eye and form? It is clearly known that external spheres such as forms, smells, and tastes exist.'
70.5
The answer states: 'The verse says: / "He spoke of the āyatanas such as form / for sentient beings who can be transformed. / Relying on the prior person's reception of the Dharma, / he spoke of there being apparitional beings." / The Tathāgata, relying on their mind-karma continuing unbroken and uninterupted, therefore said there are apparitional sentient beings. Furthermore, he said: "There is no self, no sentient being, no living soul; only through the combination of causes and conditions are dharmas produced." The Tathāgata spoke of the āyatanas such as form in this way in order to enable the prior person to receive the Dharma, because that prior person did not understand that all dharmas of causes and conditions are empty in substance; it does not mean that external spheres such as forms, smells, and tastes really exist.'
70.6
Question: If there really are no āyatanas such as form, for what reason did the Tathāgata speak thus in the sūtras?
70.7
The answer states: The verse says:
Based on the original cognition of that citta,
consciousness falsely grasps external sense-objects.
Therefore, the Tathāgata spoke of
the existence of the internal and external sense bases.
This is based on the transformations of the seeds of the beginningless citta, manas, manovijñāna, and so forth, falsely perceiving those external sense-objects such as forms, sounds, scents, and tastes. Therefore, relying on these two kinds of false phenomena, the Tathāgata spoke in such a manner: first, the seeds of the original consciousness; second, the false external sense-objects, and so forth. Relying on these two phenomena, the Tathāgata said there are the sense bases of the eye, form, and so on.
70.8
Question: In relying on what is spoken in such verses, what merit and benefit are there?
70.9
Answer: The verse says:
Observing that the false has no reality,
one enters thereby the emptiness of the self.
Observing and knowing the diversity of all phenomena,
one enters the non-self of all phenomena.
This is to make the śrāvakas understand and know that dependent on those six sense faculties and six sense-objects, six kinds of consciousness are produced, and not a single phenomenon is a real knower, up to not a single phenomenon is a real seer; it is to make such convertible sentient beings make this observation and enter the emptiness of the non-self of persons. As for 'observing the diversity of all phenomena', this refers to the bodhisattva observing that in reality there is not a single phenomenon among the external dusts such as forms that can be seen, up to there is in reality not a single tangible object that can be sensed. Observing in this way, one is able to enter the emptiness of the substance of all causally conditioned phenomena. Because of the desire to eliminate those false conceptualizations, all phenomena such as forms are said to be ultimately empty and non-existent; it is not that the ineffable realm is altogether empty and non-existent. As for the ineffable realm, it refers to the realm of practice of the Buddhas and Tathāgatas. Thus, there is only true consciousness and no other consciousness besides. If one cannot discriminate and observe in this way, one [cannot] enter the emptiness of consciousness. Thus, relying on consciousness, it is said that one enters the non-self of all phenomena; this does not mean exclusively slandering the self of true consciousness and saying that there is no real self of Buddha-nature. Furthermore, as an expedient means, to gradually cause sentient beings to be able to enter the emptiness of the self and the emptiness of phenomena, the Tathāgata spoke of the existence of internal consciousness; and yet, consciousness has no internal consciousness that can be grasped. If it were not so, one could not speak of the emptiness of self and phenomena. For this reason, in false conceptualization, this citta is directed toward that citta, and that citta knows this citta. The verse in the Madhyāntavibhāga says:
Consciousness arises and transforms, appearing as objects,
sentient beings, the self, and perceptual representations.
These sense-objects are not really existent;
because the sense-objects are absent, consciousness is also absent.
'Transforms, appearing as objects' means appearing in the nature of various sense-objects such as forms. 'Transforms, appearing as sentient beings' means appearing in the nature of the five sense faculties of one's own body and other bodies. 'Transforms, appearing as the self' refers to the defiled manas, because it is always associated with self-delusion and the like. 'Transforms, appearing as perceptual representations' refers to the other six consciousnesses, because their characteristics of perceptual discrimination are coarse. 'These sense-objects are not really existent' means that the semblance of objects and semblance of characteristics lack operational marks; the semblance of the self and the semblance of perceptual representations are not truly apparent; hence, none are really existent. 'Because the sense-objects are absent, consciousness is also absent' means that because the four sense-objects—the apprehended objects, sentient beings, the self, and perceptual representations—are absent, the apprehending consciousnesses are also not really existent. Therefore, considering people of great capacity who awaken suddenly, not even a oneness can be apprehended, much less speaking of multiplicity. Why is this? Because clinging to multiplicity, they are deluded about the one; when they awaken from the delusion of multiplicity, their faculties are not the same, and consequently the aggregates, sense bases, and elements were distinguished. If they are deluded about citta but not deluded about form, they are enumerated as the five aggregates. If they are deluded about form but not deluded about citta, they are enumerated as the twelve sense bases. If they are deluded about both citta and form, they are enumerated as the eighteen elements. If one directly perceives the nature of the true citta's spiritual understanding, then it is neither one nor many, neither phenomena nor number. The remaining teachings that can express it are all skillful gates. Meeting the capacities of beings, they broadly present refutations and establishments. Wishing to reveal the principle of true emptiness, they first clarify the origins of illusory existence, ultimately pointing back to the ocean of the one mind.
70.10
Question: Regarding worldly phenomena within the body of the five aggregates, what kind of view constitutes a non-Buddhist doctrine, and what kind of thorough comprehension constitutes the doctrine of the Buddha-Dharma?
70.11
Answer: Non-Buddhists do not comprehend that all phenomena are the conditioned combination of causes and conditions that form the various aggregates. Whatever is done is entirely the aggregate of consciousness; yet over the aggregates, they cling to the existence of a real self, possessing unhindered mastery over enjoyment and use, and call it the 'spiritual lord'. Within a continuity that only seems permanent and seems one, they say there is a spiritual nature—this is the non-Buddhist doctrine. If one understands that it is formed by the inner and outer combination of causes and conditions, is transformed by vijñaptimātra, and is manifested as apparent objects—that is, the eighth consciousness sustaining without interruption and seeming to have continuity—this is the doctrine of the Buddha-Dharma. Non-Buddhists do not know this; taking it to be really existent, they are deluded about the principle of naturelessness and cling to the folly of the view of an existing self.
70.12
Question: Previously, the five aggregates, the six sense bases, the eighteen elements, and the natures of the seven great elements were refuted, and the meaning of consciousness was entirely absent. How then can vijñaptimātra be established?
70.13
Answer: First, consciousness is established in order to dispel sense-objects. Why? If not for consciousness, how could sense-objects be established? If consciousness were not revealed, how could sense-objects be dispelled? Second, because there is the false conceptualizing citta, one is able to know names and meanings. Why? If there were no falsehood, the true could not be revealed; if there were no truth, delusion could not be broken. Hence we know that refutation and establishment reside in us, and defilement and purity depend on citta. Third, the *Wuxing lun* states: 'Now, in order to establish this other-dependent nature, the reasoning for its establishment is explained. This nature does not have verbal expression alone as its substance. Why? Because verbal expression must have that upon which it relies. It is impossible that nominal designations could be established without relying on the classes of disordered consciousness. If it were not so, since the classes relied upon would not exist, the verbal designations expressed could not be established. If so, then the two natures would not exist; because the two natures would not exist, the category of delusion would not exist; because the category of delusion would not exist, two faults would ensue: first, spontaneous liberation without exertion; second, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa could not be manifested. Because it is free from these two faults, therefore one should know that the other-dependent nature definitely exists.' Because this nature exists, the conventional truth is established. If the conventional truth were not established, one would also not attain the ultimate truth. Why? Because understanding that the conventional has no nature is itself the accomplishment of the ultimate truth. If one attempts to deny the two truths, this is the evil grasp of perverse emptiness, not a skillful comprehension of the correct principle. Moreover, if not for the origin of the ultimate truth, how could the traces of the conventional truth be cast forth? Though the origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. As explained at length in the *Fahua xuanyi*, the origin and traces are sixfold. As for the origin: the origin of principle is the single ultimate path of the true characteristic. The traces are everything else aside from the true characteristic of all phenomena; all of these are called traces. Furthermore, both principle and phenomena are called the origin; speaking of principle and speaking of phenomena are both called the traces of teaching. Furthermore, the teaching of principle and phenomena is the origin; receiving the teaching and cultivating practice are called the traces. Just as when a person relies on a place, there are footprints, and by following the footprints one finds the place. Furthermore, practice is able to realize the substance: the substance is the origin; giving rise to function based on the substance: function is the traces. Furthermore, truly obtaining substance and function is called the origin; provisionally displaying substance and function is called the traces. Furthermore, what is revealed today is the origin; what was previously spoken is the traces. It is with reference to these six meanings that origin and traces are clarified. First, clarifying origin and traces with reference to principle and phenomena: from the basis of non-abiding, all phenomena are established. The principle of non-abiding is the true characteristic, the ultimate truth of the original time. All phenomena are the manifold conventional truth of the original time. Because of the true origin of the true characteristic, the conventional traces are cast forth; following the conventional traces, the true origin is revealed. Though origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. Therefore a sūtra says: 'Observe that all phenomena are empty like the true characteristic; they exist only through causes and conditions, arising from inversion.' Second, clarifying origin and traces with reference to principle and teaching: the two truths illuminated at the original time are both ineffable, and therefore are both called the origin. When the ancient Buddha spoke them by expedient means, these were the teachings of the two truths, and the teachings are called traces. If not for the origin of the two truths, there would not be the two kinds of teachings; if not for the traces of teaching, how could the origin of the truths be revealed? Though origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. A verse in a sūtra says: 'This Dharma cannot be shown; the characteristics of words are extinguished. Through the power of expedient means, it was spoken for the five bhikṣus.' Third, taking teaching and practice as origin and traces: originally receiving the ancient Buddha's teaching as the origin, there is then the practice of cultivating the cause to achieve the fruit. Through teaching explaining principle, practice can arise; through practice converging with teaching, principle can be revealed. Though origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. A verse in a sūtra says: 'All phenomena from the beginning are constantly of the characteristic of quiet cessation. When the Buddha's sons have practiced the path, in future worlds they will become Buddhas.' Fourth, clarifying origin and traces with reference to substance and function: through originally practicing in the past and tallying with principle, realizing the dharmakāya is the origin. Because one first obtained the origin of the dharmakāya, based on the substance one gives rise to the function of the nirmāṇakāya. Because of the nirmāṇakāya, the dharmakāya can be revealed. Though origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. A sūtra says: 'Since I attained Buddhahood, it has been extremely long and distant like this; it is only by expedient means to teach and transform sentient beings that I speak in this manner.' Fifth, clarifying origin and traces with reference to provisional and real: as for the real, originally in the distant past, truly obtaining the two bodies of dharma and nirmāṇa are both called the origin. In the interim, repeatedly proclaiming birth and proclaiming cessation, variously displaying the provisional two bodies of dharma and nirmāṇa, are therefore called traces. If not for the origin of first obtaining the dharma and nirmāṇa, there would not be the interim traces of dharma and nirmāṇa. Through the traces the origin is revealed. Though origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. A sūtra says: 'This is my expedient means; so it is with all Buddhas.' Sixth, discussing origin and traces with reference to the present and the past: the principle and phenomena, up to the provisional and real, that have already been spoken in the previous teachings are all traces. The ancient principle and phenomena, up to the provisional and real, spoken in the present sūtra are all called the origin. If not for the ancient origin clarified at present, there would be no way to cast forth the traces already spoken; if not for the traces already spoken, how could the present origin be revealed? Though origin and traces are distinct, they are inconceivably one. A verse in a sūtra says: 'After a long time, the Buddhas must surely preach the reality.'
70.14
Question: In the world, there is not a single phenomenon that does not arise from conditions. Endowed with how many causes and conditions can the myriad phenomena be produced?
70.15
Answer: There has never been a phenomenon outside the citta that could serve as a condition for the citta. It is merely that what is produced from one's own citta in turn serves as the characteristic for the citta. The Hai [hui jing] yihai says: "In explaining conditioned arising, take for instance when a dust-mote is seen: this dust-mote is manifested by one's own citta. Because it is manifested by one's own citta, it serves as a condition for one's own citta. Because the condition appears before it, the mental phenomena then arise. Therefore it is called a phenomenon of conditioned arising." A sūtra says: "All phenomena arise from conditions; without conditions, they do not arise." It goes on to state that one thereby knows that the substance of the dust-mote is empty and non-existent. Now, realizing that conditions are not conditions, every arising is wondrous; yet the substance of conditioned arising is tranquil, so that what arises constantly does not arise. Comprehending that substance accords with conditions, what does not arise constantly arises. One who sees in this way is said to have real knowledge and vision. What is meant by real knowledge and vision? If one sees conditions without seeing the substance, this is the view of permanence. If one sees the substance without seeing conditions, this is the view of annihilation. Now, seeing the nature from causes and conditions, one does not fall into permanence; through conditioned arising within the true nature, one does not fall into annihilation. This is called real knowledge and vision. The reason for explaining at length the active characteristics of causes and conditions is to reveal the principle by means of phenomena so that the principle is not isolated, and to accomplish phenomena by means of the principle so that phenomena are harmoniously integrated. However, according to the sūtras and treatises, as established in accordance with conventional truth, there are four causes and conditions. Conventionally posited internally and externally, they are not without active characteristics: First, the causal condition (hetupratyaya). The treatise says: "First, the causal condition means that conditioned phenomena directly bring about their own results." Its substance has two kinds: first, seeds; second, actual states. The explanation says: If all kleśa seeds, having been suppressed by preparatory wisdom (prayoga-jñāna), forever lack the function of producing actual states, then although the seeds are phenomena of causal conditions, because they cannot produce actual states they do not receive the name of causal condition. Furthermore, for instance, if one relates mental seeds to material actual states, this is also not called a causal condition. Only when mental seeds produce mental actual states, material seeds produce material actual states, and so forth, are they causal conditions. This is because it applies equally to both categories of seeds, the newly perfumed and the innate. Second, the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya). This means the eight actual consciousnesses and their mental factors: the preceding aggregation, without interruption within its own category, equally opens the way and guides the subsequent, causing it definitely to arise. The explanation says: "The eight actual consciousnesses and their mental factors" designates the substance of the condition; it is only the darśana- and svasaṃvittibhāga. This substance of the condition is collectively called actual consciousness, thereby excluding matter, dharmas non-associated with citta, seeds, and the unconditioned, which do not have the nature of this condition. The treatise states that the immediately antecedent condition is taught solely in relation to all cittas and mental factors, because they are sustained by being opened and guided by what arose before. "Opening" has the sense of yielding, meaning yielding its place to that [subsequent one]. "Guiding" has the sense of beckoning and drawing forth, meaning that the preceding one departs, yielding its place, and beckons and draws forth the subsequent phenomenon, causing it to arise. "The preceding aggregation in relation to the subsequent" excludes simultaneous phenomena and the subsequent serving as a condition for the preceding, because these do not open and guide. "Within its own category" shows that it is not another consciousness that serves as the condition. "Without interruption" shows that although the preceding without interruption serves as a condition for the subsequent, it is not that there can be any gap in between; it must be without interruption. "Equally opens the way and guides" shows the meaning of the condition. "Causing it definitely to arise" points to the subsequent result. Even after a long duration, such as after eighty thousand kalpas, the preceding eye-consciousness, in relation to the subsequent, still serves as this condition, because that subsequent result is bound definitely to arise. This excludes the final citta upon entering the nirvāṇa without remainder, because there is no result that is bound definitely to arise, and thus it is not this condition: although it has the sense of opening, it lacks the guiding power.
70.16
Question: Since citta and mental factors are not of their own category, and just as the eight consciousnesses constantly evolve together with different substances and functions, how can they, arising together, both have the sense of mutually serving as conditions for the subsequent?
70.17
Answer: The treatise says: "Although citta and mental factors constantly evolve together, because they are associated, they are harmoniously united like one, and one cannot posit any separation or difference between them; therefore, they can mutually act as immediately antecedent conditions." "Harmoniously united like one" means having the same cognitive object, the same basis, evolving at the same time, and being subsumed under the same nature; they cannot be separated to make them different. This is unlike the eight consciousnesses, whose active characteristics, cognitive objects, and bases are each unequal, so that they do not mutually serve as conditions. Furthermore, except for those entering the nirvāṇa without remainder, all other cittas and mental factors are immediately antecedent conditions, because their power and function are equal and there is no gap within their own category. Third, the cognitive condition (ālambanapratyaya). This means that if there is a phenomenon that bears its own characteristic, being what is considered and relied upon by citta or associated [mental factors]. Its substance has two kinds: first, direct; second, indirect. If it is not separate from the substance of that which cognizes and is inwardly considered and relied upon by the darśanabhāga and so forth, one should know that it is the direct cognitive condition. If, although separate from the substance of that which cognizes, it acts as a substantive basis that can give rise to what is inwardly considered and relied upon, one should know that it is the indirect cognitive condition. That which cognizes always has the direct cognitive condition, because it certainly does not arise apart from what is inwardly considered and relied upon. That which cognizes may or may not have the indirect cognitive condition, because it can also arise apart from what is outwardly considered and relied upon. The explanation says: "If there is a phenomenon" means that it is not of the conceptualized nature (parikalpita), for the conceptualized lacks substance and cannot generate the cognizing consciousness, and hence is not a condition. A condition must be of the dependent nature (paratantra); here it must have substance before it can be a condition. "Bears its own characteristic" means that the cognizing citta and so forth bear the characteristic belonging to this matter and so forth. "Bearing" has the sense of taking along and holding. "Characteristic" refers to the substance-characteristic, not an imagistic appearance. That is to say, when correct wisdom and so forth arise, they arise taking along the substance-characteristic of tathatā; they are neither one with nor different from reality, neither characteristic nor non-characteristic. If it takes along its own [substance] of what is cognized to be the objective characteristic, that is the cognitive object. If "characteristic" refers to substance, then there are the substance-characteristics of simultaneous citta and mental factors, which are also possessed by being taken along by citta. "Characteristic" (相) means a part, or it means the substance-characteristic. Tathatā is also called a characteristic: the characteristic of non-characteristic. Thus the sūtra says: "They all share the same characteristic, namely, the absence of characteristics." Regarding the direct cognitive condition: if it is not separate from the substance of the darśanabhāga and so forth, this excludes what is transformed by other consciousnesses and the distinct cognitive objects of each of one's own eight consciousnesses; it is solely what is inwardly considered and relied upon by the darśanabhāga. This has two kinds: first, the conditioned, which is transformed by consciousness and called that which is inwardly considered and relied upon; second, the unconditioned, in which the substance of tathatā is not separate from consciousness, and is called that which is considered and relied upon. Just as the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga and so forth, these are all of this category. This refers to the direct condition. The indirect cognitive condition refers to phenomena that are separate from the cognizing citta: that is, what is transformed by another consciousness, or what is transformed by a different consciousness within one's own person, which is relied upon as a substantive basis. Furthermore, the direct cognitive object means that the darśanabhāga bears its own characteristic; in this indirect case, the reflected nimittabhāga bears the characteristic of the original substantive basis, and is therefore called the cognitive object. Moreover, the direct cognitive condition is possessed by any cognizing citta without exception, because all cittas and so forth definitely do not function apart from the nimittabhāga that is inwardly considered and relied upon. In the Mahāyāna now, if a non-existent phenomenon is cognized, citta does not arise. As for the indirect cognitive condition, the cognizing phenomenon may or may not have it, because it is a phenomenon outside the citta; for instance, when grasping at a real self or real dharmas, although there is no substantive basis, citta nonetheless arises apart from that phenomenon. Furthermore, the verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "Internal form appearing as external / serves as the cognitive condition for consciousness; / because its characteristic is admitted to exist in consciousness / and because it is able to generate consciousness." Taking the form transformed by one's own internal consciousness as the cognitive condition, it is of the dependent nature, being an existent phenomenon; it does not cognize non-existent phenomena conceptualized outside the citta. The treatise says: "The seeing relies on that to arise; it arises bearing that characteristic." "The seeing relies on that to arise" is the meaning of condition. However, when the citta arises, it arises bearing that characteristic, which is called the cognitive object. "Bearing" has the sense of taking along and closely adhering. The Baifa says: Dharmapāla explains this cognitive object as follows: like seeing reality, it has no fixed nimittabhāga, because fundamental wisdom directly realizes the substance of reality without grasping at characteristics; because it merges with the substance of reality, there is no imagistic characteristic, but only the characteristic of the substance-characteristic, which is the meaning of taking along, and this is also the cognitive condition.
70.18
Objection: If there is a darśanabhāga, then there is the characteristic of conceptual differentiation; why call it the characteristic of non-differentiation? Furthermore, does it not say there is no grāhaka (apprehender)?
70.19
Answer: Although there is a darśanabhāga, there is no conceptual differentiation, nor is there a grāhaka. When correct wisdom cognizes reality, because it directly adheres to and takes along the substance-characteristic to cognize it, there is no further imagistic characteristic; thus it is said that there is no nimittabhāga. Saying there is no grāhaka means that there is no falsely conceptualized, real apprehender; it does not mean there is no internal part that is the cognizing darśanabhāga. Another objection: If you say there is no nimittabhāga, the Ālambana[parīkṣā] says: "Arising reliant on that, bearing that characteristic: hence it is called the characteristic of the cognitive object." If there is no nimittabhāga of tathatā, then there is no cognitive object. Dharmapāla says: There is also the meaning of the cognitive condition. Although it is the darśana- and nimittabhāga, it can arise bearing the characteristic of reality, because it is not separate from it. That is, because the darśanabhāga of fundamental wisdom directly takes along the substance-characteristic of tathatā to arise, it is called the cognitive condition. Just as the svasaṃvittibhāga directly bears the darśanabhāga and is called the cognitive condition, this should also be likewise. Truly there is no sense of transforming and bearing; there is only taking along, which is called the cognitive condition. Therefore, it is distinct from subsequently attained [wisdom]. If it cognized by transforming a nimittabhāga, it would not be direct realization; that is, like subsequently attained wisdom, it would have conceptual differentiation. Since it is different from subsequently attained [wisdom], one clearly knows that there is a darśanabhāga but no nimittabhāga. Furthermore, that all darśanabhāgas have the meaning of taking along the objective characteristic is because the characteristic is not separate from the seeing; this is the meaning of taking along. Non-separation has two kinds: first, the conditioned nimittabhāga, in relation to the consciousness that can transform it, is continuously connected by bloodline, like father and son, and hence is called not separate; second, objects such as tathatā, although not transformed by consciousness, are the real substance of consciousness and so forth, and hence are called not separate.
70.20
Question: The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "Internal form appearing as external / serves as the cognitive condition for consciousness; / because its characteristic is admitted to exist in consciousness / and because it is able to generate consciousness." Thus, although external objects do not exist, there is internal form that appears resembling external objects, serving as the cognitive condition. Since the external characteristic exists in consciousness, they arise simultaneously; given that the characteristic exists [in consciousness], how can it further generate consciousness and act as a condition for consciousness?
70.21
Answer: Just as the eye-consciousness and so forth arise bearing that characteristic, although they are simultaneous, this does not obstruct precedence and subsequence, because they mutually cause one another, establishing the principle of the cognitive condition.
70.22
The treatise asks: "Since this internal objective characteristic is not separate from consciousness, how can it, arising simultaneously, act as a condition for consciousness?"
70.23
The verse answers: "Because they definitely accompany each other, / they also act as a condition when simultaneous; / or the preceding acts as a condition for the subsequent, / because it induces that function." Because the objective characteristic and consciousness definitely accompany each other, although they arise simultaneously, it also acts as a condition for consciousness. And because external phenomena are logically non-existent, it must definitely be admitted that it resides in consciousness and not elsewhere. This sense-faculty's function and the preceding objective form have, from beginningless time, mutually served as causes. In this way, for all consciousnesses, only the internal objective characteristic serves as the cognitive condition; the principle is well established.
70.24
Question: Regarding the explanation of "taking along" as the direct cognitive condition, does it take along substance or take along function?
70.25
Answer: One should analyze it with four propositions: First, substance taking along substance: that is, the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga, and the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga in turn cognizing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Second, function taking along function: that is, the darśanabhāga of the citta and mental factors of the eight consciousnesses cognizing their own direct nimittabhāga. Third, function taking along substance: that is, the darśanabhāga of fundamental wisdom cognizing tathatā. Fourth, substance taking along function: that is, the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga.
70.26
Question: Regarding the meaning of the cognitive condition, how are direct and indirect distinguished across the eight consciousnesses?
70.27
Answer: The Hundred Dharmas states that Dharmapāla explains: Regarding this eighth citta and its caittas, termed 'this category,' whether in cause or in fruit, the presence or absence of the remote objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) is indefinite. If during the causal stage the eighth consciousness relies on others' gross matter (fuchen) and the receptacle world, transforming [its own] nimittabhāga to take them as objects, they can then be mutually enjoyed and used, which constitutes the meaning of the remote objective condition. If it is the meaning of self and other as objects, the five sense faculties and the seeds do not mutually transform and become objects, and thus there is no meaning of the remote objective condition. Furthermore, in the form realm, there is gross matter, and the receptacle world can be mutual; having gross matter, it has the remote objective condition. In the formless realm, because there is no form upon which to rely, there is no meaning of the remote objective condition. If one's own eighth consciousness takes its own three objects as conditions, there is only the immediate objective condition. This is the analysis during the causal stage. If arriving at the stage of the Buddha-fruit, when the eighth consciousness takes its own objects, tathatā, and all past, future, and substanceless dharmas as objects, it does not have the remote objective condition. If it takes the bodies and lands of other Buddhas as objects, it transforms reflections to take them as objects, and this also has the remote meaning. Thus, for the eighth consciousness as the mental king itself in the stage of fruit, the presence or absence of the remote objective condition is indefinite. For the five caittas of the eighth, in both causal and fruitional stages, they all have the remote objective condition, because they rely on the three objects of the eighth mental king as the archetype (bimba) to take them as objects. As for the seventh consciousness, the treatise states: 'At the stage where the seventh citta-category has not yet undergone the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti), being innate, it necessarily relies on an external archetype; hence it also definitely has the remote objective condition. At the stage of the transformation of the basis, this is not definitely present, because when taking tathatā as object, there is no external archetype.' Now it is stated: Regarding this seventh consciousness in the tainted stage, its substance is innate, and acting spontaneously it lacks strength; because it necessarily relies on the eighth consciousness as an external archetype so that it itself may then transform a reflection to take it as an object, it definitely has the remote objective condition. With respect to the untainted state, the presence or absence of the remote objective condition is indefinite. If it is the seventh citta-category associated with fundamental cognition (mūlajñāna) taking tathatā as object, there is no remote condition. If it is subsequent cognition (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna) taking tathatā as object, there is a remote condition. If the untainted seventh takes past, future, and various substanceless dharmas as objects, none have the remote objective condition.
70.28
Question: Why must the tainted seventh consciousness, when giving rise to grasping, rely on an archetype to arise? Grasping is produced by conceptual construction; hence it should not depend on an external archetype to arise.
70.29
Answer: There are two kinds of grasping: First, grasping that arises through forceful thinking, discrimination, and calculation; in this case, the presence or absence of the external archetype relied upon is indefinite, like the solitary, dispersed thought of the sixth consciousness. Second, grasping that arises spontaneously, which is the seventh consciousness; because the seventh citta and caittas are innate and spontaneous, they lack the strength to arise on their own and must depend on an external archetype before they can give rise to grasping. Therefore, one knows that in the tainted stage of the seventh, the remote objective condition is [stated above; but here] indefinite [is clarified for other contexts]. As for the sixth consciousness: the citta-category of this consciousness-aggregate has keen and sharp cognitive characteristics and can operate freely across all stages. The external archetype it relies on may be present or absent; thus its remote objective condition is indefinitely present or absent. In both the causal and fruitional stages, it operates freely throughout, whether arising through discrimination or innately; therefore, when taking all dharmas as objects, it sometimes arises relying on an archetype and sometimes arises without relying on an archetype. Because its objects are the most extensive, the remote objective condition is indefinitely present or absent. As for the preceding five evolving consciousnesses: before the transformation of the basis, because their coarse observation is inferior, they necessarily rely on external archetypes, and hence definitely have the remote objective condition. At the stage of the transformation of the basis, this is not definitely present, because when taking the past, future, and the like as objects, there are no external archetypes. For the preceding five evolving consciousnesses in the causal and fruitional stages, in terms of the mutual functioning of the faculties, they also must rely on archetypes to arise, definitely having the remote objective condition. If arriving at the fruitional stage, its presence or absence is indefinite. Furthermore, regarding the mutual objectification among the consciousnesses: the eighth consciousness serves as the objective condition for the preceding seven. That is, the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness serves as the objective condition for the five consciousnesses; the sixth consciousness takes the four bhāgas of the eighth as objective condition; the seventh consciousness solely relies on the darśanabhāga of the eighth as objective condition. That is, the four bhāgas of the eighth consciousness serve as the archetypes; the darśanabhāgas of the preceding seven consciousnesses then transform nimittabhāgas to take them as objects. This constitutes the meaning of the eighth serving as an object for the preceding seven; therefore, the eighth exists for the seventh. Thus, the eighth serves as the remote objective condition for the preceding seven. That the seventh does not exist for the eighth means that the preceding seven do not serve as objective conditions for the eighth, because the eighth does not take the preceding seven as objects, and does not arise relying on the preceding seven, but solely takes its own three objects as objective conditions. Furthermore, the extensive commentary says: When the ancient Mahāyāna masters established the meaning of the objective condition, they said: 'That which is an existent dharma' refers to a dharma that is an archetype having substance, termed 'condition.' The phrase 'bearing its own characteristic' refers to the nimittabhāga, termed the 'characteristic of the object.' Stated together, the characteristic and archetype are called the 'objective condition.' In saying 'bearing its own characteristic,' the word 'bearing' belongs to the citta, the word 'its own' belongs to the archetype, and 'characteristic' is the nimittabhāga; this means that when the cognizing citta takes the cognized object as condition, it brings forth the nimittabhāga belonging to the archetype itself, hence it is called 'bearing its own characteristic.' They were challenged by the Hīnayāna Sammatīya master Prajñāgupta, who did not posit a nimittabhāga, and who composed a treatise of seven hundred verses refuting the Mahāyāna, refuting the ancient Mahāyāna masters' definition of the objective condition, saying: 'If you say that "its own characteristic" is the nimittabhāga and take it as the object, then in your Mahāyāna school, when non-conceptual cognition takes tathatā as its object, it does not bring forth a nimittabhāga of tathatā. Vis-à-vis the darśanabhāga of that cognizing cognition, tathatā should lack the meaning of an objective condition. If you must say that fundamental cognition taking tathatā as object also has a nimittabhāga, then this contradicts all the sūtras and treatises of your own school. How can this be reconciled?' When the ancient Mahāyāna masters met with this single difficulty, at that time there was no rescue; for twelve years, no one was able to rescue the Mahāyāna definition of the objective condition. The Tang Tripiṭaka Master rescued it, saying: 'In our Mahāyāna school, "bearing" is explained with two meanings: first, transformationally bearing (biandai); second, directly grasping and bearing (xiedai). As for transformationally bearing, it transforms and bears its own characteristic resembling the archetype as it arises—this is a characteristic in the sense of an outward form. When fundamental cognition takes tathatā as object, this is absent. As for directly grasping and bearing, it is present: fundamental cognition directly grasps and bears the substance and characteristic of tathatā to take it as object, without transforming another nimittabhāga; thus it also constitutes an objective condition.' The Tripiṭaka Master said: '"That which is an existent dharma"—tathatā is a dharma that has substance, termed "condition." This tathatā is precisely that which is deliberated upon by fundamental cognition, and is also called "the object." Stated jointly, the two aspects are called the "objective condition." The object is itself the condition: this is a karmadhāraya compound. It is also like the darśanabhāga of each of the eight consciousnesses taking its own immediate nimittabhāga as object: these are all cases of directly grasping and bearing; this extends even to the mutual cognition of the inner two bhāgas. Therefore, we know that although fundamental cognition taking tathatā as object does not transform a nimittabhāga, it directly grasps and bears the substance and characteristic of tathatā to take it as object, and thus also constitutes an objective condition.' The ancient Mahāyāna masters misunderstood the meaning of the objective condition: the meaning of the objective condition is that a dharma having substance is the condition, and because this dharma having substance is precisely that which is deliberated upon by the cognizing citta, it is named the object. Now, since the ancient Mahāyāna masters took only the actual nimittabhāga as the object, their mistake was grave indeed! The correct explanation of the objective condition is: 'That which is an existent dharma bears its own characteristic.' 'That which is an existent dharma' means a real dharma, excluding nominal dharmas and the substanceless dharmas of imagined nimittabhāgas. Substanceless dharmas are merely objects, but do not constitute conditions. To be a condition, it must be a real dharma possessing substance, because having efficacy and function, it can induce the arising of consciousness; that is, the real pariniṣpanna and paratantra are dharmas possessing substance. In saying 'bears its own characteristic,' 'bearing' has two meanings: First, transformationally bearing: the eight consciousnesses have the archetype of the remote objective condition; relying on this existent object as an archetype, they transform an image resembling the archetype to arise, which is called 'transformationally bearing.' Second, directly grasping and bearing: this is the real nimittabhāga of all immediate objective conditions; because this nimittabhāga is not separate from the cognizing citta, the cognizing citta directly grasps this nimittabhāga to take it as object, which is called 'directly grasping and bearing.' In saying 'its own characteristic,' there are also two meanings: First, stated regarding the transformationally borne remote objective condition, it is its own characteristic resembling the archetype; 'its own' means substance, that is, the nimittabhāga resembles the archetype's own substance; this is 'characteristic' in the sense of outward form. Second, stated regarding the directly grasped and borne immediate objective condition, it is the cognizing citta directly grasping and bearing the object-nimittabhāga's own characteristic; this is 'characteristic' in the sense of an objective aspect, which is not the same as the remote objective condition bearing the archetype's own characteristic to arise. If someone suddenly asks: 'In saying "bearing its own characteristic," whose own characteristic does the cognizing citta bear to take as object?' One should answer: 'If it is the remote objective condition, it transformationally bears the archetype's own characteristic to take it as object. If it is the immediate objective condition, it directly grasps and bears the nimittabhāga's own characteristic to take it as object. Furthermore, the remote objective condition is bearing the characteristic of outward form, which is bearing the outward form resembling the archetype. The immediate objective condition is bearing the characteristic of the objective aspect, because it directly grasps the objective aspect to take it as object.' If someone says that it bears the cognizing citta's own characteristic, that person does not understand the meaning of the object.
70.30
Question: If you say that directly grasping and bearing an objective aspect and transformationally bearing an outward form resembling an archetype constitute the two conditions—immediate and remote—then external material dharmas would also constitute the two conditions, immediate and remote. For instance, when a mirror illuminates a person, on the mirror's surface it can also directly grasp the person's reflection; since the person's reflection is not separate from the mirror's surface, it should constitute an immediate objective condition. Moreover, the mirror's surface vis-à-vis the external archetype of the person should constitute a remote objective condition.
70.31
Answer: One excludes this by using 'that which is deliberated upon.' The meaning is: to be an objective condition, it must be an object of deliberation in relation to a dharma that is capable of cognition and deliberation; only then is it named an objective condition. Now, since a mirror's surface is not a dharma capable of cognition and deliberation, the reflection of the person in the mirror and the external archetype of the person cannot be named dharmas that are deliberated upon either. Since they lack the meaning of being deliberated upon, they do not constitute objective conditions.
70.32
The opponent raises another objection: If so, then when the sixth consciousness takes substanceless dharmas like sky-flowers as objects, there is the meaning of being deliberated upon, and so it should constitute an objective condition, because consciousness is capable of cognition and deliberation.
70.33
Answer: One differentiates it by means of that which is relied upon (suǒtuō). The meaning is: when the mind cognizes phenomena that lack real substance, although the meaning of 'that which is deliberated upon' (suǒlǜ) is present, the meaning of 'that which is relied upon' is lacking. Because sky-flowers and the like lack real substance, they do not serve as that which is relied upon for the cognizing mind. That does not prevent them from merely being an object of cognition (ālambana), but they do not constitute a condition (pratyaya). Therefore, one must distinguish them by four propositions:
1. There is that which is deliberated upon, but not relied upon: namely, the falsely clung-to self and phenomena of pervasive conceptualization (parikalpita) and the like. Because they lack real substance, they are merely that which is deliberated upon, not that which is relied upon.
2. There is that which is relied upon, but not deliberated upon: namely, people and so forth reflected in a mirror or water. Here there is merely that which is relied upon, but not deliberated upon, because a mirror or water is not capable of deliberating.
3. Both: namely, the real nimittabhāgas of all objective conditions (ālambanapratyaya).
4. Neither: namely, other things not cognized, apart from what is reflected in a mirror or water.
Furthermore, 'immediate cognition' (qīnyuán) means pressing close, proximity; that is, like the nimittabhāga pressing directly close to the darśanabhāga without any other part intervening. 'Mediate' (shū) means distant, being separated by the nimittabhāga; that is, the archetype (vastu / original model).
Furthermore, immediate objective conditions (qīn suǒyuányuán) comprise four categories in total:
1. There is an immediate objective condition that transforms and arises from both the archetype and the mind: namely, the nimittabhāga cognized by the five consciousnesses when cognizing the five dust-objects.
2. There is an immediate objective condition that transforms solely from mind, without relying on an archetype to arise: namely, the nimittabhāga of the three realms cognized by the eighth consciousness.
3. There is an immediate objective condition that neither transforms from mind nor arises from an archetype: namely, tathatā realized by fundamental wisdom (mūlajñāna).
4. There is an immediate objective condition that is not a nimittabhāga: namely, the inner two parts cognizing each other.
Ci'en states: 'If it is not separate in substance from the cognizer and is inwardly deliberated upon and relied upon by the darśanabhāga and so on, one should know that it is an immediate objective condition.' 'If it is with the cognizer' refers to the darśanabhāga; 'not separate in substance' means not separate in substance from the svasaṃvittibhāga. The meaning is: the nimittabhāga is the immediate objective condition of the darśanabhāga, and the darśanabhāga is the immediate objective condition of the svasaṃvittibhāga; neither is separate from the substance of the svasaṃvittibhāga. This explicitly excludes mediate objective conditions (shū suǒyuányuán), for the archetype, relative to the cognizing darśanabhāga, is separate from the eight consciousnesses. This also excludes the nimittabhāga transformed by others, as well as the respective nimittabhāgas transformed by one's own eight consciousnesses, which, relative to one another, are not immediate. Here we take only the nimittabhāga transformed by one's own consciousness as 'immediate'. Relative to the transforming darśanabhāga, it is not separate in substance, and nothing intervenes in between; only then is it 'immediate'.
As for the phrase 'inwardly deliberated upon and relied upon by the darśanabhāga and so on': 'darśanabhāga and so on' includes the svasaṃvittibhāga and the fourth part (saṃvittisaṃvittibhāga), as well as fundamental wisdom cognizing suchness, etc.; all of these constitute immediate objective conditions. For instance, the nimittabhāga is the immediate objective condition of the darśanabhāga; the darśanabhāga is the immediate objective condition of the svasaṃvittibhāga; the svasaṃvittibhāga is the immediate objective condition of the saṃvittisaṃvittibhāga; tathatā is the immediate objective condition of fundamental wisdom; and further, 'and so on' includes citta and caittas cognizing their immediate nimittabhāgas, which are also immediate objective conditions. All of the above cognize by holding [the object] directly (xiédài).
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- 宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese