御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.206

2.206

經。如來說一合相至是名一合相　演曰。此論第二約二諦辨。初善現辨。後佛重成。此初也。梁唐本名一合執據能執心。此但言相依所執境。言如來說一合相者。於俗諦中有言說故。即說彼情名一合執情所執境名一合相。又釋此執行相相執無別。言即非一合相者。以勝義中情有理無。成真諦中情亦非有故。論云此上座須菩提安立第一義故結文可知。彼論第四存假謂顯如來說一合相大千界等非有實體但相無差名一合耳。

Sūtra: 'What the Tathāgata speaks of as a unitary composite ... is called a unitary composite.' The Exposition states: This treatise's second part analyzes this according to the two truths. First Subhūti analyzes it, and later the Buddha reaffirms it. This is the first. The Liang and Tang versions call it 'clinging to a unitary composite', based on the clinging mind. Here it only says 'marks', relying on the object clung to. Saying 'What the Tathāgata speaks of as a unitary composite' is because in conventional truth there is speech; thus that sentiment is called 'clinging to a unitary composite', and the object clung to by sentiment is called the 'marks of a unitary composite'. Another explanation is that this clinging's subjective aspect and its object-mark are not different. Saying 'is not a unitary composite' is because in the ultimate truth it exists in sentiment but lacks ontological truth, establishing that in ultimate truth sentiment also does not exist. Hence the treatise states: 'This Elder Subhūti establishes the paramārtha.' Thus the concluding text is readily understood. The fourth part of that treatise preserves the conventional, meaning it shows that what the Tathāgata speaks of as a unitary composite, the great-thousand worlds, etc., lacks substantial reality; it is merely that their marks are undifferentiated that they are called a 'unitary composite'.