御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.206

2.206

Sūtra: 'What the Tathāgata speaks of as a unitary composite ... is called a unitary composite.' The Exposition states: This treatise's second part analyzes this according to the two truths. First Subhūti analyzes it, and later the Buddha reaffirms it. This is the first. The Liang and Tang versions call it 'clinging to a unitary composite', based on the clinging mind. Here it only says 'marks', relying on the object clung to. Saying 'What the Tathāgata speaks of as a unitary composite' is because in conventional truth there is speech; thus that sentiment is called 'clinging to a unitary composite', and the object clung to by sentiment is called the 'marks of a unitary composite'. Another explanation is that this clinging's subjective aspect and its object-mark are not different. Saying 'is not a unitary composite' is because in the ultimate truth it exists in sentiment but lacks ontological truth, establishing that in ultimate truth sentiment also does not exist. Hence the treatise states: 'This Elder Subhūti establishes the paramārtha.' Thus the concluding text is readily understood. The fourth part of that treatise preserves the conventional, meaning it shows that what the Tathāgata speaks of as a unitary composite, the great-thousand worlds, etc., lacks substantial reality; it is merely that their marks are undifferentiated that they are called a 'unitary composite'.