御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.238

2.238

合此第二第三為觀受用。彼以能受身及能受用并所用境。能受所受同名受故。此以能所性別故離為二。亦不相違故。彼長行云。一觀有為法。以觀見相識。二者觀受用。以觀器世間等。以何處住。以何等身受用何等。三者觀有為行。以何等法三世差別轉。三次第者。且自性相總談世間外道邪妄所執能執一切自性及二所依。次明由有自性而生味著。次明由味著故過失隨起。後明除彼過失而修出離。彼論為三開合雖異。義與此同。就初自性相中有其三喻。一星二翳三燈。此論初相如星。次見如翳。彼論初見次喻於相。何故爾耶。法喻義多。而作論者所取意別。謂此論中境心次第。先相後見。是故第二著所住味以境為初方說能受。彼論生起次第見為根本。依心變境故相為後。問。法中可爾。在喻如何。答。喻亦多義。且星在夜中為他所見。亦能明照。晝則俱無。此論取為他所見義。彼論取能照明義。俱有隱顯。翳有二義。一者由翳體故實無見有此喻於見。二者由翳見毛輪等彼喻於相。若爾彼相應喻毛輪。答。毛輪無體。不離於翳故但喻翳。四屬當法喻者。論云於中自性相者共相見識。演曰。此為總標三喻所喻。一共相二見三識。一星。論云。此相如星。無智闇中有彼光故。有智明中無彼光故。演曰。未見真如。彼相可有真智。既起都不現前。彼論云。譬如星宿為日所映有而不現。能見心法亦復如是。二翳。此論云。人法我見如翳。以取無義故。彼論云。如目有翳則見毛輪等色。觀有為法亦復如是。以顛倒見故。三燈。此論云。識如燈。以渴愛潤取緣故熾然。彼論亦云。依止貪愛法住故。演曰。此明報識。由業所引愛潤熾然而生。四幻。此論云。於中著所住味者。味著顛倒境界故。以顛倒見故。彼論云。又如幻所住處亦復如是。以器世間種種差別無一體實故。問。彼論如幻唯器世間此論境界與相何別。答。相通一切染淨俱論。此中境界唯顛倒境五露。此論云。於中隨順過失相者。無常等隨順故。彼露譬喻者。顯示相體無有。以隨順無常故。彼論云。又如露身亦如是。以少時住故。演曰。彼論唯身。此論通喻有為無常。六泡。此云顯示隨順苦體以受如泡故。若有受皆是苦故。隨有應知。彼苦生故是苦苦。破滅故是壞苦。不相捨離故是行苦。復於第四禪及無色中。立不苦不樂受以勝故。演曰。彼釋行苦。由與生滅不相離故。又依捨立四禪以上。依增勝故。理實捨受亦通。下有問。若爾無漏智應名行苦。由有生滅及捨受故。答。性非順染故不立苦。由有生滅。有漏性者順於染著方立苦故。彼論云。又如泡所受用事亦如是。以受想因三法不定故。演曰。以假者能受故說受體名所受事。所言三法謂根境識。由三易脫速起速滅受亦如是。七夢。此論云。於中隨順出離相者。隨順人法無我。以攀緣故。得其出離故。說無我以為出離。演曰。攀緣者作意義者。此言屬下意觀三世遷流不定。除人法執而得出離。此總釋也。論文云。彼過去行。以所念處故如夢。演曰。過去無體如夢所見。唯有其念而無實法。唯自心故。八電。論云。現在者不久時住故。九雲。論云。未來者彼麁惡種子似虛空引心出故如雲。演曰。種子在識。但是功能而無體相故喻虛空。所生現行即有相狀故喻於雲。彼論云。以於子時阿梨耶識。與一切法為種子根本故。亦與此同。空本無雲雲在來設至現在。須臾變滅觀未來法亦復如是。有云。雲能含雨雨在未來者。若爾即應舉雨為喻故為不可。五建立者。問。何故唯立九種譬喻不減不增。答。由法有九故唯九喻。何者依此論說自性有三。謂相見識。著所住味有一。謂顛倒境界。隨順過失有二。謂無常苦隨順。出離有三。謂即三世。是為九法。若依彼論。觀相有三。謂見相識。受用有三。一器二身三能受用。約世有三。論總名為九種境界。頌云。

This combines the second and third [phases] into the contemplation of enjoyment. That [treatise] regards both the body capable of experiencing and the enjoyment itself, together with the experienced objects, as sharing the name 'experience' (vedanā/bhoga) because experiencing and that which is experienced [are one continuum]. Here, because of the difference between subject and object, they are separated into two; thus they do not contradict each other. That [treatise's] prose commentary says: 'First is the contemplation of saṃskṛta phenomena, by contemplating vision, mark, and consciousness. Second is the contemplation of enjoyment, by contemplating the receptacle world, etc.: where one abides, with what kind of body, and what one enjoys. Third is the contemplation of saṃskṛta conditioned formations, by which phenomena evolve with differences across the three times.' Third, concerning the sequence: first, the characteristic of intrinsic nature generally addresses the false conceptualisations by worldly non-Buddhists of all graspable and grasping intrinsic natures, as well as the support of both. Next, it explains that due to [the clinging to] intrinsic nature, attachment to taste arises. Next, it explains that due to attachment to taste, faults arise in succession. Finally, it explains that by eliminating those faults, one cultivates transcendence. That treatise presents three [divisions]; although the condensation and division differ, the meaning is identical with this one. Within the first, the characteristic of intrinsic nature, there are three metaphors: first, a star; second, a cataract; third, a lamp. In this treatise, the mark is first [compared to] a star, and vision next to a cataract. That treatise first treats vision and next compares the mark. Why is this so? Phenomena and metaphors have many meanings, and the authors of the treatises adopt different intents. In this treatise, following the sequence of object and mind, the mark comes first and vision later; therefore, in the second, 'attachment to the taste of where one abides', the object is taken first before speaking of the experiencing subject. In that treatise, following the sequence of arising, vision is the root; because the object is transformed based on the mind, the mark comes later. Question: This may be so for the phenomena, but what about the metaphors? Answer: The metaphors also have multiple meanings. A star at night is seen by others, and it can also illuminate; by day, neither occurs. This treatise takes the meaning of being seen by others; that treatise takes the meaning of being able to illuminate. Both involve concealment and appearance. A cataract has two meanings: first, due to the cataract itself, that which does not truly exist is seen, which serves as a metaphor for vision; second, due to the cataract, hair-wheels and the like are seen, which serves as a metaphor for the mark. If so, should not that mark be compared to a hair-wheel? Answer: A hair-wheel has no real entity and is not apart from the cataract, so only the cataract is used as the metaphor. Fourth, matching the phenomena to the metaphors: The treatise says, 'Among them, the characteristic of intrinsic nature refers to common marks, vision, and consciousness.' The Exposition says: This is a general identification of what is illustrated by the three metaphors: first, the common mark; second, vision; third, consciousness. First, a star: The treatise says, 'This mark is like a star: because in the darkness of ignorance that light exists, whereas in the light of wisdom that light does not exist.' The Exposition says: Before one has seen tathatā, that mark may appear to exist; once genuine wisdom arises, it does not appear at all. That treatise says: 'Just as stars, eclipsed by the sun, exist but are not visible, the mental dharmas capable of seeing are also like this.' Second, a cataract: This treatise says, 'The views of self of person and phenomena are like a cataract, because they grasp what is devoid of real meaning.' That treatise says, 'Just as when the eye has a cataract one sees colors such as hair-wheels, contemplating saṃskṛta phenomena is also like this, because of inverted views.' Third, a lamp: This treatise says, 'Consciousness is like a lamp, blazing up because it is conditioned by the moisture of craving and grasping.' That treatise also says, 'It abides based on the dharma of greedy craving.' The Exposition says: This explains the retribution consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna); impelled by karma and moistened by craving, it blazes forth and arises. Fourth, an illusion: This treatise says, 'Among them, attachment to the taste of where one abides is because of attachment to the taste of inverted sensory realms, through inverted views.' That treatise says, 'Furthermore, it is like an illusion, and the place of abiding is also like this, because the receptacle world has diverse varieties without a single real entity.' Question: In that treatise the illusion is only the receptacle world; how does the sensory realm in this treatise differ from the mark? Answer: The mark pervades everything, encompassing both defiled and pure; the sensory realm here refers only to inverted sensory realms. Fifth, dew: This treatise says, 'Among them, the characteristic of conforming to faults is because of conforming to impermanence and so forth.' The metaphor of dew demonstrates the non-existence of the substance of the mark, because it conforms to impermanence. That treatise says, 'Furthermore, it is like dew, and the body is also like this, because it abides for only a short time.' The Exposition says: That treatise refers solely to the body; this treatise applies the metaphor generally to the impermanence of saṃskṛta [phenomena]. Sixth, a bubble: This treatise says: 'It demonstrates the substance of conforming to suffering, because feeling is like a bubble.' If there is feeling, it is entirely suffering; one should know it in accordance with its existence. Because that suffering arises, it is the suffering of suffering; because it is destroyed, it is the suffering of change; because it does not part from them, it is the suffering of conditioned existence. Furthermore, in the fourth dhyāna and the formless realm, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is established because of its superiority. The Exposition says: That [treatise] explains the suffering of conditioned existence because it is inseparable from arising and cessation. Moreover, relying on equanimity, it establishes [the states] above the fourth dhyāna; this is based on their predominance, but in reality equanimity also pervades the lower realms. Question: If so, should uncontaminated wisdom be called the suffering of conditioned existence, since it has arising and cessation as well as neutral feeling? Answer: Since its nature does not conform to defilement, it is not established as suffering. Only through having arising and cessation and being of a contaminated nature that conforms to defiled attachment is suffering established. That treatise says: 'Furthermore, it is like a bubble, and the matters of enjoyment are also like this, because the three dharmas of feeling, ideation, and cause are unstable.' The Exposition says: Because the conventional person is capable of experiencing, the substance of feeling is called the matter of enjoyment. What is called the 'three dharmas' refers to faculty, object, and consciousness. Because the three easily change, swiftly arising and swiftly ceasing, feeling is also like this. Seventh, a dream: This treatise says, 'Among them, the characteristic of conforming to transcendence is because by conforming to the selflessness of persons and phenomena through perceptual grasping, one attains transcendence; hence selflessness is spoken of as transcendence.' The Exposition says: 'Perceptual grasping' means attention. This refers to the following: contemplating that the three times are changing and unstable, one eliminates grasping at self and phenomena and attains transcendence. This is the general explanation. The text of the treatise says: 'Those past conditioned formations are like a dream because they are the basis of memory.' The Exposition says: The past has no substance, like what is seen in a dream; there is only its memory without any real dharma, because it is merely one's own mind. Eighth, lightning: The treatise says, 'The present does not abide for long.' Ninth, a cloud: The treatise says, 'The future is like a cloud because those coarse and evil seeds resemble empty space and draw out the mind.' The Exposition says: When the seeds are in consciousness, they are merely functional capacities without substance or mark, and are therefore compared to empty space; the actual occurrences produced by them have visible forms and are therefore compared to clouds. That treatise says, 'Because at the time of seeds, the ālayavijñāna serves as the root seed for all phenomena,' which also agrees with this. In the sky there are originally no clouds; clouds exist in the future, and even if they reach the present, they transform and vanish in an instant; contemplating future phenomena is also like this. Some say: 'Clouds can contain rain, and rain belongs to the future.' If so, one should have cited rain as the metaphor, so this is untenable. Fifth, the establishment: Question: Why are only nine metaphors established, neither fewer nor more? Answer: Because there are nine dharmas, there are only nine metaphors. Which ones? Relying on this treatise, intrinsic nature has three, namely mark, vision, and consciousness. Attachment to the taste of where one abides has one, namely the inverted sensory realm. Conforming to faults has two, namely conforming to impermanence and suffering. Transcendence has three, namely the three times. These are the nine dharmas. If relying on that treatise, contemplating marks has three: vision, mark, and consciousness; enjoyment has three: first, receptacle; second, body; third, the experiencing subject; with regard to the times there are three. The treatise comprehensively calls them the nine kinds of sensory realms. The verse says: