御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.238

2.238

This combines the second and third [phases] into the contemplation of enjoyment. That [treatise] regards both the body capable of experiencing and the enjoyment itself, together with the experienced objects, as sharing the name 'experience' (vedanā/bhoga) because experiencing and that which is experienced [are one continuum]. Here, because of the difference between subject and object, they are separated into two; thus they do not contradict each other. That [treatise's] prose commentary says: 'First is the contemplation of saṃskṛta phenomena, by contemplating vision, mark, and consciousness. Second is the contemplation of enjoyment, by contemplating the receptacle world, etc.: where one abides, with what kind of body, and what one enjoys. Third is the contemplation of saṃskṛta conditioned formations, by which phenomena evolve with differences across the three times.' Third, concerning the sequence: first, the characteristic of intrinsic nature generally addresses the false conceptualisations by worldly non-Buddhists of all graspable and grasping intrinsic natures, as well as the support of both. Next, it explains that due to [the clinging to] intrinsic nature, attachment to taste arises. Next, it explains that due to attachment to taste, faults arise in succession. Finally, it explains that by eliminating those faults, one cultivates transcendence. That treatise presents three [divisions]; although the condensation and division differ, the meaning is identical with this one. Within the first, the characteristic of intrinsic nature, there are three metaphors: first, a star; second, a cataract; third, a lamp. In this treatise, the mark is first [compared to] a star, and vision next to a cataract. That treatise first treats vision and next compares the mark. Why is this so? Phenomena and metaphors have many meanings, and the authors of the treatises adopt different intents. In this treatise, following the sequence of object and mind, the mark comes first and vision later; therefore, in the second, 'attachment to the taste of where one abides', the object is taken first before speaking of the experiencing subject. In that treatise, following the sequence of arising, vision is the root; because the object is transformed based on the mind, the mark comes later. Question: This may be so for the phenomena, but what about the metaphors? Answer: The metaphors also have multiple meanings. A star at night is seen by others, and it can also illuminate; by day, neither occurs. This treatise takes the meaning of being seen by others; that treatise takes the meaning of being able to illuminate. Both involve concealment and appearance. A cataract has two meanings: first, due to the cataract itself, that which does not truly exist is seen, which serves as a metaphor for vision; second, due to the cataract, hair-wheels and the like are seen, which serves as a metaphor for the mark. If so, should not that mark be compared to a hair-wheel? Answer: A hair-wheel has no real entity and is not apart from the cataract, so only the cataract is used as the metaphor. Fourth, matching the phenomena to the metaphors: The treatise says, 'Among them, the characteristic of intrinsic nature refers to common marks, vision, and consciousness.' The Exposition says: This is a general identification of what is illustrated by the three metaphors: first, the common mark; second, vision; third, consciousness. First, a star: The treatise says, 'This mark is like a star: because in the darkness of ignorance that light exists, whereas in the light of wisdom that light does not exist.' The Exposition says: Before one has seen tathatā, that mark may appear to exist; once genuine wisdom arises, it does not appear at all. That treatise says: 'Just as stars, eclipsed by the sun, exist but are not visible, the mental dharmas capable of seeing are also like this.' Second, a cataract: This treatise says, 'The views of self of person and phenomena are like a cataract, because they grasp what is devoid of real meaning.' That treatise says, 'Just as when the eye has a cataract one sees colors such as hair-wheels, contemplating saṃskṛta phenomena is also like this, because of inverted views.' Third, a lamp: This treatise says, 'Consciousness is like a lamp, blazing up because it is conditioned by the moisture of craving and grasping.' That treatise also says, 'It abides based on the dharma of greedy craving.' The Exposition says: This explains the retribution consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna); impelled by karma and moistened by craving, it blazes forth and arises. Fourth, an illusion: This treatise says, 'Among them, attachment to the taste of where one abides is because of attachment to the taste of inverted sensory realms, through inverted views.' That treatise says, 'Furthermore, it is like an illusion, and the place of abiding is also like this, because the receptacle world has diverse varieties without a single real entity.' Question: In that treatise the illusion is only the receptacle world; how does the sensory realm in this treatise differ from the mark? Answer: The mark pervades everything, encompassing both defiled and pure; the sensory realm here refers only to inverted sensory realms. Fifth, dew: This treatise says, 'Among them, the characteristic of conforming to faults is because of conforming to impermanence and so forth.' The metaphor of dew demonstrates the non-existence of the substance of the mark, because it conforms to impermanence. That treatise says, 'Furthermore, it is like dew, and the body is also like this, because it abides for only a short time.' The Exposition says: That treatise refers solely to the body; this treatise applies the metaphor generally to the impermanence of saṃskṛta [phenomena]. Sixth, a bubble: This treatise says: 'It demonstrates the substance of conforming to suffering, because feeling is like a bubble.' If there is feeling, it is entirely suffering; one should know it in accordance with its existence. Because that suffering arises, it is the suffering of suffering; because it is destroyed, it is the suffering of change; because it does not part from them, it is the suffering of conditioned existence. Furthermore, in the fourth dhyāna and the formless realm, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is established because of its superiority. The Exposition says: That [treatise] explains the suffering of conditioned existence because it is inseparable from arising and cessation. Moreover, relying on equanimity, it establishes [the states] above the fourth dhyāna; this is based on their predominance, but in reality equanimity also pervades the lower realms. Question: If so, should uncontaminated wisdom be called the suffering of conditioned existence, since it has arising and cessation as well as neutral feeling? Answer: Since its nature does not conform to defilement, it is not established as suffering. Only through having arising and cessation and being of a contaminated nature that conforms to defiled attachment is suffering established. That treatise says: 'Furthermore, it is like a bubble, and the matters of enjoyment are also like this, because the three dharmas of feeling, ideation, and cause are unstable.' The Exposition says: Because the conventional person is capable of experiencing, the substance of feeling is called the matter of enjoyment. What is called the 'three dharmas' refers to faculty, object, and consciousness. Because the three easily change, swiftly arising and swiftly ceasing, feeling is also like this. Seventh, a dream: This treatise says, 'Among them, the characteristic of conforming to transcendence is because by conforming to the selflessness of persons and phenomena through perceptual grasping, one attains transcendence; hence selflessness is spoken of as transcendence.' The Exposition says: 'Perceptual grasping' means attention. This refers to the following: contemplating that the three times are changing and unstable, one eliminates grasping at self and phenomena and attains transcendence. This is the general explanation. The text of the treatise says: 'Those past conditioned formations are like a dream because they are the basis of memory.' The Exposition says: The past has no substance, like what is seen in a dream; there is only its memory without any real dharma, because it is merely one's own mind. Eighth, lightning: The treatise says, 'The present does not abide for long.' Ninth, a cloud: The treatise says, 'The future is like a cloud because those coarse and evil seeds resemble empty space and draw out the mind.' The Exposition says: When the seeds are in consciousness, they are merely functional capacities without substance or mark, and are therefore compared to empty space; the actual occurrences produced by them have visible forms and are therefore compared to clouds. That treatise says, 'Because at the time of seeds, the ālayavijñāna serves as the root seed for all phenomena,' which also agrees with this. In the sky there are originally no clouds; clouds exist in the future, and even if they reach the present, they transform and vanish in an instant; contemplating future phenomena is also like this. Some say: 'Clouds can contain rain, and rain belongs to the future.' If so, one should have cited rain as the metaphor, so this is untenable. Fifth, the establishment: Question: Why are only nine metaphors established, neither fewer nor more? Answer: Because there are nine dharmas, there are only nine metaphors. Which ones? Relying on this treatise, intrinsic nature has three, namely mark, vision, and consciousness. Attachment to the taste of where one abides has one, namely the inverted sensory realm. Conforming to faults has two, namely conforming to impermanence and suffering. Transcendence has three, namely the three times. These are the nine dharmas. If relying on that treatise, contemplating marks has three: vision, mark, and consciousness; enjoyment has three: first, receptacle; second, body; third, the experiencing subject; with regard to the times there are three. The treatise comprehensively calls them the nine kinds of sensory realms. The verse says: