English (machine translation)
Translation of 金剛般若經疏
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- pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.2741 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…
Contents
- 1 — 27 parts
Text
1.1
[...] called ultimate [...] contradict each other. It also contradicts the ultimate single reality of the middle way [...] the Buddha taught three kinds of ultimacy. Doubts are manifold; how are they to be reconciled? Furthermore, relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the Buddha himself reconciled and explained the various teachings that speak of emptiness, [showing that] it is solely relying on the imagined nature that all phenomena are said to be empty. If [...] how could it be that within the Lakṣaṇapratiṣedha school the three natures are all discarded? The remaining points individually present many obstructions; [...] they can be known by adducing them, so one cannot elaborate at length. One should know that when the Successor [Maitreya] expounded the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it was [...] to explain all sūtras; do not say that it only explains teachings such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Therefore the commentary on that treatise [...] says: 'This treatise is supreme, like a lotus flower, like a treasury of jewels, like the great ocean. It possesses [...] vast meanings, and skillfully explains their texts without omission.' It also says: 'What is the cause for now expounding this treatise? It means that sentient beings, from beginningless time, have been ignorant of the middle-way true reality regarding all dharmas, harbor doubts, delusions, and perverted attachments, up to [...] according to what is appropriate, expediently expounding for them various subtle dharmas, [revealing] the middle [...] marks, causing sentient beings to know that all things, being empty in such and such a way, are therefore not existent, and being existent in such and such a way, are therefore not empty; [...] dharmas are neither empty nor existent; and leaving behind doubts, delusions, and perverted attachments, they practice to extinguish obstructions, realize sambodhi, and realize the bliss of quietude and cessation.' After the Buddha's nirvāṇa, Māra's deeds arose in turmoil, sectarian clingings vied with one another, and many clung to the view of existence. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna realized the Pramuditā-bhūmi (Ground of Extreme Joy), gathered the teachings of signlessness and emptiness of various meanings, and composed the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and other works, thoroughly clarifying the true essentials and eliminating those views of existence. Up to great treatise masters such as Āryadeva, who composed the Śataka-śāstra and other works to broadly illuminate the great meaning. Because of this, sentient beings later clung to the view of non-existence. Bodhisattva Asaṅga reached the first ground, realized the Samādhi of Dharma-Light, and attained great supernatural powers. [...] Maitreya, requesting him to expound this treatise. No principle was not exhausted, no phenomenon was not completely addressed, no text was not explained, no meaning was not illustrated, no doubt was not dispelled, no clinging was not broken, no practice was not cultivated, and no fruit was not realized. It was primarily for the sake of bodhisattvas, so that [...] the objects, practices, and fruits of the various vehicles would all be skillfully mastered, diligently cultivating the Mahāyāna to realize great bodhi, and extensively expounding for sentient beings always without error; and secondarily for the sake of the other vehicles, causing them to rely on their own Dharma to cultivate their own practices and attain their own fruit realizations. Such is a brief explanation of the origin of this treatise. Thus we know that it comprehensively explains all sacred teachings, eliminates the arising of the views of emptiness and existence, and establishes the middle-way practice; how could one say that the Yogācārabhūmi is merely the Dharmalakṣaṇa school? Question: Do not the various sūtras mostly teach dharmalakṣaṇa, or mostly refute marks, or reconcile them? Why should schools not be divided? Answer: According to what has been said, the various teachings do not lack these three meanings. Merely asserting a definitive judgment that such-and-such sūtras and treatises refute that school and subsume this one is inadmissible, all [...]. Therefore, one should say that the subtle principle of the Mahāyāna, whichever sūtra it may be, contains dharmalakṣaṇa, refutation [...], and reconciliation [...]; although there may be one meaning emphasized in many places, in reality these three do not separate from one another, because distinguishing the nature of phenomena, eliminating clinging, and reconciling-and-penetrating are meanings that pervade everywhere. Question: If so, why within the Mahāyāna are there the central school and the extreme school, with Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, signless and dharmalakṣaṇa, the schools being distinct from one another? Answer: It is merely because the commentators' compositions differed; they stated different schools according to the intention of the one able to explain, not because the Buddha's words fell into extremes, establishing separate schools from the outset. Therefore, it should be said: within the Mahāyāna, the schools are divided into two. First, the school of 'ultimate truth is entirely empty'—like the Yuktivāda-Pariniṣpanna School—namely Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna down to Treatise Master Bhāviveka; relying on the signless teachings, they say that within ultimate truth all is empty, while conventional truth is existent. The Karatalaratna verses say: 'In true realization, the conditioned is empty, / because it arises from conditions like an illusion; / the unconditioned has no reality, / not arising like a sky-flower.' Up to not establishing the three natures, vijñapti-mātra, and so forth. The latter school is Maitreya Tathāgata down to Bodhisattva Dharmapāla; relying on the explicit verbal teachings of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and others, they say that ultimate truth is neither empty nor non-empty. In the Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, Maitreya's verse states: 'False discrimination exists; / in it the duality does not exist at all; / herein there is only emptiness, / and in that [emptiness] this also exists. / Therefore all dharmas are said / to be neither empty nor non-empty: / because of existence, non-existence, and existence; / this accords with the middle way.' Among the three natures, the imagined nature is non-existent, while the other-dependent and consummated natures are existent; therefore the two vehicles differ. Question: What are the characteristics of the so-called ultimate truth and conventional truth? Answer: Again, relying on the two schools, what is taught differs. First, according to the Śūnyavāda school, in ultimate truth all teachings are completely empty; within conventional truth, there can be form, mind, cultivation, abandonment, and other dharmas. As the sūtra says: 'Whatever has marks is all illusory'—this is conventional truth; 'When all marks are seen as non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata'—this is ultimate truth. All sentient beings of the four kinds of birth and the three realms are conventional truth; that there are truly no sentient beings who attain extinction is ultimate truth. The Yuktivāda school teaches that regarding the two truths, ultimate and conventional, there are two different meanings: first, distinguishing the truths based on the person; second, distinguishing the truths in terms of phenomena. Both kinds of the two truths apply to both emptiness and existence. First, based on the person: the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that what superior wisdom knows is called ultimate, and what middling wisdom knows is called conventional. What the two wisdoms know both apply to existence; therefore we know that both truths apply to both emptiness and existence. In terms of phenomena: phenomena have superior and inferior qualities, mutually contrasted to form the ultimate and conventional. This has four tiers: 1. The two truths of false and real: vases, armies, forests, and the like, being false, are conventional; the aggregates, sense fields, and realms, being real, are ultimate. 2. The two truths of principle and phenomena: phenomenal things such as the aggregates, being coarse, are conventional; the principles of the four noble truths, being subtle, are ultimate. 3. The two truths of shallow and profound: the established setup of the four truths, being shallow, is conventional; the tathatā of twofold emptiness, being profound, is ultimate. 4. The two truths of expression and signified meaning: the tathatā of twofold emptiness with expression is conventional; the expression of the single true dharmadhātu is ultimate. Altogether there are five dharmas: the first, armies, forests, and so on, is conventional and not ultimate; the last, the single true dharmadhātu, is ultimate and not conventional; the intermediate three dharmas are both ultimate and conventional, because they are mutually contrasted. This is extensively explained as in the ninth fascicle of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the sixth fascicle of Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi), and others. However, the first category is mutually grasped by the worldly as truly existent self-and-dharma natures; therefore it is empty and not existent. The remaining four dharmas universally belong to the other-dependent and consummated natures; therefore they are existent and not empty. Hence it is said that the substance of the two truths encompasses both emptiness and existence, not as previously stated that ultimate truth is entirely empty. Having understood the two truths taught by the two schools, one should next inquire into the reasons for emptiness and existence. The proponent of emptiness says: The Great Sūtra says, 'Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a transformation.' The Prajñāhṛdaya says: 'Form is emptiness, emptiness is form; sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this.' This sūtra also says: 'Prajñāpāramitā is just not prajñāpāramitā,' up to 'there is no dharma that can be spoken,' and so forth. Relying on these teachings, all dharmas are empty. Furthermore, the Pañcaskandhaka says: 'If a dharma had substance, it could arise by itself; since it relies on multiple conditions, it clearly is known to be non-existent, just as knotting a handkerchief into the shape of a rabbit or the like lacks the nature of a rabbit.' The proponent of Yuktivāda says: Relying precisely on this sūtra, 'the accumulation of merit is immeasurable'—how could it be non-existent? It also teaches that the Tathāgata has five eyes, and so forth. Furthermore, 'one who arouses anuttarabodhi does not speak of the mark of annihilation regarding dharmas,' and so forth. Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'Conditioned and unconditioned are called existent; the self and what belongs to the self are called non-existent.' It also says: 'There is no self, no maker, and no experiencer, yet wholesome and unwholesome dharmas are not destroyed,' and so forth. Although it is said that relying on conditions is of illusory and transformed nature and completely devoid of existence, this is because the proponent of Yuktivāda also uses illusion and transformation to illustrate the other-dependent, and uses stars, cataracts, lamps, and illusions to illustrate the conditioned. Moreover, it says, 'I shall cause all sentient beings to enter extinction without remainder'—if all were empty, why bother using sky-flowers to [...] into nirvāṇa? The proponent of emptiness says: All these passages on dharmas are based on conventional truth; in true emptiness there is no making, cultivating, and so forth. The proponent of Yuktivāda challenges: Are your conventional truth and ultimate truth one or different? If you say they are one, existence and emptiness would contradict each other, for we never see suffering and pleasure, or cold and heat, being one. If you say they are different, the two truths are originally simultaneous; how could one be existent while the other is non-existent? The other replies: The substance of the two truths is not different; the conventional truth's substance exists, allowing suffering, pleasure, and the like, but the substance does not pervade [both]. The two truths are mutually contrasted: to deluded sentiments, it is existent, while in true principle, all is empty. Now, following deluded sentiments, conventional truth is said to exist; speaking from reality, conventional truth is also empty. The challenge says: If conventionality is deluded, and causing one to abandon conventional truth to enter true emptiness entails the fault of the mark of annihilation of all dharmas? Answer: Since its substance is non-existent, there is nothing that can be annihilated; therefore it is said that one does not speak of the mark of annihilation of dharmas. This differs entirely from the explanation of the Yuktivāda. Question: According to the proponent of emptiness, delusion is existent and truth is non-existent, and the two truths have one substance; I wonder whether the two truths taught by the Yuktivāda are one or different? Answer: What the Yuktivāda teaches is neither one nor different. Why? Because their meanings and functions differ, they are not one; because there is no separate substance, they are not different. Just as with vases, armies, forests, and so on, looking at the five dharmas in relation to one another, it is mutually so everywhere. Since they are neither one nor different, turning this around, to say they are either different or one has no obstruction. The Renwang Jing says: 'Existence and non-existence are originally two, / like the two horns of an ox; / illuminated and seen with understanding, they are non-dual, / yet the two truths are never identical. / The understanding mind sees non-duality, / but seeking duality, it cannot be found; / this does not mean the two truths are one— / if not two, how could they be found? / In understanding they are naturally one; / in truths they are naturally two. / Penetrating this non-duality, / one enters the true primary meaning.' The intent of the verse is that tathatā is ultimate truth, and the other-dependent and imagined are conventional truth. Because they are the objects of the two wisdoms, they are called truths. Difference is solely in terms of true wisdom, which is termed 'understanding'; whether they are one or different, neither contradicts. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also says: 'Therefore, this [tathatā] and the other-dependent are neither different nor non-different, just as the nature of impermanence and so on is not seen without the other.' Fascicle 75 of the Yogācārabhūmi says: 'In the Mahāyāna, there may be a type of person who, due to wrongly grasping emptiness, speaks thus: "By conventionality, all exists; by the ultimate, all is non-existent." One should tell them: "What is conventional and what is ultimate?" If they say: "All dharmas have no inherent nature—this is called ultimate; if within the absence of inherent nature of dharmas an inherent nature is apprehendable, this is called conventional." "Why is conventionality established within non-existence? Because it arises in discourse through provisional designations and conventional speech." One should tell them: "What is your intention? Does conventionality of speech have an apprehendable inherent nature arising from causes, or is it merely conventionality of speech said to exist? If conventionality of speech arises from causes, for conventionality of speech to arise from causes yet not be existent is unreasonable." Furthermore, one should say to them: "Venerable one, for what reason is all that is apprehendable devoid of inherent nature?" (This challenges: conventional is existent, yet ultimate is non-existent.) They reply: "Because of perverted phenomena." (Meaning the mind is perverted, taking non-existence to be existence, like seeing sky-flowers.) One should again say to them: "What is your intention? Are these perverted phenomena existent or non-existent? If you say they are existent, to say that all dharmas by the ultimate are devoid of inherent nature is unreasonable. If you say they are non-existent, then [to say] because of perverted phenomena all that is apprehendable is devoid of inherent nature is unreasonable."' The proponent of emptiness says: Fascicle 2 of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra says: 'Emptiness and the nature of a bodhisattva are non-dual; because they are non-dual, they cannot be spoken of.' It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, in ultimate truth no dharma can be apprehended; because nature is non-existent, it is called empty.' Therefore, teaching emptiness is [...] the definitive meaning. The Yuktivāda says: This also is not proof. It means that relying on the non-existence of the imagined nature, śūnyatā is non-dual with awakening. Moreover, śūnyatā as the emptiness-nature, which is tathatā, is non-dual with awakening; it does not say that the substance of bodhi is empty and non-existent. If in reality all were empty, what emptiness and what awakening would there be? If you say that in accordance with refuting deluded sentiments, emptiness and awakening are non-dual, while based on ultimate truth there is neither awakening nor emptiness, one should then distinguish the length of a rabbit's horns! Since this is not the case, how could that be? Furthermore, it says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, in ultimate truth no dharma can be apprehended'—it does not say that what is not clung to is also an empty, non-existent dharma in ultimate truth. Moreover, if the nature of the two truths were one and not existent, there would be no ordinary and noble, defiled and pure, karmic actions, or the five destinies of humans and devas; there would be no three wretched destinies, no sentient beings saved by compassion, and no virtues of bodhisattvas personally practicing in toil and hardship. Since all is empty and non-existent, who would expound what for whom, and what dharma would be sought? A wise person would not, to eliminate an illusory enemy, seek a barren woman's son to serve as an army. Furthermore, for ordinary persons who are deluded and perverted, there may be conventional form, mind, and other dharmas; but the Buddhas and Tathāgatas have already severed delusions and perversions—how could there be a physical body, pure marvelous lands, and so forth? If you say that through the Buddha's compassionate mind, for the sake of sentient beings, he manifests bodies and lands, yet when sentient beings' delusions and perversions are completely severed, the Buddhas' bodies and lands are also not established, then since the ultimate is empty, the mind of compassion and wisdom would also not exist. What would be the basis for saving sentient beings? Therefore, speaking of emptiness is an intentional teaching. Doctrine and reason being thus, it incurs the fault of contradicting sacred teachings regarding the previously stated Karatalaratna inference, because it contradicts the meaning of the non-empty Dharma teaching. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also says: 'That especially contradicts and harms the sūtras cited previously.' The proponent of emptiness says: I also have scriptural teachings, citing the previously stated Great Prajñā and others to prove and establish [my point]. The Yuktivāda says: Scriptural teachings have explicit and inexplicit meanings; because you contradict explicit teachings, you commit a fault. That is, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that in the second period, turning the wheel of the true Dharma with an esoteric mark and teaching that all is empty is not the truly definitive meaning. It also says: 'The absence of nature in marks, arising, and ultimacy—such I have entirely revealed. If one does not know this intention of the Buddha, one loses the correct path and cannot proceed.' Since the sūtra itself says that the absence of nature of all dharmas is an immeasurable esoteric mark and not the truly definitive meaning, now judging the teaching of emptiness as the foremost teaching is therefore a fault. Question: Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga both ascended to the Pramuditā-bhūmi and equally realized the dharma-nature, their wisdom and vision not differing; why do the teachings of the two schools differ? Answer: According to the supreme principle, it is equal and without distinction. The Buddha, facing the capacities and needs, taught explicitly and esoterically in different ways; bodhisattvas are also like this: facing what capacities are suited to hear, what they propagated differed. Due to clinging to the view of existence, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna esoterically propagated emptiness. If the view of emptiness arises, it also becomes an illness; therefore, one must dual-explain neither existent nor empty, leaving behind the two extremes and harmonizing with the middle way, as stated in the aforementioned Yogācārabhūmi commentary and other texts. Moreover, the Mahāyāna signless empty teaching, relying on the realm of true wisdom, dispels all marks and esoterically says that all is empty. The great bodhisattvas, facing the illness of clinging to existence, propagated this esoteric teaching, not that they failed to realize the middle way. Not [...] not realizing, broadly contradicting purity—how could bodhisattvas have any contradiction? Above, we have generally distinguished the schools. Depending on the Śūnyavāda or the Yuktivāda, the two truths propagated by them and clarified in this sūtra, as the Guṇaprabha Treatise explains, all converge into the two schools; the wise should understand this thoroughly. Specifying the main theme: because the title is named Prajñā, that is the main theme. Prajñā has three types: real-mark, contemplative illumination, and written words. The Tripiṭaka Master of Ci'en, relying on various sūtras and treatises, added two more types: namely, the objective realm and the retinue. In all, there are five dharmas: 1. nature of prajñā; 2. marks of prajñā; 3. causes of prajñā; 4. objects of prajñā; 5. companions of prajñā. Defining by their nature and taking them together, all are named prajñā. One opinion holds that this sūtra takes contemplative illumination as its theme, because it speaks of that which is able to sever; as the Great Sūtra says, among the six perfections, the perfection of prajñā is the island, the guide, the leader, the foremost, the torch, and so forth. Therefore, this solely takes the mark of wisdom as its theme, which is the non-conceptual fundamental and subsequently attained two wisdoms penetrating the emptiness of persons and dharmas; or taking the preparatory practices is also not contrary to principle, because the eighteen abodes comprehensively subsume the stages on the grounds. Another opinion holds that it also takes real-mark prajñā as the theme of the sūtra, because it is the nature that can sever, and wisdom arises only when true principle is the foundation; gold and jewels also illustrate the tathāgatagarbha; therefore the sūtra extensively clarifies the signless true principle, the ultimate fruit of the dharmakāya, which is precisely the proper object contemplated by signless wisdom. If one distinguishes the substance of suchness, various explanations differ, as narrated in the Commentary on the Sūtra on Purifying Karmic Obstacles. Question: Why not take the three such as written words? Answer: Because they are not what the sūtra directly clarifies, being [...] branch-ends, while these two are the root; because bodhi and nirvāṇa are their two substances; because the nature of the five dharmas subsumes the three bodies; and because they are the grasper and the grasped, the support and the supported, whether nature or mark, being the root of merits. The third gate is concluded. Fourth, the capacities suited to be addressed: first distinguish the natures of the faculties, and then address them with the teaching. [...] First, the difference in the natures of the faculties: the single vehicle and the five natures have been disputed since ancient times. Now briefly summarizing them, there are three differing explanations: One says: Sentient beings all possess Buddha-nature; there are definitively no fixed-nature two vehicles or those lacking nature. Fascicle 27 of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The lion's roar is the definitive teaching that all sentient beings universally have Buddha-nature.' It also says: 'All sentient beings all have minds; whoever has a mind will all attain anuttarabodhi; therefore I say that all sentient beings universally have Buddha-nature.' Also fascicle 37 says: 'For the sake of non-Buddha-nature, Buddha-nature is taught; non-Buddha-nature refers to insentient things such as walls, tiles, and stones; separated from such insentient things, it is called Buddha-nature.' Relying on this sūtra passage, it is not according to principle [to restrict it]: the five aggregates of sentient beings are not excluded, nor is it a minor fraction; because being separated from insentient things is Buddha-nature, how could one speak of non-Buddha-nature [among them]? Does Buddha-nature contain non-Buddha-nature, just as speaking of the unconditioned apart from conditioned dharmas means that within the unconditioned there is conditioned? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'All sentient beings all have three concentrations: superior, middling, and inferior. The superior is Buddha-nature; the middling is the first dhyāna; the inferior is the great earth.' The middling concentration is not a minor fraction, so we know that just as the superior concentration is also for all, belonging to the same text. Since it is called a concentration, it is not according to principle [to take it as mere nature], for the Śūraṅgama Samādhi is said to be Buddha-nature. The Lotus Sūtra says: 'For one great matter as the cause and condition, [Buddhas] appear in the world: desiring to cause sentient beings to open the Buddha's knowledge and vision and cause them to attain purity,' and so forth. It also says: 'In the Buddha-lands of the ten directions, there is only the stage of the One Vehicle; there is neither a second nor a third, except for the Buddha's expedient teachings, merely using provisional names to guide sentient beings.' The Fo Xing Lun (Buddha-Nature Treatise) says: 'The tathatā of twofold emptiness is named the cause of what should be attained; because the Buddha fruit should be attained, it is called what should be attained and known.' Thus those possessing the rational nature definitively possess practice and fruit; since the principle universally exists in all, practice and fruit are therefore not a minor fraction. If it is said that in the Lotus Sūtra the two vehicles have no extinction and will all become Buddhas, this teaching differs; the fixed two vehicles are not those of fixed nature. If not so, the indefinite [lineage] would also become Buddha's teaching, beginning with the first turning of the wheel of Dharma, having them speak on equal terms. If they were the same, why was there the earnest three-fold request before granting the teaching, causing the arrogant to rise in deceit and fright, and Śāriputra and others to suspect the Buddha was Māra? Truly because present and past are vastly disparate, there were these doubts and inquiries. Thus the sūtra says, 'The reason it was never taught before is that the time to speak had not yet arrived; now is precisely the time to definitively teach the Great Vehicle.' Thus we know it was meant to be taught together, not taught previously.
1.2
The second [view] states: There are five lineages: first, the śrāvaka lineage; second, the pratyekabuddha lineage; third, the Tathāgata lineage; fourth, the indeterminate lineage; fifth, the lack of lineage. Question: How is it known that there is the presence or absence of lineage? Answer: Both the four-fascicle and eight-fascicle versions of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra say that the icchantika of great compassion and the [icchantika who has severed all roots of goodness] ultimately do not achieve awakening. If all possessed the lineage, then sentient beings would eventually all attain buddhahood; how could Great Compassion ultimately never achieve it? Furthermore, the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says that sentient beings who are devoid of good spiritual friends, devoid of hearing [the Dharma], and act contrary to Dharma are matured through the wholesome roots of humans and devas. The Bodhisattva-bhadra-śīla Sūtra says that because a person of no lineage lacks the lineage, even though they generate the intention and strive with diligence, they ultimately cannot attain unexcelled bodhi. The Bodhisattvabhūmi and Yogācāra[bhūmi] share this statement. Furthermore, among the three kinds of sick persons in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the third, whether encountering or not encountering a fine physician, definitely does not recover; if they possess the lineage, how could they not recover? Furthermore, among the seven persons in the Ganges, the first corresponds to [this]; each of the seven persons corresponds to one, and that one is the one without lineage. The first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra states that there are two kinds of icchantika: first, the temporary; second, the ultimate. As for the temporary, there are four: first, one who exclusively performs evil; second, one who completely severs all wholesome dharmas; third, one who lacks the wholesome roots conducive to liberation; fourth, one whose wholesome roots are incomplete. As for the one who ultimately lacks the dharma of nirvāṇa, because they lack the cause, they lack the lineage of parinirvāṇa; that is, they only seek saṃsāra and take no pleasure in nirvāṇa. However, some explain: 'Ultimate' means, first, in terms of severed wholesome [roots], simultaneously [severing] innate wholesome [roots], severing the causes of the three times completely—this is called ultimately lacking the nature of nirvāṇa; second, in terms of time, because there are dull-rooted ones who transmigrate for a long time and cannot generate [it], it is called ultimately lacking the dharma of nirvāṇa; it does not mean definitely lacking the nature to the exhaustion of the future limit is called ultimate. This explanation is not correct. Those who sever wholesome roots only sever the innate, not the acquired wholesome roots. Furthermore, they suppress the active manifestation, but are not without the seeds; how could they lack the cause? Also, there would be no difference from the temporary complete severing of wholesome dharmas. Furthermore, those who sever wholesome roots in both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras and treatises are all sharp-rooted, not dull-rooted ones. 'Ultimate' and 'to the exhaustion of the future limit' differ in wording but are identical in meaning. If this were not so, then 'ultimate like space' would not be all-pervading in the dharmadhātu. Furthermore, in the sixty-seventh fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi there are five objections and six answers, extensively establishing the absence of lineage; we shall set aside reciting them here.
1.3
The above concerned the absence of lineage. Next, establishing the determinate lineages: according to fascicle 593 of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, Jinadatta requested, saying: 'We only pray that the World-Honoured One, having pity on us, will fully expound the realm and wisdom of the Tathāgata. If there are sentient beings whose lineage is determinate in the śrāvaka vehicle, having heard this Dharma they will quickly be able to realize their own stage of the [four noble] truths. For those whose lineage is determinate in the pratyekabuddha vehicle, having heard this Dharma they will quickly rely on their own vehicle to attain emancipation,' and so forth, down to: 'If there are sentient beings who, although not yet entered into the certainty of realization, are indeterminate in the lineages of the three vehicles, having heard this Dharma they will quickly generate the aspiration for unexcelled, perfect awakening.' Since outside of the determinate, the indeterminate is spoken of separately, it clearly shows that there are separately determinate śrāvakas. Furthermore, the seventy-sixth fascicle of the Yogācāra[bhūmi] and the second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana both speak of śrāvakas who exclusively head toward quiescent cessation. The fortieth fascicle of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra speaks of determinate-nature pratyekabuddhas; the first fascicle of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra does likewise. In the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, fascicle thirty, in the Sūtra on the Characteristics of Non-Self, for the monks the path of the one vehicle, one practice, one object is expounded, down to: 'My disciples, having heard me speak thus, do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Tathāgata says that srotāpannas down to arhats are all able to become buddhas."' If all become buddhas and there were no determinate lineage, this would be understanding the Buddha's intention; why would this statement be needed? If so, how is it that in the Lotus Sūtra only the one vehicle is expounded as ultimate? Answer: As in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it is harmonized through ten meanings; the Saṃdhinirmocana also has a text harmonizing the one vehicle. In general, according to the sūtras and treatises: buddha-nature has three kinds, śrāvakas have four kinds, and icchantikas have three kinds. The three kinds of buddha-nature are: first, the nature of principle, namely tathatā; second, the nature of practice, namely uncontaminated seeds; third, the concealed nature, which is the time of suffering and toil. The four kinds of śrāvakas are: first, the apparitional; second, those who have regressed from the bodhicitta; third, the haughty; fourth, those heading toward quiescent cessation. The three kinds of icchantika are: first, the Mahāyāna [icchantika]; second, those who have severed wholesome [roots]; third, those without lineage. The two schools above have cited scriptural texts and both have clear statements. The five explanations resolving objections and reconciling contradictory texts are investigated one by one in detail as in the separate record; those who delight in extensive exposition and diligently expound the Dharma should recount them all.
1.4
The third [view] states: This having of lineage and lacking of lineage is the secret realm of the Tathāgata's teaching, dispersed among the various sūtras, and the Buddha does not speak of it determinately. How can the previous commentators desire to determinately judge right and wrong? Because this is known by the power of knowing the various dispositions among the ten powers, only a buddha together with a buddha can know and verify each one. Fascicle seventeen of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Regarding the various explanations of the three vehicles: the Dharma of the one vehicle is expounded as three according to suitability,' down to: 'Because the Tathāgata clearly sees the capacities of sentient beings, he is ultimately free from falsity and severs faults and errors. Although free from falsity, if he knows that sentient beings will gain the benefit of the Dharma through false words, he expounds them in accordance with expediency.' These, then, are the profound realms of the buddhas, not known by the two vehicles. Relying on this scriptural passage, how can ordinary mortals mistakenly deliberate on it? Furthermore, fascicle thirty-four of that [sūtra] says: 'Good sons, the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, for the sake of sentient beings, expounds the brief within the extensive, and expounds the extensive within the brief,' down to: 'Therefore, [speaking] according to the person, according to the intent, and according to the time is called the Tathāgata's power of knowing the various faculties. Good sons, if I were to give a determinate explanation regarding such meanings, I could not be called a Tathāgata who possesses the power of knowing the faculties.' Fascicle thirty-five says: 'Good sons, this dispute of the Tathāgata is the realm of the buddhas, not what is known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. If someone gives rise to doubt about this, they can still destroy the Mount Sumeru of immeasurable afflictions; if someone gives rise to determination regarding it, this is called clinging,' down to: 'Good sons, such clinging is not called good. Why? Because it cannot destroy the net of doubts.' Kāśyapa said again: 'World-Honoured One, such a person fundamentally does not doubt; why say that they do not destroy the net of doubts?' 'Good sons, their doubt itself is doubt.' Fascicle thirty-six says: 'Good sons, although I say that all sentient beings possess the buddha-nature, sentient beings do not understand the words spoken in accordance with the Buddha's own intent by the buddhas, tathāgatas, and so forth. Good sons, such words cannot even be understood by bodhisattvas in their final rebirth, let alone by the two vehicles and the remaining bodhisattvas.' Furthermore, a later passage says: 'If someone says that all sentient beings definitely have the buddha-nature or definitely lack the buddha-nature, such persons are all called defamers of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha.' In accordance with these texts, we attribute the merit to the Buddha and merely record them with reverence. Therefore, regarding the various commentaries, one may accept or reject according to one's inclination, for their teachings and reasons are equally balanced; one should not give rise to partisan clinging among them and forcibly produce biased views, claiming to accord with the Buddha's word—there is no truth in that. However, one should fully recount the teachings and reasonings of the various schools, wishing to let scholars know their positions. Question: The principle has only one superiority; both should not be correct. In unravelling and explaining the treasury of teachings, one must determine where they lead. Now, merely moderating the light and making an indeterminate explanation, what will this cause later students to rely upon? Answer: Regarding meanings, there are those that can be determined and those that cannot be determined; when an indeterminate meaning has an excess of reasonings, to demand that it be determinately explained in an exclusive manner—when even the Buddha did not determine it, who would dare determine it? Question: It is secret and difficult to know, truly as you have said. Sentient beings in this land delight in hearing of the buddha-nature; why did the Tathāgata not make a determinate explanation? Answer: Who says they exclusively delight in hearing that it exists? Yet the buddhas' sentient beings naturally have two kinds: First, hearing of the buddha-nature, they rejoice that they have a basis and advance vigorously; if they were to hear that there is no lineage, having nothing to rely on, they would give up the mind of gratitude and distance. Second, if they hear that a portion lacks the lineage, fearing that they might fall into this condition, they add exertion to cultivate and practice; if they hear that all possess this buddha-nature, they instead produce indolence. Due to differences in corresponding faculties, the teachings are indeterminate. Clearly, one need only strive diligently, firmly gather practices and vows, and behold the golden countenance face-to-face—then one will naturally know it.
1.5
The above explained the differences in roots and lineages. As for those addressed by the sūtra: if relying on the first explanation, there is no further dispute; but those of the five-lineage school must distinguish them. In terms of those primarily addressed, it is solely the superior vehicle, because the sūtra says: 'expounded for the sake of those who have set forth in the Great Vehicle,' which is what other sūtras call: 'expounded for bodhisattvas in response to the six pāramitās, now attaining sarvākārajñatā.' If in terms of those secondarily addressed, it extends to the two vehicles and those without lineage, because the four assemblies and eight classes [of beings] listed below are not excluded. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'Prajñāpāramitā is able to distinguish the stages of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas,' which is the passage on Jinadatta cited earlier, also addressing the two vehicles. Below this, the vast mind of the bodhisattva causes [beings of] the three realms and the four modes of birth to be completely brought to nirvāṇa. Bodhisattva Asaṅga asked: 'Why vow for this unattainable meaning?' The answer is: 'Because it encompasses sentient beings, there is no error.' This will be understood below.
1.6.1
Fifth, as for directly explaining [the sūtra] relying on the text, there are two parts: first, explaining the title, and then explaining the text of the sūtra. Regarding the explanation of the sūtra title: The translations of the Qin, Wei, and Liang all have the title *Vajra-prajñā*. The two versions of the Tang dynasty are both entitled *Vajracchedikā* [Vessel That Can Cut Diamond / Vajra-Cutter]. The translation made in the Sui dynasty, according to its treatise, was entitled *Vajra-Cutter* [Vajracchedikā]. The first two versions are abbreviated, whereas the latter three are complete. [The former] adduce the essence to subsume the function, merely presenting the names of the phenomenon and the simile; [the latter] illuminate both essence and function, concurrently setting forth the cause of cutting off. Although broad and abbreviated differ, their meaning does not conflict. First comes the separate explanation, followed by the combined explanation. In Sanskrit it is called *vajra*; here translated as *jingang* (diamond / adamantine). It is the most supreme among jewels, and its substance and types are manifold. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Śakra has a jewel named *vajra*, which cannot be seen by other sentient beings." The records of Paramārtha say: "There are six kinds of jewels, all named *vajra*: First, mostly blue, which can eliminate all disasters and perils; second, yellow, which can produce various things according to what people need; third, red, which can enable people to travel through the sky; fourth, white, which can produce water and purify turbid water; fifth, sky-coloured, which can produce fire; sixth, emerald green, which can neutralize all poisons." The above explains the substance of the simile. Next, we bring up the meaning and function. First relying on various teachings, and then based on this treatise: Among various teachings, as the twenty-fourth fascicle of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* extensively praises the vajra-samādhi: "Just as wherever a vajra is struck, nothing is not shattered and destroyed, yet the vajra itself suffers no damage"; and it also says: "Just as vajra is the most supreme among all jewels." According to the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, Vasubandhu Bodhisattva explains the four meanings of the vajra-concentration as similes: First, it can destroy afflictions; second, it can induce remainingless merit; third, it is solid and indestructible; fourth, its sharp function penetrates all dharmas. Concentration being like this, by analogy wisdom is also the same. The twelfth fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* explains four meanings of the vajra-concentration: First, uninterrupted, because it is not interrupted or deficient due to worldly practice; second, firm, because it can destroy all obstacles and is not itself destroyed; third, of one taste, because its non-conceptual nature is purely of one taste; fourth, all-pervading, because it takes the common-characteristic tathatā of all dharmas as its cognitive sphere. Vajra also has four [meanings]: First, its substance is without gaps, not impeded by sand or stone; second, it is knowable; third, it is of one pure kind, unchanging and undifferentiated; fourth, it pervades the world, as in the vajra-wheel, vajra-mountains, vajra-seat, vajra-sceptre, and so forth. Comprehensively gathering the various texts, vajra has ten meanings: 1. Most supreme; 2. Difficult to see; 3. Eliminating disasters; 4. Solid; 5. Granting wishes; 6. Capable of leading [to merit]; 7. Sharp function; 8. Uninterrupted; 9. Of one taste; 10. All-pervading. The text and meaning of this sūtra also have ten kinds: Because it is the utmost, primary, and rare teaching; because its meaning and fruition are inconceivable; because sinful karma and obstructive afflictions are eradicated; because it can shatter firm attachments to what is not that; because it benefits sentient beings, adorns buddha-lands, and attains bodhi; because it can generate all buddhas and gather good dharmas; because it penetrates selflessness and its vision of wisdom is pure; because it is not mixed with conceptualized marks; because the meaning of 'thusness' of all dharmas is unconditioned in essence; because its merit and wisdom are like space and immeasurable. Corresponding to the preceding ten similes, they are matched and explained in sequence. Although these meanings are complete, they are not the intention of the root treatise. The root treatise has four meanings: 1. Subtle; 2. Firm; 3. Capable of cutting; 4. Similar. The first three are common meanings: contemplation of the true mark pervades all teachings. The last one is uncommon: the text-prajñā is unique to this sūtra and treatise. First, marking that it says 'vajra capable of cutting', one should know that this designation corresponds to two meanings, just as it is said of 'entering the practice of right view' and 'entering the practice of wrong view'. However, in explaining this text, doctrinal accounts differ. Ci'en explains: Corresponding to two meanings reveals that vajra extends to both that which counteracts and that which is counteracted. The phrase 'just as it is said' below is an explanation by giving an example. Right view refers to the group determined in correctness; wrong view refers to the group determined in falsehood. Practicing good or bad deeds capable of entering those groups is called those two practices. Or, pointing generally, it means: Just as it is said that two persons, good and bad, practice good and bad deeds, this practice enters the category of right views, and this practice enters the category of wrong views. Though right and wrong are distinct, both are called 'practices of view'. Here, the counteracting three wisdoms and the counteracted two obstacles, although defiled and wholesome differ, are both named vajra. Just as the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: "A vajra is extremely firm, and ten thousand things cannot destroy it, except for a white ram's horn and a turtle's shell." The intention is that, corresponding to their states, the earthly obstacles cannot be cut off by ordinary beings and the two vehicles; only the three wisdoms that have aroused the great mind of bodhi can subdue them, either by subduing or cutting them off. This takes what is cut off as the simile of the vajra, like 'entering the practice of wrong view'. Furthermore, just as the nature of jade and stone is extremely solid and not destroyed by objects, and only a vajra can shatter it, the two obstacles are also like this: they are not shattered by the conventional wisdom of ordinary beings or the true wisdom of the two vehicles, because the two vehicles do not cut off the latent propensities of the afflictive obstacles. Only the three wisdoms of the Great Vehicle, like that vajra, can subdue and cut them off. Since at the stage of ultimate cutting off there is the cultivation-wisdom of vajra, the sūtra only speaks of vajra as a simile for concentration. This is taking that which can cut off as the simile of the vajra, like 'entering the practice of right view'. Hence it is said there are two meanings: first, the meaning of what is broken; second, the meaning of what can break. If it were only what can break, the simile of the two views, wrong and right, would not correspond. However, the text of the treatise is brief and does not explicitly bring out the counteracted vajra; it is only revealed by being contained within 'capable of cutting'. Henan explains again: Vajra is only a simile for the three wisdoms and the teaching. Why so? The simile of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* is that vajra is extremely firm and nothing can destroy it, except turtle shells, etc. That sūtra is also like this: only an icchantika is excepted, whose cause of bodhi cannot be established. Since the ram's horn and the like are used as similes for the icchantika, it is clear that what cannot be cut off is called vajra. And as for saying 'two meanings': first, realizing the principle of tathatā, like entering the practice of right view; second, cutting off all afflictions, like entering the practice of wrong view. This vajra-wisdom can break [the obstacles of] people of the Great Vehicle who possess roots of goodness and whose faculties are mature; it cannot remove the two heavy obstacles and afflictions in the bodies of those persons whose roots of goodness are cut off. There is yet another explanation saying: According to the phrase 'vajra is difficult to break' in the topic-collection at the beginning of this treatise, it is clear that it is not what is cut off. Although it is said in other places that afflictions are hard to cut off just like a vajra, here, saying that they can be cut off, it is inappropriate to use vajra as a simile. Just as an icchantika is said to be difficult to convert using the simile of scorched grain; if an icchantika were said to be treatable, this simile would not be used. And as for the correspondence to two meanings: vajra can cut both firm and non-firm objects, which is called the two meanings. The commentary [by Yan] says: The first explanation is superior, because it accords with the treatise's text. Primarily, it takes the vajra as a simile for the wisdom capable of cutting, and secondarily as a simile for what is cut off to reveal the function of wisdom. The second fascicle of the *Daśacakra-sūtra* says: "How can one break continuity like a vajra?" Afflictions have many pathways in principle; how could the simile be fixed?
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