維摩經疏 1.9

1.9

自下文殊設兩關難。第一文殊執理徵事難。維摩舉事顯理答第二文殊執理窮詮難。維摩拂詮顯理答先明第一執理徵事難。又問空何用空又問空執理。何用空徵事。若使理體不是空。可許却物作事空。此室理體自是空。何須除去室中物。自下明舉事顯理答。答曰以無分別空故空。以無分別空者。眾生不解理空故。言無分別空故空者。故作事空用顯理空。令彼眾生尋事悟理。又復理空冥莫難知。非詮不顯故將事空為筌用顯理空。是故除去室中物作事空也。自下第二執理窮筌難。維摩拂筌顯理答。先明執理窮筌。又問。空可分別耶。又問空執理可分別耶。窮筌。又問。理空可得以事空分別理空耶。若使理空之外有事空。可許將事分別理空。理空之外本無事。云何以事顯理空。自下拂筌顯理。答曰分別亦空。能分別之事空亦是理空。眾生未解理空時。作彼事空分別理空若也。解彼理空竟即知分別亦理空。上來難訖。

Below, Mañjuśrī sets forth two objections. First, Mañjuśrī clings to principle to challenge phenomena, and Vimalakīrti adduces phenomena to reveal principle in his answer; second, Mañjuśrī clings to principle to press upon the verbal expression, and Vimalakīrti sweeps away verbal expression to reveal principle in his answer. First, he clarifies the first objection, clinging to principle to challenge phenomena. He also asks, 'What need is there for emptiness to be empty?' 'Also asks, "emptiness"' clings to principle; 'what need is there for emptiness?' challenges phenomena: 'If the substance of principle were not empty, it could be permitted to remove things to produce the emptiness of phenomena. Since the substance of principle in this room is naturally empty, why is there a need to remove the things in the room?' Below, he clarifies the answer adducing phenomena to reveal principle: 'He answered, "It is empty through nonconceptual emptiness." "Through nonconceptual emptiness" means that sentient beings do not understand the emptiness of principle. Saying "empty through nonconceptual emptiness" means intentionally producing the emptiness of phenomena in order to reveal the emptiness of principle, causing those sentient beings to follow phenomena and awaken to principle. Furthermore, the emptiness of principle is obscure and difficult to know; unless verbally expressed it cannot be revealed, and so taking the emptiness of phenomena as a snare reveals the emptiness of principle. Therefore, the things in the room are removed to produce the emptiness of phenomena.' Below is the second objection, clinging to principle to press upon the verbal expression, and Vimalakīrti sweeps away verbal expression to reveal principle in his answer. First, it clarifies clinging to principle to press upon the verbal expression: 'He also asked, "Can emptiness be conceptualised?"' 'Also asked, "emptiness"' clings to principle; 'can it be conceptualised?' presses upon the verbal expression. He also asks: 'Can the emptiness of principle be conceptualised through the emptiness of phenomena? If there were an emptiness of phenomena outside the emptiness of principle, it could be permitted to use phenomena to conceptualise the emptiness of principle. Originally there are no phenomena outside the emptiness of principle; how can one use phenomena to reveal the emptiness of principle?' Below, he sweeps away the verbal expression to reveal principle: 'He answered, "Conceptualisation is also empty." The emptiness of phenomena that is able to conceptualise is also the emptiness of principle. When sentient beings have not yet understood the emptiness of principle, they make that emptiness of phenomena to conceptualise the emptiness of principle. If they then understand that emptiness of principle, they immediately know that conceptualisation is also the emptiness of principle.' The above concludes the objections.