唯識三十論要釋 1.37

1.37

釋曰。此三行頌釋三性難。初一頌明遍計所執。於中初句顯能遍計。第二示所遍計境。後半方申遍計所執。能遍計者。謂六七識周遍計度故名遍計。品類眾多故言彼彼。計度分別為能遍計。以五八識無計度故。執我法者必由有慧。第八不與慧相應故。五識雖與微慧相應。但任運緣無計度故。末那雖不遍緣諸境。亦名意識。能執類故。所遍計者是依他起。遍計心等所緣緣故。圓成實性非是彼境。真非妄執所緣境故。依展轉說亦所遍計。遍計所執雖是彼境。而非所緣緣故非所遍計。遍計所執其相云何。與依他起復有何別。謂有一切心及心所由熏習力所變二分從緣生故皆依他起。遍計依斯妄執定實有無一異俱不俱等。此二方名遍計所執。此所執性都無所有。教理推微不可得故。其次半頌顯依他起。所言分別緣所生者。以諸染淨心心所法皆名分別。別緣遍故。是則一切染淨依他皆是此中依他起攝。後一頌半顯圓成實。即前二句正顯其性。其次三句顯與依他非一非異。其第四句顯由證此了依他幻。二空所顯圓滿成就諸法實性名圓成實。顯此遍常體非虛謬。簡自共相虛空我等。無漏有為離倒究竟勝用周遍亦得此名。然今頌中說初非後。此即於彼依他起上常遠離前遍計所執。二空所顯真如為性。說於彼言顯圓成實與依他起不即不離。常遠離言顯妄所執能所二取理恒非有。前言義顯不空依他。性顯二空非圓成實。真如離有離無性故。由前理故。此圓成實與彼依他起非異非不異。異應真如非彼實性。不異此性應是無常。彼此應淨非淨境。則本後智用應無別。如彼無常無我等性與行等法非一非異。異應彼法非無常等。不異此應非彼共相。由斯喻顯此圓成實與依他起非一非異。法與法性理必應然。勝義世俗相待立故。非不證見此圓成實而能見彼依他起性。未達遍計所執性空。不如實知依他有故。無分別智證真如已。後得智中方能了達依他起性如幻事等。此中意說。三種自性皆不遠離心心所法。謂心心所及所變現眾緣生故。如幻事等非有似有誑惑愚夫。一切皆名依他起性。愚夫於此橫執我法有無一異俱不俱等。如空花等性相都無。一切皆名遍計所執。依他起上彼所妄執我法俱空。此空所顯識等真性名圓成實。是故此三不離心等。虛空擇滅非擇滅等何性所攝。三性容攝。心等變似虛空等相隨心生故依他起攝。愚夫於此妄執實有。此即遍計所執性攝。若於真如假施設有虛空等義圓成實攝。有漏心等定屬依他。無漏心等容二性攝。眾緣生故攝屬依他。無顛倒故圓成實攝。三性五事相攝云何。諸聖教說相攝不定。依不雜亂義相說者說。依他起攝彼相名分別正智。圓成實性攝彼真如。遍計所執不攝五事。彼說有漏心心所法變似所詮說名為相。似能詮現施設為名。能變心等立為分別。無漏心等離戲論故。但總名正智。不說能所詮。四從緣生皆依他起。三解脫門所行境界與此三性相攝云何。理實皆通隨相各一。空無相願如次應知。緣此復生三無生忍。一本性無生忍。二自然無生忍。三惑苦無生忍。如次此三是此境故。此三云何攝彼二諦。應知世俗具此三種。勝義唯是圓成實性。世俗有三。一假世俗。二行世俗。三顯了世俗。如次應知即此三性。勝義有三。一義勝義。謂即真如勝之義故。二得勝義。謂即涅槃勝即義故。三行勝義。謂即聖道勝為義故。無變無倒隨其所應故。皆攝在圓成實性。如是三性何智所行。遍計所執都非智所行。以無自體非所緣緣故。愚夫執有。聖者達無。亦得說為凡聖智境。依他起性二智所行。圓成實性唯聖智境。此三性中幾假幾實。遍計所執妄安立故可說為假。無體相故非假非實。依他起性有實有假。眾集相續分位性故說為假有。心心所色從緣生故說為實有。若無實法。假法亦無。假依實因而施設故。圓成實性唯是實有。不依他緣而施設故。此三為異為不異耶。應說俱非。無別體故。妄執緣起真義別故。如是三性義類無邊。恐文增廣略示綱要。自下通釋三無性難。論生起云。若有三性。如何世尊說一切法皆無自性。頌曰。

Commentary: These three verses explain the objections concerning the three natures (tri-svabhāva). The first verse clarifies the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva); within it, the first line shows the active imaginer, the second shows the object that is imagined, and the second half sets forth the imagined nature itself. As for the active imaginer: the sixth and seventh consciousnesses evaluate universally, and thus are called "imagination"; their categories are manifold, hence it says "each and every." Discriminative evaluation constitutes the active imaginer, because the fifth and eighth consciousnesses are without evaluation. Grasping at ātman and dharmas necessarily requires wisdom (prajñā); the eighth consciousness is not associated with wisdom. Although the five consciousnesses are associated with subtle wisdom, they only take objects spontaneously and lack evaluation. Although manas does not take all objects universally, it is also named mano[-vijñāna] because it is capable of grasping categories. The object that is imagined is the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), because it serves as the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya) for the imagining mind and so forth. The perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) is not its object, because the true is not an object taken by false grasping; in an indirect sense, it is also said to be imagined. Although the imagined nature is its object, it is not an objective condition and therefore is not an object that is imagined. What is the characteristic of the imagined nature? And what distinction does it have from the dependent? Namely, all minds and caittas, by the power of perfuming (vāsanā), transform into the two parts [of nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga]; because they arise from conditions, they are all dependent. Imagination, based upon this, falsely grasps them as definitively real, existent or nonexistent, identical or different, both or neither, and so forth; these two aspects are only then named the imagined nature. This grasped nature is completely nonexistent, because when investigated thoroughly through scripture and reason, it cannot be found. Next, half a verse shows the dependent nature. As for what is said, "arisen from conditions of discrimination": because all defiled and pure minds and caittas are called "discrimination," discrimination conditions them comprehensively. Thus, all defiled and pure dependents are included herein under the dependent nature. The final verse and a half show the perfected nature. The first two lines directly show its nature. The next three lines show that it is neither different nor non-different from the dependent. Its fourth line shows that through realising this, one understands the illusion of the dependent. The true nature of all dharmas, which is revealed by the twofold emptiness (śūnyatā) and is completely perfected, is called the perfected nature. This shows that it is omnipresent and eternal, and its essence is not erroneous; this excludes individual and common characteristics, space (ākāśa), ātman, and the like. Uncontaminated conditioned dharmas, because they are free from inversion, are ultimate, and their superior function is all-pervading, also obtain this name. However, now in the verse, the former is spoken of, not the latter. That is to say, on that dependent nature, it is eternally separated from the former imagined nature; its nature is tathatā revealed by the twofold emptiness. Saying "upon that" shows that the perfected nature and the dependent nature are neither identical nor separate. Saying "eternally separated" shows that the two graspings, subject and object, which are falsely grasped, are by principle constantly nonexistent. The word "former" implicitly shows that the dependent is not empty. "Nature" shows that the twofold emptiness is not the perfected nature, because tathatā is free from the nature of existence and nonexistence. By the aforementioned principle, this perfected nature and that dependent nature are neither different nor non-different. If different, tathatā would not be the real nature of that [dependent]; if non-different, this nature would be impermanent. The one and the other would respectively be pure and impure objects, and then the functions of fundamental and subsequent wisdom would not be distinct. Just as the nature of impermanence, non-self, and so forth is neither one with nor different from dharmas such as conditioned formations—if different, those dharmas would not be impermanent, etc.; if non-different, this [nature] would not be their common characteristic. By this analogy, it is shown that this perfected nature and the dependent nature are neither one nor different. As between dharma and dharmatā, the principle must necessarily be so, because ultimate truth and conventional truth are established in mutual dependence. It is not the case that without having realised and seen this perfected nature, one can see that dependent nature. Since one has not yet penetrated the emptiness of the imagined nature, one does not know the existence of the dependent in accordance with reality. Only after non-discriminative wisdom has realised tathatā can one, within subsequent wisdom, fully penetrate the dependent nature as being like an illusion or the like. The intention here is to say: the three self-natures are all not separate from minds and caittas. Namely, because minds, caittas, and what they transform and manifest arise from multiple conditions, they are like illusions, etc., nonexistent yet appearing as existent, deceiving and deluding foolish commoners; they are all called the dependent nature. Foolish commoners, with regard to this, arbitrarily grasp at ātman, dharmas, existence, nonexistence, identity, difference, both, neither, and so forth; like flowers in the sky, their nature and characteristics are completely nonexistent; they are all called the imagined nature. On the dependent nature, the ātman and dharmas falsely grasped by them are both empty; the true nature of consciousness and so forth revealed by this emptiness is called the perfected nature. Therefore, these three are not separate from mind and so on. Under which nature are space (ākāśa), cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), cessation not through deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and so on subsumed? They can be subsumed under the three natures. When mind and so forth transform to resemble the mark of space and so on, they arise in accordance with mind, and thus are subsumed under the dependent; foolish commoners falsely grasp these as truly existent, and this is subsumed under the imagined nature; if, with regard to tathatā, space and so forth are provisionally posited (prajñapti), they are subsumed under the perfected nature. Contaminated minds and so forth definitively belong to the dependent; uncontaminated minds and so forth can be subsumed under two natures: because they arise from multiple conditions, they are subsumed under the dependent; because they are non-inverted, they are subsumed under the perfected nature. How do the three natures and the five dharmas (pañca-vastu) subsume each other? Various sacred teachings state their mutual subsumption non-definitively. According to the explanation based on their unconfused characteristics: the dependent subsumes nimitta (mark), nāma (name), vikalpa (discrimination), and samyag-jñāna (correct wisdom); the perfected nature subsumes tathatā; the imagined nature does not subsume the five dharmas. That explanation says: contaminated minds and caittas transform to resemble the signified, which is called nimitta; appearing to resemble the signifier, they are provisionally posited as nāma; the minds and caittas capable of transforming are established as vikalpa. Because uncontaminated minds and caittas are free from conceptual proliferation (prapañca), they are merely collectively called samyag-jñāna, without speaking of signifier and signified. All four arise from conditions and are dependent. How do the spheres of activity of the three doors of liberation (vimokṣa-mukha) and these three natures subsume each other? In principle and truth, all three apply throughout; according to their respective characteristics, each corresponds to one: emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (animitta), and wishlessness (apraṇihita) should be known in that order. Conditioned by these, there further arise three endurances of non-arising (anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti): first, the endurance of the non-arising of original nature; second, the endurance of natural non-arising; third, the endurance of the non-arising of affliction and suffering; because, in that order, these three [natures] are their objects. How do these three subsume the two truths (satya-dvaya)? It should be known that the conventional truth possesses all three; the ultimate truth is solely the perfected nature. Conventional truth is threefold: first, conventionality of prajñapti; second, conventionality of activity; third, conventionality of manifestation; in that order, they should be known as these three natures. Ultimate truth is threefold: first, the ultimate of reality, meaning tathatā, because it is the reality of the ultimate; second, the ultimate of attainment, meaning nirvāṇa, because the ultimate itself is the attainment; third, the ultimate of practice, meaning the holy path, because the holy is the practice of the ultimate. Because they are immutable and non-inverted according to what is appropriate, they are all subsumed within the perfected nature. By what wisdom are these three natures accessed as spheres of activity? The imagined nature is completely not a sphere of activity for wisdom, because having no self-essence, it is not an objective condition. Foolish commoners grasp it as existent, while holy ones penetrate it as nonexistent; it may also be called an object of the wisdom of ordinary persons and holy ones. The dependent nature is the sphere of activity of two wisdoms. The perfected nature is solely the sphere of holy wisdom. Among these three natures, how many are provisional and how many are real? The imagined nature, because it is falsely established, can be called provisional; because it is without substantial marks, it is neither provisional nor real. The dependent nature has both real and provisional: because it is of the nature of aggregation, continuity, and states, it is said to be provisionally existent; because mind, caittas, and rūpa arise from conditions, they are said to be substantially existent. If there were no real dharmas, provisional dharmas would also not exist, because the provisional is posited in reliance upon real causes. The perfected nature is solely substantially existent, because it is posited without relying on other conditions. Are these three different or non-different? One should say that they are both neither: because there is no separate essence, yet the falsely grasped, the conditioned arising, and the true meaning are distinct. The meanings and categories of these three natures are boundless; fearing that the text would expand too much, their essential principles have been briefly indicated. Below, the objection concerning the three non-natures (tri-niḥsvabhāvatā) is explained generally. The treatise introduces it, saying: "If there are three natures, how is it that the World-Honoured One said that all dharmas are without self-nature?" The verse says: