大乘百法明門論開宗義決 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

Now, broadly expounding the grand doctrine relies upon uninhibited eloquence; setting forth the manifold tenets in detail necessarily depends upon accumulated treatises. Therefore, the Perfectly Awakened One spoke the sūtras, and the bodhisattvas composed the treatises. The gateways of the teaching were broadly expounded, and commentaries and sub-commentaries flourished in profusion. They blocked those heterodox teachers, opened wide this noble path, spread abroad the ocean of wisdom, raised aloft the high mountain of principles, cast far the clouds of compassion, and universally showered the rain of the Dharma. Being dim and ignorant, I presumptuously received their transmission and study. Initially, in my native region, I applied myself to vijñapti-mātra and the Kośa; later, traveling to the capital Jinghao, I focused on the Awakening of Faith and the Diamond Sūtra. Although I did not plumb the deep subtleties, I roughly knew the basic contours. When I returned to Hexi, I was just about to engage in propagation. It was a time of moral decline and an age of distress and peril. Those who turned toward the Way were pressed for food and clothing; students toiled ceaselessly in attending their masters. At small treatises and small sūtras they already felt as if facing a sheer precipice; before grand commentaries and extensive sub-commentaries, their minds gave up in despair. Blind to the Three Jewels throughout their whole lives, foolish regarding the Four Noble Truths to the end of their days. Deeply moved by this wasted life, I lamented their enduring delusion. In some cases, I supplied the omissions of former practitioners to complete extensive explanations; in others, I pruned the diffuse clutter of ancient virtues to fashion concise treatises. First, in Shuofang, I composed the Jin gang zhi zan (Praise on the Purport of the Diamond Sūtra); next, in Liangcheng, I composed the Qi xin xiao wen (Elucidation of the Awakening of Faith); later, in Shazhou, I composed the Ru dao ci di kai jue (Decisions on the Stages of Entering the Way) and composed the Bai fa lun kai zong yi ji (Record of the Doctrinal Essentials Revealing the Doctrine of the Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas). Fearing that the purport of this commentary was too remote and its text too obscure for students to investigate, I further drew broadly upon manifold tenets to decide and resolve the text of the commentary, so that those disciples who had gone astray might succeed in their practice. The time was the Great Tang, the ninth year of Dali, the year of [jiazi, the first day of the sixth month].

1.3

Regarding "Teaching that establishes the definitive meaning based on the ālayavijñāna, etc.": According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, among all the noble teachings, if they have not established the ālayavijñāna, none are of definitive meaning, but accord with the Hīnayāna tenets as teaching that accords with provisional reasoning. If they have already established the ālayavijñāna, one should know that they are all the definitive Mahāyāna. This treatise arises relying upon this definitive teaching.

1.4

Regarding "Generating deep compassion based on the fundamental and subsequently attained wisdoms, etc.": Due to the mūla-jñāna, identity of substance is generated; arising the pṛṣṭha-labdha-jñāna, seeing suffering, compassion is generated. Identical-in-substance wisdom and compassion is truly deep! This compassion and wisdom are the bodhisattva's practice. Composing the treatise based on them is relying on wondrous practice.

1.5

Regarding "The third, generating perfect illumination, etc.": Question: What is the difference between this and generating resolute conviction? Answer: The former departs from the two extremes; this accords with the middle path. The former departs from one-sided views; this generates perfect wisdom. The former generates understanding in reference to the principle; this accomplishes realization relying on the object. Because the signified meanings are distinct, they are divided into two gateways.

1.6

Regarding "Fully explaining the ultimate and conventional, mutually revealing existence and emptiness, etc.": Among the five categories of dharmas, the first four dharmas fully explain the saṃvṛti-satya; the fifth, the asaṃskṛta, fully explains the paramārtha-satya. The first five kinds of dharmas reveal existence; the latter twofold selflessness reveals their emptiness. Since the paramārtha-saṃvṛti, existence and emptiness, are not separate in substance, these paramārtha-saṃvṛti are neither existent nor empty. By not clinging to the two extremes, one attains the madhyamā-pratipad.

1.7

Regarding "Fully expounding defilement and purity, what is abandoned, realized, and cultivated, etc.": Defilement refers to greed and the like; purity refers to faith and the like. Defilement is what is abandoned; purity is what is cultivated. What is cultivated is wisdom; what is realized is principle. Now, relying on giving rise to practice, one advances.

1.8

Regarding "Whether partial or complete āśraya-parivṛtti, etc.": This āśraya-parivṛtti is said to be of six kinds: First is the transformation of diminishing power and augmenting capacity. In the ranks prior to the grounds, it diminishes the force of the defiled seeds in the mūlavijñāna and augments the functional capacity of the pure seeds in the mūlavijñāna, causing the afflictions not to be actively manifest. When afflictions are actively manifest, there is deep shame and remorse; through shame and remorse, one honors good and resists evil. Having two superior attainments serves as the substance capable of transforming. Because the factor of faith initially increases and does not increase after a long time, one transforms defilement and relies on purity. Second is the transformation through comprehension. In the darśana-mārga, by the power of the darśana-mārga one comprehends tathatā, severs the dauṣṭhulya of the twofold obscuration born of discrimination, and realizes a portion of true āśraya-parivṛtti. Third is the transformation through cultivation. Beginning from the ground of faith up to the ten grounds, because of cultivating the practices of the ten grounds, one gradually severs the innate dauṣṭhulya of the twofold obscuration. Fourth is the transformation of fulfilled fruition. That is, the ultimate rank. Due to cultivating and amassing boundless difficult and superior practices over three great asaṃkhyeya kalpas, when the vajropama-samādhi appears before one, one eternally severs all primordial dauṣṭhulya and suddenly realizes the fulfilled āśraya-parivṛtti of the buddha-fruition, benefiting and bringing joy inexhaustibly to the ends of future time. Fifth is the inferior transformation. In the ranks of the two vehicles, common to those with training and beyond training: 1. Solely for self-benefit; 2. Having attraction and aversion; 3. Solely awakening to pudgala-śūnyatā; 4. Solely severing afflictions; 5. Solely realizing true pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; 6. Having no superior functional capacity. Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha refers to tathatā; because one obtains this principle of cessation through discernment by wisdom. Having no superior functional capacity means lacking sarvajñā. Sixth is the vast transformation. That is, the ranks of the Mahāyāna bodhisattva. Because of constantly benefiting others, they proceed toward great bodhi. Toward saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, they have neither attraction nor aversion. They are fully able to comprehend the tathatā of twofold emptiness, simultaneously sever the seed of the jñeyāvaraṇa and kleśāvaraṇa, and suddenly realize unsurpassed bodhi and nirvāṇa. Having superior functional capacity, it is called the vast transformation. The substance of the āśraya-parivṛtti apprehended is vast. One transforms and abandons the two dauṣṭhulya and realizes it. It is not called fulfilled transformation because fulfilled transformation is spoken in contrast to bodhisattvas, while vast transformation is spoken in contrast to the two vehicles. Another explanation: Since it says vast transformation, it is clear that fulfilled is also included within it; this is merely mentioning one corner. Here, āśraya-parivṛtti refers to the fulfilled and partial fruitions. That is, among the meanings of the six kinds of āśraya-parivṛtti, the transformation of diminishing power and augmenting capacity, the transformation through comprehension, and the transformation through cultivation are partial fruitions; the ultimate transformation is the fulfilled fruition. The two kinds of āśraya-parivṛtti, inferior and vast, are common to the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, cause and fruition, fulfilled and partial. Fearing prolixity, the various transformations are not set forth further; those who delight in it may expand upon it.

1.9

Regarding "Ignorance, doubt, inverted views, perverse attachment, etc.": Ignorance refers to the ordinary fools of the world, who have no understanding whatsoever of heterodox or orthodox teachings. Doubt refers to those who wish to enter the Dharma, who harbor hesitation regarding heterodox and orthodox teachings. Inverted views refers to those who have mistakenly entered heterodox teachings and slander the Buddha's Dharma, such as various non-Buddhists. Perverse attachment refers to those within the Buddha's Dharma, such as the various Hīnayāna schools and those who overvalue emptiness.

1.10

Regarding "Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, etc.": That is what was formerly called Longshu Pusa (Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva). Correctly it is called Nāgārjuna. Nāga means dragon. Arjuna means majestic and fierce. The old translation mistakenly rendered it as Longshu ("Dragon Tree"). Now, this bodhisattva had the majestic fierceness of a dragon; none among monastics or laity dared look up at him. If a person looked upon him, their speech became confused and they lost their composure. Expressing his traces at the time, he was named Nāgārjuna ("Dragon Fierce"). He composed several tens of treatises, such as the Madhyamaka-śāstra; his abundant virtues and noble traces are fully detailed in his separate biography.

1.11

Regarding "Āryadeva": Ārya is Chinese; Deva is Sanskrit. Here it is translated as "god" (tian). That is the master of the Śataśāstra-vaipulya, Āryadeva Bodhisattva. He was Nāgārjuna's chief disciple. He composed the Catuḥśataka, which circulated widely in India. The Śata-śāstra and Śataśāstra-vaipulya have already been transmitted to the Eastern Xia, revealing the correct and crushing the heterodox. Full details are as in his separate biography.

1.12

Regarding "Realizing the Dharmaprabhāsa-samādhi": This means that herein he realized a rare samādhi, able to emanate the light of wisdom to illuminate and comprehend dharmas. Or it is called the Suryaprabhā-samādhi (Sunlight Samādhi), named after a metaphor.

1.13

Regarding "The twenty-second patriarch who transmitted the Dharma pitaka": In the biography, his name is Poxiupanduo (Vashubandhu); the Fahua lun (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-śāstra) calls him Posoupanchan; while the Zheng lun calls him Fasubanfan (Vasubandhu). Formerly translated as Tianqin; now named Shiqin (Vasubandhu). "Vasu" refers to the lord of the world god (deva). Because this god is the lord of the world, this god is called the lord of the world. It says this worldly god is a dear friend. Therefore, the new and old translations each present one name. Master Yuanhui, in his commentary on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, does not accept that Vasubandhu was the twenty-second; his enumeration of the Dharma-transmitters is deeply confused and erroneous. Moreover, the Fu fazang zhuan (Transmission of the Dharma Pitaka) states that this noble one composed five hundred treatises, and the name is identical; hence we definitely know he was the patriarch who transmitted the Dharma. He was a person from Gandhāra in Northern India. The two brothers both entered the Buddha's Dharma. The elder brother Asaṅga cultivated and studied the Mahāyāna, realizing the first bhūmi. The younger brother Linchi cultivated and studied the Hīnayāna, attaining arhatship. Vasubandhu was exceptionally intelligent, revered across the five regions of India. The treatises he composed were a mirror for a thousand generations. Asaṅga Bodhisattva saw that his younger brother Vasubandhu possessed the Mahāyāna nature, but fearing he would realize the lesser fruition, wished to enlighten him and cause him to return to the Mahāyāna. He then feigned illness to summon him. Vasubandhu, hearing the command, came from afar. Asaṅga secretly sent two people to wait for him and, in the dead of night, approach Vasubandhu's room. One recited the "Mahāyānasaṃgraha" chapter of the Abhidharma-sūtra, and one recited the "Daśabhūmika" chapter of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra. Vasubandhu, hearing the Dharma, gave rise to grief and remorse simultaneously: "Such a wondrous Dharma as this I previously slandered! The fault lies with this tongue; it is proper to cut it off." He immediately seized a sharp knife, intending to cut out his tongue himself. Suddenly, he saw Asaṅga standing before him, seizing his hand to stop him, and saying to him: "Now, the Mahāyāna is the ultimate Dharma. I wished to instruct you, and you have awakened on your own. Your awakening comes at the right time! What could be better than this? In the noble teachings of the buddhas, changing one's path is true repentance. Previously you used your tongue to slander the Mahāyāna; now you should use your tongue to broadly praise and explain it. In vainly cutting off your tongue, what benefit would there be?" Having spoken these words, he suddenly vanished. Vasubandhu was deeply awakened and thereupon did not cut his tongue. He went to Asaṅga and requested instruction on the Mahāyāna. Asaṅga then composed the root text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha for him, instructing him to compose a commentary, and conferred the Daśabhūmika-sūtra upon him, directing him to compose a treatise. Therefore, these two treatises were the first composed by Vasubandhu Bodhisattva upon his initial entry into the Mahāyāna. His abundant virtues were very numerous, fully detailed in his separate biography.

1.14

Regarding "When seeking this effect, one takes only this cause, etc.": Since when seeking this effect one proceeds only from this cause and does not take others, that effect arises only from this cause and does not arise from others. Thus we know that within the cause there is definitely the nature of the effect. If one says that within the cause there is no nature of the effect, then one cause should produce all effects. Since without the nature of this effect it can produce this effect, it also lacks the nature of other effects, so why does it not produce other effects? Or one effect could be produced by all causes: since within one cause originally there was no nature of this effect and yet this effect was able to be produced, within all causes there is also no nature of this effect, so they should produce this one effect. The principle that within the cause there is the effect is well established. Now, one should ask that adherent of such a view: Are the two characteristics of cause and effect different or not different? If they are not different, cause and effect are not established, because there would be no distinction between the two characteristics of cause and effect. If cause and effect have no distinction, the effect arises from the cause, and since cause and effect are identical, the cause would arise from the effect. That within the cause there is an effect is unreasonable. If they have different characteristics: is the substance of the effect within the cause characterized as unproduced or characterized as already produced? If it is characterized as unproduced, to say that the effect already exists while still unproduced is unreasonable. If it is characterized as already produced, the substance of the effect is already produced, yet arises again from the cause, which is unreasonable. Therefore we know that within the cause there is not previously an effect; rather, there must be a cause that awaits conditions to produce an effect.

1.15

Regarding "The school asserting manifestation from conditions": That is, both the aforementioned theorists of the effect existing in the cause and the Śabda theorists assert that the substance of all dharmas is primordially existent by nature and merely manifested through manifold conditions, not produced by conditions. That is, since within the cause there is previously the nature of the effect, that it is later produced from conditions is unreasonable. However, it is not accomplished without the application of effort; it necessarily requires effort for the effect to be manifested. One should ask the school asserting manifestation from conditions: If you say that within the cause there is previously the nature of the effect, why is it not manifest, but must await conditions before being manifested? If there are obstructing conditions that cause it not to be manifest, why do they not obstruct the cause, but only obstruct the effect? For instance, darkness obstructs the water in a basin and also obstructs the basin; here it is also like that. If those obstructing conditions also obstruct the cause, when manifestation occurs from conditions, why does it only manifest the effect? The two dharmas of cause and condition together bring about one effect; that it is only manifested from conditions is unreasonable.

1.16

Regarding "past and future, like the present, are all real entities," and so forth: they make the following clinging: if a dharma abides in its own characteristic, this dharma truly exists. If it were non-existent in the future, at that time it would not yet have received its own characteristic. If it were non-existent in the past, at that time it would have lost its own characteristic. If there were no future, what would produce the present dharma so that the present dharma could become a fruition? If there were no fruition, then there would be no fruition of that [cause]; how could one speak of the present being a cause? If they were definitively non-existent, the own-characteristics of dharmas would not be established and their natures would not be real. Since you grant that present dharmas are real entities, why reject the past and future as non-existent? One should ask them: are the two characteristics of past and future different or not different from the characteristic of the present? If they are not different, establishing the characteristics of the three times is unreasonable. If they are different, the past and future being real entities is unreasonable. Furthermore, ask them: are the dharmas belonging to the three times that you hold permanent or impermanent? If they are permanent, their substantial entities being motionless and unchanging, yet belonging to the three times, is unreasonable. If they are impermanent, being constantly real entities within the three times is unreasonable.

1.17

Regarding "distinctly existing when the characteristics of rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna become manifest," and so forth: they say this: if there were no self, when the consciousness perceiving rūpa arises, only a consciousness having the characteristic of rūpa should arise; a distinct consciousness having the characteristic of a self should not arise. The consciousnesses of vedanā, saṃjñā, and the rest should likewise be understood in this way. Since one does not first give rise to a cognitive thought of the five items, but only gives rise to five kinds of consciousness having the characteristic of a self, therefore one definitively knows that there is truly a self. One should ask them: does the consciousness that grasps a self take an object of direct perception (pratyakṣa) or an object of inference (anumāna)? If it takes direct perception, why say only the aggregates such as rūpa are direct perception? If it takes inference, like the foolish, infant, and so on who cannot deliberate, it should not abruptly give rise to a consciousness of a self. Moreover, is the grasped self wholesome or unwholesome? If it is wholesome, why do extremely evil and foolish people deeply give rise to the view of self and thereby increase all evil faults? If the grasped self is unwholesome, it should not be correctly spoken of or non-inverted. Since it is not wholesome, it is precisely erroneous and inverted; clinging to the self as a real entity is unreasonable.

1.18

Regarding "dharmas such as atoms are all permanently abiding," and so forth: relying on the divine eye attained through worldly concentration, they themselves see their bodies and the worlds continuing without interruption from previous lives, and cling that the self and the world are both permanently abiding. Or, relying on worldly concentration, they give rise to this view: they cling that existence precedes the arising of fruitions, and dispersion precedes the destruction of fruitions; meaning, coarse physical fruitions arise from an aggregation of atoms, and when coarse things are analyzed, they only reach and abide at the atom; therefore, atoms are permanent and coarse things are impermanent. One should say to them: do the self and the world have alteration or no alteration? If they have alteration, clinging that this world is entirely permanently abiding is unreasonable. If they have no alteration, then there would be no distinction; having various characteristics is unreasonable. Atom-theorists, I now ask you: do the atoms you cling to have spatial division or not? If they have spatial division, they should be capable of being analyzed, and clinging to them as permanent is unreasonable. If they have no spatial division, they would have no physical resistance and could not aggregate to produce coarse rūpa, which is unreasonable.

1.19

Regarding "stating that suffering, pleasure, and the rest are caused by past actions," and so forth: they see that in the world, even though one is endowed with right means, one incurs suffering, and even though one is endowed with wrong means, one attains pleasure. Therefore, they give rise to this thought and establish such a doctrine, stating that the causes of suffering and pleasure are all definitively caused by past actions. If one currently experiences suffering, it is due to past evil karma; if one is diligently energetic and thoroughly cultivates ascetic practices, one can expel old karma and present evil causes, because they are destroyed by not creating causes. In this way, afterwards one will no longer have any bias toward what is induced by past causes, and both the suffering brought about by past causes and the suffering incurred by present ascetic practices are completely exhausted, enabling one to realize the nirvāṇa of the exhaustion of suffering in a future body. One should ask them: if you say present suffering all takes past evil karma as its cause, do the ascetic practices you cultivate in the present life take past evil karma as their cause, or do they take present means as their cause? If they take past evil karma as their cause, saying that these newly cultivated present ascetic practices can expel old karma is unreasonable. If they take present means as their cause, what you previously said—that worldly suffering and pleasure are all due to past causes—is unreasonable. Therefore, one knows that the suffering and pleasure experienced in the world are also due to the present life and are not definitively caused by the past; or through the present body hearing the true Dharma, one attains awakening in the present body.

1.20

Regarding "wishing to perform wholesome actions and so on, yet matters all turn out contrary," and so forth: this means seeing sentient beings in the world, at the time of the cause, wishing to cultivate pure karma, yet failing to achieve their original intent and instead doing evil; at the time of the fruition, wishing to be born in good destinies, yet failing to achieve their original intent and instead falling into evil destinies; intending to experience pleasure, yet instead experiencing all kinds of suffering. Through seeing this, they make this thought: all things in the world must definitely have a distinct creator, generator, and transformer, who is the father of those things, called Maheśvara or another [creator]. One should ask them: does the power of transformation of the great Maheśvara use past karma, or does it not? If it uses past karma as its cause to arise, then only this capacity would use karma as its cause, and not the rest of the world, which is unreasonable. If it arises of itself without past karma, then only this capacity would arise without a cause, and not worldly things, which is unreasonable. Furthermore, ask you: is this Maheśvara subsumed within the world or not? If you say he is subsumed, then, being identical with the world, universally producing the world is unreasonable. If he is not subsumed, then something that is not a worldly dharma producing the world is unreasonable.

1.21

Regarding "meat-loving brahmins," and so forth: when the evil kalpa of contention arose, the brahmins transgressed the ancient brāhmaṇa teachings; out of a desire to eat meat, they falsely conceptualized: in that sacrificial rite, preceded by incantations, one kills living beings; the one who performs the sacrifice, the one who does the killing, and all the assistants will all be born in heaven. One should ask them: is the power of this incantation the true Dharma or is it not the true Dharma? If it is the true Dharma, using it in an unlawful practice such as killing living beings for a sacrifice is unreasonable. If it is not the true Dharma, using an incantation to kill living beings and all being born in heaven is unreasonable. If you say that just as poison is subdued by an incantation and cannot cause harm, this is also like that, then can this incantation also remove the three poisons? If you say it can, no one has been heard to have attained the pacification of the poisons of greed, anger, and delusion. If it cannot, using an incantation to kill living beings and removing unrighteous karma is unreasonable.

1.22

Regarding "recollecting the kalpas of destruction and formation, observing up, down, and across," and so forth: recollecting the kalpa of destruction, one gives rise to the conception of finitude regarding the world. Recollecting the kalpa of formation, one gives rise to the conception of infinitude regarding the world. Downward penetrating to the Avīci [hell] and upward reaching the fourth dhyāna, finding nothing further, one gives rise to the conception of finitude. Horizontally everywhere not finding a boundary, at that time one gives rise to the conception of both finitude and infinitude. Inverting the third proposition, in all directions horizontally as well as up and down, one forms the conception of neither finitude nor infinitude. Now I ask those who hold the view of a finite world: after the previous kalpa is destroyed, does the subsequent kalpa arise or not? If you say it arises, then because the previous has a subsequent, clinging that the world has finitude is unreasonable. If it does not arise, then you now abide relying on this world, and clinging that the world has finitude is unreasonable. Based on the view of finitude, one consequently clings to infinitude; infinitude and the rest are all false.

1.23

Regarding the "school of immortal evasive equivocations (amarāvikkhepa)": there are four kinds of immortal evasive equivocations. First, one whose awareness is not yet awakened; fearing that others will know of his ignorance, he does not answer clearly, "I do not know anything." Second, one gives rise to excessive pride regarding what he has realized; fearing other people's cross-examination and fearing lying, he does not clearly state, "I have realization." Third, his awareness is already awakened but not yet definitive; fearing lying and fearing other people's cross-examination, he does not clearly state, "I am not definitive." These three kinds resort to other matters and use evasive language. Fourth, one is feeble, dull, and foolish; he does not understand either worldly or world-transcending paths, nor can he understand worldly texts; fearing other people's cross-examination and that they will know his foolishness, he only asks them in return, turns according to their words, and then declares himself: "I rely upon and study the pure immortal devas." Thus, he counter-questions and uses evasive words in response to what was asked; therefore, it is called immortal evasive equivocation. In the Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra, this view is not refuted, because it is foolish and has no fixed tenet.

1.24

Regarding the "doctrine that all dharmas have no cause," and so forth: relying on worldly dhyāna and incorrect reflection, one sees that the self and the world arise without a cause. Or again, at other times, one sees that all causes and conditions are void and without karmic retribution. That is, seeing that the world has no causes or conditions at all: a great wind suddenly arises, and at one time, also without causes or conditions, serenely ceases; a great river overflows, and suddenly is emptied and dried up; fruit trees blossom luxuriantly, and swiftly wither and fade. Based on such views, they establish the doctrine of causelessness: the self and the world arise without a cause. Now one should ask them: do all kinds of worldly things that arise, or arise suddenly, have no cause or have a cause? If they have no cause, that they arise in various ways and then suddenly do not arise is unreasonable. If they have a cause, clinging that the self and the world are produced without a cause is unreasonable.

1.25

Regarding the "doctrine of annihilation after death," and so forth: relying on worldly wisdom, they make this thought: if there were a body again for the self after death, one would receive karmic retribution without having done deeds. If the essential nature of the self were entirely and perpetually non-existent, how could the karmic fruit experienced exist? Observing that both of these are logically impossible, they therefore give rise to this view and establish such a doctrine. Now one should ask them: for one who holds the view of annihilation, is it the aggregates that are annihilated, or is it the self that is annihilated? If the aggregates are annihilated: the nature of the aggregates is impermanent; since they are neither permanently existent nor permanently non-existent, cause and effect arise continuously in succession; therefore, to say the aggregates are annihilated is unreasonable. If the self is annihilated: what you previously said—that the coarse material body is annihilated after death—being subsumed under the gods of sensual pleasures, the gods of material form, and the four formless realms, is unreasonable.

1.26

Regarding "seeing that performing good and evil yields discordant fruits": relying on worldly dhyānas, they see that a donor in the world continuously practices giving throughout a lifetime, yet upon dying from this life is born into a low and destitute family, impoverished and in want; they also see someone continuously practicing wonderful conduct, yet after death falling into evil destinies; or someone practicing evil conduct, yet conversely born in good destinies; furthermore, parents in turn becoming sons and daughters, and seeing sons and daughters in turn becoming parents. Seeing such events, they therefore reflect: definitively there is no giving, no wonderful or evil conduct, no karmic retribution, no father, mother, and so on. Now one should ask this nihilist theorist: do you accept that karma and fruition have future experiencing or not? If you accept that they do, your previous statement that there is no wonderful conduct, no evil conduct, and no karmic retribution is unreasonable. If you say there is no future experiencing of them, then those who perform pure and impure karma would all at once experience all pure and impure fruits in this very life, which is unreasonable. Moreover, one should ask the one who says there are no parents: for all bodies born from a womb and from seeds, are those [progenitors] parents or not parents to this [body]? If you say they are, then your statement that there is no father and no mother is unreasonable. If you say they are not, saying that this body is born from that womb and from seeds, yet they are not parents, is unreasonable. When acting as father and mother, they are not sons and daughters; when acting as sons and daughters, they are not parents. Therefore, with respect to the present body, there is no indefinite fruition. Hence, what is said here is unreasonable.

1.27

Regarding "asserting that Brahmins are supreme," and so forth: In the age of discord, the Brahmins, out of greed for fame, gain, and reverence, formulated this supposition: "The Brahmin caste is the supreme; the Kṣatriyas and others are inferior castes. The white and black [castes] should be known to be likewise. [Brahmins] are the sons of Brahmā, born from Brahmā's mouth; Kṣatriyas and others are born from his navel, knees, and heels. The Brahmin caste alone can attain purity, because its nature can cultivate true brahma-conduct." Now one should question those who assert this supremacy: Does the Brahmin caste have parents or not? If they say they do not, they must be apparitionally born, but for you to go against observed fact is unreasonable. If they say they do, then to claim that [only they] cultivate brahma-conduct and others cannot is unreasonable. Furthermore, are they called supreme because of their caste, or are they called supreme because of morality and learning? If they are supreme because of caste, then what is stated in your own treatises—that supremacy is due to learning and morality in the midst of sacrificial rites—is unreasonable. If they are called supreme because of morality and learning, then asserting that Brahmins are the supreme caste and the others are inferior is unreasonable.

1.28

Regarding "holding that the precepts of chickens, dogs, and the like bring purity," and so forth: There were non-Buddhists who attained worldly meditative stabilization and supernormal powers, and saw chickens, dogs, or cattle being reborn in heaven after death; or they saw going naked, falling into ashes and dirt, or undergoing afflictive torments resulting in rebirth in heaven. Unable to properly understand the principle of dependent origination, they formed such views and established such doctrines: "Imitating those dogs and the like and maintaining their precepts is called purity, and all will attain rebirth in heaven." Or there were those who falsely held that the waters of the Puṇḍarīka River, the Bahudā River, the Gayā River, the Gaṅgā River, and so forth are pure, and that bathing in them will eradicate all sinful hindrances and all will attain rebirth in heaven. Now one should question those who assert this purity: Is it because of undertaking pure things and practicing pure conduct that one attains purity, or is it because of receiving defiled things and practicing bad conduct that one attains purity? If it is due to undertaking what is pure and practicing pure conduct, the world universally agrees that dogs are bad and impure; thus for you to allow that undertaking the precepts of dogs and the like brings purity is unreasonable. If it is because of undertaking what is impure and practicing bad conduct that one attains purity, then that which is itself bad and impure being able to make another pure is unreasonable. Furthermore, is it through internal purity that one is ultimately pure, or through external purity that one is ultimately pure? If through internal purity, then attaining purity by bathing in river water is unreasonable. If through external purity, then [leaving] the interior full of defilement and confusion while only removing external dirt is unreasonable.

1.29

Regarding "constantly moving according to the sun, moon, and stars," and so forth: There was someone who had attained worldly dhyāna, whom worldly people universally considered an arhat. When worldly people wished for sovereign pleasure and desired to have their wishes fulfilled, they would go and inquire of him. However, he did not know the principle of the conformity of karma and fruition and dependent origination; he merely saw that when the sun and moon in the world underwent eclipses and the celestial bodies lost their proper orbits, at that time the fruition of sentient beings' pure and impure karma happened to ripen. He then conjectured that this was caused by the sun, moon, and so forth, and for those who placed their faith in this he established this doctrine. Now one should question those who assert such auspiciousness: Are all the rises and falls and so forth in the world caused by the motions of the sun, moon, and stars, or are they caused by pure and impure karma? If they were caused solely by the sun, moon, and so forth, then what is presently observed—that experiencing prosperity, decline, and so forth follows the creation of meritorious and non-meritorious karma—would be unreasonable. If they are caused by pure and defiled karma, then saying that they are caused by the sun, moon, and so forth is unreasonable.

1.30

Regarding "the different schools of the Hīnayāna doctrine number twenty," and so forth: The verse in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra states: / Eighteen together with the original two / All arose from the Mahāsāṃghika. / There is neither right nor wrong; / I speak of what will arise in the future.

1.31

Regarding "the original Sthavira and Mahāsāṃghika," and so forth: This meaning is explained in detail in the Commentary on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra. Now I shall briefly recount it to reveal their origins and branches. A hundred and some years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, there was a merchant in the country of Mathurā who married a young wife and had a son. His facial features were handsome and he was named Mahādeva. The merchant traveled far for many years; when the son grew up, the mother coerced him into illicit intercourse. Later, hearing that his father was returning, he was terrified and jealous, and plotting with his mother, he poisoned and killed him. Fearing that their defiled deeds would be exposed, they fled together to another country. There he encountered his family preceptor, an arhat; fearing that he would reveal their family affairs, he deceitfully invited and killed him. Later, the mother engaged in another illicit affair; seeing this, the son was infuriated, and his resentment and remorse reaching an extreme, he killed her as well. Although he had committed three deadly sins, he did not cut off his roots of goodness, and he approached the Saṃgha to go forth, hoping to eradicate these grave sins. After going forth, he studied and recited with diligent exertion; his nature and understanding were acute, and he thus mastered the sacred teachings. Kings, ministers, monastics, and laypeople alike revered him. Having become addicted to fame and gain, evil views then arose in him, and he fraudulently claimed to have attained the fruit of an arhat. The king, confused about who was ordinary and who was noble, frequently invited him for offerings. Seeing the palace maidens, [Mahādeva] harbored inappropriate thoughts, and during a night dream he had an emission of impurity. His disciple, while washing his robe, was astonished and asked: "Since you are an arhat, how could there be an emission?" He deceitfully answered: "It was due to the harassment of Māra. Because the heavenly Māra constantly torments the Buddha's Dharma, even one who has attained the state of non-learning can still be harassed by him. Furthermore, emissions are of two kinds: an arhat does not have an emission of afflictions, but one beyond training may have an emission of impurity. I was harassed by Māra, hence there was an emission." Furthermore, wishing to make his disciples closely attached to him, he fraudulently prophesied for them in sequence the four fruits of asceticism. At that time, the disciples were puzzled by their own lack of knowledge regarding the fruits and realizations they had obtained, and they all came to inquire. He answered: "Those beyond training also have ignorance, because this ignorance is of two kinds. Defiled ignorance the non-learner does not have; defiled ignorance is the obscuration of afflictions, which obstructs nirvāṇa and causes sentient beings to receive bodies in the three realms. Non-defiled ignorance the non-learner still possesses; non-defiled ignorance is the obscuration of the knowable, which is lack of clarity regarding objects and causes bodhisattvas and those of the two vehicles to receive transformed bodies. Although you have attained the fruits, you cannot know it yourselves." Furthermore, at another time a disciple addressed him: "I have heard that the noble ones have already crossed beyond all doubts; how is it that we still doubt the treasure of the truths?" He answered: "Arhats also have doubt, because doubts are of two kinds. Doubt of the nature of latency the arhat does not have; doubt regarding what is possible and impossible the non-learner still possesses. How could you be free of doubt regarding the real truths?" Later, the disciples again asked: "The sūtras state that noble ones attain the true eye of wisdom and personally realize liberation; how is it that we today only awaken and enter through the words of our teacher?" He then answered: "There are arhats who enter only through another and cannot know it themselves. Like Śāriputra, the foremost in wisdom: if the Buddha had not prophesied it, he would not have known it himself; how much less could people like you not enter through another?" Although he had committed sins, he had not generated wrong views; privately bearing his heavy sins, he wondered what suffering he would undergo, and pressed by grief and affliction, he cried out at night, "Oh, what suffering!" A disciple living nearby heard it and was astonished, asking in the morning after his well-being. He answered: "Very well." [The disciple] asked again: "Why did you cry out 'Oh, what suffering' last night?" He deceitfully answered: "I was calling upon the Noble Path. That is, regarding the Noble Path, if one does not sincerely call upon and summon it through suffering, it will ultimately not manifest before one. Therefore, last night I was merely calling upon the Noble Path." Mahādeva later gathered the five evil-view matters he had previously stated and composed a verse, saying: / Seduced by others; ignorance; / Hesitation; entering through another; / The path arises because of sound: / These are called the true teachings of the Buddha. / On the fifteenth night, at the time of the poṣadha, when it was Mahādeva's turn to ascend the seat and recite the precepts, he then recited the gāthā he had composed. At that time, among the assembly there were those who were in training, of wide learning, keepers of the precepts, and cultivators of dhyāna; hearing what he said, there were none who were not alarmed and scolded him. All of them immediately composed a countering verse to what he had said, altering the fourth line to say: "These are not the Buddha's teachings." Thereupon, dispute raged throughout the night, and by the morning the factions became even stronger. The scholars, commoners, and even ministers in the city came in turn to reconcile them, but none could stop it. At that time the king heard of it and saw it, and he also became doubtful. Due to this dispute, [the Saṃgha] split into two schools: the noble ones and elders, although many in number of years, were few in monastic count, and were named the Sthaviranikāya; Mahādeva's faction, although fewer in elders, had many followers, and was named the Mahāsāṃghika school. By the beginning of the second century after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, due to disputes within the Mahāsāṃghika, it underwent four schisms from first to last and split into nine schools. In the first schism, three schools split off: first, the Ekavyāvahārika school, which asserted that all worldly and transmundane dharmas are merely nominal designations; second, the Lokottaravāda school, which asserted that worldly dharmas are inverted and transmundane dharmas are real; third, the Kaukkutika school, whose school founder was of chicken lineage. In the second schism, the school founder's learning surpassed his original school, hence named the Bahuśrutīya school. In the third schism, they asserted that worldly and transmundane [dharmas] also have some nominal designations, hence named the Prajñaptivāda school. In the fourth schism, there was a non-Buddhist who went forth within the Mahāsāṃghika, was of wide learning, and resided at Caityagiri; he re-expounded the five matters, splitting [the group] into three schools: first, those followers residing in their original dwelling place, the Caitika school; second, a faction living west of Caityagiri, named the Aparaśaila school; third, a faction living north of Caityagiri, named the Uttaraśaila school. Thus the Mahāsāṃghika underwent four schisms, and distinguishing root and branches, they formed nine schools in total. As for the Sthavira school, between the beginning of the third century and the end of the fourth century, through seven root-and-branch schisms it became eleven schools: In the first schism, an elder composed the Jñānaprasthāna; the original school was refuted and moved into the Himālaya, named the Haimavata school, while those who studied the treatise and asserted that all dharmas exist were called the Sarvāstivāda school. Second, from the Sarvāstivāda branched off one school, which was the lineage born from an ancient ṛṣi copulating with a cow, named the Vātsīputrīya school. Third, from the Vātsīputrīya four schools branched off: first, the school founder possessed dharmas surpassing others and worthy of elevation, named the Dharmottarīya school; second, the school founder's nature was virtuous, being of noble lineage, named the Bhadrayānīya school; third, the school founder measured dharmas correctly without deviation, named the Sammatīya school; fourth, the school founder lived in a dense mountain forest, named the Ṣaṇṇagarika school. Fourth, from the Sarvāstivāda branched off one school whose founder was originally a king, named the Mahīśāsaka school. Fifth, from the Mahīśāsaka branched off one school whose founder held the Dharma as secret as a treasury, named the Dharmaguptaka school. Sixth, from the Sarvāstivāda branched off one school whose founder was of the lineage of the ṛṣi Kāśyapa, named the Kāśyapīya school. Seventh, from the Sarvāstivāda again branched off one school that established valid cognition based on sūtras and not on vinaya or śāstras, named the Sautrāntika school. Thus the Sthavira repeatedly split in root and branches, and including the root, formed eleven schools in total. Counting these together with the previous nine schools makes twenty schools. These are the names and meanings of the various schools here.

1.32

Regarding "and relying on the aggregates and so forth, there is a distinct self": What this school asserts is that among dharmas such as the five aggregates, if spoken of individually, there is no function; but when they are aggregated together, there is a universal characteristic of sovereign agency and function. It is like carts, houses, and the like: if the forest trees are separated individually, their function is absent, but when assembled together, they have real utility. This is just the same.

1.33

Regarding "the aggregates and so forth of the three times all truly exist": This school holds that conditioned dharmas possess substantial entity across the three times, while their function may be present or absent. When a dharma is in the future, its function has not yet arisen; but produced by the future characteristic of arising, it flows into the present. Maintained by the characteristic of abiding, its function then arises. Altered by the characteristic of difference, it undergoes decay and change. Ceased by the characteristic of cessation, it flows into the past. What is called "cessation" merely extinguishes the function and is called entering the past; it does not extinguish the substance of the dharma. It is like moving a single counting rod to the hundreds or thousands position: only the name differs, while its substance is undivided. For this reason, the three times are all real.

1.34

Regarding "the aggregates and so forth of the past and future are all non-existent": What that school asserts is that the past and future are not real, because they are distinct from present dharmas. If one were to say that the substances of dharmas across the three times are all real, their function should not exist only in the present. If that were not so, the function and the substance would have to be different. If different from the substance, it should not be called its function, just as form is different from sound and form is not the function of sound; therefore, present dharmas are real, while the past and future are devoid of substance.

1.35

Regarding "present aggregates are real because they are aggregated dharmas," and so forth: This school asserts that dharmas such as form and mind are subtly real and coarsely nominal. An infinitesimal atom is real because it is the essential nature of form; coarse form is nominal because it is assembled together. A single real infinitesimal atom is not an object of the visual consciousness; only when combined into coarse form is it an objective condition for visual consciousness. Even a single infinitesimal atom is subsumed under the aggregates; "aggregate" has the meaning of accumulation, therefore the aggregates are real. Coming together to produce consciousness is called āyatana and dhātu; therefore dharmas within the gates of the āyatanas and dhātus are all nominal.

1.36

Regarding "both worldly and transworldly dharmas are non-real," etc.: Question: What difference is there between this and the Mahāyāna doctrine? Answer: Because they cling to all dharmas as definitely being conventionally posited. It is unlike Mahāyāna, wherein both nominal and real are extinguished; they merely say that all dharmas are conventional and not real, without stating the cause of dharmas being non-real. It is unlike the correct principle that all dharmas are produced from mind. Moreover, it differs from the emptiness of ultimate truth, [in which] dharmas do not exist by virtue of the ultimate truth. Therefore, there is a difference from Mahāyāna.

First 36 of 258 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大乘百法明門論開宗義決 — Classical Chinese