大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.123

4.123

論。二者聞修至離一切相　釋曰。次第二我見中。初明起執之由也。即大品等諸般若經。為破取著生死涅槃妄生分別而欣厭者故。說諸法畢竟皆空。故彼文云一切諸法如幻如夢畢竟皆空。乃至涅槃真如之法如幻如夢。若當有法過涅槃者。我說亦復如幻如夢。世間諸法即生死法。從本已來自空等。顯非先有今無名空。即本無性名之空耳。

[Treatise:] Second, hearing that [the sūtras teach that the dharmadhātu is ultimately empty, that even nirvāṇa and tathatā are also ultimately empty, naturally empty, and] free from all characteristics—
[Commentary:] "Explication": Next, under the second view of self, it first explains the origin of the arising of attachment. That is to say, all the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras such as the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, in order to refute grasping and attachment to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, falsely giving rise to conceptual discrimination with longing and revulsion, teach that all dharmas are ultimately empty. Thus that text states: "All dharmas are like illusions, like dreams, and ultimately empty, up to and including the dharmas of nirvāṇa and tathatā, which are like illusions and like dreams. If there were any dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would say it too is like an illusion and like a dream." All mundane dharmas are precisely the dharmas of saṃsāra, being naturally empty from the very beginning, and so forth, showing that emptiness does not mean having previously existed and now being non-existent, but rather being termed empty because they originally lack self-nature.