Establishment of Brahman 3.15

3.15

udapādi cet ‘sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam'; ityupakramāt ‘tattvamasi'ityantādvākyādātmatattvāvabodhaḥ, padānāṃ parasparānvitārthatvāt, kimanyadvidhiḥ kariṣyati? na pravṛtta eva pravartyaḥ /
atha padārthasamanvayamātrānna tattvabodhotpādaḥ, sutarāmapravartyaḥ /
śābdasya tattvāvabodhasyāsaṃbhavāt /
syādetat ---
utpanne 'pi tattvāvabhāse śabdāt, niścaye pravartyaḥ ‘evamidam'; iti /
tanna /
yadi tasmācchabdānniścayaḥ, sa jāta eva /
athānyato niścayaḥ, anyavāñchanaṃ pramāṇāntarāpekṣā, na tatra tattvaniścayanibandhanaṃ śabdaḥ syāt /
evaṃ tāvanna tattvaniścayāya vidhirarthyate /

If knowledge of the reality of the Self is produced from the sentence that begins, 'In the beginning, gentle one, this was Being alone, one only without a second,' and ends with, 'You are that,' because the words have meanings connected with one another, what else will an injunction do? One who has already engaged in activity is not to be impelled.
Now, if the arising of the knowledge of reality does not occur merely from the connection of word-meanings, [one] is all the more not to be impelled, because verbal knowledge of reality would then be impossible.
It might be said: even though the appearance of reality has arisen from the word, one is to be impelled toward certainty: 'This is so.'
That is not right. If certainty arises from that word, it has already been born. If certainty comes from elsewhere, desiring something else is a reliance on another means of valid cognition; verbal testimony would not be the cause of the certainty of reality in that case. Thus, first of all, an injunction is not desired for certainty of reality.