Advaitasiddhi 2.9

2.9

nanu-- dṛśi viṣayādhyāsasvīkarturjīvacaitanyaṃ vā viṣayadṛk? brahmacaitanyaṃ vā? nādyaḥ, jīve avacchinnacitsvarūpe kalpite adhyāsāyogāt. na ca viṣayadṛk jīvacaitanyameva, adhyāsastu brahmacaitanya iti vācyam. dṛśyayorevādhyāsikasambandhāpatteḥ, adhyastādhiṣṭhānayorubhayorapi dṛgbhinnatvāt. ata eva na dvitīyo'pi. saviśeṣabrahmaṇo'pi kalpitatvena tatrādhyāsāyogācca. na ca śuddhacaitanyamekameva. tadevādhiṣṭhānam. tatrāvacchedakamavidyādikaṃ nādhiṣṭhānakoṭau praviśati. tadeva ca jīvaśabdena brahmaśabdena ca vyapadiśyate, upādhiviśeṣāt. tathā ca jīvacaitanyasya dṛktve'pi dṛśyādhyāso nānupapanna iti vācyam. śuddhacaitanyasya āsaṃsāramāvṛtatvena jagadāndhyaprasaṅgāditi cenna. mūlāvidyānivṛttyabhāvena sarvata āvaraṇābhibhavābhāve'pi ghaṭādyavacchedenāvaraṇābhivād āndhyavirahopapatteḥ. nanu tarhīdānīmapi brahmasphuraṇe caramavṛttivaiyarthyam. adhikabhāne'pi tasya sphuraṇāt. na hyakhaṇḍārthavedāntajanyāyāṃ vṛttau bhāvo abhāvo vā viśeṣaṇamupalakṣaṇaṃ vā prakāraḥ prakāśata iti cenna. upādhyaviṣayakabrahmasphuraṇasya caramapravṛttiprayuktatvena tasyāḥ sāphalyāt. prakārāsphuraṇaṃ tu tasyāḥ bhūṣaṇameva. idānīntanasphuraṇasya saprakārakatvenopādhiviṣayatvāt. `ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam' ityādiśrutibalāt svasamānaviṣayajñānādeva cājñānanivṛtterakhaṇḍacinmātrajñānasyaiva mokṣahetutvāvadhāraṇāt. na ca antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanyasya jīvatve suṣuptidaśāyāṃ tadabhāvena kṛtahānyādyāpattiriti vācyam. tadā'pyasya kāraṇātmanā'vasthānāt. sthūlasūkṣmasādhāraṇasyāntaḥkaraṇasyopādhitvāt. `tadapīteḥ saṃsāravyapadeśāt' ityasmin sūtre cāyamarthaḥ spaṣṭataraḥ. na ca vṛttyuparaktatvaṃcaitanyasya na tatpratibimbitatvam. darpaṇe mukhasyevānud‌bhūtarūpe'ntaḥkaraṇe śabdānyapratibimbanopādhitāyā acākṣuṣacaitanyasya pratibimbanāyāścāyogāditi vācyam. ud‌bhūtarūpavattvaṃ na pratibimbanopādhitāprayojakam. asvacche'pi loṣṭādau pratibimbāpatteḥ.

[Objection:] For one who accepts the superimposition of objects upon pure consciousness, is the consciousness of the individual self the apprehender of objects, or is the consciousness of Brahman? Not the first, because superimposition is impossible upon the individual self, whose nature is delimited consciousness and who is imagined. Nor should one say that the individual self's consciousness alone is the apprehender of objects, while the superimposition is upon Brahman's consciousness; for that would entail an illusory relation between two perceived things alone, since both the superimposed and the substratum would be distinct from the apprehender. For the very same reason, neither is it the second; and also because even qualified Brahman, being imagined, cannot be the locus of superimposition. Nor should one say: Pure consciousness alone is one; that alone is the substratum. There, the delimiter, such as ignorance, does not enter into the scope of the substratum. And that [pure consciousness] alone is designated by the word "individual self" and by the word "Brahman" because of particular adjuncts. Hence, even if the individual self's consciousness is the apprehender, the superimposition of the perceived is not untenable. For, since pure consciousness is veiled up to the end of transmigratory existence, the consequence of universal blindness would follow.
[Reply:] No. Even though there is no defeat of the concealment everywhere because the root ignorance has not ceased, the absence of blindness is accounted for because there is a defeat of the concealment as delimited by a pot and the like.
[Objection:] In that case, if Brahman shines forth even now, the final mental state would be purposeless; for that [Brahman] shines forth even when there is an additional appearance. Indeed, in the mental state generated by the Upaniṣads conveying an impartite sense, neither an existent nor a non-existent, whether as a qualification or as an indicator, shines forth as a qualifier.
[Reply:] No. Because the shining forth of Brahman devoid of adjuncts is brought about by the final mental state, that [final mental state] is fruitful. The non-appearance of qualifiers is indeed its ornament, since the shining forth of the present time, possessing qualifiers, takes an adjunct as its object. On the strength of Vedic texts such as "It is to be seen as one alone," and because the cessation of ignorance arises only from cognition having the identical object as itself, it is determined that cognition of impartite pure consciousness alone is the cause of liberation.
Nor should one say: If consciousness delimited by the internal organ is the individual self, then, in the state of deep sleep, due to its absence, consequences such as the destruction of what has been done would follow; for even then, this [internal organ] persists in the form of the cause, since the internal organ common to the gross and the subtle [states] is the adjunct. And this meaning is quite clear in the aphorism: "Because transmigration is designated until dissolution in that."
Nor should one say: Consciousness being colored by a mental state is not its being reflected [in it]; because the internal organ, having unmanifest color, cannot be an adjunct for reflection—just as a mirror is for a face—for anything other than sound, nor can consciousness, being non-visual, be reflected. For having manifest color is not the determinant of being an adjunct for reflection, since reflection would [otherwise] undesirably occur in a clod of earth and the like, which is not transparent.