Sarvadarshanasangraha 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

On this point, it is stated by the Buddhists: What was said—that invariable concomitance is difficult to comprehend—is entirely incorrect, because invariable concomitance is easily known through identity and causality. So it has been said:

2.2

"From the relation of cause and effect, or from essential nature, which is the determinant,

2.3

the rule of invariable concomitance [is established] through non-perception [when the other is absent], not through mere observation." / So it is said.

2.4

On the view that positive and negative concomitance ascertain invariable concomitance, the non-deviation between the probandum and the probans would be difficult to establish, because the doubt of deviation cannot be eliminated in regard to an object that is past, future, or present but unperceived.

2.5

If it is objected: "In such a case, the doubt of deviation is difficult to avoid on your doctrine as well,"

2.6

Do not speak thus. For a doubt of the kind, "let the effect be produced even without a cause," is eliminated because it culminates in self-contradiction. Indeed, that alone should be doubted which, when doubted, would not bring about self-contradiction and the like. Thus it has been said: "Doubt reaches its limit at self-contradiction." Therefore, invariable concomitance is determined through the ascertainment of origination therefrom. And that ascertainment of origination therefrom is based upon the fivefold sequence of perception and non-perception of the effect and the cause: (1) non-perception of the effect prior to its origination; (2-3) its perception when the cause is perceived; (4-5) subsequently, non-perception of what was perceived, owing to the non-perception of the cause—by this fivefold causal condition, the relation of cause and effect between smoke and fire is determined. Likewise, invariable concomitance is also determined by the ascertainment of identity. For if the *śiṃśapā* tree were to transgress treeness, it would abandon its very nature—such is the operation of the counter-argument against the negative instance. But when a counter-argument does not operate, even though frequent co-presence is observed, who could dispel the suspicion of variability? And the ascertainment of identity between the *śiṃśapā* and the tree is established by force of the co-reference: "this tree is a *śiṃśapā*." For this [co-reference] is not possible in the case of absolute non-difference, since being synonyms they could not be used simultaneously; nor in the case of absolute difference, since [it is] not observed between a cow and a horse. Therefore, it is established that the two whose nature is the effect make known through inference the two whose nature is the cause.

2.7

If someone should not accept the epistemic validity of inference, one should say to him: Is it only stated, "inference is not a means of valid cognition," and no proof whatsoever is adduced there, or is one adduced? Not the first, for upon the adducing of a headless statement, the proposition to be proved is not established.

2.8

For a bare proposition alone / cannot prove what is asserted,

2.9

according to this rule. Nor the last. For if you, saying that inference is not a means of valid cognition and not admitting verbal testimony as a means of valid cognition, adduce a statement accepted as epistemically valid in your own or another's treatise, self-contradiction would result, just like [the statement] "my mother is barren." Moreover, by speaking of the establishment of valid cognitions and their pseudo-forms because they are of the same class, you yourself have accepted inference by essential nature. And by stating that disagreement situated in another is [known] through the inferential sign of speech, [you have accepted] inference having an effect as its inferential sign. By denying some object through non-perception, [you have accepted] inference having non-perception as its inferential sign. And thus it was said by the Buddhists:

2.10

From the establishment of what is common to another means of valid cognition, from the comprehension of another's mind,

2.11

from the reality of another means of valid cognition, and from the negation of something. // Thus.

2.12

And heroic efforts have been made on this point by the wise; hence we desist, for fear of multiplying the text.

2.13

And those Buddhists proclaim the highest aim of human existence by means of a fourfold contemplative cultivation. And these Buddhists, famous by the names Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika, maintain respectively the doctrines of the emptiness of all things, the emptiness of external objects, the inferability of external objects, and the perceptibility of external objects. Although the blessed Buddha was only one teacher, nevertheless, owing to the difference in intellect of those to be taught, there is a fourfold division. Just as when it is said, "the sun has set," paramours, thieves, Vedic scholars, and others understand [thereby] the time for their assignation, stealing another's property, performing proper conduct, and so forth, according to their own desires.

2.14

It should be seen that a tetrad of contemplative cultivations is taught: "All is momentary, momentary; suffering, suffering; uniquely particular, uniquely particular; empty, empty."

2.15

Among these, momentariness is to be inferred in the moments of blue and the like by their existence: whatever is existent is momentary, just like a mass of clouds, and these entities are existent. Nor is this inferential reason unestablished, because existence, defined as the capacity for causal efficacy, is established by perception for the moments of blue and the like; and because, by the rule that the exclusion of that which is pervaded follows from the exclusion of that which pervades, the exclusion of existence from the non-momentary is established upon the exclusion of succession and non-succession, which are the pervaders. And that causal efficacy is pervaded by succession and non-succession; nor is any manner possible other than succession and non-succession,

2.16

For when there is mutual contradiction, no other manner can subsist;

2.17

nor is there unity of contradictory things, because of contradiction in the mere statement.

2.18

because by this rule the self-contradiction is glaring. And those two, succession and non-succession, turning away from a permanent entity and thereby turning away causal efficacy as well, establish existence only on the side of momentariness—thus it is established.

2.19

Now, if it is asked: why should causal efficacy not belong to the non-momentary?

2.20

That is incorrect, because it cannot endure conceptual division. For instance: at the time of performing a present causal action, does a permanent entity have the capacity for past and future causal actions, or not?

2.21

(i) In the first case, it would follow that the two cannot be withheld, because what is capable cannot delay; and because of the reductio inference: whatever is capable of doing something at a given time does it at that time, just as a causal complex [produces] its own effect, and this entity is capable.

2.22

(ii) In the second case, it would never perform [them], because causal efficacy is invariably connected with capacity alone; and because of the converse: whatever does not do something at a given time is not capable of it at that time, just as a piece of stone [is incapable] with respect to a sprout; and at the time of performing the present causal action, this does not perform the past and future causal actions.

2.23

If it is objected: because it obtains auxiliary conditions having succession, the sequential performance of past and future [causal actions] by a permanent entity is intelligible—

2.24

then on this point let the gentleman explain, when asked: do the auxiliary conditions benefit the entity, or not?

2.25

(A) If not, they are not to be depended upon, because those that do nothing cannot have that purpose. [Now, if it is said: it is the nature of the entity to produce the effect only along with those auxiliary conditions—

2.26

well then, it would not abandon the auxiliary conditions; on the contrary, even if they were fleeing, it would bind them around the neck with a rope and produce the effect to be done, since its nature does not depart.]

2.27

(B) On the alternative that they are benefactors, is this benefit different from the entity, or not?

2.28

(B1) On the alternative of difference, causal efficacy would belong only to that adventitious [benefit], not to the non-momentary entity, because the effect conforms to the positive and negative concomitance of the adventitious excess. Thus it has been said:

2.29

What do rain and heat do to the sky? Their effect is upon the leather.

2.30

If it is like leather, it is non-eternal; if it is like the sky, it produces no effect.

2.31

Furthermore, does the excellence produced by auxiliary causes initiate another excellence, or does it not? On either alternative, a shower of hail-stones of refutations ensues. If it initiates another excellence, there would also be the predicament of a multifaceted infinite regress: when an excellence is to be produced, if another auxiliary cause is required, a regress of such auxiliaries follows—this is established as the first infinite regress. Likewise, when an excellence of the seed is produced by auxiliary causes such as water, air, and the whole host of entities, the seed must be admitted as the producer; otherwise, even in its absence, the excellence would appear. And the seed, in producing the excellence, produces it only depending on auxiliary causes; otherwise, since assistance would always be rendered, the sprouting of the shoot would also inevitably occur at all times. Therefore, by the auxiliary causes required for the sake of the excellence, another excellence must be produced in the seed; and with respect to that assistance too, if by the same reasoning the seed depending on auxiliary causes is the producer, the first infinite regress of excellences residing in the seed and brought about by auxiliary causes stands established.

2.32

Now, does this assistance, though required for the sake of the effect, produce the effect independently of the seed and the like, or depending on it? On the first alternative, the seed and the like would turn out not to be causes. On the second alternative, an excellence must be produced in the assistance by the seed and the like which are depended upon; thus, in each succeeding instance as well, an infinite regress of excellences residing in the excellences produced by the seed and the like would inevitably follow—so the second infinite regress would be firmly established. In the same way, another assistance must be produced in the substratum, namely the seed and the like, by the assistance that is depended upon; thus an infinite regress of excellences residing in the seed and produced by the assistance would follow—so a disastrous third infinite regress would result.

2.33

If, on the other hand, it should be accepted that the excellence produced by the auxiliary causes is non-different from the entity, then the former entity devoid of excellence has ceased, and another entity endowed with excellence, designated by words such as ‘having the nature of acting’, is born; and thus the tree of my desires has also borne fruit. Therefore, causal efficiency is impossible for a non-momentary entity in successive order.

2.34

Nor does it work simultaneously, because it cannot endure alternative possibilities. To explain: does the nature capable of producing all effects simultaneously persist in the time subsequent to that, or does it not?

2.35

On the first alternative, the production of all those effects would inevitably occur at other times just as at that time. On the second alternative, the hope of a persistence through enduring existence would imitate the prayer for producing shoots and the like from a seed that has been eaten by mice.

2.36

Whatever is superimposed with contradictory attributes is multiple, like cold and hot; and this [enduring entity] is superimposed with contradictory attributes—thus the invariable relation is established in the case of a cloud.

2.37

Nor is this inferential sign unestablished, because capability and incapability according to the difference of time in an enduring entity are established by reductio ad absurdum and its contrapositive. Among these, the reductio ad absurdum and its contrapositive establishing incapability have been stated before; those establishing capability will now be stated.

2.38

Therefore, it is established that existence—whose negative pervasion has been apprehended through the non-apprehension of the pervader by excluding succession and simultaneity in the counter-instance, and whose positive pervasion has been grasped by the force of reductio ad absurdum and its contrapositive—will be established only on the position of momentariness. As has been stated by Jñānaśrī:

2.39

[Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya 2.117]

2.40

Whatever is existent is momentary, like a cloud; and these entities are existent.

2.41

Here, existence is the capacity for purposeful action, since it is ascertained; that capacity is not established in enduring things.

2.42

Nor is it of one mode only; otherwise, action and the like would occur even through what is done by another.

2.43

Hence, the coherence of momentary destruction in both ways also comes to rest in the probandum.

2.44

Nor should it be maintained, by adopting the position of Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda, and others, that existence is merely connection with the universal ‘existence’. For this would result in the non-existence of universals, particularities, and inherence. Nor can conventional designation as ‘existent’ there be based on essential existence, because that would entail unwarranted complexity in the causal ground, and because it is refuted by the alternative of being recurrent or non-recurrent; and also because in distinct moments such as mustard seeds and mountains, a recurrent form is not perceived, as a string in beads or a quality in the aggregates of elements. Furthermore, is a universal omnipresent, or omnipresent [only] in its own substrata? On the first alternative, an intermixture of all things would follow, and there would be the fallacy of contradicting one's own tenets, since Praśastapāda has stated that it is ‘omnipresent in its own domain’. Furthermore, when a universal existing in an existing pot is connected with another [pot] being born elsewhere, does it become connected by coming from that [pot], or without coming? On the first alternative, it would follow that it is a substance. On the second alternative, connection would be impossible. Furthermore, when a pot is destroyed, does the universal remain, is it destroyed, or does it go elsewhere? On the first alternative, it would follow that it is without a substratum. On the second alternative, the statement that it is eternal would be inappropriate. On the third alternative, it would inevitably follow that it is a substance. Since it is thus seized by the eclipse-demon of such faults, a universal is devoid of epistemic validity. As has been stated:

2.45

For that which exists elsewhere, when an arising occurs in another place from it,

2.46

its occurrence without moving from that place is an utter absurdity!

2.47

It is not connected with that entity where it exists,

2.48

and yet it pervades that which is in that place—what an extraordinary marvel this is!

2.49

It does not go, nor was it there, it exists afterwards, and it has no parts;

2.50

it does not abandon its previous substratum—alas, what a series of misfortunes!

2.51

If it be asked, ‘What is the objective support of a recurrent cognition?’—

2.52

My good friend, you, long-lived one, should be content that its objective support is merely the exclusion of others; enough with excessive digression!

2.53

That all cyclic existence is of the nature of suffering is agreed upon by all philosophical teachers; otherwise, for those who wish to turn away from it, undertaking the means for its cessation would be impossible. Therefore, one should contemplate: ‘All is suffering, [all is] suffering.’

2.54

If it be objected: when asked ‘like what?’, an illustrative example must be stated—

2.55

Not so. Since unique particulars, which are moments, lack common characteristics because of their momentariness, it is impossible to say ‘another is similar to this’. Therefore, one should contemplate: ‘[Each is a] unique particular, [each is a] unique particular.’

2.56

In the same way, one should also cultivate [the thought]: "Void, void." For in dreaming and in waking, a qualified negation is observed: "This silver or the like was not seen by me." If what was seen were real, then the seeing qualified by that, the "this-ness", the substrate, the silverness and so forth superimposed upon it, and their relation, such as inherence, would all have reality. Nor is this accepted by any debater. Nor is a half-and-half view (the maxim of the half-aged woman) appropriate; for one cannot suppose that one part of a hen is for cooking and the other part is for laying eggs. Therefore, among the superimposed, the substrate, their relation, the seeing, and the seers, if one or many are unreal, it follows by force [of logic] that all are unreal because they are the object of negation. When the Blessed One taught this, the Mādhyamikas, possessing supreme intellect, explained as follows: On the principle of the wandering monk stretching out his feet, through the approach of stating momentary destruction and the like, by dispelling the delusions of permanence, pleasurable experience, generic continuity, and the reality of everything, [the teaching] culminates only in the voidness of everything. Therefore, the principle is just the void, freed from the four alternatives consisting of real, unreal, both, and neither. To explain: If reality were the intrinsic nature of a pot or the like, then the operation of causal factors would be useless. If the position were that unreality is its intrinsic nature, the very same flaw would manifest, as has been said:

2.57

For what is real, dependence on a cause is not fitting, as in the case of space and the like;

2.58

A cause of an effect is impossible for what is unreal, as in the case of a sky-flower.

2.59

Due to contradiction, the other two positions are also untenable. As was said by the Blessed One in the Laṅkāvatāra:

2.60

When scrutinized by the intellect, the intrinsic nature [of things] cannot be determined;

2.61

Therefore, they are shown to be inexpressible and devoid of intrinsic nature.

2.62

This follows by the force of things, as the wise say:

2.63

Just as things are contemplated, so do they fall to pieces. // And so forth.

2.64

The meaning is that it does not stand in any position whatsoever. And the conventional practice regarding observed objects is coherent through conventional truth, like conventional practice in a dream. Hence it has been said:

2.65

For an ascetic, a lustful man, and a dog, in one and the same woman's body,

2.66

There are three conceptual determinations: a corpse, an alluring woman, and food.

2.67

Thus, through the power of the four contemplative cultivations, upon the cessation of all latent impressions, supreme nirvāṇa in the form of the void will be attained, so that we have accomplished our aim and have nothing to be instructed about. As for the disciples, two things are to be done: yoga and ācāra. There, inquiry for the attainment of an unobtained principle is yoga; accepting the principle stated by the teacher is ācāra. Because they accept what was stated by the teacher, they are the highest, and because they do not make an objection, they are the lowest; hence they are renowned as "Mādhyamikas" (the middle ones).

2.68

The fame of certain [thinkers] as "Yogācāras" arises because, having accepted the four contemplative cultivations stated by the teacher and the voidness of the external object, they raised the inquiry: "How is the voidness of the internal [consciousness] accepted?" This indeed is their technical premise: Self-awareness must certainly be accepted; otherwise, the blindness of the entire world would result. That was declared by Dharmakīrti:

2.69

For one whose cognition is not perceptible, the seeing of an object is not established.

2.70

An external object of cognition is simply untenable, because the conceptual alternatives are impossible. Would an object grasped by cognition be produced or unproduced? Not the first, because what has been produced does not endure. Nor the second, because what is unproduced does not exist. Now, if you think that the past object alone is grasped by cognition because it produces that [cognition], that too is childish talk: because it contradicts the appearance of presentness, and because sense faculties and the like, as producers of cognition, would also unacceptably become objects of cognition. Moreover, is the object of cognition of the form of an atom or of the form of a composite whole? Not the latter, because it is refuted by the alternatives of [residing in] the whole or in parts, and so forth. Not the former, because it is beyond the senses, and because simultaneous conjunction with a group of six is a defeating argument, as has been said:

2.71

Because of simultaneous conjunction with six [atoms], an atom would have six parts;

2.72

If those [six] occupied the same single place, the mass would be a mere atom.

2.73

Therefore, since there is no object of cognition distinct from itself, it is established that the intellect, identical with it, manifests its own nature entirely by itself, like light. As has been said:

2.74

There is no other object to be experienced by the intellect, nor is there another experience of it;

2.75

Deprived of object of cognition and cognizing subject, it illuminates itself by itself alone.

2.76

And non-difference between the object of cognition and the cognizing subject is to be inferred: That which is cognized by whichever cognition is not different from it, just as the self [is not different] from cognition; and blue and other [forms] are cognized by those [cognitions]. For if there were difference, then a relation between this [cognition] and the object would not exist now, since identity, which is the cause of regulation, is absent, and being produced from that is not a regularizing factor. And this distinct appearance of the object of cognition, the cognizing subject, and the cognition is a delusion, like the appearance of duality in a single moon. Here too, only the beginningless, unbroken stream of the latent impression of difference is the cause. As has been said:

2.77

Due to the rule of simultaneous apprehension, there is non-difference between the blue and the cognition of it;

2.78

And difference is seen through erroneous cognitions, as in the case of the undifferentiated moon.

2.79

Although undivided, the nature of the intellect, by those whose vision is inverted,

2.80

Appears as if endowed with the difference of object of cognition, cognizing subject, and cognition. // And:

2.81

Nor should it be thought that taste, potency, digestive transformation, and the like would be equal in sweetmeats obtained by wishful thinking and in [actual] sweetmeats. For, although in reality intellect is devoid of the forms of the cognized and the cognizer, it possesses various forms of object of cognition and cognizing subject to conform with the understanding of conventional agents, just as in the distinct cognitions of a tuft of hair or a vein by those whose eyes are afflicted by cataract and the like; since a system is tenable through the power of beginningless corrupted latent impressions, this objection does not apply. As has been said:

2.82

Just as that which is devoid of the forms of cognized and cognizer is viewed by the deluded

2.83

As disordered into the forms of object of cognition and cognizing subject having differentiated definitions,

2.84

So when this conventional system is established, like the distinction in cognitions of hairs and the like,

2.85

Then the definition of object of cognition and cognizing subject is not to be challenged.

2.86

Therefore, it is established that the intellect alone appears in manifold forms under the influence of beginningless latent impressions. And consequently, through the power of the accumulation of the previously mentioned contemplative cultivations, the arising of purified consciousness—wherein the turmoil of manifold objective forms has melted away upon the eradication of all latent impressions—is the supreme attainment.

2.87

Others, however, maintain: That there is no external group of entities, as previously asserted, is untenable, because of the absence of a means of valid cognition. Nor should it be said that the rule of simultaneous apprehension is a means of valid cognition, for, since it lacks an establishing reason, its exclusion from the counter-instance is doubtful when it is intended to prove the non-difference between what is known and what knows.

2.88

If it is objected: "If there were difference, there would be no ground in the form of the rule of simultaneous apprehension"—no, because cognition appears as inward-facing and the knowable as outward-facing, and thus they appear as distinct; and also because the rule of being together characterized by identity of place and identity of time is impossible. Moreover, if an object such as blue were the form of cognition, the appearance would be 'I', not the apprehension 'this', since it is not distinct from the cognition.

2.89

Now if it is said: "Although the form of blue is the very nature of cognition, it appears through error as if outside and distinct, and there is no mention of 'I' in it; as has been said:

2.90

"That part which, due to another determination, stands as if external,

2.91

even that appearance of difference in non-different cognition is an affliction;" and

2.92

"That which is an internal knowable principle appears as if external;"

2.93

That is untenable. In the absence of an external object, there is no understanding of it, and so the statement of comparison 'as if external' is unfounded. For no discerning person would say: 'Vasumitra appears like the son of a barren woman.' Moreover, it results in mutual dependence: if the appearance of difference is erroneous, the appearance of non-difference has epistemic validity; and if it has epistemic validity, the appearance of difference is erroneous. Furthermore, it is observed as an established fact in the world that people, experiencing blueness and the like, adopt only the external through non-discrepancy and disregard the internal. Thus, this reason meant to establish non-difference shares the semblance of a fallacious reason like the 'cow-dung-and-rice-pudding' maxim. Therefore, one who says 'as if external' must recognize that the external alone is apprehended; thus your own arrow strikes you back.

2.94

If it is objected: "The apprehendability of an object that belongs to a different time from the cognition is illogical"—

2.95

that is illogical. For an object in contact with a sense faculty imparts its own form to the cognition to be produced, and by means of that imparted form, the inferability of that object is established. For this very reason, the objection and the answer have been summarized:

2.96

"If it is asked how that which has a different time is apprehended, they understand apprehensibility

2.97

to be nothing other than its causality with respect to the manifestation, capable of imparting the form of cognition."

2.98

And likewise, just as a meal is inferred by nourishment, country by language, or affection by flurry, so the knowable is to be inferred by the form of cognition. As has been said:

2.99

"For it does not connect it with the object without the form of the object;

2.100

therefore, the means of valid cognition for apprehending the object of cognition is having the form of the object of cognition."

2.101

For it is not the mere existence of cognition that is suitable as its cognition, because that is non-distinct everywhere. But entering into similarity with it, it brings about representation. And so the formal argument for the existence of external objects is: All things that occur occasionally despite the presence of something depend on something distinct from it; just as, when I have no intention to speak or go, appearances of speech and movement depend on the streams of other persons who intend to speak or go; and so cognitive acts of active engagement in dispute, despite the presence of the storehouse-consciousness, refer to blue and so forth only occasionally. There, 'storehouse-consciousness' is the consciousness that is the locus of 'I'; and the consciousness that refers to blue and so forth is the 'active consciousness'. As has been said:

2.102

"That would be the storehouse-consciousness which is the locus of 'I';

2.103

that would be the active consciousness which refers to blue and the like."

2.104

Therefore, the external object, distinct from the stream of storehouse-consciousness, which is the cause of the occasional active consciousness, is indeed to be apprehended; it should be understood that its production does not occur only occasionally because the conditions for the ripening of impressions are occasional.

2.105

For in the doctrine of the Vijñānavādin, an impression is the capacity of the storehouse-consciousnesses residing in a single continuum to generate their respective active consciousnesses. And its ripening is its orientation toward the production of its own effect. And its condition, the cause, is accepted to be the preceding moment residing in its own continuum, since causation by another continuum is not admitted.

2.106

And therefore it must be said that all moments residing in the storehouse-consciousness are capable with respect to the ripening of the impression residing in the storehouse-consciousness that produces the active consciousness; otherwise, not even one would be capable, since there is no difference in their residing in the stream of storehouse-consciousness. On the position that all are capable, delay in time is illogical. And therefore, in order to account for occasional occurrence, a clever person of clear intellect, without concealing his own experience, must determine, even if unwilling, that all six cognitions—whose objects are sound, touch, form, taste, smell, and pleasure and the like—arise dependent on four conditions.

2.107

Those four conditions are well known as the object-condition, the immediately preceding condition, the auxiliary condition, and the dominant condition.

2.108

(i) There, the mind, which is denoted by the word 'cognition' and has the appearance of blue and so forth, comes to have the form of blue from the object-condition, namely blue.

2.109

(ii) From the immediately preceding condition, namely the preceding cognition, it attains the nature of awareness.

2.110

(iii) From the auxiliary condition, namely light, it attains clarity.

2.111

(iv) From the eye, the dominant condition, comes the specific restriction in the apprehension of the object. When the arisen cognition could equally apply to taste and the like, the eye, being the regulator, is fit to be the dominant condition, because in the world the regulator is observed to have dominance.

2.112

Thus the aggregate consisting of mind and mental factors is of five kinds, bearing the names form, consciousness, feeling, conceptualization, and karmic formations. There, by the etymologies 'objects are given form by these' and 'they are given form', the sense organs along with their objects are the form-aggregate. The stream of storehouse-consciousness and active consciousness is the consciousness-aggregate. The stream of cognitions of pleasure, pain, and the like, produced by the connection of the two previously mentioned aggregates, is the feeling-aggregate. The stream of cognitions referring to words such as 'cow' is the conceptualization-aggregate. The defilements such as passion and aversion, the secondary defilements such as intoxication and pride, and merit and demerit, which are grounded in the feeling-aggregate, are the aggregate of karmic formations.

2.113

[l. 2.290]

2.114

Having meditated that all this is suffering, the abode of suffering, and the means to suffering, one should attain knowledge of reality as the means to its cessation. Therefore it has been said: suffering, origin, cessation, and path are the four principles recognized by the noble Buddha. Among these, suffering is well known. Origin is the cause of suffering. That is twofold: through connection with conditions and through connection with causes. There, the aphorism summarizing the connection with conditions states: 'This is the fruit of conditions'; that is to say, this effect which other causes 'reach' (pratyayanti), i.e., go to—the state of these incoming causes is 'conditionality', namely the combination of causes; the meaning of the aphorism is that it is the fruit of that alone, not of any conscious agent. For example, the sprout, whose cause is the seed, arises from the combination of six elements. There, the earth-element generates the sprout's hardness and smell; the water-element generates its moisture and taste; the fire-element its colour and heat; the wind-element its touch and motion; the space-element its opening and sound; the season-element the earth and other factors as appropriate.

2.115

And the aphorism summarizing the connection with causes states: 'Whether Tathāgatas arise or whether they do not arise, this nature of things, this stability of things, this regulative order of things, this conformity to dependent origination, remains fixed.'

2.116

In the view of the Tathāgatas, the Buddhas, this very nature of things—which are of the nature of effects and causes—consisting in the causal relation, remains fixed whether [Tathāgatas] arise or do not arise. Namely, that which arises when something is present, and does not arise when it is absent, is the effect of that cause.

2.117

The explanation of the term 'nature of things' is given by the words 'the stability of things', etc. It is the staying of a thing, i.e., an effect, without overstepping its cause. The affix -tal indicates the stem's own meaning. It is the regulative power of a thing, i.e., a cause, with respect to its effect.

2.118

Now, if it is objected that this causal relation is not possible without a conscious agent, the aphorism says: 'dependent', etc. When a cause exists, having depended on it—having reached it—that conformity, that following along in its origination, is itself the nature of things that remains fixed, whether [Tathāgatas] arise or do not arise. Nor is any conscious presiding agent apprehended here: this is the meaning of the aphorism.

2.119

The connection of dependent origination with causes is, for instance: from the seed the sprout, from the sprout the stem, from the stem the stalk, from the stalk the bud, then the spike, then the flower, then the fruit. Nor in this external aggregation does the cause—the seed and so forth—or the effect—the sprout and so forth—consciously think, 'I am producing the sprout', or 'I have been produced by the seed.' In the same way, the two kinds of causes are to be understood in internal things as well.

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Because of the ocean of knowable objects standing before us, out of fear of extending the book,

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we desist according to this maxim. Liberation is the cessation of both [internal and external aggregates] or, immediately thereafter, the arising of pure knowledge. The path is the means to their cessation; and that is the knowledge of reality. And that occurs by the power of prior contemplative cultivation: this is the supreme secret. To those who asked for the end of the aphorism, it was said: 'Since you have asked for the end of the aphorism, you shall be Sautrāntikas'; through being so named by the Blessed One, the designation 'Sautrāntika' arose.

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Certain Buddhists, declaring: 'Although external things like smell and internal aggregates like form exist, the Blessed One, in order to generate indifference toward them, taught the primary pupils that everything is empty; to the second group, who were seized by the grasp of mere consciousness, he taught that consciousness alone is real; but to the third group, who maintained that both are real, [they maintain] that the knowable is inferable, which is a contradictory discourse'—are known by the name of Vaibhāṣikas. For this is the definition that emerges among them: in the doctrine that the knowable is inferable, because there is no perceived object whatsoever, there is no place to grasp pervasion, so inference cannot function, and there is contradiction with the experience of all people. Therefore, an object is of two kinds: the directly apprehended and the conceptually determined. Between them, direct apprehension, being indeterminate, is a means of valid cognition, because it is free from conceptual construction. Conceptual determination, being determinate, is not a means of valid cognition. Thus it has been said:

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Perception is non-erroneous, indeterminate, and free from conceptual construction;

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conceptual construction is an error, because it illuminates what is unreal and lacks practical concordance.

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For the directly apprehended real entity is the means of valid cognition; direct apprehension which is other than this

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is neither a real entity nor a valid cognition, arising from words, inferential signs, sense organs, and the like.

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Now, if it is asked: if determinate cognition is not a means of valid cognition, how could reaching the object and practical concordance be explained for one who acts from it?

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This is not sound; for that is explained by the possibility of obtaining the object mediately, on the analogy of the concept of a jewel with respect to the radiance of a jewel. The rest has been detailed in the section on the Sautrāntikas, so it is not elaborated here.

Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit