Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.5

4.5

[Only] arrangements that can be fabricated by a specific activity of hands and so forth are observed to have a conscious agent, such as pots, clothes, houses, and the like; in the absence of that, how could there be an inference of such [a creator] for organic limbs, bodies, and the like, which arise through evolutionary transformation, merely from a specific arrangement—just like [inferring] fire merely from paleness? Likewise, co-presence is observed for things characterized by arrangement with a conscious agent endowed with a body, sense organs, and so forth, and this is negated in the case of grass sprouts and the like because no such thing is observed when it should be visible. When that is negated, it is impossible to infer a mere conscious agent devoid of body and the like, just like [inferring] a hot fire in snow from alterations of grass and the like. Nor does this entail the consequence of abolishing all inference: when all particulars are excluded, the co-presence of the universal 'smokeness' with the universal 'fireness' is understood, and that is observed in its entirety on the mountain; thus the inference there is legitimate. It is only the universal that is inferred, not the particular, because there is no recurrence [of the latter]. Although the universal is already understood in the kitchen and the like, it becomes the object of knowledge when recognized through inference in another place, at another time, and so forth, just as [it would be] through perception; therefore, there is no [defect of] proving what is already established. And there indeed exists a relation of inherence in the conjoined between the mountain and the universal; thus the inference of it there is legitimate. Objection: But the intrinsic nature of a thing can change because of a specific region; for in some places a scorpion bite even results in death, whereas elsewhere it does not; likewise, there might be a doubt that smoke fails to be accompanied by fire in another region. True, such [a doubt] does arise; but it can be dispelled by hearing from people who have arrived from those respective regions; thus everything is unblemished. Therefore, whatever universal or particular has been observed to have an invariable co-presence by whatever relation with whatever universal or particular in places and times as observed, that very thing of that very kind, when seen in another place, at another time, and so forth, makes known that [other thing] of that kind solely on account of that invariable co-presence; and it is established that the invariable co-presence can be understood in observed regions by repeated observations alone, assisted solely by the non-observation of counter-instances. The relation of the inferential mark with the possessor of the inferential mark consists entirely in invariability, and that has repeated observation as its means of knowledge. / By Pārthasārathi Miśra, in accordance with what is stated in the sub-commentary verses, / invariable concomitance, together with its means of knowledge, has been determined according to cognition.