Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4
English (machine translation) 4
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Contents
4.1
Where they disagree regarding the relation of the sign and the signified,
both with respect to nature and means of valid cognition, there the determination is now stated.
4.1.p1
First, regarding [its] intrinsic nature: followers of Kaṇāda assert that [the relation is] the cause of inference denoted by the word 'laiṅgika' (inferential sign) on account of causality, conjunction, inherence, inherence in a common object, and contradiction, saying: 'This is its cause, its effect, conjunct, inherent in a common object, and contradictory—this is what constitutes an inferential sign.' The Buddhists hold that invariable concomitance is the positive and negative concomitance of the probans with the probandum and its absence, rooted in essential identity and causation. Others hold it to be pervasion of the probans by the probandum. The Mīmāṃsakas hold it to be of the nature of a restriction. There is [likewise] disagreement regarding the means of knowledge [for grasping it]: the Buddhists state that essential identity and causation are the means of knowledge. Others say it is mental perception. Others say it is purely sensory perception. Some say it is even the initial perception. Still others consider the final perception, assisted by repeated observation, to be the means of knowledge for restriction. Others say it is postulation. The Teacher holds that it is repeated observations themselves, assisted by non-observation of counter-instances. Among these views, if one accepted only causality and so forth as adopted by the Vaiśeṣikas, there could be no relation of revealer and revealed between the rising of the Kṛttikās and [the rising of] Rohiṇī and the like, because causality and so forth are absent [between them]. Nor can all [relations] be included by taking the term 'conjunct' (saṃbandhin), because that refers merely to conjunction and inherence. And if it referred to everything, then causality and the rest would also be established from that alone, making their separate mention useless. Moreover, in this way, there would also be an inference of smoke from fire, since they are [related as] cause and effect; [or an inference of being a tree] from being a śiṃśapā tree, because they co-inhere in the same object. If [it is argued that] this unwanted consequence does not follow because it is not restricted, then restriction alone is the auxiliary factor for inference, not causality and so forth. Even on the Buddhist view, because the reason is an inferential mark only through obtaining positive concomitance of essential identity and effect alone, the cognition of Rohiṇī having recently risen would not be established from the rising of the Kṛttikās. And if it is said that the inference of color from taste is an inference of the material cause of color, which is a cooperative cause of the material cause of taste, from taste by virtue of the efficacy of action, and from that material cause of color an inference of the resulting color is made by virtue of the efficacy of action—this is not so, because [one] is not the effect [of the other]. Even though a cause together with its auxiliary causes is inferred from an effect, an effect cannot be inferred from a cause, even through the efficacy of action, because it is not an effect [of it] nor of the same essence. If a cause can also be an indicator, then, as stated, the unwanted consequence of inferring smoke from fire would follow. Furthermore, positive concomitance means following after; but fire, which is situated on the ground, does not follow after smoke that is rising upward; nor does the sun in the sky follow the shadow of a gnomon situated on the ground. By this, pervasion is also refuted, for:
4.2
Fire stationed on the ground does not encompass the tip of the smoke situated in the sky; / Therefore, restriction is the relation between the sign and that which possesses the sign.
4.2.p1
As has been stated:
4.2.p2
'The relation called restriction is now stated according to our own view.'
4.2.p3
Whatever entity is restricted in a certain way, by whatever [entity], of whatever kind, and in whatever manner,
4.2.p4
that entity, being of such a nature, makes known elsewhere only such an entity of that kind. (3)
4.2.p5
Whatever entity has been determined in exemplary instances as restricted by whatever [other entity], of whatever kind, existing in whatever place and time, in whatever manner, by whatever relation—whether conjunction, inherence, inherence in a common object, causality, or any other, directly or indirectly—that entity, when perceived in other subjects, being of such a nature, leads to the inference of a related entity of such a kind, existing in that place and time, and having such a relation. For example: smoke existing in the sky and rising upward, being restricted by fire that is not situated too far away, makes that [fire] known in just that manner. A river flood, on the other hand, which is present now and located in a lower region, makes known rain that occurred far away. The rising of the moon makes known the swelling in the ocean at that same time. Its position in the middle of the sky makes known that same [swelling] after seven and a half nāḍikās have elapsed, because it is restricted by that [state] as having just that nature. One should infer likewise in other cases as well. It is restriction alone that is designated by the word 'pervasion' in the sub-commentary verse:
4.2.p6
Here, the relation of the property of the sign with the possessor of the sign is held to be pervasion;
4.2.p7
And that which is pervaded is held to be the indicator, while that which pervades is held to be the indicated.
4.2.p8.1
—in passages such as these. By what means of knowledge, then, is this restriction apprehended? Some say: either from causality or from essential identity. That is incorrect, because it would entail that there is no restriction in instances like the rising of Kṛttikās and Rohiṇī, which are neither cause and effect nor identical in nature. Moreover, causality is nothing other than a restriction of prior and posterior sequence; and how can a restriction itself be the means of knowledge for a restriction, as this would incur the fault of self-dependence? Furthermore, what means of knowledge is there for effect and essential identity themselves? If it is said that through perception only mere coexistence is apprehended, not the fact that smoke is its effect—this is not true. For where it is seen, its presence there is apprehended; where it is not seen, its absence is apprehended. But whence [is its] effect-status [known]? Therefore, because causality itself lacks a means of knowledge, determining a restriction based on it is untenable. And essential identity is completely unsupported by any means of knowledge. For even though a śiṃśapā is seen somewhere to be of the nature of a tree, it cannot be restricted by being of its essence, because being of its essence entails an invariable attachment to that alone. And there is no means of knowledge showing that tree-ness is attached to śiṃśapā alone, since even when there is simultaneous perception, tree-ness can deviate [from it]. If it is said that deviation of śiṃśapā-ness is never observed anywhere, even so, doubt is not dispelled because deviation is possible in another place or at another time. Therefore, restriction is not established from essential identity. Some, however, declare restriction to be [grasped by] mental perception. That is incorrect, because the mind has no independent functioning externally. If it is said that it can function externally with the aid of repeated observation, that is not so, because it does not go outside the body. For mere arising from a sense organ is not the definition of perception; otherwise, inference and so forth, being produced by the mind assisted by the inferential sign and so forth, would also be perceptions. Perception arises from the contact of sense organ and object, and that contact is of four kinds: apprehension of substance from conjunction; of qualities, actions, and universals from inherence in the conjoined; of quality-ness and so forth from inherence in that which inheres in the conjoined; and apprehension of existence residing in quality-ness and so forth from inherence in that.
4.2.p8.2
Nor is this fourfold contact possible between the mind and an external object, because [the mind] does not exist outside the body. Even for those who assert that the mind is all-pervading, although the mind is an all-pervading substance like space, they still maintain the status of an organ only for the mind as delimited by the body, just as [they do for] space delimited by the ear cavity; therefore, contact with an external object is impossible. Otherwise, inference and the like would also result in being perception, since their objects would be connected with the mind. If contact is only fourfold, how then is sound apprehended? For since sound and the auditory organ—which is identical to one among space, the directions, or the ego-sense—are inactive, contact between them is not possible, because [contact] is produced by action. To this it is replied: contact itself is their relation. And this is not produced by action, because [that definition] fails in the case of contact produced by contact. Nor is it produced by contact, because [that definition] fails in the case of [contact] produced by action. Continuous proximity residing in substance, which is common to both, is its cause. And that is possible even between two all-pervading entities. Or let it be that, because contact produced by contact is unproven, contact that has an origin is [always] produced by action, without exception; for the contact with the shuttle residing in the threads indeed resides also in the cloth once the threads have attained the state of cloth, but there is no cognition of another contact there. Then uncaused contact between two all-pervading entities will be established through inference: 'Two all-pervading entities are mutually in contact, because, while being substances, they are in continuous proximity, like a pot and space.' If, however, continuous proximity itself is contact, even so, contact is established for two all-pervading entities as well. But surely, [sound is not a substance] because there is no evidence for its residing in a substance? Surely an effect cannot exist without a substrate! True, but sound is not an effect, because it is eternal. But someone maintains that sound is a quality, like color and the like, because it is graspable by a single sense organ. For him too, there is inconclusiveness with regard to wind. Even if the qualification 'while being devoid of touch' is added, there is deviation with universals such as cowness and colorness, because these, although accessible to the eye alone, are not qualities.
4.2.p8.3
Moreover, the space assumed to be the substrate of sound must be either perceptible or imperceptible. If it is perceptible, the reason deviates on account of that very [space], which is a substance accessible to the eye alone. If it is imperceptible, it is counter-balanced; for it is not possible that an imperceptible [substance] should have a perceptible quality, sound. Indeed, one can formulate [the counter-inference]: 'Sound is not a quality, because, while being devoid of the qualityhood of a perceptible substance, it is perceptible, like a pot.' Therefore, its apprehension through contact is proper when it is a substance; and so, relation is indeed fourfold. Thus, because there is no relation of the mind with an external object, the invariable relation residing in smoke and the like cannot be an object of mental perception. In that case, this [cognition] would follow as another means of valid cognition—one produced by the mind assisted by repeated observation, like the knowledge produced by the mind assisted by an inferential sign and the like. And that is unacceptable to those who assert six means of valid cognition. But someone holds that the invariable relation is an object of the external sense organs alone. For he thinks that the relation between fire and smoke is apprehended by perception as simply undelimited by space and time. Objection: Since perception has as its object proximate space and time, the contact is delimited only by them. Reply: It is not so. For 'this-ness' is the delimitation by proximate space and time, and that is apprehended only of the two substances, not of the contact; for the cognition is 'these two are connected', not 'this contact is between these two.' Therefore, contact is not delimited by space and time, but rather the substances alone are; space and time are not delimiters of the contact. Hence it is determined that the undelimited relation belongs to smoke alone, and consequently it is only the existence of smoke that requires a means of valid cognition with respect to another space and time, etc., but not its contact with fire, because that has already been apprehended. But in the case of fire, although it is seen connected with smoke, since deviation is observed somewhere, its contact with smoke is caused by an extrinsic condition such as wet fuel, and is not intrinsic; but in the case of smoke, since no such extrinsic condition is observed, its relation to fire is intrinsic and invariable. For what is intrinsic does not deviate.
4.2.p8.4
On this point we say: consciousness alone must first be examined here. For it arises precisely delimiting contact by space and time: 'these two, fire and smoke, have been connected, are being connected, will be connected'—because it is contact itself, as the verbal meaning, that is delimited by the three times. Thus the arrow shot by yourself strikes you: for it is the operation of the semantic factor that is to be delimited by the three times, not the semantic factor [itself]. Nor must time necessarily be indicated only by the word 'this', because its indication is even more clearly accomplished by the present tense affix and the like. And if connection with time belonged only to an independent substance and not to dependent qualities and actions, then the verbal affixes, which are remembered in the sense of a specific time, would be devoid of an object. For they indicate the temporal delimitation of action alone, not of substance. If that [action] were not delimitable, to what could they express a connection with time? Let there be no apprehension of delimitation of the contact by space and time; even so, [its] intrinsicality is completely unproven. For the determination of its absence is not established merely by the non-apprehension of delimitation, since non-apprehension of what exists is possible. And when the absence of delimitation is not ascertained, intrinsicality is not established. Or, if it is established, present time would also be intrinsic, and consequently, just like contact with fire, this connection with [present] time would result in being intrinsic. There, just as there is no existence [of smoke] devoid of contact with fire, so too, because smoke cannot exist apart from its connection with this [present] time, connection with any other time is ruled out by perception itself, and the momentariness of entities is thereby entailed—so the Buddhists have won! If, on the other hand, connection with time, though undelimited, is not intrinsic, the same would apply to contact with fire. Now, [you might say that] even setting aside the intrinsic connection with time, there is no ascertainment of the invariable relation. Objection: Since connection with other times is apprehended through recognition, the persistence of smoke is established even upon abandoning the previous time; but smoke is never observed apart from contact with fire, so how could it exist without it?
4.2.p8.5
Is momentariness now grasped by perception alone and later sublated by recognition? For this is not your accepted view. And even granting this—that sublation of previously understood momentariness belongs to that whose connection with another time is understood by perception—yet how could the momentary state of fire, which was understood by perception, be sublated by inference, and its connection with another time be understood? Moreover, if a connection with another time—which contradicts the restriction to that specific time understood by perception and is completely unknown—were apprehended by inference, then the idea that inference grasps what has already been grasped would be thoroughly discarded. Furthermore, because a connection with time is seen to deviate even when unconditioned, persons doubting whether the connection with fire also might deviate or not could not reach an end to that [doubt] even in a thousand human lifetimes. Even if a deviation was diligently sought in observed places and times and not seen, still who indeed could dispel the doubt that deviation might occur somewhere, at some time? Perception is not capable of dispelling it, since its operation is restricted solely to the proximate place and time. Nor is inference [capable], because it is dependent on ascertaining the invariant relation; and if the invariant relation were dependent on that [inference], there would result the defect of mutual dependence. If it is said that there is no deviation because [the relation] is natural, no; for there is no means of valid cognition for it being natural. Being natural is just being free of adjuncts, and it has been said that the absence of an adjunct is not established merely through non-cognition of an adjunct. Moreover, what is the means of valid cognition for the claim that what is natural does not deviate? It is neither perception, nor inference, nor anything else. And deviation is observed even of the unconditioned connection with time; so it could be for the connection with fire as well. Furthermore, the relation was understood between two other instances of fire and smoke in an exemplar subject, while this smoke located on the mountain is different, and its connection with fire is not understood; so how could it be an inferential sign? If it is said that the universal is the inferential sign, no, because its relation is not understood.
4.2.p8.6
The substance alone is qualified by all [these]—by place and time, by relation, and by the universal—and there is no syntactic connection between the relation and the universal with one another, because the universal too, like conjunction, is a qualifier of the substance. If it is said that there is a relation between the two universals through the medium of the substance, even so, just as the relation of fire with smoke has wet fuel and the like as an adjunct, in the absence of that, at another time, when that substance is absent, the relation mediated by it would also not exist. But a relation with another time mediated by another substance was not known beforehand; so how could it be an auxiliary to inference? Nor can the relation be understood between the two universals by a single observation to the exclusion of the particulars. Moreover, conjunction too is delimited by place and time through the medium of the substance, so there is no lack of delimitation. And just as the relation mediated by substance is natural to the universal, so too the delimitation of the relation with fire to that time, even if mediated by substance, would be natural; thus, by relinquishing that time, the relation would not endure at another time, so that, by the reasoning stated by you, one would have to ascertain the complete absence of relation between fire and smoke at another time, and there would not even be a suspicion of a relation with fire for smoke at another time; hence enough with excessive insistence. Another view [is as follows]: From seeing smoke with fire hundreds of times, and from not seeing it where there is no fire, the cognition 'this is invariably accompanied by fire' arises even in animals. Nor is this non-valid cognition, because it always arises with confirmation for everyone. Therefore, this is indeed a means of valid cognition. And it is subsumed under the sixfold [means of valid cognition]. There, it cannot be inference, because that is dependent on ascertaining the invariant relation. Nor is it verbal testimony, because it is not produced by words. It is not analogy, because its object is not similarity. It is not presumption, because nothing is seen that would be inexplicable without the invariant relation. Absence, however, is thoroughly discarded with regard to an invariant relation that is positive in nature. If it is objected: 'This is just an absence in the form of exclusion from the counter-instances'; no, the invariant relation is not mere exclusion, because of the absurd consequence that the horn of a hare and the like, being excluded from all counter-instances, would have an invariant relation to all things.
4.2.p8.7
Exclusion even from all counter-instances is hard to obtain, because there is no non-perception of what is perceptible. By elimination, this is just perception. Nor is it non-perceptual because it is not understood at the first sight; for, like the true nature of a gem, it is plausible that it is an object of perception aided by repeated acquaintance. Objection: Perception has the present as its object; then how can the invariant relation, whose essence is connection with other places and times, be understood by it? It is answered: The invariant relation is not a connection with other times and the like, but rather the intrinsic nature of smoke and the rest. And since that is present, it is proper that it is graspable by perception. For in order to grasp the invariant relation, a connection with other places and the like does not have to be grasped, just as with the enduring form of walls and the like. For it is not the case that because their connection with another time is imperceptible, their form is imperceptible. If that were so, 'this is not silver' would not sublate the previous cognition at a later time, because the objects would be different. For at the previous time, silver was posited by the cognition of silver; and at the later time, there is its absence; so, because the objects are different, how could there be sublation? Therefore, one must say that enduring silver was grasped; and it is said: 'For the silver being grasped is understood to be long-lasting.'
4.2.p9
Likewise, the form of the invariant relation is grasped, so its perceptibility is proper. But of what kind is this form of smoke and the rest? The invariant relation is that 'this is restricted to fire'—the meaning is that whenever and wherever there is smoke, then and there is fire. Therefore, it is established that the invariant relation is an object of perception. Regarding this, the following must be stated: Is perception entirely the apprehension of what is present, or is it also the apprehension of what is not present? First, perception as apprehension of what is not present cannot be possible, because it has been established that, since it is generated by contact with that [object], it is the apprehension of what is present. And thus its having the invariant relation as its object is impossible, because its form pervades all places and times. For this alone is the invariant relation of smoke with fire: that fire pervades all places and times of smoke. As it has been said:
4.2.p10
That which, in terms of place and time, is equal to or less than another
4.2.p11
is the pervaded; the pervader of that is equal to it, or greater.
4.2.p12
As for what was said—that restriction is the very nature of smoke—let this nature indeed be just identical with the non-deviation of the relation to fire. And what is this non-deviation other than the existence of relation to fire throughout all the space and time of smoke? And in that case, when that [nature] is perceived, the relation in other places and times would result in being perceived. Moreover, to say that one directly perceives an immediate form called 'restriction' belonging to smoke—distinct from its relation [to fire]—like paleness and the like, contradicts experience. Furthermore, if this were an additional form distinct from relation, like paleness and the like, then even when that is grasped by perception, the fire's pervading all places and times of smoke would not be grasped; for when one thing is grasped, another is not thereby grasped, because that would lead to over-extension. And if non-deviation across space and time is not grasped, how could inference arise? Moreover, this additional form as well, being grasped by perception, is grasped only as delimited by proximate space and time, so that a restriction with another time would not be established. As for what was also pointed out—that [it is] an enduring form, like that of a wall and the like—that too must be examined. Is the intention there that permanence itself is grasped, or that what is in fact enduring is grasped, or that it is the capacity for enduring? The first alternative does not hold: for permanence is persistence through multiple times; how could that be grasped by perception alone, since it has the present for its object? And if this were grasped by perception alone, then the regard for recognition in order to establish permanence would be useless. But in the second alternative, that is merely the form of the wall, nothing else; thus here too, it would only be established that what is in fact restricted is the very nature of smoke which is perceived. Nor is there any purpose served by that. As for capacity, since [the capacity] of all entities is cognised through postulation, its being cognisable through perception is impossible. In such cases, [the cognition] of permanence is inferential, because of prior acquaintance. And its inferential nature is clear because of the form stated [above]. For this cognition is of the following sort: 'If this is not split by a weapon or the like, then it will endure for some time.' Thus, even in the case of silver and the like, the permanence of its form is purely inferential. With this very intention it was said:
4.2.p13
For silver, when being grasped, is grasped as long-enduring.
4.2.p14
This very point explains the nature of a defeater as well. For it is understood through inference that when silver exists, its non-existence does not arise uncaused, nor does that which is not of that nature become of that nature. When it is settled that this [object] has the very same nature at both times, the silver-nature previously grasped extends to the subsequent time, and the non-silver-nature grasped at the subsequent time extends to the previous time. Because of having the same object, the silver-nature previously grasped is defeated by the cognition arising at the subsequent time: "This is not silver." But where identity of nature at both times is not cognized by inference regarding an entity, there no defeat occurs at all, as in the case of the cognition of blackness in a jujube fruit [not being defeated] by the cognition of redness arising at the time of ripening. If, however, permanence were grasped by perception, defeat would occur even there. Therefore, permanence cannot be firmly ascertained by perception. Likewise, restriction too [cannot be so ascertained], because it consists in pervading all places and times. [Objection:] Surely, restriction is the naturalness of the relation, not the relation at other times; and that [naturalness] is present right now, so it is reasonable that it is grasped by perception. [Reply:] What then is this 'naturalness'? First, it is not eternal existence, because that which is occasional cannot possess that. If it is said to be caused by essential nature: the essential nature of fire too is the cause in its relation to smoke, and so its relation to smoke would also be restricted. [Objection:] Surely its relation to smoke is produced by wet fuel and the like, not caused by essential nature. [Reply:] True, the essential nature is a cause [only] with wet fuel etc. as an accessory cause, yet it is indeed a cause. For without the essential nature of a relatum, a relation does not exist. If it is said to be a property of the essential nature, the same fault applies: contact is indeed a property of the essential nature of fire as well. If it is said that a relation is natural when it is caused solely by essential nature, and in the case of fire's relation to smoke there is indeed a cause other than its essential nature, such as wet fuel, whereas in the case of smoke's relation to fire, its essential nature alone is the cause and there is no other cause—if this is the view, then naturalness cannot be known by perception. For through it the absence of another cause cannot be cognized, since perception has existent entities as its object. And through the non-cognition of what is perceptible, the absence of another cause is cognized; hence its being graspable by perception is unfeasible. Moreover, in smoke's relation to fire, its essential nature alone is not the cause, because fire and the like are also causes. Therefore, naturalness is nothing other than non-deviation from the essential nature; and non-deviation is pervasion of all those places and times, and hence its being graspable by perception is unfeasible, because [perception] has the present as its object. Furthermore, even naturalness can be ascertained only for what is present and near, not for relations that are past, future, intervened, or distant. For there are many instances of the relation of fire and smoke; how could it be cognized by perception, which has an object in contact, that the essential nature of smoke alone is the cause of all of them? If it is said that it is the cause of relation in general, no, because since that is eternal, it has no cause. And this is an equal flaw even in the view that restriction is cognizable by a single observation. For in that view too, the causality of smoke-production is cognized only for that contact which is in conjunction, not for past ones and the like. And that [contact] is destroyed at another time; hence there would be inference at another time through the cause consisting in the nature of contact cognized by perception. Therefore, it is established that restriction cannot in any way be the object of perception. Others, however, consider restriction to be cognizable by presumption: "This observation of smoke in fire hundreds of times and its non-observation anywhere in non-fire is inexplicable if there were no restriction of smoke with fire; for if it were unrestricted, it might sometimes be observed somewhere without fire." That too is untenable. Non-observation is explained simply by absence [in those seen places]; but by that much, it cannot be ascertained that it does not exist everywhere in non-fire, because of the lack of a means of valid cognition. Merely observing it is also explained simply by its presence [there]; but by that alone, it cannot be firmly ascertained that smoke exists everywhere in fire. Therefore, a means of valid cognition for restriction must be stated. In reply, it is said: What is there to state here, since:
4.4
The author of the sub-commentary verses himself has indicated the means of valid cognition, / by stating that pervasion is indeed cognizable by repeated observation.
4.4.p1
For the previous paths were crooked, resorting to great contrivance, not based on direct experience, and resorted to out of mere impudence by the maxim of 'the resort of the helpless', because of resorting to the perception-hood—which contradicts direct experience—of a cognition whose nature is conjecture, namely: 'Surely this smoke is restricted to fire.' And there is this straightforward path: restriction is cognizable by repeated observation. What then is this means of valid cognition called 'repeated observation'? It cannot be stated restricting it to any single one; rather, by whichever one among perception and the rest the frequent co-presence of the inferential mark with the possessor of the mark is cognized, that very thing, accompanied by the non-observation [of the mark] in counter-instances, can serve as the means of valid cognition for restriction. [Objection:] Surely, co-presence is cognized in various places by repeated observations, but co-presence everywhere cannot easily be found by living beings. Even from non-observation in counter-instances, an absence is cognized only in proximate counter-instances; but exclusion from all counter-instances is truly impossible to obtain, because there is no non-cognition of the perceptible [in distant ones],
4.4.p2
and because absence is not established merely by non-observation. How then can restriction, which consists in pervasion of all places and times, be cognizable by repeated observation? And this was doubted by the master himself when he said:
4.4.p3
"For the positive concomitance of the pervader is not seen in each thing to be pervaded;
4.4.p4
for it could be obtained only endlessly through individual births and so forth."
4.4.p5
Likewise:
4.4.p6
"For being a probative reason is not cognized through absence from counter-instances," and so forth.
4.4.p7
The meaning is that the absence in all counter-instances cannot be obtained. And here the defense was stated: "There, merely by its non-observation, it is an indicator of its co-present [partner]"—here, "there" means in the counter-instance. This is what is meant: Let it be granted that the absence of the inferential mark in all counter-instances is not established; non-observation of the inferential mark in counter-instances certainly exists, and by that much, smoke or the like, being observed as co-present, becomes an indicator of fire or the like, which is co-present. As for the claim that co-presence too is impossible to see everywhere, in that regard also an answer has been given:
4.4.p8
"As to what is said: 'Co-presence / is impossible to see everywhere,'
4.4.p9
it may not indeed be seen everywhere, / but it is certainly seen in two or three [instances]."
4.4.p10
When the coexistence of fire and smoke is established because [their observation] is confined to limited places,
4.4.p11
or because the negative instance is not seen, its capacity to convey [the inferable] is established.
4.4.p12
This is the meaning: granted that coexistence is not observed everywhere, its observation in two or three places is indeed easy to do. With just that much, in the absence of observing a counterexample, inference occurs. For if an invariable rule in the form of pervasion over all places and times were admitted by us to be an auxiliary to inference, then there would be an objection. But it is not stated by us in this way. Rather, wherever smoke and the like are seen, there everywhere without exception they coexist with fire and the like, and they are not seen where there is no fire—just this much is the cause for the arising of an inference. For just this much makes smoke convey fire to ordinary people. But it does not depend on apprehending the positive and negative concomitance in all subjects and counter-subjects, which would make the means of valid cognition hard to attain. Therefore, the designation of 'invariable rule' is not made with reference to all places and times; rather, whichever invariable rule of coexistence of the sign with the possessor of the sign holds in observed places and times, that alone is called the invariable rule. Therefore, that alone is the auxiliary to inference. And since that is easily accessible through multiple observations alone, the invariable rule of coexistence with the possessor of the sign is not unauthoritative. As he said: 'By the mere observation of coexistence, it is an indicator of its coexistent partner.'
4.4.p13
Through how many observations of coexistence, then, does an inference arise? Who indeed could state this? It arises through just as many as are observed, but it cannot be stated by counting. Even those who say that the invariable rule is grasped by perception assisted by repeated observation, and even those who, when the invariable rule is grasped even upon a single observation, require repeated observation in order to eliminate the suspicion of an extraneous condition—they too do not specify it in this way; likewise, neither do we; so there is no difference between them and us. 'Should, then, the fire's pervasion of all places and times of smoke not be understood by one who wishes to infer?' True, it need not be understood. 'Well, in that case, how is the possessor of one part of the subject, whose relation is not known even in general, designated by the phrase 'whose relation is known'?' This does not designate the possessor of one part of the subject; rather, it designates the possessor of one part of the example. This, then, is the meaning of the Bhāṣya: when the relation has been known between two parts—smoke and fire—in a different possessor of parts altogether, such as a kitchen, having seen that one part, smoke, elsewhere in a mountain or the like, or in that very kitchen at another time, fire is inferred, because it is observed thus in ordinary life. And so, having stated that by the word 'whose relation is known' there is a designation of the knower, the meaning is: not of the knower. When it is asked, 'of which object of valid cognition is it the possessor of parts?', it is said: 'of the example's possessor of parts.' As they said: 'If some possessor of parts has had its connection known through two parts,
4.4.p14
another [whole] similar to that, or that very one, is inferred distinctively through those two.'
4.4.p15
'Or that very one through those two' intends another time. And stating it thus, he says that under the view that the word 'whose relation is known' has the possessor of parts as the meaning of another word [in the compound], it designates the possessor of one part of the example. Be that as it may, inference arises just from the invariable rule of coexistence in observed places. But as for this apprehension arising from repeated observation that 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', how is that [explained]? For it does not fail to exist, nor is it unauthoritative, because it arises firmly for all people at all times. Therefore, this must be stated to be subsumed under some means of valid cognition. It is replied: this apprehension is inferential, because it arises for one whose relation is known. And because it has an imperceptible form, it is not sensory, owing to the absence of direct perception and because that would contradict experience. For once one has apprehended the coexistence of smoke with fire in many places and times, an inference occurs: 'All other places possessing smoke, whether past, future, or remote, possess fire, because they possess smoke, like the observed kitchen and the like.' Therefore, because it follows the totality of causal conditions for a means of valid cognition in accordance with ordinary experience, an inference regarding another property-bearer arises precisely from the invariable rule of coexistence residing in a different property-bearer; this is unexceptionable. And he says: 'Therefore, in whatever property-bearers, by whatever [probans], of whatever sort,
4.4.p16
in whatever place or time, the state of being pervaded was previously ascertained,
4.4.p17
for that [probandum], of such a sort it would be in that much [space or time]; but in another observed property-bearer,
4.4.p18
the pervaded portion indicates the pervading portion in the very same way.'
4.4.p19
By the words 'of whatever sort' and 'of such a sort', it is shown that a form deficient compared to the form observed in the example is neither a sign nor a possessor of a sign. For ordinary people do not infer fire from doves and the like merely through the quality of whiteness, without the presence of smokiness. Nor does an altered grass-product observed in frost, which is not invariable with hot fire, cause one to infer an un-hot fire when the heat is sublated due to contradiction with the coldness apprehended by perception. And the course of means of valid cognition must be followed by examiners in accordance with ordinary life, not in contradiction with it. Thus, by this, it is shown that all non-instigating reasons are fallacious. A form over and above that, however, must be accepted intact. Therefore, the coexistence of the state of being harm with the state of being demerit is apprehended when accompanied by the state of being prohibited, as in the killing of a Brahmin and the like; hence harm without the state of being prohibited is seen to have coexistence with demerit in approaches to a teacher's wife and the like, so it is an inferential indicator. Just as the pupil engaged in duties such as study is observed to have coexistence with the teacher repeatedly, one cannot infer a teacher merely by [the presence of] a pupil alone. Likewise, the coexistence of the dark complexion of Devadatta's sons is caused by the particular foods, drinks, and so on consumed at the time of embryonic development; in the absence of that, one cannot infer the dark complexion of another son of his by the mere fact of being Devadatta's son. By this, the inference that slender plants, trees, and the like, through their being qualified by spatial arrangement, have an agent who possesses perceptual apprehension, like a pot and the like, is refuted. To explain: in those cases where
4.5
[Only] arrangements that can be fabricated by a specific activity of hands and so forth are observed to have a conscious agent, such as pots, clothes, houses, and the like; in the absence of that, how could there be an inference of such [a creator] for organic limbs, bodies, and the like, which arise through evolutionary transformation, merely from a specific arrangement—just like [inferring] fire merely from paleness? Likewise, co-presence is observed for things characterized by arrangement with a conscious agent endowed with a body, sense organs, and so forth, and this is negated in the case of grass sprouts and the like because no such thing is observed when it should be visible. When that is negated, it is impossible to infer a mere conscious agent devoid of body and the like, just like [inferring] a hot fire in snow from alterations of grass and the like. Nor does this entail the consequence of abolishing all inference: when all particulars are excluded, the co-presence of the universal 'smokeness' with the universal 'fireness' is understood, and that is observed in its entirety on the mountain; thus the inference there is legitimate. It is only the universal that is inferred, not the particular, because there is no recurrence [of the latter]. Although the universal is already understood in the kitchen and the like, it becomes the object of knowledge when recognized through inference in another place, at another time, and so forth, just as [it would be] through perception; therefore, there is no [defect of] proving what is already established. And there indeed exists a relation of inherence in the conjoined between the mountain and the universal; thus the inference of it there is legitimate. Objection: But the intrinsic nature of a thing can change because of a specific region; for in some places a scorpion bite even results in death, whereas elsewhere it does not; likewise, there might be a doubt that smoke fails to be accompanied by fire in another region. True, such [a doubt] does arise; but it can be dispelled by hearing from people who have arrived from those respective regions; thus everything is unblemished. Therefore, whatever universal or particular has been observed to have an invariable co-presence by whatever relation with whatever universal or particular in places and times as observed, that very thing of that very kind, when seen in another place, at another time, and so forth, makes known that [other thing] of that kind solely on account of that invariable co-presence; and it is established that the invariable co-presence can be understood in observed regions by repeated observations alone, assisted solely by the non-observation of counter-instances. The relation of the inferential mark with the possessor of the inferential mark consists entirely in invariability, and that has repeated observation as its means of knowledge. / By Pārthasārathi Miśra, in accordance with what is stated in the sub-commentary verses, / invariable concomitance, together with its means of knowledge, has been determined according to cognition.
Other recensions (1)
- English (machine translation) (mt) — English, machine translation
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyaratnamālā — Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sanskrit