Nyayasutra 381

[This is] untenable, because of a contradiction between the two terms in the proposition sentence, and between the proposition and the logical reason. The meaning of the word 'everything' is the totality of many, and the meaning of the word 'non-existence' is the denial of an entity. The former is expressible; the latter is inexpressible. In that case,

how could what is designated by a name be non-existence, which is nameless? For never can nameless non-existence be asserted as manifold and exhaustive. If [you say], “All this is non-existence” — that what you think to be ‘all this’ is non-existent? If that is the case, the contradiction is not removed: there cannot be a cognition with the content ‘manifold’ and ‘exhaustive’ in regard to non-existence. And this cognition ‘all’ does exist; therefore, it is not non-existence.
Moreover, there is a contradiction between proposition and logical reason: the proposition is ‘all is non-existence’, which is a denial of existence; the logical reason is ‘because of the establishment of mutual non-existence among existent things’. Having conceded and relied upon mutual non-existence among existent things, it is said that all is non-existence through the establishment of mutual non-existence. If all is non-existence, then [the reason] ‘because of the establishment of mutual non-existence among existent things’ is not tenable. And if mutual non-existence among existent things is established, then [the proposition] ‘all is non-existence’ is not tenable.

And the connection with the sūtra [is as follows]:

NyS 4.1.38: [All is] not [non-existence], because of the establishment of the intrinsic nature of existent things.

All is not non-existence. Why? Because existent things exist through their own being. It is asserted that existent things exist through their own property. And what is the own property of existent things? The universal such as ‘existent’ belonging to substances, qualities, and motions; the particularity of substances such as ‘possessing action’, and of earth [the qualities] terminating with touch; and each has infinite distinction. And distinct properties of universals, particularities, and inherence are apprehended.

Since non-existence is nameless, would not this distinction of objects that produces communication be absent? But it does exist; therefore, all is not non-existence.
Alternatively: ‘[All is] not [non-existence], because of the establishment of the intrinsic nature of existent things’ means: because of the establishment of their essential form. When the word ‘cow’ is uttered, a substance qualified by the universal is apprehended, not mere non-existence. And if all were non-existence, non-existence would be understood from [the word] ‘cow’, and non-existence would be expressed by the word ‘cow’. But since, upon the utterance of the word ‘cow’, a particular substance is understood, not non-existence, therefore [the view] is incorrect.
Alternatively: ‘because of the establishment of intrinsic nature’ [means]: why is it not said, ‘a cow is non-existent as a cow’, as [it is said], ‘a cow is non-existent as a horse’? From the absence of such a statement, [it follows that] a cow exists as a cow; thus there is the establishment of intrinsic nature. Or why is it not said, ‘a horse is a non-horse’, or ‘a cow is a non-cow’? From the absence of such a statement, it is understood that the substance exists in its own form.

And when a non-difference is denied, there is co-reference of the cognition of non-existence with an existent thing. In the case of an existent thing, difference is a relation such as contact. Here, non-difference is the relation named identity; upon its denial, there is always co-reference of the cognition of non-existence, as in ‘there are no jujube fruits in the bowl’. In ‘a cow is non-existent as a horse’ and ‘a cow is a non-horse’, non-difference between cow and horse is denied, [meaning] there is no oneness of cow and horse. When that is denied, there is co-reference of the cognition of non-existence with the existent thing, the cow, in ‘a cow is non-existent as a horse’—just as in ‘there are no jujube fruits in the bowl’, when the contact of the jujube fruits in the bowl is denied, there is co-reference of the cognition of non-existence with existent things. ||38