Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 2.2.26

2.2.26

tulyajātīyeṣv arthāntarabhūteṣu ca viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt |

It may be said, “A non-common property cannot be the cause of Doubt by being the cause of indecision or uncertainty. And Soundness as well as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-common property.” We say: Truly its difference or divergence is common to homogeneous and hetrogeneous things, and so only this common difference or divergence has been stated to be the cause of Doubt. Difference or divergence, which is the counter-opposite of Sound-ness, is the common property; and the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of the difference or divergence belonging to both, in other words, Sound-ness, is the non-common property. Therefore it has been said: “From the observation of the difference in both.” Here the observation of particular, i.e., the difference, in both, i.e., in homogeneous and heterogeneous things, constituting the cause of Doubt, it becomes really the common property.—22.

“Doubt arises in respect of sound,”—is the complement of the aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute, or a Substance, or an Action, because the ‘particular,’ i.e., difference or divergence is observed both in homogeneous objects, namely the twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Substances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species, or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed.