Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 2.2

2.2.1

puṣpavastrayoḥ sati sannikarṣe gandhāntarāprādurbhāvo vastre gandhābhāvaliṅgam |

puṣpa-vastrayoḥ—of a flower and a cloth; sati—existing; sannikarṣe—contact; guṇāntarāprā-durbhāvaḥ—non-appearance from another Attribute; vastre—in the doth; gandhābhāva-liṅgam—mark of the non-existence of Smell.

1. The non-production (of the smell which is perceived in the cloth), after or during its contact with a flower, from the Attribute (of the constitutive cause of the cloth), is the mark of the non-existence of smell in the cloth.

[Read sūtra 2.2.1 above]

2.2.2

etenāpsūṣṇatā vyākhyātā |

etena—by this; uṣṇatā—Hotness; Warmth. vyākhyātā—explained.

3. By this hotness is explained.

[Read sūtra 2.2.3 above]

2.2.3

vyavasthitaḥ pṛthivyāṃ gandhaḥ |

[Read sūtra 2.2.3 above]

2.2.4

tejasy uṣṇatā |

tejasaḥ—of Fire; uṣṇatā—Hotness.

4. Hotness (is the charateristic) of Fire.—83.

[Read sūtra 2.2.4 above]

2.2.5

apsu śītatā |

apsu—in Waters; śītatā—Coldness.

5. Coldness (is the characteristic) of Water.

[Read sūtra 2.2.5 above]

2.2.6

aparasmin paraṃ yugapad ayugapac ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni |

aparasmin—in respect of that which is posterior; aparam—posterior; yugapat—simultaneous; ciram—slow; kṣipram—quick; iti—such; kala-liṅgāni—marks of Time.

6. ‘Posterior’ in respect of that which is posterior, ‘simultaneous’, ‘slow,’ ‘quick,’—Such (cognitions) are the marks of Time.—85.

[Read sūtra 2.2.6 above]

2.2.7

dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte |

[Read sūtra 2.2.6 above]

2.2.8

tattvaṃ bhāvena |

[Read sūtra 2.2.6 above]

2.2.9

kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam |

[Read sūtra 2.2.6 above]

2.2.10

nityeṣv abhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt |

nityeṣu—in eternal Substances; abhāvāt—because it does not exist; anityeṣu—in non-eternal Substances; bhāvāt—Because it exists; kāraṇe—in the cause; kālākhyā—the name of Time; iti—hence.

9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal substances.

[Read sūtra 2.2.9 above]

2.2.11

kāraṇe kālākhyā |

nityeṣu—in eternal Substances; abhāvāt—because it does not exist; anityeṣu—in non-eternal Substances; bhāvāt—Because it exists; kāraṇe—in the cause; kālākhyā—the name of Time; iti—hence.

9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal substances.

[Read sūtra 2.2.9 above]

2.2.12

ita idam iti yatas tad diśo liṅgam |

itaḥ—from this; idam—this; iti—such; yataḥ—whence; tat—that; diśyam—relating to Space; liṅgam—mark.

10.That which gives rise to such (cognition and usage) as “This (is remote, etc.) from this,”—(the same is) the mark of Space.

[Read sūtra 2.2.10 above]

2.2.13

dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte |

dravyatva-nityatve—Substance-ness and eternality; vāyunā—by Air; vyākhāyāte—explained.

11. The substanceness and eternality (of Space are) explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.

[Read sūtra 2.2.11 above]

2.2.14

tattvaṃ bhāvena |

tattvam—unity; bhāvenā—by Existence.

12. The unity (of space is explained) by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.

[Read sūtra 2.2.12 above]

2.2.15

kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam |

kārya-viśeṣeṇa—owing to difference or distinction of effects; nānātvam—multiplicity or diversity.

13. The diversity (of Space) is due to the difference of effect—92.

[Read sūtra 2.2.13 above]

2.2.16

ādityasaṃyogād bhūtapūrvād bhaviṣyato bhūtāc ca prācī |

āditya-sāṃyogāt—from the conjunction of the sun; bhūta-pūrvāt—past and gone; bhaviṣyataḥ—future; bhūtāt—what has taken place or come into existence; present; ca—and; prācī—east (lit; Orient).

14. (The direction comes to be regarded as) the east, from the past, future, or present conjunction of the sun—93.

[Read sūtra 2.2.14 above]

2.2.17

tathā dakṣiṇā pratīcy udīci ca |

tathā—similarly; dakṣiṇā—south; pratīcī—west; udīcī—north; ca—also.

15. South, West, and North also are similarly (distinguished).

[Read sūtra 2.2.15 above]

2.2.18

etena digantarāṇi vyākhyātāni |

etena—by this; digantarālāni—intervals of Space or Direction; vyākhyātāni—explained.

16. By this, the intervals of direction are explained.

[Read sūtra 2.2.16 above]

2.2.19

sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ |

sāmānya-pratyakṣāt—from the perception of the Genus or general property; viśeṣāpratyakṣāt—from the non-preception of the Species or special property or differentia; viśeṣasmṛteḥ—from the recollection of particulars, i; e., alternatives. ca—and; saṃśayaḥ—doubt.

17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object containing) the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and the recollection of the alternatives, all at once or in one act of thought.

[Read sūtra 2.2.17 above]

2.2.20

dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭām |

[Read sūtra 2.2.17 above]

2.2.21

dṛṣṭaṃ ca dṛṣṭāvat |

dṛṣṭam—that which is seen; cā, and—dṛṣṭa-vat, like that which was seen.

18. And that which is seen, resembles that which was seen—(this also is the source of Doubt.)—97.

[Read sūtra 2.2.18 above]

2.2.22

dṛṣṭaṃ yathādṛṣṭām ayathādṛṣṭām ubhayathādṛṣṭatvāt |

yathā-dṛṣṭam—that which has been seen in a certain form A-yathā-dṛṣṭatvāt, because it is not seen in that form; cā—and.

19. (Doubt also arises), where that which has been seen in one form, is seen in a different form.

[Read sūtra 2.2.19 above]

2.2.23

vidyāvidyātaś ca saṃśayaḥ |

vidyā-a-vidyāta—from science and nescience; ca—and; saṃśayaḥ—Doubt.

20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience.

2.2.24

śrotragrahaṇo yo 'rthaḥ sa śabdaḥ |

20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience.

2.2.25

tasmin dravyaṃ karma guṇa iti saṃśayaḥ |

Sound having thus appeared as an object which contains properties, its being the mark or Ether depends solely on its being an Attribute, Therefore to establish its Attribute-ness, he brings out the trilateral Doubt, and says:

“Doubt arises in respect of sound,”—is the complement of the aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute, or a Substance, or an Action, because the ‘particular,’ i.e., difference or divergence is observed both in homogeneous objects, namely the twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Substances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species, or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed.

2.2.26

tulyajātīyeṣv arthāntarabhūteṣu ca viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt |

It may be said, “A non-common property cannot be the cause of Doubt by being the cause of indecision or uncertainty. And Soundness as well as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-common property.” We say: Truly its difference or divergence is common to homogeneous and hetrogeneous things, and so only this common difference or divergence has been stated to be the cause of Doubt. Difference or divergence, which is the counter-opposite of Sound-ness, is the common property; and the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of the difference or divergence belonging to both, in other words, Sound-ness, is the non-common property. Therefore it has been said: “From the observation of the difference in both.” Here the observation of particular, i.e., the difference, in both, i.e., in homogeneous and heterogeneous things, constituting the cause of Doubt, it becomes really the common property.—22.

“Doubt arises in respect of sound,”—is the complement of the aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute, or a Substance, or an Action, because the ‘particular,’ i.e., difference or divergence is observed both in homogeneous objects, namely the twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Substances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species, or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed.

2.2.27

ekadravyavattvān na dravyam |

eka-dravyatvāt—because it resides in one Substance; na—not; dravyam—Substance.

23. (Sound) is not a Substance, since it resides in one Substance only.

‘Ekadravyam’ is that which has one Substance only as its combinative cause. And no Substance whatever contains a single Substace as its combinative cause. Therefore, owing to this difference in property from Substances, this Sound is not a Substance. This is the meaning.—23.

2.2.28

acākṣuṣatvān na karma |

na—not; api—also Karma, action; acākṣnuṣatvāt—not being visible.

24. Nor (is Sound) an Action, because it is not an object of visual perception.

Because the intuition of perception of Sound is not visual, i.e., is produced by an external sense-organ other than the eye. So that the import is that, like the quality of Taste, etc., Sound-ness also does not reside in Actions, because it is a ‘class’ which does not reside in the objects of visual perception.—24.

2.2.29

guṇasya sato 'pavargaḥ karmabhiḥ sādharmyam |

guṇasya—of Attribute; sataḥ—being; apavargaḥ—speedy destruction; karmabhiḥ—with Actions; sādharmmyam—resemblance.

25. The resemblance (of Sound), although it is an Attribute, with Actions, consists in its speedy destruction.

‘Apavargaḥ’ means speedy destruction. And this, even in the case of Attribute-ness, is dependent upon the incidence of a rapidly appearing destroyer, in the same way as duality, etc., are. This constitutes only its resemblance to Actions, and not its Action-ness. The quality of undergoing rapid destruction which you (i.e., the objector) advance as as an argument, is not one-pointed i.e., multifarious, because it is found in Duality, Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, etc., as well. This is the import.—25.

2.2.30

sato liṅgābhāvāt |

sataḥ—of (Sound as) existent; liṅgābhāvāt—from the absence of mark.

26. (Sound does not exist before utterance), because there is no mark of (Sound as) evistent (before utterance).

For, if Sound were existent (before and after utterance), then there would be found some ‘mark,’ i.e., additional proof, of it as existent. But in the state of non-hearing, there is no proof that Sound exists. Therefore it is only an effect, and not something which reqṅires to be revealed only.—26.

2.2.31

nityavaidharmyāt |

nitya-vaiadharmyāt—owing to difference in property from what is eternal.

27. (Sound is not something which only requires to be brought to light), because it differs in property from what is-eternal.

The difference of Sound from what is eternal, is observed. Whereas, as in “Caitra speaks,” the existence of Caitra, Maitra, etc., even though they are covered from view, may be inferred from their voice; and whereas that which reveals, e.g., the lap, etc., is never inferred by that which is revealed, e.g.. the water-pot, etc.; therefore Sound is only a product, and not something which requires to be brought to light. This is the sense.—27.

2.2.32

kāryatvāt |

anityaḥ—non-eternal; ca—and; ayam—it; kāraṇataḥ—from its having a cause.

28. And Sound is non-eternal, (because it is observed to be produced) by a cause.

“Because its production is observed,”—this is the complement. For Sound is observed as issuing out of the (temporary) conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick, etc. So that it is non-eternal, because it has a production (or beginning). Or “From a cause” may imply the reason that it has a cause.—28.

2.2.33

abhāvāt |

“Because its production is observed,”—this is the complement. For Sound is observed as issuing out of the (temporary) conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick, etc. So that it is non-eternal, because it has a production (or beginning). Or “From a cause” may imply the reason that it has a cause.—28.

2.2.34

kāraṇo vikārāt |

na—not; ca—and; asiddham—disproved, Vikārāt from change.

29. Nor is (the dependence of Sound upon a cause) disproved by its modifications.

From observing the loudness, softness, and other modifications, it should not be concluded that the possession of a cause by Sound is thereby disproved. For a loud or soft sound is perceived according to the hardness or softness of the beating of the drum with the drumstick, and the like; whereas the loudness, etc., (i.e., the intensity) of that which is made known, is not dependent on the loudness, etc., (i.e., the intensity) of that which makes it known. Hence from its undergoing modification according to the modification of the cause, it is inferred to be a product, and not something to be revealed only-—29.

2.2.35

doṣāt |

abhivyaktau—in (the theory of the) manifestation or revelation (of Sound); doṣāt—from defect; Because there will be a defect.

30. (Sound is not eternal), because the theory that it requires to be revealed only, will entail a defect.

On the theory of the revelation of Sound, the defect will arise that (in each case) an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed will have to be admitted in respect of things co-existent and capable of being perceived by the same sense. But the invariable relation-ship of the revealer and the revealed is nowhere observed of such things. If it be not assumed here, then it will follow that on the manifestation of one letter, say ka, all the letters will become manifest. The rejoinder that an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed is in fact observed to obtain among the characteristic of being existent, the characteristic of being a man, and the characteristic of being a Brāh-mana, which are also co-extensive and are revealed by their individual difference, situation, and origin, is invalid. For they lack in being co-extensive, inasmuch as the extension of the characteristic of being a man, or of the characteristic of being a Brāhmaṇa, is not so large as that of the characteristic of being existent.—30.

2.2.36

saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ |

aṃyogāt—from Conjunction; vibhāgāt—from Disjunction; ca—and; śabdāt—from Sound; ca—and; śabda-niṣpattiḥ—production of Sound.

31. Sound is produced from Conjunction, from Disjunction, and from Sound also.

‘From Conjunction’.—i.e., from Conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick. ‘From Disjunction’—i.e., when a bamboo is being split up. Here Conjunction is by no means the cause of the first Sound, because there is then no Conjunction. Therefore the Disjunction of the two halves of the bamboo is the efficient or conditional cause, and the Disjunction of the halves and Ether is the non-combinative cause. And where Sound is produced in a distant flute, and the like, there Sound which is produced in the order of a current, leaches the portion of Ether limited by the hollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard, therefore Sound is produced from Sound also.—31.

2.2.37

liṅgāc cānityaḥ |

liṇgāt—from its mark; ca—and; anityaḥ—non-eternal; śabdaḥ—Sound.

32. Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark.

The meaning is that Sound, consisting of letters (i.e., articulate Sound), is non-eternal, because, while possessing a ‘class,’ it is capable of being perceived by the ear, like the Sound of a lute, etc.—32.

2.2.38

dvayos tu pravṛttyor abhāvāt |

dvayoḥ—of both; tu—but; provrittyoḥ—of the activities or occupations; abhāvāt—from the non-existence or absence.

33. (Sound is eternal), because (otherwise) the occupations of both (the teacher and the pupil) will vanish out of existence.

The word ‘tu’ cuts off connection with the context, and introduces the statement of an objection of the first party. The occupation or employment ‘of both,’ i.e., of the teacher and the pupil in teaching and learning respectively, is observed. “From its non-existence or absence,” i.e., from the entailment of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of gift or donation. The teacher makes a gift of the Veda to the pupil. If it is something constant or fixed, then a donation of it is possible. The second party may say, “A cow, and the like which are being given away, are perceived as standing between the donor and the donee; whereas the Veda, etc., are not perceived as lying between the teacher and the pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation.” Our (i.e., the first party’s) reply is that they are perceived in the interval between the teacher and the pupil by the ear of a person standing there. Moreover, the eternality of Sound follows from recurrence also. As in “He sees the colour for five times,” the recurrence or persistency of colour which is constant or permanent is observed, so the recurrence or persistency of Sound in “The anuvāka or paragraph has been read ten times, twenty times,” is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And constancy or steadiness being proved, since nothing is known which can destroy it, its eternality also is necessarily proved, on the principle “What will afterwards destroy it which is constant or lasting all this time?” This is the import.—33.

2.2.39

saṃkhyābhāvāt |

The word ‘tu’ cuts off connection with the context, and introduces the statement of an objection of the first party. The occupation or employment ‘of both,’ i.e., of the teacher and the pupil in teaching and learning respectively, is observed. “From its non-existence or absence,” i.e., from the entailment of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of gift or donation. The teacher makes a gift of the Veda to the pupil. If it is something constant or fixed, then a donation of it is possible. The second party may say, “A cow, and the like which are being given away, are perceived as standing between the donor and the donee; whereas the Veda, etc., are not perceived as lying between the teacher and the pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation.” Our (i.e., the first party’s) reply is that they are perceived in the interval between the teacher and the pupil by the ear of a person standing there. Moreover, the eternality of Sound follows from recurrence also. As in “He sees the colour for five times,” the recurrence or persistency of colour which is constant or permanent is observed, so the recurrence or persistency of Sound in “The anuvāka or paragraph has been read ten times, twenty times,” is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And constancy or steadiness being proved, since nothing is known which can destroy it, its eternality also is necessarily proved, on the principle “What will afterwards destroy it which is constant or lasting all this time?” This is the import.—33.

2.2.40

prathamāśabdāt |

prathamāśabhāt—from the word ‘the first; ’

34. From the word, ‘the-first,’ (it follows that Sound is eternal).

The meaning is that the thrice recitation of the first and the last mantra for kindling a sacrificial fire, as enjoined in the text, “The first should be recited three times, the last three times,” is not justified or accountable without the steadiness of Sound.—34.

Candrakānta reads II.ii.34 as Prathamā-ādi-Śabdāt while the meaning remains unchanged. (Ādi = and others, e.g., the second).

2.2.41

sampratipattibhāvāc ca |

sampratipatti-bhāvāt—from the possibility or existence of recognition; ca—and.

35. (The eternality of Sound follows), also from the possibility of recognition.

‘Sampratipatti-bhāvāt’—i.e., from the existence of recognition. The word ‘pratipatti’ (cognition) alone would have conveyed the sense of recognition which is a particular kind of the former; therefore the prefix ‘Sam’ (in the sense of thorough-ness) implies certainty. Thus, “He is reciting the very same poem which was recited by Maitra,” “He is reading the same verse over and over again,” “You are repeatedly saying the same thing which has been said before,” “You are even now making the very same statement which was made by you last year and the year before,” “It is that same letter ga,”—on the strength of the recognition of Sound in such cases, the steadiness or permanence of Sound is proved.—35.

2.2.42

sandigdhāḥ satibahutve |

sandigdhāḥ—Doubtful; Uncertain. Inconclusive. sati—existing; bahutve—plurality.

36. Plurality (of Sound) existing, (these arguments are) inconclusive.

‘Sandighāḥ,’ i.e., not one-pointed. So it has been said, “Kaśyapa taught that a contradictory, unproved, or uncertain mark was no mark.” Thus it is observed that there can be learning, repetition, and also recognition, also if there is a plurality of diversity of Sound, therefore these arguments are inconclusive. For, “He learns dancing,” “He practises dancing.” “He danced the same dance twice,” “You are dancing the same dance to-day, which you danced the other day,” “This man also is dancing the same dance which was danced by another dancer,”—in these cases, learning, repetition, and recognition (of Action) are observed. But you (the conclusionist) too do not on this account admit the permanence (or eternality) of dancing which is a particular kind of Acting.—36

Candrakānta reads II. ii. 33 as simply sandigdhāḥ, supplying for himself the reason for the declaration there, and joins the latter part of it to II. ii. 37, and interprets it to mean that in spite of plurality of individual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference to their genera or types.

2.2.43

saṃkhyābhāvaḥ sāmānyataḥ |

saṃkhyābhāvaḥ—the existence or application of Number; sāmānyataḥ—from Genus.

37. The existence of number (in Sound) is with reference to the Genus.

The meaning is that the existence of the number, fifty, etc., arises from the class notion of ka, ga, etc. Although there might be an infinity of ka’s, etc., the letters determined by the notions of ka, ga, etc., are fifty, three, or eight, in the same way as Substances, Attributes, etc.,' are nine, twenty-four, etc., although there may be an infinity of them according to differences within the group of each of them. This is th a import.

Candrakānta reads II. ii. 33 as simply sandigdhāḥ, supplying for himself the reason for the declaration there, and joins the latter part of it to II. ii. 37, and interprets it to mean that in spite of plurality of individual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference to their genera or types.