Aphorisms on Brahman 12: caturthā pādaḥ

12.1

||atha tṛtīyādhyāye caturthaḥ pādaḥ||

Now begins the fourth quarter of the third chapter.

12.2

3-4-1
kiṃ vidyātaḥ puruṣārthaḥ, uta karmaṇa iti saṃśayaḥ| karmaṇa iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ; karmasu kartṛbhūtapratyagātmano yāthātmyapratipādanaparāṇi vedāntavākyāni| vidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatvaṃ ca|yadeva vidyayā karoti.... tadeva vīryavattaramiti śrutyaivāvagamyate| na ca prakṛtodgīthopāsanaviṣayatvamasya vaktuṃ śakyate, |yadeva vidyayā karotīti śrutyaiva sarvakarmasu vidyāyā viniyuktatvāt| śrutiśca prakaraṇādbalīyasī| vidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatvaṃ kathamityapekṣāyāṃ |tattvamasi |ayamātmā brahmeti sāmānādhikaraṇyena karmāṅgabhūtakartṛyāthātmyānusandhānadvāreṇa vidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatvamityavagamyate| ataḥ kartṛsaṃskārarūpatvādbrahmavidyāyāḥ karmaṇa eva puruṣārthaḥ| tatratatra phalaśrutirarthavādassyāt| vidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatve bhūyāṃsi liṅgāni ca dṛśyante sarvavedānteṣu| rāddhāntastu- karmasu kartuḥ pratyagātmano'rthāntarabhūtasya
svasaṅkalpakṛtajagadudayavibhavalayalīlasya nikhilaheyapratyanīkakalyāṇaikatānāntajñānānandaikasvarūpasya sarveśvarasya satyasaṅkalpasya karaṇādhiparūpapratyagātmādhipasya vedyasya vedanarūpāyā vidyāyāḥ |brahmavidāpnoti paramityādiṣu brahmaprāptirūpaphalopadeśāt vidyāta eva phalam| |yadeva vidyayā karotīti śrutiḥ prasiddhavannirdeśātḥprasiddhiśca prakṛtodgīthopāsanasyaiveti, prastutodgīthopāsanaviśeṣaniṣṭhā| |tattvamasīti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca tacchabdanirdiṣṭasya svasaṅkalpakṛtajagajjanmasthitidhvaṃsādikasya parasya brahmaṇo na jīvasvarūpatvaparam; api tu jagatkāraṇasya brahmaṇo jīvaśarīrakatayā jīvasyātmatvaparamiti |adhikaṃ tu bhedanirdeśādityādiṣūktam| |ya ātmati tiṣṭhan... yasyātmā śarīramiti ca pratyagātmana ātmatvaṃ parasya brahmaṇaḥ śrutyantare vyaktam| sūtrārthastu- puruṣārtho'ta--vidyātaḥ; kutaḥ? |brahmavidāpnoti paramityādiśabdāt||

3-4-1
There is a doubt: does the human goal [arise] from knowledge, or from ritual action? The prima facie view is that it is from ritual action; the Vedānta texts are dedicated to teaching the true nature of the individual inner self, who is the agent in ritual actions. And that knowledge is subordinate to ritual action is understood from scripture itself: ‘Whatever indeed one performs with knowledge… that alone becomes more potent.’ Nor can it be said that this refers to the meditation on the udgītha under discussion, because through scripture itself—‘Whatever indeed one performs with knowledge’—knowledge is assigned to all ritual actions. And scripture is stronger than the context. If it is asked how knowledge is subordinate to ritual action, it is understood through co-ordinate predication, as in ‘That thou art’ and ‘This self is Brahman,’ that knowledge is subordinate to ritual action by way of contemplating the true nature of the agent who is an auxiliary to ritual action. Therefore, since it is of the nature of a purificatory refinement of the agent, the human goal arises from ritual action alone; the statement of a fruit here and there would be a laudatory passage. And manifold indicative signs are seen in all the Vedāntas for knowledge being subordinate to ritual action. But the established conclusion is: knowledge is the cognitive awareness of an object of knowledge who is different from the individual inner self that is the agent in ritual actions, whose sport is the origination, sustenance, and dissolution of the universe performed by his own resolve, whose sole essential nature is knowledge and bliss that is boundless and consisting solely of auspicious qualities antithetical to all imperfection, the Lord of all, whose resolve is true, the sovereign of the individual inner self who is the ruler of the organs; and because the fruit consisting in the attainment of Brahman is taught in texts such as ‘The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,’ the fruit [arises] from knowledge alone. The scriptural statement ‘Whatever indeed one performs with knowledge’ is restricted to the specific meditation on the udgītha under discussion, because it refers [to it] as already known, and the notoriety belongs only to the meditation on the udgītha under discussion. And the co-ordinate predication in ‘That thou art’ does not aim at the supreme Brahman—designated by the word ‘that,’ who carries out the birth, preservation, and destruction of the universe by his own resolve—being identical in nature with the individual self; rather, its aim is that Brahman, the cause of the universe, has the individual self as a body and is thus the Self of the individual self, as stated in ‘But [the text refers to] an additional one, because difference is taught’ and so forth. And that the supreme Brahman is the Self of the individual inner self is evident in another scriptural text: ‘He who, dwelling in the self… whose body is the self.’ The meaning of the aphorism, however, is: the human goal [is] from this—from knowledge; why? From the word [of scripture], in texts such as ‘The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme.’

12.3

3-4-2
|tattvamasītyādisāmānādhikaraṇyena brahmaṇaḥ karmasu kartṛsvarūpatvāvagamādvidyāyāḥ kartṛsaṃskāradvāreṇa karmaśeṣatvāttatra puruṣārthavādo'rthavādamātram; yathā anyeṣu dravyasaṃskārādiṣviti jaiminirācāryo manyate||

3-4-2
Because it is understood from the co-ordinate predication in texts such as ‘That thou art’ that Brahman is identical in nature with the agent in ritual actions, knowledge is an auxiliary to ritual action by way of being a purificatory refinement of the agent; therefore, the statement of a human goal therein is a mere laudatory passage, just as in the case of purificatory refinements of substances and the like in other instances—so the teacher Jaimini holds.

12.4

3-4-3
itaśca vidyā karmāṅgam; brahmavidāmācāro hi karmapradhāno dṛśyate| yathā'śvapatiḥ kekayo brahmavidagresaraḥ |yakṣyamāṇo ha vai bhagavanto'hamasmi|ityāha| |karmaṇaiva hi saṃsiddhimāsthitā janakādayaḥ|
iti ca smaryate||

3-4-3
For this reason too knowledge is an auxiliary to ritual action: indeed, the conduct of knowers of Brahman is seen to be predominantly ritual action. For instance, Kekaya's [king] Aswapati, the foremost among the knowers of Brahman, said: ‘I am about to perform a sacrifice, venerable sirs.’ And sacred tradition records: ‘Janaka and others indeed attained perfection through ritual action alone.’

12.5

liṅgamidam; prāptirucyatāmityatrāha-
3-4-4
|yadeva vidyayā karotītyādikāyāśśrutervidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatvamavagamyate| naca durbalena prakaraṇena śrutirvidyāviśeṣodgīthaviṣayopāsane vyavasthāpyate||

To the objection, ‘This is an indicative sign; let a direct means of apprehension be stated,’ [the author] replies:
3-4-4
From scripture such as ‘Whatever indeed one performs with knowledge,’ it is understood that knowledge is subordinate to ritual action. Nor can scripture be restricted to a particular knowledge—meditation concerning the udgītha—by the weaker context.

12.6

3-4-5
|taṃ vidyākarmaṇī samanvārabhete|iti vidyākarmaṇorekasminpuruṣe sāhityaṃ ca vidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatve hi bhavati||

3-4-5
‘Knowledge and ritual action cling to him’: this togetherness of knowledge and ritual action in a single person indeed occurs because knowledge is subordinate to ritual action.

12.7

3-4-6
vidyāvataḥ karmavidhānācca vidyā karmāṅgam| |ācāryakulādvedamadhītya yathāvidhānaṃ guroḥ karmātiśeṣeṇābhisamāvṛtya kuṭumbe|ityādinā'dhyayanavataḥ karmāṇi vidadhadarthāvabodhaparyantatvādadhyayanasya vidyāvata eva karmāṇi vidadhātītyavagamyate||

3-4-6
And because ritual action is enjoined for one possessing knowledge, knowledge is subordinate to ritual action. Through texts such as ‘Having studied the Veda from the family of a teacher according to rule, in the time remaining after ritual action for the guru, having returned home to a household,’ which enjoin ritual actions for one who has studied [the Veda], it is understood that [scripture] enjoins ritual actions only for one who has knowledge, because study culminates in the comprehension of the meaning.

12.8

3-4-7
|kurvanneveha karmāṇi jijīviṣecchataṃ samāḥ|ityātmavidāmāyuṣaḥ karmasu niyamadarśanācca karmaṇa eva puruṣārthaḥ; na vidyāta ityavagamyate| ataśca vidyā karmāṅgam|
3-4-8
tuśabdātpakṣo vyāvṝttaḥ| bādarāyaṇasyaivaṃ-vidyātaḥ phalamiti matam; kutaḥ? adhikopadeśāt-karmasu kartuḥ pratyagātmano'dhikasya-arthāntarabhūtasya vedyasya vedanabhūtavidyāyāḥ phalasādhanatvopadeśāt| taddarśanāt- dṛśyate hi vedāntavākye'dhikaviṣayatvaṃ vidyāyāḥ| evameva hi |tadaikṣata bahusyāṃ prajāyeyeti |so'kāmayata bahusyāṃ prajāyeyetyādiṣu bahubhavanasaṅkalpapūrvakasṛṣṭyādeḥ kartussarveśvarasya karaṇādhipādhipasyānavadhikātiśayajñānānandaikasvarūpasya nikhilaheyapratyanīkasya vedyasya vidyā brahmaprāptiphalāya vidhīyate||

3-4-7
And because of the observation of a restriction of the lifespan of knowers of the Self to ritual actions in ‘Only performing ritual actions here should one wish to live a hundred years,’ it is understood that the human goal arises from ritual action alone, not from knowledge. And for this reason, knowledge is subordinate to ritual action.
3-4-8
By the word ‘but,’ the prima facie view is set aside. Bādarāyaṇa's view is this: the fruit is from knowledge. Why? Because of the teaching of someone additional: because knowledge—which is the knowing of an object of knowledge who is additional to, that is, different from, the individual inner self that is the agent in ritual actions—is taught to be the means to the fruit. Because of that being seen: for in the Vedānta texts, it is seen that knowledge has this additional one as its object. In this very way, in texts such as ‘It thought, “May I become many, may I reproduce,”’ and ‘He desired, “May I become many, may I reproduce,”’ knowledge of the object of knowledge—who is the agent of creation and so forth preceded by the resolve to become many, the Lord of all, the sovereign of the rulers of the organs, whose sole essential nature is unsurpassable knowledge and bliss, and who is antithetical to all imperfection—is enjoined for the sake of the fruit that is the attainment of Brahman.

12.9

3-4-9
vidyāyāḥ pradhānatve'pi brahmavidāmācāradarśanaṃ tulyam- karmaṇāmanācāradarśanamapyastītyarthaḥ, |ṛṣayaḥ kāvaṣeyāḥ kimarthā vayamadhyeṣyāmahe kimarthā vayaṃ yakṣyāmahe|ityādau| karmānuṣṭhānadarśanaṃ tu phalābhisandhirahitasya karmaṇo vidyāṅgatvāt; tyāgastu phalābhisandhiyuktasya vidyāvirodhitvādityabhiprāyaḥ||

3-4-9
Even if knowledge is primary, the observation of the conduct of knowers of Brahman is equal: the meaning is that there is also observation of non-performance of ritual actions, in texts such as ‘The Kāvaṣeya sages [said], “For what purpose shall we study? For what purpose shall we sacrifice?”’ The observation of the performance of ritual action, however, is because ritual action devoid of desire for fruits is an auxiliary to knowledge; but the abandonment [of ritual actions] is because [action] accompanied by desire for fruits is opposed to knowledge—this is the intended meaning.

12.10

3-4-10
|yadeva vidyayā karotīti śrutiḥ sarvavidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatvaṃ vidadhātītyetadasaṅgatam; atra vidyāśabdābhihitā tu na sārvatrikī, api tūdgīthavidyā| yatkaroti, tadvidyayeti naivaṃ padānvayaḥ; api tu yadeva vidyayā karoti, tadeva vīryavattaramiti| vidyayā kriyamāṇasyānyato'vagatasya vīryavattaratvaṃ pratisādhanabhāvo'vagamyate, yadeveti prasiddhavannirdeśāt| anyato'vagatirhi |udgīthamupāsīteti sannihitodgīthavidyāyāḥ||

3-4-10
The claim that the scriptural text ‘Whatever indeed one performs with knowledge’ enjoins that all knowledge is subordinate to ritual action is untenable. For the [knowledge] expressed here by the word ‘knowledge’ is not universal, but rather the udgītha-knowledge. The syntactical connection of the words is not: ‘what one performs, that [one performs] with knowledge’; rather, it is: ‘whatever indeed one performs with knowledge, that alone becomes more potent.’ It is understood that being performed with knowledge, which is known from elsewhere, is the means to greater potency, because of the reference [to it] as already known by the words ‘whatever indeed.’ For the apprehension from elsewhere belongs to the immediately proximate udgītha-knowledge in ‘One should meditate on the udgītha.’

12.11

3-4-11
|taṃ vidyākarmaṇī samanvārabhete| ityatra vidyā ca svasmai phalāya karma ca svasmai phalāyānvārabhata iti vibhāgo draṣṭavyaḥ, yato vidyākarmaṇorbhinnaphalatvamuktam| śatavat-yathā kṣetraratnavikrayiṇaṃ śatadvayamanvetītyukte, kṣetrārthaṃ śatam, ratnārthaṃ śatamiti vibhāgo'vagamyate; tadvat||

3-4-11
In ‘Knowledge and ritual action cling to him,’ a division is to be understood, namely: knowledge clings [to him] for its own fruit, and ritual action clings [to him] for its own fruit; because knowledge and ritual action have been stated to have different fruits. As in the case of a hundred: just as, when it is said, ‘Two hundred [coins] follow the seller of a field and a jewel,’ the division is understood, ‘one hundred is for the field, one hundred is for the jewel’; so it is here.

12.12

3-4-12
|vedamadhītyetyadhyayanamātravata eva karmavidhānāt anena vidyāyā na karmāṅgatvamavagatam| adhyayanavidhirhyādhānavanniyamavadakṣararāśigrahaṇamātre paryavasyati; gṛhītasya svādhyāyasya phalavadarthāvabodhitvadarśanāttannirṇayaphalamīmāṃsāśravaṇe adhītavedaḥ puruṣassvayameva pravartate| arthāvabodhaparyantatve'pyarthajñānādarthāntarabhūtā smṛtipratyayāvṛttirūpā, vidyāt, upāsīteti śāstravihitā vidyā na karmāṅgam||

3-4-12
Because actions are enjoined for one who merely possesses Vedic study, as in the statement ‘Having studied the Veda...’, meditation is not understood from this to be an auxiliary to ritual action. For the injunction to study, like the establishment [of the sacred fires], terminates merely in the acquisition of the collection of syllables according to rule. When it is observed that the private Vedic recitation which has been mastered conveys meaning endowed with a fruit, a person who has studied the Veda proceeds of his own accord to listen to the inquiry whose fruit is the determination thereof. Even if [study] extends to the comprehension of meaning, meditation—which is distinct from the mere knowledge of meaning, consists in a repeated succession of memory-cognitions, and is enjoined by scripture as ‘let one know’ and ‘let one meditate’—is not an auxiliary to ritual action.

12.13

3-4-13
|kurvanneveha karmāṇi| iti brahmavidāmāyuṣaḥ karmaṇi niyamo dṛśyata ityetanna saṃbhavati, aviśeṣāt- viduṣa eveti viśeṣābhāvātkimityaviduṣo na syāt? viduṣastvāprayāṇādupāsanānuvṛttidarśanādarthasvabhāvāt viduṣa evetyabhiprāyaḥ||

3-4-13
As for the claim that a restriction to ritual action throughout the lifespan of the knowers of Brahman is seen in ‘Performing actions indeed here...’, this is impossible; ‘due to non-difference’—because there is no specification that it applies ‘to the knower alone’, why should it not apply to the non-knower? But because the continuation of meditation up to death is seen in the case of the knower, by the nature of the matter, the intention [of the opponent] is that it applies to the knower alone.

12.14

3-4-14
vāśabdo'vadhāraṇe| |īśāvāsyamidaṃ sarvam|iti vidyāprakaraṇādvidyāstutaye karmānumatireva| vidyāmāhātmyātsarvadā karmāṇi kurvannapi tairna lipyata iti hi stutā bhavati vidyā| vākyaśeṣe ca |na karma lipyate nare|iti śrūyate||

3-4-14
The word ‘or’ (vā) is for restriction. Because the context is knowledge, as in ‘All this is to be pervaded by the Lord...’, it is merely permission of ritual action for the praise of knowledge. For knowledge is indeed praised in that, even if one always performs actions due to the greatness of knowledge, one is not tainted by them. And in the remainder of the passage it is stated: ‘Action does not cling to a man.’

12.15

3-4-15
eke śākhinaḥ kāmakāreṇa ca vidyāniṣṭhasya gārhasthyāgamadhīyate| |kiṃ prajayā kariṣyāmo yeṣāṃ no'yamātmā'yaṃ lokaḥ |iti gārhasthyakarmatyāgaṃ brūvadvākyaṃ vidya pradhānamiti darśayati||

3-4-15
And some branches record the abandonment of the householder's stage of life at will on the part of one devoted to knowledge. The passage stating the renunciation of the duties of a householder—‘What shall we do with offspring, we for whom this self is this world?’—shows that knowledge is the primary entity.

12.16

3-4-16
vidyayā sarvakarmopamardaṃ cādhīyate |kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmindṛṣṭe parāvare|iti; tadvidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatve na saṃgacchate||

3-4-16
And [scripture] records the destruction of all ritual action through knowledge: ‘And his actions are destroyed when He, who is high and low, has been seen’; that is not compatible with knowledge being an auxiliary to ritual action.

12.17

3-4-17
ūrdhvaretassvāśrameṣu brahmavidyādarśanāt teṣu cāgnihotrādikarmābhāvānna vidyā karmāṅgam| te cātraśramāssantyeva; yato vaidike śabde te'pi dṛśyante |trayo dharmaskandhāyajño'dhyayanaṃ dānam| iti, |ye
ceme'raṇye śraddhā tapa ityupāsate |etameva pravrājino lokamicchantaḥ pravrajanti|ityādau| |yāvajjīvamagnihotramityādikā tu śrutiraviraktaviṣayā||

3-4-17
Knowledge is not an auxiliary to ritual action because knowledge of Brahman is observed in stages of life of the chaste, and in them actions such as the agnihotra do not exist. And those stages of life certainly exist, because they too are seen in Vedic revelation, in passages such as: ‘There are three branches of duty: sacrifice, study, and charity...’, ‘And those who in the forest meditate with faith and austerity...’, and ‘Desiring this very world, renunciants wander forth’. But scripture such as ‘The agnihotra as long as one lives...’ applies to those who are not dispassionate.

12.18

3-4-18
|trayo dharmaṃskandhāḥ |ityādiṣu teṣāmāśramāṇāmacodanāt- avidhānāt upāsanāstutyarthaṃ parāmarśam- anuvādaṃ jaiminirācāryo manyate| api ca apavadati hi śrutirāśramāntaraṃ |vīrahā vā eṣa devānāṃ yo'gnimudvāsayate| ityādikā| ataste na santyeva||

3-4-18
The teacher Jaimini considers that in ‘There are three branches of duty...’ and so on, there is no injunction—no prescription—of those stages of life, and that it is a reference—a restatement—for the purpose of praising meditation. Moreover, scripture certainly censures the other stages of life, as in: ‘He is a killer of the gods who extinguishes the fire.’ Therefore, they do not exist at all.

12.19

3-4-19
gṛhasthāśramavadāśramāntaramapyanuṣṭheyaṃ bhagavān bādarāyaṇo manyate; kutaḥ? tasyāpi tatsāmyaśruteḥ-| trayo dharmaskandhāḥ |ityevamādau hi sarveṣāmāśramāṇāmekarūpaṃ saṃkīrtanam||

3-4-19
The venerable Bādarāyaṇa considers that the other stage of life is also to be practiced, just like the householder's stage of life. Why? Because scripture declares equality for that as well; for in ‘There are three branches of duty...’ and so on, all stages of life are mentioned in the very same manner.

12.20

3-4-20
vāśabdo'vadhāraṇe; sarveṣāmāśramāṇāṃ vidhirevāyam| dhāraṇavat yathā |adhastātsamidhaṃ dhārayannanudravet |upari hi devebhyo dhārayati|ityanuvādarūpe'pyuparidhāraṇasyāprāptatvena vidhirāśrīyate; evamihāśramāṇāmapi| ataḥ ūrdhvaretassvapi vidyādarśanādvidyātaḥ puruṣārtha iti|| iti puruṣārthādhikaraṇam||

3-4-20
The word ‘or’ (vā) is for restriction; this is indeed an injunction of all the stages of life. As in the case of holding: just as in ‘Holding the firewood stick below, one should run behind; for he holds it above for the gods’, even though it is in the form of a restatement, an injunction is accepted because the holding above was not previously established; so too here regarding the stages of life. Therefore, because knowledge is observed even among the chaste, the human goal arises from knowledge. Thus ends the topical section on the human goal.

12.21

3-4-21,22
|omityetadakṣaramudgīthamupāsīta |sa eṣa rasānāṃ rasatamaḥ paramaḥ parārthyo'ṣṭamo yadudgīthaḥ|ityetajjātīyake kiṃ karmāṅgāśrayāṇāṃ dṛṣṭiviśeṣāṇāṃ vidhirāstheyaḥ, utodgīthādistutimātramiti saṃśayaḥ| vidhitve siddhe hi godohanādivadbhavati; vidhitvameva na
saṃbhavatīti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| |iyameva juhūssavargo loka āhavanīyaḥ|itivat karmāṅgabhūtodgīthādisaṃbandhitayopādānādrasatamatvādeḥ tatstutimātratvameva; na rasatamatvādidṛṣṭividhiḥ| rāddhāntastu- juhvādividhivadudgīthādividheratrā sannidhānāt, rasatamatvāderaprāptatvācca, upāsīteti vidhipratyayena ca, na stutimātram, taddṛṣṭividhireva| sūtradvayamapi vyākhyātam|| iti stutimātrādhikaraṇam||

3-4-21, 22
In passages of this class, such as ‘Let one meditate on the syllable Om, the udgītha...’, ‘That which is the udgītha is this very essence of essences, the highest, the supreme, the eighth’, there is a doubt: Is an injunction of specific viewpoints based on auxiliaries of action to be accepted, or is it a mere praise of the udgītha and so on? If it were established to be an injunction, it would be like the milk-pail and so on; but the prima facie view is that an injunction itself is impossible. As in ‘This [earth] indeed is the ladling-spoon, the heavenly world is the āhavanīya fire’, because being the essence of essences and so on are introduced in connection with the udgītha and so on which are auxiliaries to action, it is merely praise of them; it is not an injunction of the viewpoint of being the essence of essences and so on. But the established conclusion is: because the injunction of the udgītha and so on is not proximate here as the injunction of the spoon and so on is, and because being the essence of essences and so on are not previously established, and by the injunctive affix in ‘let one meditate’, it is not mere praise, but an injunction of that viewpoint. Both aphorisms have also been explained. Thus ends the topical section on mere praise.

12.22

3-4-23,24
|pratardano ha vai daivodāsiḥ| ityādayo vedānteṣvākhyānaviśeṣāḥ kiṃ pāriplavaprayogārthāḥ, uta tatratatra vidyāviśeṣapratipādanārthāḥ iti saṃśayaḥ| |ākhyānāni śaṃsantīti pāriplave viniyogāttadarthāḥ iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu- |ākhyānāni śaṃsantītyuktvā |manurvaivasvato rājā|iti manvādyākhyāne viniyogasya viśeṣitatvāt, |taṃ māmāyuramṛtamityupāssya |ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ|ityādividhinaikavākyatvācca, so'rodīt|ityādivadvidyāvidhyarthā eva| sūtradvayamapi vyākhyātam|| iti pāriplavārthādhikaraṇam||

3-4-23, 24
Concerning specific stories in the Upaniṣads, such as ‘Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, indeed...’, there is a doubt: Are they for the purpose of the cyclical ritual recitation, or for the purpose of expounding specific meditations in their respective contexts? The prima facie view is that they are for that purpose because of their application in the cyclical recitation, as in ‘They recite the stories’. But the established conclusion is: because the application is specified in stories such as that of Manu, stating ‘They recite the stories’ and then ‘Manu Vaivasvata was king...’, and because of syntactical unity with injunctions such as ‘Meditate on me as life, as immortality’ and ‘The Self, my dear, should indeed be seen...’, like ‘He wept...’, they are for the purpose of injunctions of knowledge alone. Both aphorisms have also been explained. Thus ends the topical section on the purpose of the cyclical recitation.

12.22.p1

3-4-25

12.23

ūrdhvaretassvāśrameṣu brahmavidyā saṃbhavati, neti saṃśayaḥ| yajñādyabhāvātteṣāṃ tadaṅgikā vidyā na saṃbhavatīti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu- |yadicchanto brahmacaryaṃ caranti |etameva pravrājino lokamicchantaḥ pravrajanti|ityādiśruteḥ teṣāṃ vidyāvattvāvagamātteṣvagnihotrādyanapekṣā vidyeti niścīyate| sūtrārthastu-ata - eva- vidyāvattvaśrutereva, ādhānādyanapekṣā teṣu vidyā| agnīndhanaṃ hi agnyādhānam|
3-4-26
karmavatsu gṛhastheṣu kiṃ yajñādikarmāpekṣā vidyā, uta tatrāpi kevalaiveti saṃśayaḥ| ūrdhvaretassu yajñādyanapekṣaivāmṛtatvaṃ sādhayati cet; karmanirapekṣāyā vidyāyā eva sādhanatvamabhyupagamanīyam| tathā sati gṛhastheṣvapi tannirapekṣaiva sādhayituṃ samartheti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| na hi svargādisādhanabhūtamagnihotrādikarma puruṣabhedena nānāvidhāṅgakaṃ dṛṣṭam| |vividiṣantīti śabdo'pi vedanecchāyāṃ karmāṇi viniyuṅkte, na vidyāyām| rāddhāntastu-karmavatsu gṛhastheṣu yajñādi sarvakarmāpekṣā vidyā; kutaḥ? yajñādi śruteḥ- |tametaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena|iti hi yajñādayo vidyāṅgatvena viniyujyante| ato gṛhastheṣu karmāpekṣā vidyā| icchāyā iṣyamāṇapradhānatvāt vividiṣantītiṣyamāṇaṃ jñānamevetyavagamyate| yathā gamanasādhanabhūto'śvaḥ svaparikarabandharūpaparikarmāpekṣaḥ; evaṃ mokṣasādhanabhūtā vidyāpi
nityanaimittikaparikarmāpekṣā| ūrdhvaretassu ca svāśramavihitaṃ karmaiva parikarma bhavatīti teṣvapi vidyāsaṃbandhaśśāstrādavagamyate| śāstraikasamadhigamye hi yathāśāstramabhyupagamanīyam| sūtramapi vyākhyātam|| iti sarvāpekṣādhikaraṇam||

There is a doubt whether knowledge of Brahman is possible in the stages of life of the celibates or not. The prima facie view is that, because of the absence of sacrifice and the like among them, knowledge which has these as its auxiliary elements is not possible. But the established conclusion is: from scripture such as, 'Desiring which they lead the life of celibacy,' and 'Desiring this very world, renunciants renounce,' their possession of knowledge is known, and therefore it is determined that knowledge among them does not require the Agnihotra and the like. The meaning of the aphorism is: 'for this very reason'—precisely from the scripture mentioning the possession of knowledge—knowledge among them does not require the kindling of the fire and the like; for the 'fueling of the fire' indeed refers to the ritual setting up of the sacred fires.
3-4-26
There is a doubt whether, among householders who perform rites, knowledge requires rites such as sacrifice, or whether there too it is solely independent. If among celibates it accomplishes immortality without any requirement of sacrifice and the like, then knowledge entirely independent of rites must be accepted as the means. That being so, even among householders it would be capable of accomplishing it quite independently [of rites]—this is the prima facie view. For a rite like the Agnihotra, which serves as a means to heaven and the like, is not observed to have diverse auxiliary elements depending on differences among persons. Moreover, the word 'they desire to know' (vividiṣanti) applies rites to the desire to know, not to knowledge itself. But the established conclusion is: among householders who perform rites, knowledge requires all rites such as sacrifice. Why? Because of the scripture regarding sacrifice and the like. For through the text, 'Him this [Self] the Brāhmaṇas desire to know through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through giving,' sacrifices and the like are indeed enjoined as auxiliary elements of knowledge. Therefore, among householders, knowledge requires rites. Because desire is subordinate to the object desired, it is understood that what is desired in 'they desire to know' is knowledge itself. Just as a horse, serving as a means of travel, requires preparation in the form of fastening its equipment, so too knowledge, serving as the means to liberation, requires preparation in the form of obligatory and occasional rites. And among celibates, the rite enjoined for one's own stage of life is itself the preparation, and so the connection with knowledge in their case too is known from scripture. For in a matter that is ascertainable solely through scripture, one must accept it as scripture states. The aphorism too has been explained. Thus ends the topical section on the requirement of all.

12.24

3-4-27
kiṃ, vidyānirvṛttaye gṛhasthaiśśamadamādaya upādeyāḥ, uta neti saṃśayaḥ| gṛhasthānāmāntarabāhyakaraṇavyāpārarūpakarmāṅgakatvādvidyāyāḥ, tadviparītarūpaśamadamādyupādānāsārmathyādūrdhvaretassu karmarahiteṣu śamādiviniyogo bhaviṣyati; yathā yajñādiviniyogaḥ karmavatsu gṛhastheṣu| tasmādanupādeyāśśamādaya iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu- |tasmādevaṃvicchānto dānta uparatastitikṣussamāhito bhūtvā''tmanyevātmānaṃ paśyet |iti sāmānyena vidyaṅgatayā viniyogāt gṛhasthairapyupādeyāḥ| na ca karmavatāṃ teṣāṃ śamādyupādānāsārmathyam; bhinnaviṣayatvācchamādeḥ| vihiteṣu hi karmasu karaṇavyāpāraḥ; avihiteṣu prayojanaśūnyeṣu ca śamadamādayaḥ| ataśśamādiviniyogo yajñādiviniyogavanna saṅkocamarhatīti|
sūtrārthastu-yadyapi gṛhastho yajñādikarmasu viniyukta, tathāpi tu śamadamādyupetassyāt; kutaḥ? |śānto dāntaḥ|ityādinā tadvidheḥ tadaṅgatayā-vidyāṅgatayā vidyāniṣpattaye teṣāmavaśyānuṣṭheyatvācca| ekāgratāniṣpādyatvācchamadamādibhireva vidyāniṣpattirityarthaḥ| yajñādikarmāṇyapi pāpanibarhaṇadvāreṇaikāgratām āpādayantītyabhiprāyaḥ|| iti śamadamādyadhikaraṇam||

3-4-27
There is a doubt whether tranquility, self-restraint, and the like are to be adopted by householders for the accomplishment of knowledge, or not. The prima facie view is: since knowledge for householders has rites as its auxiliary elements in the form of the activity of the internal and external organs, and since they lack the capability to adopt tranquility, self-restraint, and the like which are of the opposite nature, the injunction of tranquility and the like will apply to the celibates who are devoid of rites, just as the injunction of sacrifice and the like applies to the householders who perform rites. Therefore, tranquility and the like are not to be adopted [by householders]. But the established conclusion is: since they are enjoined generally as auxiliary elements of knowledge by the text, 'Therefore, knowing thus, becoming tranquil, self-restrained, withdrawn, patient, and concentrated, one should see the Self in the self alone,' they must be adopted even by householders. Nor is there an incapacity to adopt tranquility and the like on the part of those performing rites, because tranquility and the like have a different domain. For the activity of the organs applies to enjoined rites, whereas tranquility, self-restraint, and the like apply to unenjoined and purposeless [actions]. Hence, the injunction of tranquility and the like, unlike the injunction of sacrifice and the like, does not deserve to be restricted. And the meaning of the aphorism is: although the householder is enjoined to perform rites such as sacrifice, nevertheless he must be endowed with tranquility, self-restraint, and the like. Why? Because of the injunction of that by means of 'tranquil, self-restrained,' etc., and because they must necessarily be practiced for the accomplishment of knowledge as its auxiliary elements. The meaning is that the accomplishment of knowledge takes place solely through tranquility, self-restraint, and the like, because it is to be accomplished through one-pointedness. The underlying intention is that rites such as sacrifice also bring about one-pointedness by means of removing sin. Thus ends the topical section on tranquility, self-restraint, and the like.

12.25

3-4-28
vājināṃ chandogānāṃ ca prāṇavidyāyāṃ |na ha vā evaṃvidi kiñcanānna bhavati| iti sarvānnānumatissaṅkīrtyate| kiṃ prāṇavidassarvānnānumatissarvadā, uta prāṇātyayāpattāviti saṃśayaḥ| aviśeṣāsarvadeti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| atiśayitaśakterbrahmavido'pi ucchiṣṭaparigrahaṇabhakṣaṇayoḥ prāṇātyayāpattāveva darśanādalpaśakteḥ prāṇavidaḥ kiṃ punariti prāṇātyayāpattāveveti rāddhāntaḥ|
sūtrārthastu-caśabdo'vadhāraṇe; prāṇavidassarvānnānumatiḥ| prāṇātyaya eva; kutaḥ? taddarśanāt atiśayitaśakterbrahmavidaḥ prāṇātyaya eva sarvānnānumatidarśanāt||

3-4-28
In the Prāṇavidyā of the Vājasaneyins and the Chāndogas, permission to eat all foods is stated: 'Nothing indeed becomes non-food for one who knows thus.' There is a doubt whether the permission to eat all food for the knower of Prāṇa applies at all times, or only upon the danger of loss of life. The prima facie view is that it is at all times, because there is no distinction. The established conclusion is: since, even in the case of a knower of Brahman possessing superior capacity, the acceptance and consumption of remnants of food is seen only upon the danger of loss of life, how much more so in the case of a knower of Prāṇa of inferior capacity? Thus, it is only upon the danger of loss of life. And the meaning of the aphorism is: the word 'and' (ca) is in the sense of restriction; permission to eat all foods for the knower of Prāṇa is only upon the danger of loss of life. Why? 'Because of that being seen'—because even for a knower of Brahman possessing superior capacity, permission to eat all foods is seen only upon the danger of loss of life.

12.26

3-4-29
|āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhissttvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ|ityāhāraśuddhividherabādhācca prāṇātyaya eva||

3-4-29
And only upon the danger of loss of life, so that there is no contradiction of the injunction concerning the purity of food, such as: 'When the food is pure, the inner nature is pure; when the inner nature is pure, memory is firm.'

12.27

3-4-30
|prāṇasaṃśayamāpanno yo'nnamatti yatastataḥ| lipyate na sa pāpena padmapatramivāmbhasā|| iti prāṇasaṃśaya eva sarvānnānumatiḥ smaryate ca||

3-4-30
And permission to eat all food only upon danger to life is stated in sacred tradition: 'He who, having fallen into danger of life, eats food from wherever, is not stained by sin, just as a lotus leaf is not stained by water.'

12.28

3-4-31
yatassarvānnānumatiḥ prāṇātyaye; ato'kāmakāre śabdaśca kāmakārasya pratiṣedhakaśabdaścopapadyata ityarthaḥ|| asti hi
kaṭhānāṃ kāmakārapratiṣedhakaśśabdaḥ |tasmādbrāhmaṇassurāṃ na pibati pāpmanā notsṛjā| iti| pāpmanā saṃspṛṣṭo na bhavānīti matvā surāṃ na pibatītyarthaḥ| iti sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam||

3-4-31
Since the permission to eat all food is only upon the danger of loss of life, for this reason scripture is also valid regarding non-arbitrary action—that is, the scriptural text prohibiting arbitrary action is reasonable. For there is a text among the Kaṭhas prohibiting arbitrary action: 'Therefore a Brāhmaṇa does not drink wine, [thinking,] "May I not be touched by evil."' The meaning is that, thinking 'May I not be contacted by sin,' he does not drink wine. Thus ends the topical section on the permission to eat all foods.

12.29

3-4-32
kiṃ yajñādayo vidyāṅgabhūtāḥ kevalāśramasyāpyaṅgabhūtāḥ, uta neti saṃśayaḥ| kevalāśramasyāpyaṅgatve nityānityasaṃyogarūpavirodhaḥ prasajyata iti nāṅgabhūtāḥ kevalāśramasyeti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu-yadaikenaiva viniyogenobhayāṅgatvamiṣyate; tadā nityānityasaṃyogavirodhaḥ| iha tu |yāvajjīvamagnihotraṃ juhuyāt |tametaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena|iti viniyoga pṛthaktvena virodhaḥ parihriyate; yathā'gnihotrādīnāmeva karmaṇām| jīvanādhikārakāmanādhikārayorivādhikārabhedasyāsphuṭatvāttatsphuṭīkaraṇāya punariha cintyate|
sūtrārthastu-|yāvajjīvamagnihotraṃ juhuyādityādinā kevalagṛhasthāśramiṇo jīvananimittatayā vihitatvādeva yajñādi kevalāśramakarmāpi||

3-4-32
There is a doubt whether sacrifices and the like, which are auxiliary elements of knowledge, are also auxiliary elements of the mere stage of life, or not. The prima facie view is that, if they are auxiliary elements of the mere stage of life as well, there would be the contradiction of connecting what is permanent with what is impermanent; therefore, they are not auxiliary elements of the mere stage of life. But the established conclusion is: when auxiliary status to both is maintained through a single injunction, then there is a contradiction of connecting the permanent with the impermanent. Here, however, through texts such as 'One should perform the Agnihotra as long as one lives' and 'Him this [Self] the Brāhmaṇas desire to know through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through giving,' the contradiction is removed by the distinction between the [two] injunctions, just as in the case of the very rites like the Agnihotra. Because the distinction between qualifications is not obvious—unlike between the qualification based on life and the qualification based on desire—it is investigated here again to make that clear. And the meaning of the aphorism is: sacrifice and the like are rites belonging to the mere stage of life as well, precisely because they are enjoined as occasioned by life for one who is merely in the householder stage of life, by texts such as 'One should perform the Agnihotra as long as one lives.'

12.30

3-4-33
|tametaṃ vedānuvacanenetyādinā vidyāsādhanatvena vihitatvācca vidyāsahakāritvena cānuṣṭheyaṃ yajñādikarma| viniyogapṛthaktvena virodhaḥ parihriyata ityabhiprāyaḥ||

3-4-33
And because they are enjoined as the means to knowledge by the text, 'Him this [Self] through the study of the Veda,' etc., rites such as sacrifice are also to be performed as cooperative factors for knowledge. The underlying intention is that the contradiction is removed through the distinction between the injunctions.

12.31

3-4-34
sarvathāpi- ubhayatra viniyoge'pi ta eva yajñādayaḥ| kutaḥ? ubhayaliṅgāt- ubhayatra pratyabhijñānākhyaliṅgāt||

3-4-34
In every way—even when applied in both contexts, those very same [rites] such as sacrifices [are performed]. Why? "Because of marks of both"—because of the mark called recognition in both cases.

12.32

3-4-35
|dharmeṇa pāpamapanudati|ityādibhiśca yajñādidharmānnirdiśya tairvidyāyāḥ anabhibhavaṃ-pāpakarmabhirutpattipratibandhābhāvaṃ darśayati| ata ubhayatra viniyogātkevalāśramiṇāṃ mumukṣūṇāṃ cānuṣṭheyā yajñādayaḥ|| iti vihitatvādhikaraṇam||

3-4-35
And by texts such as, "Through righteousness he dispels evil," [scripture] designates duties such as sacrifices and indicates the non-overpowering of knowledge by them—that is, the absence of an impediment to its arising caused by evil deeds. Therefore, because of application in both contexts, sacrifices and the like are to be performed both by those merely belonging to an order of life and by those desiring liberation. Here ends the topical section on what is enjoined.

12.33

3-4-36
vidhurādīnāmanāśramiṇāṃ brahmavidyāyāmadhikāro'sti, neti saṃśayaḥ| āśramadharmetikartavyatākatvādvidyāyāḥ tadabhāvātteṣāmanadhikāra iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu- ūrdhvaretassiva raikvādiṣvanāśramiṣu vidyāniṣṭhatvadarśanādāśramāniyatairjapopavāsadānadibhireva teṣāṃ vidyānugraho bhavatītyastyevādhikāraḥ|
sūtrārthastu- tuśabdātpakṣo vyāvṛttaḥ| caśabdo'vadhāraṇe| antarā'pi- āśramānantarā vartamānānām anāśramiṇāmapyadhikāro'styeva| kutaḥ? tadadṛṣṭeḥ- raikvādiṣu vidyāniṣṭhatvadṛṣṭeḥ||

3-4-36
There is a doubt whether widowers and others who do not belong to an order of life are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not. The prima facie view is that they are unqualified, because knowledge requires the duties of an order of life as its procedure, and these are absent [in their case]. The established conclusion, however, is that since devotion to knowledge is seen among those not belonging to an order of life, such as Raikva, just as among celibates, assistance to knowledge does indeed come to them through recitation, fasting, charity, and the like, which are not restricted to an order of life; and therefore qualification definitely exists.
As for the meaning of the aphorism: The word "but" (tu) sets aside the [prima facie] view. The word "and" (ca) denotes emphasis. "Even between"—even of those existing in the interval between orders of life, who do not belong to an order of life, qualification definitely exists. Why? "Because that is seen"—because devotion to knowledge is seen in Raikva and others.

12.34

3-4-37
api ca anāśramiṇāmapi japādibhireva vidyāgrahaḥ smaryate |japyenāpi ca saṃsidhyedbrahmaṇo nātra saṃśayaḥ|ityādinā|
3-4-38
āśramāniyatadharmaviśeṣeṇa vidyānugrahaśśrūyate ca |tapasā brahmacaryeṇa śraddhayā vidyayā cā''tmānamanvicchet|iti||

3-4-37
Furthermore, the acquisition of knowledge even by those not belonging to an order of life through recitation and the like is remembered in sacred tradition: "Even by recitation a brāhmaṇa would attain perfection, without doubt in this regard," and so on.
3-4-38
And the assistance to knowledge through specific virtues not restricted to an order of life is heard in scripture: "One should seek the Self through austerity, chastity, faith, and knowledge."

12.35

3-4-39
ataḥ-anāśramitvāditarat-- āśramitvaṃ jyāyaḥ, dharmabhūyastvāt; liṅgācca smṛteścetyarthaḥ|
|anāśramī na tiṣṭhettu dinamekamapi dvijaḥ|iti hi smaryate| tasmādanāśramitvena vidyāniṣṭhatvamāpadviṣayamityabhiprāyaḥ|| iti vidhurādhikaraṇam||

3-4-39
"The other" than this—belonging to an order of life, rather than not belonging to an order of life—"is superior," because of the abundance of duties; and this is meant by the words "because of an indicatory mark and sacred tradition."
For sacred tradition states: "A twice-born should not remain even for a single day outside an order of life." Therefore, devotion to knowledge while not belonging to an order of life pertains to times of distress; such is the purport. Here ends the topical section on the widower.

12.36

3-4-40
naiṣṭhikavaisvānasaparivrājakānāṃ svāśramebhyaḥ pracyutānāmapi vidyādhikāro'sti, neti saṃśayaḥ| vidhurādivajjapādibhiranugrahasaṃbhavādastyevādhikāra iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu-naiṣṭhikādīnāṃ svāśramabhraṣṭānāṃ prāyaścittābhāvasmaraṇācchiṣṭabahiṣkṛtatvācca teṣāmanadhikāraḥ iti|
sūtrārthastu- tadbhūtasya tu nātadbhāvaḥ- naiṣṭhikādibhūtasyātathābhāvo na saṃbhavati; kutaḥ? tadrūpābhāvebhyaḥ śāstraiḥ niyamāt, tadrūpābhāvāḥ naiṣṭhikādyāśramadharmābhāvāḥ, tebhyo niyacchanti hi śāstrāṇi| |brahmacāryācāryakulavāsī tṛtīyo'tyantamātmānamācāryakule'vasādayan|iti naiṣṭhikasya tatraiva niyamaḥ; |araṇyamiyāttato na punareyāt|iti ca vaikhānasasya; |saṃnyasyāgniṃ na punarāvartayet|iti ca parivrājakasya| ata eva teṣāmanāśramitvenāvasthānābhāvādvidyādhikāro na saṃbhavati| jaiminerapyavigīto'yam||

3-4-40
There is a doubt whether perpetual students, forest hermits, and renunciants who have fallen from their orders of life are qualified for knowledge or not. The prima facie view is that they are indeed qualified, because, as in the case of widowers and others, assistance [to knowledge] can occur through recitation and the like. The established conclusion, however, is that perpetual students and the like who have fallen from their order of life are unqualified, because sacred tradition states the absence of expiation for them and because they are excluded by the virtuous.
As for the meaning of the aphorism: "For one who has become that, however, there is no becoming not that"—for one who has become a perpetual student or the like, non-existence of that state cannot occur. Why? "Because of prohibition by the scriptures from the absence of their characteristics"; "the absence of their characteristics" means the absence of the duties of the orders of life such as perpetual studentship, and the scriptures indeed prohibit them from these [absences]. For there is a rule restricting the perpetual student to that very place: "A student residing at the family home of the teacher, as a third [class of student], wearing out his body to the end in the family home of the teacher"; and for the forest hermit: "He should go to the forest and not return from there"; and for the renunciant: "Having renounced the fire, he should not rekindle it." For this very reason, since they cannot exist as persons merely outside an order of life, qualification for knowledge cannot occur. This is agreed upon by Jaimini as well.

12.37

3-4-41
ādhikārikam- adhikāralakṣamoktam |avakīrṇapaśuśca tadvat|ityetatprāyaścittaṃ naiṣṭhikasya na saṃbhavati| kutaḥ? patanānumānānnaiṣṭhikasya tadayogāt| tasya hi patanaṃ smaryate prāyaścittābhāvavacanena, |ārūḍho naiṣṭhiṃ dharmaṃ yastu pracyavate dvijaḥ| prāyaścittaṃ na paśyāmi yena śudhyetsa ātmahā|| iti| ata upakurvāṇabrahmacāriviṣayamādhikārikam||

3-4-41
That expiation relating to the title [of the student] stated in the chapter on qualification—namely, "And likewise the animal sacrifice for one who has broken his vow of chastity"—cannot apply to a perpetual student. Why? "Because of the inference of a fall, [there is] incompatibility for him"; for his fall is remembered in the statement of the absence of expiation: "A twice-born who, having ascended to the perpetual duty, falls away from it—I see no expiation by which that slayer of the self could become pure." Therefore, that which relates to the title pertains to the temporary student.

12.38

3-4-42
eke prāyaścittabhāvamapi manyante, yata upapūrvam- upapātakamidam; aśanavat-madhvaśanādiniṣedhatatprāyaścittavadbhavatītyarthaḥ| ata upakurvāṇasya brahmacāriṇaḥ uktamādhikārikamasyāpi bhavatīti| taduktaṃ smṛtikāraiḥ |uttareṣāṃ caitadavirodhi| iti| upakurvāṇe brahmacāriṇyukto dharma uttareṣāṃ cāśramiṇāṃ svāśramāvirodhī bhavatyevetyarthaḥ||

3-4-42
Some consider that there is indeed an expiation, because this is an "upa-prefixed" [sin], that is, a minor sin; "like eating"—that is, it is like the prohibition against eating honey and the like, and the expiation for it. Therefore, what was stated relating to the title in the case of the temporary student applies to this one as well. So it has been said by the authors of sacred tradition: "And this is not contradictory for the later ones." The meaning is that the duty stated with respect to the temporary student is definitely applicable to the later orders of life, so long as it is not contradictory to their own order of life.

12.39

3-4-43
ubhayadhāpi-upapātakatve mahāpātakatve'pi naiṣṭhikātpracyuto bahirbhūtaḥ karmādhikārāt, |prāyaścitaṃ na paśyāmi|iti smṛteḥ; ācārācca--varjayanti hyenaṃ śiṣṭā vidyopadeśādau| yadyapi kalmaṣanibarhaṇāya kaiścitprāyaścittamucyate; tathāpi karmādhikārāpādinī śuddhisteṣāṃ na saṃbhavatītyabhiprāyaḥ||

3-4-43
Even in both cases—whether it is a minor sin or a mortal sin—one who has fallen from perpetual studentship is excluded from qualification for rituals, because of the sacred tradition: "I see no expiation"; and because of custom, for the virtuous avoid him in the instruction of knowledge and the like. Even though an expiation is stated by some for the destruction of sin, nevertheless, the purity that produces qualification for rituals cannot occur for them; such is the purport.

12.40

3-4-44
udgīthādyupāsanaṃ kiṃ yajamānenānuṣṭheyam, uta ṛtvijeti saṃśayaḥ| |yadeva vidyayā karoti... tadeva vīryavattaramiti kratuvīryavattaratvaphalaṃ yajamānasyeti daharopāsanādivadyajamānenānuṣṭheyamiti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| karmāṅgāśrayatvādasyopāsanasya karmaṇaścārtvijyatvena etadapi ṛtvijā'nuṣṭheyaṃ, godohanadivaditi rāddhāntaḥ|
sūtrārthastu- svāminaḥ-yajamānasyodgīthādyupāsane kartṛtvam, kutaḥ? tasyaiva phalaśruterityātreyo manyate||

3-4-44
There is a doubt whether meditation on the udgītha and the like is to be performed by the sacrificer or by the officiating priest. The prima facie view is that it is to be performed by the sacrificer, like the meditation on the small [ether], because the fruit—the greater potency of the sacrifice—belongs to the sacrificer, according to the text: "Whatever one performs with knowledge... that indeed becomes more potent." The established conclusion is that because this meditation depends on an accessory of the ritual, and the ritual belongs to the office of the priest, this too is to be performed by the officiating priest, like the milk-pail vessel.
As for the meaning of the aphorism: "Of the master"—of the sacrificer is the agency in the meditation on the udgītha and the like; why? "Because the fruit is heard for him alone"—so Ātreya thinks.

12.41

3-4-45
ṛtvaṅgāśrayatvena ṛtvadhikṛtasyaivāsminnupāsane'dhikārāt ṛtoścārtvijyatvena etadapyārtvijyamityauḍulomirācāryo manyate, yajamānaphalasādhanatve'pi kratostadanuṣṭhānāya hi
ṛtvikparikriyate| iti svāmyadhikaraṇam||

3-4-45
The teacher Auḍulomi thinks that because it depends on an accessory of the sacrifice, only the one qualified for the sacrifice has qualification in this meditation, and because the sacrifice belongs to the office of the priest, this too belongs to the office of the priest; for although the sacrifice is an instrument for the sacrificer's fruit, the officiating priest is indeed engaged for its performance. Here ends the topical section on the master.

12.42

3-4-46
|tasmādbrāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityaṃ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset bālyaṃ ca pāṇḍityaṃ ca nirvidyātha miniḥ|ityatra maunaṃ vidyāṅgatayā vidhīyate, utānūdyata iti saṃśayaḥ| maunasya mananarūpatvāt |śrotavyo mantavyaḥ|iti śva prāptatvenānūdyata iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ| rāddhāntastu- muniśabdasya prakṛṣṭamananaśīle prasiddheḥ, prakṛṣṭamananamupāsyaviṣayābhyāsarūpaṃ vidyāniṣpattaye vidhīyata
iti|
sūtrārthastu-tadvataḥ-vidyāvataḥ, sahakāryantaraṃ-maunaṃ vidhiḥ; vidhīyata iti vidhiriti maunaṃ vidhirityuktam| vidhyādivat-atrāpi vidhīyata iti vidhiḥ yajñadānaprabhṛtyāśramadharmaḥ, ādiśabdācchravaṇamanane gṛhyete| āśramadharmavacchravaṇamananavacca pāṇḍityabālyayostṛtīyamidaṃ sahakāryantaraṃ maunapūrvaṃ vidhīyate; kuta ityata āha- pakṣeṇeti| muniśabdasya prakṛṣṭamananayukte pakṣeṇa- prasiddherityarthaḥ||

3-4-46
Regarding the text: "Therefore, let a brāhmaṇa, having become disgusted with learning, desire to abide in a childlike state; having become disgusted with the childlike state and with learning, then [he becomes] a muni" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.5.1), there is a doubt whether munihood is enjoined as an auxiliary to knowledge or merely reiterated. The prima facie view is that since munihood consists of reflection (manana), it is merely reiterated as already established by: "He is to be heard, to be reflected upon" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5). The established conclusion, however, is that since the word muni is well known to designate one given to intense reflection, intense reflection—which consists of repeated meditation upon the object of meditation—is enjoined for the accomplishment of knowledge. And the meaning of the aphorism is: For him who possesses that—that is, the possessor of knowledge—another auxiliary, namely munihood, is an injunction; "injunction" means it is enjoined, hence it is said that munihood is an injunction. Just as with injunctions and the like—here too "injunction" means what is enjoined, namely duties of the stages of life such as sacrifice and charity, and by the word "and the like" hearing and reflection are included. Like the duties of the stages of life and like hearing and reflection, this third auxiliary besides learning and the childlike state, preceded by munihood, is enjoined. Why? To this he replies: "alternatively." The meaning is: because the word muni is well known, alternatively, to denote one endowed with intense reflection.

12.43

3-4-47
sarvāśramiṇāṃ vidyāvattve'pi chāndogye |sa khalvevaṃ vartayanyāvadāyuṣaṃ brahmalokamabhisaṃpadyate| iti gṛhasthadharmeṇopasaṃhāraḥ sarvāśramadharmapradarśanārthaḥ| kutaḥ? kṛtsnabhāvāt-kṛtsneṣu bhāvāt- kṛtsneṣvāśramiṣu vidyāyāssadbhāvādityarthaḥ||

3-4-47
Even though the possessors of knowledge exist in all stages of life, the conclusion in the Chāndogya with the duty of the householder—"Living in this way throughout his life, he attains the world of Brahman" (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.15.1)—is intended to illustrate the duties of all stages of life. Why? Because of existence in all; that is, because of existence in all stages of life—the meaning is, because knowledge exists in all those who belong to the stages of life.