Manava Dharmashastra 3.45.2

3.45.2

vidhiviśeṣo niyamaḥ | “atha vidhiḥ kaḥ” | yaḥ śabdaḥ kartavyatābodhakaḥ “agnihotraṃ juhuyātsvargakāmaḥ” iti | na hyagnihotrasyaitadvacanamantareṇānyataḥ kutaścitkartavyatāvagamaḥ | 'niyamaḥ' punaryatrādṛṣṭasiddhayarthasya vacanamantareṇa pākṣikī prāptiḥ | yathā “same yajeteti” darśapaurṇamāsādiyāgavidhānāddeśamātramākṣiptam, na hi kaściddeśamanāśritya yāgaprayogaḥ saṃbhavati | dvividhaśca deśaḥ, samo viṣamaśca | tatra yadā tāvatsame yajeta tadaitadvacanamanuvāda eva | yadā tvicchāyā niraṅkuśatvādviṣame yiyakṣati tadaitadvacanaṃ samadeśaṃ vidadhadarthavat | vihite same viṣamasyānāśrayaṇamavidhānāt | etatsāmarthyāttannivṛttiḥ | vidhinibandhane hyanuṣṭhāne kimiyavihitaṃ kriyeta | tatkaraṇe hi na yathācoditānuṣṭhānasiddhiḥ | idaṃ cātra smārtamudāharaṇam | prāṅmukho'nnāni bhuñjīta | bhuñjānasya yadṛcchayā yāṃ kāṃciddiśamāśritya bhojanaṃ prāptam | tatra kadācitprācī kadāciditarā yā kācitprāptā | tatra yadā prācī na tadetarā, yadetarā na tadā prācīti | tatrāprāptipakṣe vidhyarthaṃ vacanaṃ prāṅmukho'nnāni bhuñjīteti | tatrātikramācchāstrārthaṃ jahāti | evamiha yadṛcchayopagamanamṛtāvapyupagamanaṃ, pakṣe vidhīyamānamupagamanamananuṣṭhīyamānaṃ, śāstrātikramakāritāṃ janayet | yathā'nye śāstravihitārthā atikramyamāṇāḥ prāyaścittahetavo bhavanti tathā'nugamanam |

Restriction is supplementary to Injunction.

“What is Injunction?”

Injunction is that word which expresses the idea of some act to be done; e.g., in the sentence ‘one desirous of Heaven should offer the Agnihotra.’ With the exception of this sentence, there are no other words which could give us the idea of the Agnihotra as something to be done. We have ‘restriction’ in a case where the partial idea of something to be done for the purpose of a transcendental result is obtained even without the scriptural words; e.g., if we have the injunction ‘one should offer the sacrifice on even ground,’ in connection with the Daśapūrṇamāsa sacrifices, the idea of some place in general where they are to be performed is implied by the nature of the act itself; no sacrifice can be performed, except at some place; and places are of two kinds, even and uneven; now, in the event of the sacrificer happening to select an even spot [merely on the strength of the general injunction of the sacrifice],—the words, ‘should offer the sacrifice on even ground,’ become merely descriptive; but if, by reason of man’s desire being untramelled, some one were to elect to perform his sacrifice on uneven ground, then the words, ‘should offer the sacrifice on even ground,’ become useful by asserting the necessity of adopting even ground; for, when the words clearly enjoin the even ground, the avoiding of uneven ground follows directly from the fact of its not being enjoined; so that the avoiding of uneven ground is obtained from the implication of the injunction of even ground. For every performance being dependent upon injunction, wherefore could there be adoption of what is not enjoined at all? If such were adopted, there would be no accomplishment of the act in due accordance with what has been enjoined.

[ The above being an example of Restriction from Śrauta literature] we have an example from Smārta literature in the shape of the Injunction—‘One should eat food facing the East.’ When a man is going to take food, it is open to him to face any direction he likes; so that at one time he might face the East, at another he might face the West, or any other direction; and when he would face the East, he would not face any other, while when he would face another direction he would not face the East. Hence in the event of the man electing to face another direction, the injunction that ‘one should eat food facing the East’ comes in useful; and by disobeying this, one would be transgressing a scriptural injunction.

Similarly, in the case in question, the act of approaching one’s wife at any time one chooses aṇd not approaching her during the ‘season,’ would make one open to the charge of transgressing the scriptural injunction; as he would, partially (i.e., by not approaching during ‘season,’ and by approaching out of season) be omitting to do what has been directly enjoined; and the act of approaching (out of season) would make him subject to expiation in the same manner as the transgressing of other acts enjoined in the scriptures. When it is open to one to approach one’s wife, through passion, both during ‘season’ and out of it, then we have use for such a direction as ‘one should approach one’s wife only during season, and never out of season,’ Just as the direction ‘five five-nailed animals are edible,’ has its use when it is open to man, under the influence of hunger, to eat the hare, etc., (which are permitted), as well as the monkey and the rest (which are not permitted). In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the two sets of animals may he eaten in turn (as it is possible in the case of the approaching of one’s wife during ‘season’ and also, at another time, ‘out of season’). So that in the case just cited (of the edibility of five five-nailed animals), there is possibility of both (eating of hare, etc., and eating of monkey, etc.) being done simultaneously; and hence we have the direction ‘only five five-nailed animals are edible,’ which serves to preclude the other alternative (of all five-nailed animals being eaten). And thus, in this case, we have Preclusion.