Manava Dharmashastra 3.45.3

3.45.3

athartāvṛtau ca gamane rāgataḥ prāpte vacanamṛtāvupeyāditi, tadaivaṃ vacanaṃ mṛgyate 'ṛtāvevopeyādanṛtau na gacchet' | yathā 'pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā' iti kṣutpratighātainārthena śaśakādiṣvapi pañcanakheṣu bhakṣyatā prasaktā tadvyatirikteṣvapi vānarādiṣu | na ca tatra paryāyeṇaiva pravṛttiḥ | yugapattatra cānyatra ca prasaktau 'pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā' iti vacanamitaraparisaṃkhyānārthaṃ saṃpadyate | evamiha parisaṃkhyeti | "nanu ca parisaṃkhyāṃ doṣatrayavatīmācakṣate | trayo hi tatra doṣāḥ prāduḥṣyuḥ, svārthatyāgaḥ parārthakalpanā prāptabādhaśca | pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā iti yadā'nvayataḥ pañcanakhaviṣayaṃ bhakṣaṇaṃ pratīyate tadā tattyaktaṃ bhavati, tadvyatiriktaniṣedhaparatvādvākyasya | aśrutaśca niṣedhaḥ, ataḥ parārthakalpanā arthitvācca sarvaviṣayaṃ bhakṣaṇaṃ yatprāptaṃ tasya bādhaḥ | evame na parisaṃkhyāyāṃ trayo doṣāḥ" | naitatsāram | satyarthitve śrutārthāsaṃbhave vākyasyānarthakyaṃ mā bhūdityetatparatā na viruddhā | kiṃ punaratra yuktam | 'tatra cānyatra ca prāptau' parisaṃkhyālakṣaṇasya vidyamānatvātparisaṃkhyeti | ṛtāvapi gamanaṃ prāptamanṛtāvapi | na tu yadattau tadānṛtāviti | yathā satyarthitve yat bhojanaṃ tatra niyamo''śrāddham' na punarāhāratyāgena aśrāddhameva bhuñjāna āste | evamiha sati khede yadgamanaṃ tatra niyamo'nṛtau na gacchedityavagacchati | arthitvācca gamane prasakte kālavidhānaparataiva yuktā vākyasya | anyathā'nārabhyo'rtha upadiṣṭaḥ syāt | kiṃcāpatyotpattividheḥ kṛtavivāhasyānuṣṭheyatvādṛtau ca tatsaṃbhavādaprāptameva gamanam |

“But they say that Preclusion is beset with three defects: in every case of Preclusion three defects crop up: (1) the renouncing of its meaning, (2) the assuming of a different meaning and (3) the setting aside of what is possible.

(1) Now in the case of the words, ‘five five-nailed animals are edible,’ the idea afforded by it is in the affirmative form—‘five five-nailed animals should be eaten:’ and this is renounced when the words are taken to mean the negativing of the eating of animals other than the five.

(2) Further, no negation is expressed by the words of the sentence; hence, when it is taken as preclusive, a meaning different from its own becomes assumed.

(3) Lastly, it being open to the hungry man to eat all animals, when the sentence is token as preclusive, that which is possible becomes set aside. These are the three defects that beset every case of preclusion.”

There is nothing in all this. If the man is hungry, the eating of animals is already open to him; so that no injunction being needed for that purpose, it is not possible for the sentence to be taken in its direct sense (that certain animals shall be eaten); and hence, in order to guard against the futility of the injunction (if token affirmatively), if it is taken in the negative sense (of preclusion), there can be no incongruity in this. It has been thus declared—‘when what is laid down is what is absolutely unknown, it is a case of injunction; it is a case of Restriction when the course laid down is partially (i.e., optionally) possible; and it is a case of Preclusion when what is laid down is possible, as also something else.’ (Tantravārtika 1. 2. 42).

Now we have to consider what is the right view to take in regard to our text.

Similarly, in the case in question, the act of approaching one’s wife at any time one chooses aṇd not approaching her during the ‘season,’ would make one open to the charge of transgressing the scriptural injunction; as he would, partially (i.e., by not approaching during ‘season,’ and by approaching out of season) be omitting to do what has been directly enjoined; and the act of approaching (out of season) would make him subject to expiation in the same manner as the transgressing of other acts enjoined in the scriptures. When it is open to one to approach one’s wife, through passion, both during ‘season’ and out of it, then we have use for such a direction as ‘one should approach one’s wife only during season, and never out of season,’ Just as the direction ‘five five-nailed animals are edible,’ has its use when it is open to man, under the influence of hunger, to eat the hare, etc., (which are permitted), as well as the monkey and the rest (which are not permitted). In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the two sets of animals may he eaten in turn (as it is possible in the case of the approaching of one’s wife during ‘season’ and also, at another time, ‘out of season’). So that in the case just cited (of the edibility of five five-nailed animals), there is possibility of both (eating of hare, etc., and eating of monkey, etc.) being done simultaneously; and hence we have the direction ‘only five five-nailed animals are edible,’ which serves to preclude the other alternative (of all five-nailed animals being eaten). And thus, in this case, we have Preclusion.

Since the present case fulfills the condition of Preclusion that ‘what is laid down is possible, as well as something else,’ it should be taken as a Preclusion. It is possible for the man to approach his wife ‘during the season’ as well as ‘out of season;’ but if the approaching is done ‘daring season,’ then it cannot be done ‘out of season’ at the same time (i.e., both alternatives are not possible at the same time). Just as when the man is hungry, it is open to him to eat at śrāddhas as well as not at śrāddhas; and when the rule says, ‘he should eat not at śrādḍha,’ he simply avoids eating at śrāddhas; and he does not give up all food, seeking thereby to obey the injunction of not eating at śrāddhas;—similarly, when the man has a longing for intercourse, it is open to him to have recourse to it at all times, and we understand the present rale to mean that ‘one should not approach one’s wife out of season.’ The act of approaching itself being already possible by reason of the man himself desiring it, it is only right that the sentence should be taken as laying down the proper time for that act. Otherwise, it would be prescribing something not referred to before at all. Farther, the obeying of the injunction of begetting children is possible only for one who has married; and this begetting is possible only by approaching one’s wife daring ‘season;’ so that the act of approaching daring ‘Beason’ is already rendered possible by all this. Then, again, for one who has already got a child, the act of approaching oue’s wife again for the purpose of begetting a second child cannot be regarded as being done in accordance with the injunction of begetting children, for the injunction being in the form ‘one should beget a child,’ and the singular number in ‘child’ being meant to be significant, the injunction will have been duly fulfilled by the- begetting of the first child. [Thus, then, there would be no point in the present text enjoining the act of approaching one’s wife during ‘season’]. Nor could the approaching be taken as laid down for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result; because it is not possible to impose upon it either the character of a sacramental rite, or that of an act for a definite result; specially, as the act of approaching during ‘season’ is already implied by the injunction of ‘begetting a child.’ From all this it follows that the statement that ‘one should approach one’s wife during season’ is meant to prohibit the act ‘out of season;’ so that, in its own(?) form, it is merely re-iterative (of what has been enjoined in regard to the begetting of a child), but in its indirect sense it is a Preclusion. And when thus taken in this indirect sense, the passage comes to serve a distinctly useful purpose.