Manava Dharmashastra 3.45

3.45.1

ukto vivāhaḥ | tasminnirvṛtte samupayāte dāratve tadaharevecchāyopagame prāpte tannivṛttyarthamidamārabhyate | na vivāhasamanantaraṃ tadahareva gacchet, kiṃ tarhi ṛtukālaṃ pratīkṣeta | gṛhyakāraistu “ata ūrdhvamakṣāralavaṇāśinau brahmacāriṇāvadhaḥśāyinau syātām—trirātraṃ dvādaśarātraṃ saṃvatsaraṃ vā” iti (āśva0 gṛ0 1| ṛturnāma strīṇāṃ śoṇitadarśanopalakṣitaḥ śarīrāvasthāviśeṣo garbhagrahaṇasamarthaḥ kāla ucyate | upalakṣaṇatvācca darśanasya nivṛtte'sminvakṣyamāṇakālānuvartī bhavatyeva | tasya kāla 'ṛtukālaḥ' | sāhacaryādvā kāla eva ṛtuḥ | tathā ca samānādhikaraṇasamāsaḥ | ṛtukāle'bhigantuṃ vratamasyetyṛtukālābhigāmī | 'vrate' iti ṇiniḥ (pā0 sū0 3| kīdṛśaṃ punaretadvra tam | kimṛtāvabhigantavyameva, athartāveva gantavyamiti | etaduktaṃ bhavati kiṃmayaṃ niyama uta parisaṃkhyeti | “nanu ca vratamiti śāstrato niyama ucyate | tatraiva cāyaṃ ṇiniḥ | ataḥ parisaṃkhyā kathamāśaṃkyate” ? ucyate | parisaṃkhyāyāmapi śāstroyatvaṃ niyamarūpatā ca vidyata iti darśayiṣyāmaḥ | “kastarhyayorviśeṣaḥ” ?

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
Marriage has been described. Marriage having been accomplished, and the wifehood of the girl having been established, one might have the idea that he was entitled to have intercourse with her that same day; hence, with a view to preclude the possibility of this being done, the text proceeds with the following rules.

One should not have recourse to his wife immediately after marriage, on the same day; he should wait for her puberty. In fact, the authors of Gṛhyasūtras have declared that ‘after marriage, for three days or twelve days, or tor a year, the pair should take food without salt, observing continence and lying down upon the ground.’ (Āśvalayana, 1. 8. 10-12.) Hence, if puberty appears in course of the year, there should be no intercourse; similarly, even after the said time, there is to be no intercourse before puberty. In this manner, there is to inconsistency between the present text and the rule laid down by Aśvalāyana. As for the mention of the option of ‘three days,’ etc., what is meant is that, if the pair happen to be very passionate, they might adopt the lesser periods, but others should observe continence (for the full period of twelve months).

‘Season’ is that period of time during which the bodily condition of woman is marked by a flow of blood and indicates her capacity for conception. The actual sight of blood being merely an indication, even after the actual flow has ceased, the time that follows—up to the limit to be described below—is also called the ‘season.’ Or, because of the association of the name ‘season’ with the term ‘period,’ the period itself may be regarded as the ‘season;’ and in this case, we would have the appositional compound (in ‘ṛtukāla’).

The person who has resolved to approach only during the season is culled ‘one who observes the rule of approaching only during the season;’ the affix ‘ṇini’ (in gāmī) having the sense of vote or resolve, according, to Pāṇini 3. 2. 20; just as we have in the case of such terms as ‘sthaṇḍilaśāyī,’ ‘aśrāddhabhojī,’ and the like.

What sort of ‘rule’ is this? (a) is it that one must approach her during the ‘season?’ (b) or that he should approach her only, during the ‘season?’ That is to say, is the rule restrictive or preclusive?

“Well, the very name ‘vrata,’ ‘vow,’ indicates scriptural restriction; and the verbal affix ‘ṇini’ denotes ‘vow;’ so that why should there be any question of its being preclusive?”

Our answer to this is as follows:—We shall show later on that preclusion also is scriptural in character and restrictive in form.

“What then is the difference between the two?”

3.45.2

vidhiviśeṣo niyamaḥ | “atha vidhiḥ kaḥ” | yaḥ śabdaḥ kartavyatābodhakaḥ “agnihotraṃ juhuyātsvargakāmaḥ” iti | na hyagnihotrasyaitadvacanamantareṇānyataḥ kutaścitkartavyatāvagamaḥ | 'niyamaḥ' punaryatrādṛṣṭasiddhayarthasya vacanamantareṇa pākṣikī prāptiḥ | yathā “same yajeteti” darśapaurṇamāsādiyāgavidhānāddeśamātramākṣiptam, na hi kaściddeśamanāśritya yāgaprayogaḥ saṃbhavati | dvividhaśca deśaḥ, samo viṣamaśca | tatra yadā tāvatsame yajeta tadaitadvacanamanuvāda eva | yadā tvicchāyā niraṅkuśatvādviṣame yiyakṣati tadaitadvacanaṃ samadeśaṃ vidadhadarthavat | vihite same viṣamasyānāśrayaṇamavidhānāt | etatsāmarthyāttannivṛttiḥ | vidhinibandhane hyanuṣṭhāne kimiyavihitaṃ kriyeta | tatkaraṇe hi na yathācoditānuṣṭhānasiddhiḥ | idaṃ cātra smārtamudāharaṇam | prāṅmukho'nnāni bhuñjīta | bhuñjānasya yadṛcchayā yāṃ kāṃciddiśamāśritya bhojanaṃ prāptam | tatra kadācitprācī kadāciditarā yā kācitprāptā | tatra yadā prācī na tadetarā, yadetarā na tadā prācīti | tatrāprāptipakṣe vidhyarthaṃ vacanaṃ prāṅmukho'nnāni bhuñjīteti | tatrātikramācchāstrārthaṃ jahāti | evamiha yadṛcchayopagamanamṛtāvapyupagamanaṃ, pakṣe vidhīyamānamupagamanamananuṣṭhīyamānaṃ, śāstrātikramakāritāṃ janayet | yathā'nye śāstravihitārthā atikramyamāṇāḥ prāyaścittahetavo bhavanti tathā'nugamanam |

Restriction is supplementary to Injunction.

“What is Injunction?”

Injunction is that word which expresses the idea of some act to be done; e.g., in the sentence ‘one desirous of Heaven should offer the Agnihotra.’ With the exception of this sentence, there are no other words which could give us the idea of the Agnihotra as something to be done. We have ‘restriction’ in a case where the partial idea of something to be done for the purpose of a transcendental result is obtained even without the scriptural words; e.g., if we have the injunction ‘one should offer the sacrifice on even ground,’ in connection with the Daśapūrṇamāsa sacrifices, the idea of some place in general where they are to be performed is implied by the nature of the act itself; no sacrifice can be performed, except at some place; and places are of two kinds, even and uneven; now, in the event of the sacrificer happening to select an even spot [merely on the strength of the general injunction of the sacrifice],—the words, ‘should offer the sacrifice on even ground,’ become merely descriptive; but if, by reason of man’s desire being untramelled, some one were to elect to perform his sacrifice on uneven ground, then the words, ‘should offer the sacrifice on even ground,’ become useful by asserting the necessity of adopting even ground; for, when the words clearly enjoin the even ground, the avoiding of uneven ground follows directly from the fact of its not being enjoined; so that the avoiding of uneven ground is obtained from the implication of the injunction of even ground. For every performance being dependent upon injunction, wherefore could there be adoption of what is not enjoined at all? If such were adopted, there would be no accomplishment of the act in due accordance with what has been enjoined.

[ The above being an example of Restriction from Śrauta literature] we have an example from Smārta literature in the shape of the Injunction—‘One should eat food facing the East.’ When a man is going to take food, it is open to him to face any direction he likes; so that at one time he might face the East, at another he might face the West, or any other direction; and when he would face the East, he would not face any other, while when he would face another direction he would not face the East. Hence in the event of the man electing to face another direction, the injunction that ‘one should eat food facing the East’ comes in useful; and by disobeying this, one would be transgressing a scriptural injunction.

Similarly, in the case in question, the act of approaching one’s wife at any time one chooses aṇd not approaching her during the ‘season,’ would make one open to the charge of transgressing the scriptural injunction; as he would, partially (i.e., by not approaching during ‘season,’ and by approaching out of season) be omitting to do what has been directly enjoined; and the act of approaching (out of season) would make him subject to expiation in the same manner as the transgressing of other acts enjoined in the scriptures. When it is open to one to approach one’s wife, through passion, both during ‘season’ and out of it, then we have use for such a direction as ‘one should approach one’s wife only during season, and never out of season,’ Just as the direction ‘five five-nailed animals are edible,’ has its use when it is open to man, under the influence of hunger, to eat the hare, etc., (which are permitted), as well as the monkey and the rest (which are not permitted). In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the two sets of animals may he eaten in turn (as it is possible in the case of the approaching of one’s wife during ‘season’ and also, at another time, ‘out of season’). So that in the case just cited (of the edibility of five five-nailed animals), there is possibility of both (eating of hare, etc., and eating of monkey, etc.) being done simultaneously; and hence we have the direction ‘only five five-nailed animals are edible,’ which serves to preclude the other alternative (of all five-nailed animals being eaten). And thus, in this case, we have Preclusion.

3.45.3

athartāvṛtau ca gamane rāgataḥ prāpte vacanamṛtāvupeyāditi, tadaivaṃ vacanaṃ mṛgyate 'ṛtāvevopeyādanṛtau na gacchet' | yathā 'pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā' iti kṣutpratighātainārthena śaśakādiṣvapi pañcanakheṣu bhakṣyatā prasaktā tadvyatirikteṣvapi vānarādiṣu | na ca tatra paryāyeṇaiva pravṛttiḥ | yugapattatra cānyatra ca prasaktau 'pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā' iti vacanamitaraparisaṃkhyānārthaṃ saṃpadyate | evamiha parisaṃkhyeti | "nanu ca parisaṃkhyāṃ doṣatrayavatīmācakṣate | trayo hi tatra doṣāḥ prāduḥṣyuḥ, svārthatyāgaḥ parārthakalpanā prāptabādhaśca | pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā iti yadā'nvayataḥ pañcanakhaviṣayaṃ bhakṣaṇaṃ pratīyate tadā tattyaktaṃ bhavati, tadvyatiriktaniṣedhaparatvādvākyasya | aśrutaśca niṣedhaḥ, ataḥ parārthakalpanā arthitvācca sarvaviṣayaṃ bhakṣaṇaṃ yatprāptaṃ tasya bādhaḥ | evame na parisaṃkhyāyāṃ trayo doṣāḥ" | naitatsāram | satyarthitve śrutārthāsaṃbhave vākyasyānarthakyaṃ mā bhūdityetatparatā na viruddhā | kiṃ punaratra yuktam | 'tatra cānyatra ca prāptau' parisaṃkhyālakṣaṇasya vidyamānatvātparisaṃkhyeti | ṛtāvapi gamanaṃ prāptamanṛtāvapi | na tu yadattau tadānṛtāviti | yathā satyarthitve yat bhojanaṃ tatra niyamo''śrāddham' na punarāhāratyāgena aśrāddhameva bhuñjāna āste | evamiha sati khede yadgamanaṃ tatra niyamo'nṛtau na gacchedityavagacchati | arthitvācca gamane prasakte kālavidhānaparataiva yuktā vākyasya | anyathā'nārabhyo'rtha upadiṣṭaḥ syāt | kiṃcāpatyotpattividheḥ kṛtavivāhasyānuṣṭheyatvādṛtau ca tatsaṃbhavādaprāptameva gamanam |

“But they say that Preclusion is beset with three defects: in every case of Preclusion three defects crop up: (1) the renouncing of its meaning, (2) the assuming of a different meaning and (3) the setting aside of what is possible.

(1) Now in the case of the words, ‘five five-nailed animals are edible,’ the idea afforded by it is in the affirmative form—‘five five-nailed animals should be eaten:’ and this is renounced when the words are taken to mean the negativing of the eating of animals other than the five.

(2) Further, no negation is expressed by the words of the sentence; hence, when it is taken as preclusive, a meaning different from its own becomes assumed.

(3) Lastly, it being open to the hungry man to eat all animals, when the sentence is token as preclusive, that which is possible becomes set aside. These are the three defects that beset every case of preclusion.”

There is nothing in all this. If the man is hungry, the eating of animals is already open to him; so that no injunction being needed for that purpose, it is not possible for the sentence to be taken in its direct sense (that certain animals shall be eaten); and hence, in order to guard against the futility of the injunction (if token affirmatively), if it is taken in the negative sense (of preclusion), there can be no incongruity in this. It has been thus declared—‘when what is laid down is what is absolutely unknown, it is a case of injunction; it is a case of Restriction when the course laid down is partially (i.e., optionally) possible; and it is a case of Preclusion when what is laid down is possible, as also something else.’ (Tantravārtika 1. 2. 42).

Now we have to consider what is the right view to take in regard to our text.

Similarly, in the case in question, the act of approaching one’s wife at any time one chooses aṇd not approaching her during the ‘season,’ would make one open to the charge of transgressing the scriptural injunction; as he would, partially (i.e., by not approaching during ‘season,’ and by approaching out of season) be omitting to do what has been directly enjoined; and the act of approaching (out of season) would make him subject to expiation in the same manner as the transgressing of other acts enjoined in the scriptures. When it is open to one to approach one’s wife, through passion, both during ‘season’ and out of it, then we have use for such a direction as ‘one should approach one’s wife only during season, and never out of season,’ Just as the direction ‘five five-nailed animals are edible,’ has its use when it is open to man, under the influence of hunger, to eat the hare, etc., (which are permitted), as well as the monkey and the rest (which are not permitted). In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the two sets of animals may he eaten in turn (as it is possible in the case of the approaching of one’s wife during ‘season’ and also, at another time, ‘out of season’). So that in the case just cited (of the edibility of five five-nailed animals), there is possibility of both (eating of hare, etc., and eating of monkey, etc.) being done simultaneously; and hence we have the direction ‘only five five-nailed animals are edible,’ which serves to preclude the other alternative (of all five-nailed animals being eaten). And thus, in this case, we have Preclusion.

Since the present case fulfills the condition of Preclusion that ‘what is laid down is possible, as well as something else,’ it should be taken as a Preclusion. It is possible for the man to approach his wife ‘during the season’ as well as ‘out of season;’ but if the approaching is done ‘daring season,’ then it cannot be done ‘out of season’ at the same time (i.e., both alternatives are not possible at the same time). Just as when the man is hungry, it is open to him to eat at śrāddhas as well as not at śrāddhas; and when the rule says, ‘he should eat not at śrādḍha,’ he simply avoids eating at śrāddhas; and he does not give up all food, seeking thereby to obey the injunction of not eating at śrāddhas;—similarly, when the man has a longing for intercourse, it is open to him to have recourse to it at all times, and we understand the present rale to mean that ‘one should not approach one’s wife out of season.’ The act of approaching itself being already possible by reason of the man himself desiring it, it is only right that the sentence should be taken as laying down the proper time for that act. Otherwise, it would be prescribing something not referred to before at all. Farther, the obeying of the injunction of begetting children is possible only for one who has married; and this begetting is possible only by approaching one’s wife daring ‘season;’ so that the act of approaching daring ‘Beason’ is already rendered possible by all this. Then, again, for one who has already got a child, the act of approaching oue’s wife again for the purpose of begetting a second child cannot be regarded as being done in accordance with the injunction of begetting children, for the injunction being in the form ‘one should beget a child,’ and the singular number in ‘child’ being meant to be significant, the injunction will have been duly fulfilled by the- begetting of the first child. [Thus, then, there would be no point in the present text enjoining the act of approaching one’s wife during ‘season’]. Nor could the approaching be taken as laid down for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result; because it is not possible to impose upon it either the character of a sacramental rite, or that of an act for a definite result; specially, as the act of approaching during ‘season’ is already implied by the injunction of ‘begetting a child.’ From all this it follows that the statement that ‘one should approach one’s wife during season’ is meant to prohibit the act ‘out of season;’ so that, in its own(?) form, it is merely re-iterative (of what has been enjoined in regard to the begetting of a child), but in its indirect sense it is a Preclusion. And when thus taken in this indirect sense, the passage comes to serve a distinctly useful purpose.

3.45.4

utpannaputrasya ca na dvitīyaputrotpādanaṃ vaidham | apatyamutpādayedityekatvavivakṣāyāṃ vidhyarthanivṛtteḥ | na ca gamanamevādṛṣṭārthatayā śakyaṃ vidhātum | saṃskāravidhitvādadhikāraśravaṇātkalpanāyāścāśakyatvāt, apatyotpattividhyākṣepādṛtau gamanasya | yadyātrartāvupeyāditi tadanṛtupratiṣedhārtham | tatrānuvādaḥ, paraṃ parisaṃkhyā | tatra hyarthāntaralakṣaṇāyā'pyarthavattā bhavati | evaṃ ca kṛtvā gautamīyenāvipratipattiḥ | evaṃ tatroktam | ‘ṛtāvupeyātsarvatra vā pratiṣiddhavarjam’ ( a0 5 sū0 1-2) iti | ‘sarvatra ve’tyeṣa vikalpaḥ kāmacārātnujñānārthaḥ | na punaḥ sarvadartāvanṛtau ca niyamopapattiḥ | yadi ca pūrvatrartāvupeyāditi niyamaḥ, ‘sarvatra ve’tyatrāpi sa evopeyādityanuprayujyamānaśabdo niyamārthaḥ prāpnoti ekaprakramatvāt, nahi sa eva śabdaḥ punaranuccāryamāṇo bhinnārtho bhavituṃ yuktaḥ | na cartauranyatra niyamārthatopapadyate ityuktam | tasmādṛttau gamanavacanamanṛtau pratiṣedhārtham | tatrānutpannaputrasya vidhyantarānniyama eva | utpannaputrastu yathākāmī | anṛtau pratiṣiddhe gamane bhāryecchayā punaḥ pratiprasūyate parvavarjaṃ vrajeccaināṃ tadvrat iti | taditi bhāryāyāḥ pratyavamarśaḥ | taccittagrahaṇaṃ vratamasyeti tadvrataḥ | ratikāmyayā | vinā'pyapatyārthenotpannaputra ṛtāvanutpannaputro vā'nṛtau suratasambhogecchayā tadvrata enāṃ vrajentāmecchayetyarthaḥ | athavā tacchabdo ratikāmyayetyatra vyapekṣyate, smṛtiśāstratvādyasya | tadratikāmyayā parvavarjamanyatrāpi vrajet | tatraivākāraśleṣo draṣṭavyaḥ, ‘aratikāmyayā’, ātmana iti śeṣaḥ |

When it is thus, taken, then this text does not conflict with what has been said in Gautama’s work. In the latter, it is asserted—‘one should approach one’s wife during season, or at all times, with the exception of the sacred days’ (5. 1-2); and here the phrase, ‘or at all times,’ mentions an option, which permits freedom of action; and there would be no point in laying down any such rule as ‘one may do the act at all times, during season as well as out of season;’ and (as the words stand) when the preceding clause is taken as laying down the rule that ‘one should approach one’s wife during season,’ the same verb, ‘should approach,’ being construed with the subsequent phrase, ‘at all times,’ this also would have to be regarded as a rule, occurring as it does in the same context as the preceding rule; specially because, so long as the word is not actually repeated in the text (and is construed with the latter clause only as it stands in the preceding clause), no different meaning can be attributed to it. And it has already been explained that there would be no point in any restriction being imposed, apart from the ‘season.’

From all this it follows that the assertion regarding ‘approaching during season’ is meant to prohibit the act ‘out of season.’ For one who has not yet got a son, the restriction (regarding approaching during season only) is got at from a different injunction (that of begetting a child); but for one who has already got a son might do what he likes (hence the prohibition becomes useful).

The act of approaching the wife out of season having been prohibited, the text proceeds to make an exception in the case of the wife evincing a desire for intercourse—‘In consideration of her, he may approach her, except on the sacred days.’ ‘Her’ refers to the wife. ‘In consideration of her,’—i.e., intent upon pleasing her mind.

‘With the desire for sexual intercourse,’ ‘ratikāmyayā,’ i.e., in consideration of her wishes,—not by one’s own wish—one may approach her with a view to the pleasures of sexual intercourse,—one who has already got a son may do this during ‘season,’ and one who has not got a son may do it out of season.

Or, the pronoun ‘tat’ (in ‘tadvrataḥ’) may be construed with ‘ratikāmyayā;’ such irregular construction being permissible, in view of the work being a text-book of Smṛti. The meaning in this case would be—‘with a view to giving her pleasure, he may approach her at other times also, except on the sacred days.’ And in this case, we might assume the presence of an ‘a,’ the term being ‘aratikāmyayā’—i.e., ‘not with a view to giving pleasure to himself.’ But in the explanation that has been given before, there would be no use for assuming this ‘a,’ nor for construing the pronoun ‘tat’ apart from its context.

Since the present case fulfills the condition of Preclusion that ‘what is laid down is possible, as well as something else,’ it should be taken as a Preclusion. It is possible for the man to approach his wife ‘during the season’ as well as ‘out of season;’ but if the approaching is done ‘daring season,’ then it cannot be done ‘out of season’ at the same time (i.e., both alternatives are not possible at the same time). Just as when the man is hungry, it is open to him to eat at śrāddhas as well as not at śrāddhas; and when the rule says, ‘he should eat not at śrādḍha,’ he simply avoids eating at śrāddhas; and he does not give up all food, seeking thereby to obey the injunction of not eating at śrāddhas;—similarly, when the man has a longing for intercourse, it is open to him to have recourse to it at all times, and we understand the present rale to mean that ‘one should not approach one’s wife out of season.’ The act of approaching itself being already possible by reason of the man himself desiring it, it is only right that the sentence should be taken as laying down the proper time for that act. Otherwise, it would be prescribing something not referred to before at all. Farther, the obeying of the injunction of begetting children is possible only for one who has married; and this begetting is possible only by approaching one’s wife daring ‘season;’ so that the act of approaching daring ‘Beason’ is already rendered possible by all this. Then, again, for one who has already got a child, the act of approaching oue’s wife again for the purpose of begetting a second child cannot be regarded as being done in accordance with the injunction of begetting children, for the injunction being in the form ‘one should beget a child,’ and the singular number in ‘child’ being meant to be significant, the injunction will have been duly fulfilled by the- begetting of the first child. [Thus, then, there would be no point in the present text enjoining the act of approaching one’s wife during ‘season’]. Nor could the approaching be taken as laid down for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result; because it is not possible to impose upon it either the character of a sacramental rite, or that of an act for a definite result; specially, as the act of approaching during ‘season’ is already implied by the injunction of ‘begetting a child.’ From all this it follows that the statement that ‘one should approach one’s wife during season’ is meant to prohibit the act ‘out of season;’ so that, in its own(?) form, it is merely re-iterative (of what has been enjoined in regard to the begetting of a child), but in its indirect sense it is a Preclusion. And when thus taken in this indirect sense, the passage comes to serve a distinctly useful purpose.

3.45.5

yathā tu vyākhyātaṃ tathā na kiñcidatrāpraśleṣeṇāpi vā tacchabdasya samāsopasarjanasyāsambandhena | parvāṇi vakṣyati | ‘amāvāsyāmaṣṭamīṃ ca paurṇamāsīṃ caturdaśīmiti’ | svadāranirataḥ | svadāreṣu nirataḥ syāttatprītibhāvanāparaḥ | athavā svadāreṣveva ramate na paradārānramayediti paradārapratiṣedhaḥ | sadā | yāvajjīvametadvrataṃ paripālanīyam | ataḥ sthitametat | trīṇi vākyānpatra-ṛtukālābhigāmī syādityetadekam, anutpannaputrasya niyamānuvādarūpam | dvitīyam bhāryāprayuktasya parvavarjamṛtāvantau ca, na suratecchayā | svadāranirata iti tṛtīyam | eṣāṃ ca padayojanā—ṛtukālābhigāmī syādapatyārtham, ratikāmyayā tu tadvrata enāṃ vrajet, svadāranirataśca syāt |