The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c13: Chapter IX

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c13

Language: English

Chapter IX

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FOREIGN INVASIONS AND THE WESTERN FRONTIER.

The problem of North India's defence is considerably minimised by its natural boundaries. If we exclude the coast line in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, it is only in the northwest that she is really vulnerable¹. From times immemorial, foreigners have entered through this northwestern passage leading into areas which afford convenient bases for an eventual conquest of the fertile plains. Owing to the peculiar configuration of mountain ranges in this region, an effective defence of this entrance is possible only by a complete military control of the area extending from Kabul, via Ghazni, to Kandahar, the so-called "scientific frontier" of India², controlling, as it does, the approaches to the fertile valleys of the Punjab rivers. For, the more southern entrances, through the Bolan and Las Bela regions, lead to the Indian desert. "India's second line of defence"³. The control of the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line, flanked by the Hindu-kush, is thus not only essential from the point of view of military strategy, but in an age, when the alien conquerors of India were dependent for reinforcement on Central Asia, for political considerations also. Another aspect of this frontier problem, still a source of great difficulty to the present rulers of India, is the control of the ever-turbulent hill-tribes, inhabiting the wide mountainous belt of land extending from Kashmir to the seacoast, through which all the principal passages run. In the northern half of the Sind-Sagar Doab, round the chain of hills known as the Salt Range (Koh-i-Jud), lived, in the early middle ages, a number of warlike and lawless tribes,—the Khokars, Awans and Janjuhas¹,—whose political instability and periodic depredations on the Jhelum and Chinab valleys added to the enormity of the problem.

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¹ The eastern Himalayas and the Assam hills are difficult for any invading army and the few trade routes from Tibet do not lead to the key positions necessary for the conquest of North India. The coming of the Tibeto-Mongoloid races into Brahmaputra valley was more a tribal migration than invasion at a given time. It is needless to refer to the exploded myth of Changiz Khan's invasion through the eastern route, as recorded by Ferishta, I, p. 70, and reproduced by Stewart, History of Bengal p. 62, and Thomas: Chronicles, p. 121, note. As Raverty has pointed out long ago, the story arose out of a misreading by Ferishta of what was meant for Jajnagar, which a careless scribe could easily turn into Changiz: see Raverty: op. cit. p. 665, note 8. On the eastern routes into India see also IGI, I, p. 18 and Holdich: Gates of India, p. 517.

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² CHI, VI, p. 457.

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³ Holdich; op. cit., p. 143.

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¹ Shahpur Settlement Report, 1886, pp. 27-28; Jhelum District Settlement Report 1874-78, pp. 29-36.

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To the Moghul emperors of India, the advance upto the Kabul-Ghazni-Khandahar line was a major policy of expansion; to the newly-arrived Turks of the 13th century, control of the line to secure communications with their homeland was a vital necessity. As long as the kingdom of Ghor was strong enough to hold its ground in Afghanistan, Delhi was safe and communications uninterrupted. But its inclusion in the Ghoride empire exposed it to the ever changing political forces of Central Asia. In an earlier chapter reference has been made to the great concern which Aibak felt on this score after Muizzuddin's death, and to his policy directed to separating Delhi from Central Asiatic complications. With the absorption of Ghazni in the empire of the Khwarizm Shah, whose eastern frontier touched the Indus², Delhi's security was directly threatened. Shortly afterwards the Mongols changed the whole map of Asia. Mongol outposts were established in Ghazni, Peshawar and other places in Afghanistan, and the Indus nearly disappeared as a political boundary. Delhi's administrative frontier was, as a consequence, pushed back far into what is now modern Punjab. For the rest of the century the Memelukes were thrown on the defensive and their forward policy in this direction aimed only at extending control over the Chinab basin rather than reaching the scientific frontier. The Indus remained only the geographical boundary of ‘Hind and Sind;” and the tract east of the river was turned into a kind of no-man's land.

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² Minhaj, Raverty's trans. p. 267. Peshawar was the eastern frontier

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It has been stated elsewhere that Lahore and Multan formed the westernmost provinces of Delhi during the early years of the conquest. The river Chinab roughly marked the boundary line within which was situated the fortress of Sialkot, repaired and garrisoned by Muizzuddin. His expedition against the Khokars and other tribesmen of the Salt Range marked the earliest attempt to reduce the unregulated belt of land across the Jhelum, which was, soon after, overrun by the invasions of Yalduz, first in 605 and again in 612. Our available data are unfortunately much too scanty to enable us to trace the changes which these invasions must have caused in the administrative boundary. Yalduz is said to have claimed the Punjab as part of his appanage; during the period of his rule in Ghazni; he is even reported to have sent troops on several occasions to occupy Lahore¹. Possession of the city was contested not only by Yalduz and Qubachah but also by Iltutmish. The latter's dispute which resulted in Yalduz's defeat

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¹ Minhaj, p. 143.

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outpost of Khwarizm when Changiz defeated Mangbarni on the Indus in 618/1221; en Nessawi, p. 79.

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and death is said to have orginated from the uncertainty of their respective boundaries¹. From its position on the Ravi, Lahore could certainly cut off the flanks of an invading army proceeding southwards to Multan; its possession was also necessary for an eventual advance into the Sind Sagar Doab. It is difficult, however, to be precise as to the steps that Iltutmish must have taken in this direction after he organised the Lahore province in 1217; indications are available to show that he contemplated an advance up to the Indus. It was probably soon after the acquisition of Lahore that Malik Aetigin was put in charge of Kujah and Nandanah in the Salt Range which Minhaj refers to as the 'frontier'². The fact that these places, along with Sialkot, are listed among Iltutmish's conquests, makes it exceedingly probable that these acquisitions were preceded by concentrated operations. They were doubtless garrisoned to serve as operational bases against the hill-tribes.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 171.

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² See note 4, p. 93, supra.

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This process of gradual advance up to the Indus, was, in any case, interrupted by the political upheavals caused by the Mongol eruption. By the year 617/1220, the Khwarizmi empire was no more; from the Jaxartes to the Caspian Sea and from Ghazni to Iraq, Changiz destroyed flourishing cities and great centres of learning. Alauddin Muhammud, the Khwarizm Shah, was driven across his northern provinces to find refuge and eventual death in an island on the Caspian³; his crown prince, Jalaluddin Mangbarni, expelled from Khurasan, fled southwards to Ghazni. On the way he achieved a brilliant victory over the pursuing Mongols at Barwan but as Changiz himself moved against him from Talkan, he left Ghazni and took the road to the Indian frontier. He was overtaken on the Indus and compelled to turn round and fight in desperation. In the battle his courage and intrepidity evoked warm praise from the great Mongol, but his small force was easily overpowered. As the Mongols closed the escape routes, Mangbarni hastily put his family in a boat and sending them over to be drowned in the Indus waters, flung his horse into the river and crossed over to India¹.

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³ For a full account of the Khwarizm Shah's war with Changiz and his subsequent retreat towards the east, see Bartold: *Turkestan*, pp. 403-426. Alauddin Muhammud died in 617/1220.

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¹ For details of this battle see Juwaini, II, p. 43; also Howorth: Mongols, I, p. 90; en-Nessawi, p. 83-84. It was fought on the 8th Shawwal, 618.

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Changiz Khan and Mangbarni.

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The exact spot where, in 1221, this first wave of Mongol eruption touched Indian soil is still a matter of speculation². It is certain, however, that it lay not very far from the Salt Range through which, according to most of the early writers, Mangbarni made his way into the Sind Sagar Doab. Fortunately for Delhi, Changiz did not think it necessary to persue him across the river, but engaged himself in reducing the Ighraki tribesmen who inhabited the northern reaches of the Kabul river and who had furnished contingents to the Khwarizmi forces³; his sons, Tuli and Chagatai, were sent to reduce Khurasan, Kerman and Ghazni⁴. Changiz lingered near the Indus for three months and is said to have contemplated returning to Qaraqoram through India, by way of "Lakhnauti and Kamrud and through the Qarachal mountains"⁵. He is even reported to have sent envoys to Delhi, soliciting the necessary permission from Iltutmish. Whether the Delhi Sultan could effectively stop the Mongol if he decided to march through inspite of his reported refusal, is highly doubtful. That Changiz yet respected Delhi’s sovereignty and in the winter of 1222, marched back through the Hindukush, speaks well of his moderation and his scrupulous observance of international practice¹.

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² See Raverty: Notes on Afghanistan, pp. 338 and 448; trans. Tab Nas. p. 292-93; Bartold: Turkestan, p. 445-46.

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³ Minhaj, p. 355. On the Ighrakis, who are stated to have been a sept of the Khaljis, see Raverty's notes, trans. Tab. Nas.. p. 1043.

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⁴ Juwaini, I, p. 108; Howorth: Mongols, I, p. 90.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 355 and 375; Juwaini, I, p. 109.

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¹ In view of the Mongol's unwillingness, shortly afterwards, to pursue Mangbarni into the Punjab when he turned to seek shelter in Delhi, it is not unlikely that Delhi had entered into some kind of a pact with Changiz. Iltutmish's refusal to shelter the fugitive prince was perhaps in accordance with this agreement.

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Changiz spared India on this occasion, but with Mangbarni were commenced a series of invasions on the cis-Indus region. Having collected such of his followers as had succeeded in crossing the river, he obtained arms by a night attack on a party of robbers near by, and then defeated a force of about five thousand Hindu troops sent by the chief of the Salt Range². News of this success reaching Changiz, a force was sent in his persuit from Ghazni. As the latter crossed the Indus, Mangbarni, anxious to avoid them, turned south towards Lahore. The Mongols, probably unwilling to open hostilities with Delhi, did not persue him into the Punjab, but contended themselves by plundering a fortress called Malikpur in the vicinity of the Salt Range³.

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² The Hindu force is said to have come from the hills of "Balala and Makala"—the last name being, according to Raverty, identical with Makhiala, the local name of the Salt Range; Raverty: trans. Tab. Nas. p. 537, note; also, see Juwaini, II, p. 143-44; en Nessawi, who calls the Hindu chief Chatar Sal, states that he himself advanced with a great force and just when Mangbarni was arranging to recross the Indus in order to avoid the "more cruel Hindus", fell upon him. In the resulting battle Chatar Sal is however said to have been killed and the Hindus dispersed; French trans. by Scheffer, p. 142. Cf. Alfi, f. 559b, and Ferishta, II, p. 315, for a slightly different account.

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³ According to Raverty, Malikpur was the name of a town in the Rawalpindi district; trans. Tab. Nas., p. 537, note. He describes the siege of Multan on this occasion and contradicts his own statement on p. 293,

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Mangbarni advanced three stages towards Delhi and from there sent Ainul Mulk to ask for an asylum. The request met with overt refusal on the plea of the country’s uncongenial climate¹. Delhi even appeared a potential enemy. Mangbarni thereupon turned to his former refuge,—the Mongols having in the meantime retired—and sent a force to plunder the Khokar territory. The expedition proved an eminent success; not only was the Khokar chief defeated but was obliged to give his daughter in marriage and even to lend armed assistance².

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¹ Juwaini, II, p. 145, states that Iltutmish even murdered the envoy; see p. 91 supra.

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² See IA, 1907, p. 3, for a traditional account of this marriage current among the Khokars.

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This alliance immensely strengthened the fugitive’s position. He now turned to establishing himself more securely at the expense of Qubachah whose dominion reached as far north as Mianwali district and even included Nandanah³. Between him and the Khokars there was longstanding enmity which Mangbarni now exploited in attacking his northern districts. He opened hostilities by capturing Kallurkot and destroying a fortress

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³ It was held on his behalf by Qamaruddin Kirmani, who after Mangbarni’s victory over the Khokar chief, promptly submitted; en-Nessawi, p. 86. Qubachah was accused of having killed a Khwarizni refugee; a young relation of Mangbarni had been brutally murdered at Kallurkot one of Qubachah’s dependencies, en-Nessawi, p. 88.

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note, that the Mongol commander Turtai, “retired after plundering the neighbourhood of Malikpur”. Howorth, as well as Bartold, also make the mistake of supposing that Multan was besieged on this occasion. If in 618 the Mongols really reached as far as Multan it is strange that they could not find the fugitive; all writers agree that when he left India, he did so to avoid another Mongol expedition sent in his persuit; if we accept the view that Multan was invested in 618 by the Mongols, the proceedings of the second expedition under Turtai in 621, will have remained absolutely unknown to us. The date of Mangbarni’s departure from India and that of the Mongol investment of Multan, in 621, makes it clear that in 618, the Mongols did not proceed far into the Punjab. See Howorth: Mongols I, p. 90; Bartold: Turkestan, p. 446; Minhaj, p. 143; en-Nessawi, p. 94; Tarikh-i-Muhammadi: Or 137, f. 334a; Juwaini is not consistant in his account of the forces sent into India by Changiz; see for example, I, pp. 108, 110, 112, and II, p. 144 and 147.

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near by. Qubachah prepared for battle, but before he could commence operations, he was routed in a night attack at Uch by the Khwarizmi general, Uzbek Pai¹. Qubachah fled to Multan and when Mangbarni demanded indemnity and the return of his wife who had taken shelter at his court, he found himself obliged to make prompt compliance². The fugitive's stay in India was however, coming to an end. As he was preparing to spend the summer in the Salt Range, news of the approach of another Mongol army in his persuit compelled him to turn southwards³. Passing by Multan he demanded money contribution, but Qubachah, now aware of the fugitive's difficulties, refused and prepared for battle. With the Mongols on his trail Mangbarni could hardly afford to fight, and proceedd to Uch where also he met with a similarly hostile reception. Setting fire to the city he then departed towards Sehwan where he compelled Qubachah's governor, Fakhruddin Salari, to submit and deliver the city. After a month's stay at Sehwan, he left to attack Debal and put the ruler, named Chanisar, to flight⁴. An expedition was next sent to Gujrat (Anhilwara) which yielded some booty⁵. The Mongols were reported to be nearing Multan; Qubachah's hostility cut him off from his Khokar ally. News then arrived that his brother Ghiyasuddin had made himself unpopular in Iraq and that the army and the people preferred his rule. Mangbarni therefore called a council of his followers to decide on the course of action. Hasan Qarlugh, Uzbek Pai and others advised him to stay on and try to organise an anti-Mongol pact with the Sultan of Delhi. But the temptation to rule in Iraq "seized him"¹. Leaving Hasan Qarlugh and Uzbek Pai as his representatives in Afghanistan and Sind respectively, Mangbarni finally left India by way of Makran, in 621/1224².

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¹ Juwaini, II, p. 146. *Cf.* en-Nessawi, p. 88.

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² Juwaini, II, p. 147; en-Nessawi, p. 90-91, states that after defeating Qubachah, Mangbarni went to 'Nuhaoor' (? meant for Lahore ?) held by a rebellious son of Qubachah who submitted promptly.

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³ On his way towards the Salt Range he captured the fortress of 'Busraor' which Cunningham identified with the present Pasraur, 20 miles S.E. of Sialkot; but it is not situated on the route from the Salt Range. See Cunningham: *Reports*, XIV, p. 46-47. Ferishta adds that Mangbarni also heard of a Delhi force coming against him; II, p. 315.

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⁴ Juwaini, II, p. 147. *Cf.* en-Nessawi, pp. 90-91.

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⁵ Juwaini, II, p. 148.

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¹ en-Nessawi, p. 92.

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² Juwaini, II, p. 149.

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The effect of his three years' sojourn in the western Punjab and Sind was to put heavy pressure on Delhi's administrative frontier which, as a result, gradually receded. The Indus was abolished even as a geographical boundary, for the cis-Indus tracts now became part of the Ghazni territory over which the Mongols, in pursuit of the remnants of the Khwarizmi officers, extended their operations. Even before Mangbarni's departure from lower Sind came the Mongol army under Turtai. Capturing Nandanah, possibly from one of Hasan Qarlugh's officers, Turtai proceeded to Multan where Qubachah had so recently sought shelter. The city was closely besieged and was about to fall when the excessive heat of the place compelled the besiegers to withdraw³. On their way back they plundered "the territories of Lahore and Multan". It does not appear that they permanently garrisoned the Nandanah fortress or occupied the area. In 623/1226, the district of Sehwan was invaded by a large force consisting of Khalji tribesmen, remnants of the Khwarizmi army whom the Mongols drove from their home in Garmsir; Qubachah, however, succeeded in overpowering them¹.

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³ Minhaj, p. 143; Juwaini, I, p. 112, writes it as Biah, which Elliot tries to identify with Bhera, on the west bank of the Jhelum; II, p. 392, note 1; see also Cunningham: Reports, XIV, p. 37-38. Minhaj, p. 143, dates it in 621/1224. See Fawadul Fawaid f. 59a, for a tradition of how this unexpected deliverance was ascribed to the miraculous power of the saint Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 143.

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The northwestern frontier region, as a result of these repeated invasions, was thus in a state of utmost confusion. In the north the Salt Range tribes were emboldened to exploit their adversaries' weakness. They not only occupied the whole of the northern Doab but also spread further east and even beyond the Beas² to menace Lahore which they took the earliest opportunity to sack and plunder. West of the Indus, the area known to the contemporary writers as Baniyan³ formed part of Hasan Qarlugh's dominions who precariously held whatever portion he could of his master's appanage of Ghazni. To the south was the territory of Qubachah with a rapidly declining hold on the outlying districts like Sehwan and Debal. Between all these was Uzbek Pai, who, till 627/1220, remained in the Sind Sagar Doab and the Punjab and possibly in control of Multan as well⁴.

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² Raziah was able to raise, from Bhatinda, a mercenary force consisting mainly of the Khokars. See p. 116 supra.

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³ Minhaj, p. 388; for Hasan Qarlugh's coins found in Baniyan and in the Sind Sagar Doab, see Thomas: *Chronicle*, p. 99.

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⁴ He issued coins in his own name and in one, with a Nagari obverse, Thomas read the mint name as Multan; *Chronicle*, no. 85.

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Iltutmish's annexation of Qubachah's dominions by the year 1228 brought the Delhi kingdom in direct contact with the Mongols operating from what is now modern Afghanistan. With the expulsion from Ghor of the last Khwarizmi officer, Qutbuddin Hasan⁵, increased pressure was bound to be felt on the Indus valley; even Hasan Qarlugh had to maintain his existence by a timely submission to his enemy in 628/1230⁶. In Sind the continued political existence of Uzbek Pai was a standing invitation to the Mongols to extend their operations thither. Even his expulsion, sometime after 1229, by the combined exertions, according to en-Nessawi¹, of Iltutmish and his own erstwhile colleague Hasan Qarlugh, does not seem to have improved matters, for, by taking over Uch and Multan, Iltutmish became a neighbour of the Mongols².

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⁵ The event is placed in 620/1223; Minhaj, p. 370.

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⁶ *Ibid*, p. 377.

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¹ pp. 90 and 217.

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² He appointed governors in Uch and Multan as early as 625/1227; Minhaj pp. 232 and 234.

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The Mongol *Quriltai*, convened for the coronation of Uktai Khan in 1229, decided on a reconquest and partial annexation of Khurasan and Afghanistan³. This resulted in a series of fresh assaults on territories contiguous to the Delhi frontier. In 633/1235, the principality of Siestan in western Afghanistan was made to acknowledge Mongol sway⁴; across the Helmand, through Beluchistan, Mongol horsemen became active in the Derajat valley leading to Upper Sind. Simultaneously, a Mongol force pushed through northern Afghanistan⁵ and commenced operations in the upper Indus. Details of their proceedings in this region are not found on record, but Iltutmish’s last expedition, projected towards Baniyan, must be remembered in this connection. It seems to have been intended, in accordance with the agreement implied in his co-operation against Uzbek Pai, to assist the Qarlugh chief.

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³ Howorth: *Mongols*, I, p. 126-27.

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⁴ *Tarikh-i-Siestan*, p. 397.

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⁵ Alfi, f. 617a.

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This renewed pressure from the Mongols, in any case, made Hasan’s position untenable in Baniyan, and he accordingly planned to carve out a principality for

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Renewed Mongol pressure.

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himself in the districts east of the Indus. In 634/1236, during the confusions prevailing in the reign of Firoz, he made his first attempt on Lower Sind and attacked Uch but was repelled with heavy losses¹. Very soon he was forced to cross the Indus once again, for in 636 the Mongols finally annexed his territory and drove him to seek shelter in the Punjab. He thereupon attempted to renew the friendly relation which he had with Iltutmish and sought to convert this into a full-fledged anti-Mongol alliance. His son visited Raziah's court who, while according to him all the marks of honour, showed a prudent disinclination to court Mongol hostility. From Baran, which she assigned for his expenses, and where she presumably interned him, the disappointed Qarlugh prince fled secretly to rejoin his father who had found temporary shelter with the Khokar allies of his late master². Raziah's action seems to have pleased the Mongols who, possibly because of her father's anxiety to remain neutral in Changiz's war with the Khwarizm Shah, respected her frontier and gave no help to the rebel Kabir Khan. From the details of the latter's proceedings who was obliged to halt in his westward flight, this frontier appears to have been marked by the Sodharah (Chinab) beyond which the Mongols barred his progress.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 237.

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² Ibid, p. 392.

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Bahram's reign saw the occurrence of events which were to result in a further constriction of this line. Following Raziah's deposition which the Mongols seem to have construed as terminating the non-aggression pact with Delhi, they decided at last on bringing India within their scheme of conquest. In 639/1241 Bahadur Tair, the commander of the Mongol forces in Herat, Ghor, Ghazni and Tukharistan, crossed the Indus and for the first time appeared before Lahore. The city was ill-prepared to stand a siege and the inhabitants showed a fatal indifference to the danger. In spite of an urgent appeal to Delhi, the machinations of the wazir diverted the reinforcements, and the governor, Malik Qaraqash, was obliged to flee the city. As the defences were breached the next morning, the citizens, now roused to action, put up a desperate street-fight but it was merely to delay the eventual occupation¹. The invaders, however, did not garrison Lahore, but, in order to open the route for an eventual advance on Delhi, practically depopulated the town and destroyed its defences. On their departure the Khokar tribes swarmed into whatever remained of the city and completely gutted it. Qaraqash, returning to collect his belongings, however, succeeded in driving them out, and, under Masud, the 'iqta' of Lahore is said to have been placed under Yuzbak-i-Tughril Khan². But the city remained deserted and had to be thoroughly rebuilt and repopulated after Balban's accession. From Masud's time the province became the 'frontier', the inner line corresponding roughly to the Ravi: the force that at last was sent out in response to Qaraqash's appeal was despatched towards Lahore "to guard the frontiers"³.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 392 sq.

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² Ibid, p. 262.

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³ Ibid, p. 195.

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In Sind also repercussions of the Mongol offensive seriously jeopardised Delhi's hold. Hasan Qarlugh, now desperately in need of a secure shelter, opened his attacks on Multan. The town was held by Kabir Khan, who had lately revolted against Masud and had forcibly seized Uch also⁴.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 399.

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Qarlugh in Sind.

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After many attempts Hasan succeeded, in 643/1245, in wresting Multan¹. Thus, with Uch in the possession of the rebel Kabir Khan, the whole of Sind was lost. A Mongol invasion, early next year, however, unexpectedly enabled Masud's government to recover a partial control of the province. Mangutah, who succeeded Bahadur Tair in the Afghanistan command, crossed the Indus to chase, as the sequel seems to show, Hasan Qarlugh out of Sind. The latter thereupon hastily left Multan and fled down the Panjnad to Sehwan and thence to lower Sind². The Mongols, guided by Jaspal Sihra, the chief of the Salt Range, then directed their attention to Uch which was evacuted by Kabir Khan. The townsmen put up a brave defence and even inflicted sharp reverses on the besiegers but, at the end, they found single-handed resistance difficult to continue and sent an appeal to Delhi for succour. The naib Ulugh Khan (Balban) at once siezed this opportunity and speedily marched at the head of a strong force to their assistance. By a flank movement along the northern bank of the Beas, he threatened to cut off the Mongols' line of retreat through the Upper Sind Sagar Doab³. Sensing this danger, and informed of the great number of the Delhi troops, the latter thereupon raised the siege and withdrew beyond the Indus leaving a large number of captives behind.

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¹ Ibid, pp. 235 and 287.

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² The Panjnad then flowed east of Multan; IGI, XVII, I, p. 35; JASB, 1892, p. 157, note; Raverty: trans, Tab. Nas. p. 1155, note 6.

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³ For details of this strategic move see Minhaj, p. 288-89 and p. 400: also for a detailed discussion of the route and, incidentally, of the old river beds of the Punjab rivers, see Raverty: The Mihran of Sind, JASB, 1892, pp. 162-66.

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Ulugh Khan found no opposition in occupying Uch and also the undefended Multan. Leaving both the towns under the charge of Kashlu Khan⁴, he moved his forces to the north in order to chastise the hill-tribes for their late depredations on Lahore and also for their assistance to the Mongols. The operation, however, had to be postponed because of the political move at Delhi designed to remove Masud from the throne, which required Ulugh Khan’s early return.

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⁴ Minhaj, p. 269.

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Ulugh Khan’s exertions could change but little the situation in the west. The following year witnessed another Mongol invasion led by the Nuin, Sali Bahadur, and once again Delhi suzerainty was negatived from over Sind. The invaders proceeded to Multan and by a close siege compelled the deputy governor, Changiz Khan, to open negotiations for peace. The saint Bahauddin Zakariya was sent to ask Shamsuddin Kurt, the vassal ruler of Herat who accompanied the Mongols on this occasion, to intercede for the besieged town and an idemnity of 100,000 dinars was offered¹. Agreeing to the terms, Sali raised the siege and marched on to Lahore whose governor had to purchase immunity by a similar contribution. He even agreed to be a tributary vassal of the Mongols². The political settlements following Mahmud’s accession probably kept Ulugh Khan busy at Delhi and no reinforcement could at once be sent to the affected regions. His expedition towards the end of the same year, although ostensibly planned to resume operations against the Rana Jaspal of the Salt Range, yet could not have been entirely unconnected with this Mongol invasion³. On reaching the Chinab, he pushed into the hills and is reported to have inflicted prodigious losses on the tribesmen, and to have plundered "as far as the neighbourhood of

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¹ Rauzatul-Jinnat: f. 192b. Minhaj skips over th incident; Cf. Raverty: trans. Tab. Nas. p. 677, note and p. 1201, note.

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² Rauzatul-Jinnat, idem. The governor of Lahore is called Kuret Khan, possibly identical with Kurez who was the deputy governor of Multan a few years later under Sher Khan; see Minhaj, p. 277.

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³ Minhaj, p. 209, however, states that it was meant to relieve Multan

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Lahore, a Mongol dependency.

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Nandanah”. If the reference to Nandanah meant an attempt to recover the fortress it must have proved unsuccessful, for, although the Delhi forces are said to have reached the Indus on this occasion, their operations were evidently confined to the districts east of and adjacent to the Jhelum. Beyond, were the Mongols who “from the ferries of the Jhelum beheld the Mussalman troops serving under Ulugh Khan and fear fell upon their hearts”¹. Inspite of this allegedly triumphant advance across the Chinab, the tract beyond the Ravi, for all practical purposes was lost and formed the Mongol sphere of influence. Shamsuddin’s successor, Ruknuddin Kurt of Herat, exercised sway over territories extending up to the Indus river and is even reported to have controlled the highways “as far as the frontiers of Delhi”². When Lahore is next mentioned in the pages of the Tabaqat-i-Nasiri under the year 652/1254, it is described as a Mongol dependency.

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¹ Ibid, 290.

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² Rauzatul-Jinnat, f. 100b.

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In Sind the set-back to Mahmud’s authority continued. Shortly after 647/1249 Hasan Qarlugh again appeared before the walls of Multan and Kashlu Khan hastened to its defence from Uch. In the siege operations the Qarlugh chief was killed but his forces succeeded in occupying the town³. Multan remained in possession of the Qarlughs, until, following Kashlu’s futile attempts to regain control, it was recovered, possibly under instructions from Delhi, by Sher Khan, the governor of Bhatinda⁴. On his trying to recapture it subsequently Kashlu was repulsed and in 648/1250 Sher Khan dispossessed him of Uch⁵ also. To celebrate the

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³ Minhaj, 270.

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⁴ See Ferishta, I, p. 125. Minhaj p. 277.

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⁵ Minhaj, pp. 214, 271.

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Sind, a highly insecure possession.

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and destroy the ‘infidels of Chin’.

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return of the districts to Delhi, a number of Mongol captives, sent by the deputy governor of Multan, were ceremoniously paraded in the capital¹. But Sind was to prove a highly insecure possession, for distance from Delhi and the proximity of the Mongols frequently strained the governors' loyalty. Between Sher Khan and the ‘maliks of the capital’ a great deal of estrangement is reported by the chronicler; during the year of Ulugh Khan’s banishment from the capital, even armed strife is said to have taken place between the two². Whether Sher’s subsequent defection was in any way connected with the general opposition to Rayhan’s ascendency in Mahmud’s government, the chronicle gives us no clear indication; it merely states that following a reverse which he suffered on the banks of the Indus, he betook himself to Turkestan and to the court of the Mongol emperor Mangu Khan at Qaraqoram³.

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¹ *Ibid*, p. 215; see also Haji Dabir, II, p. 715.

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² In Uch, Multan and Bhatinda which he held, he was replaced by Arslan Khan; this was obviously to exclude the Turkish chiefs of Ulugh Khan’s party; Sher Khan, it seems, had to be removed by force; the rsulting animously is alluded to by Minhaj, p. 271. The same allusion seems also to be intended on p.. 277, though the language, most probably corrupt here, suggests strife with Ulugh Khan.

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³ Minhaj, p. 217, 277; he is contradictory in his statements; see Raverty's notes, *op. cit.* p. 792; *TA*, I, p. 75, Budauni, I, p. 91.

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Unless he can be proved to have been carried a prisoner by the Mongols, Sher Khan’s action must be regarded as open treason against Delhi. Minhaj makes a mystery of his real motive, but a similar defection about the same time, of prince Jalaluddin Masud, brother of the reigning king, and his subsequent proceedings in India, make it tolerably clear⁴. Masud was appointed in 646/1248 to the provinces of Sambhal and Budaun, but for some unexplained reason, is stated to have

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⁴ Minhaj, p. 212; Raverty's trans, p. 684.

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Sher Khan and prince Masud.

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suddenly become alarmed and fled, through the Sirmur hills, to Lahore then, as shown above, under Mongol suzerainty. Ulugh Khan’s expedition in the same year “to the upper provinces as far as the waters of the Beas” must have had some connection with Masud’s flight¹. According to Wassaf², the latter then proceeded to the court of Mangu Khan, where his presence, along with Qutlugh Khan and Sunqar (Sherkhan Sunqar) is noticed by Binagiti also,—‘all the three having fled in fear of Ulugh Khan’. Obviously, some kind of active support against either Ulugh Khan or the hated Rayhan, then in possession of power, was sought from the Mongol sovereign; Masud probably added his own claim to his father’s kingdom. They were all received honourably befitting their ranks. It served the Mongol’s purpose to patronise Masud and to install him at least as a vassal ruler over their trans-Indus possessions. He was therefore sent back to Lahore with instructions to obtain the necessary help from Sali Bahadur. The latter accordingly escorted him through the Punjab. Masud was thus enabled to take possession of the districts extending from the Salt Range upto Lahore and including, it is added, Kujah and Sodharah⁴. From the mention of Hajner, beyond which the escorting Mongols expressed their inability to proceed⁵, it is possible to fix the boundary of Delhi at this time along the old bed of the Sutlej. It seems not improbable that their unwillingness to cross the frontier arose from the existence of some kind of truce with the Delhi government.

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¹ *Ibid*, p. 292.

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² Add. 23517, f. 254b.

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³ *Tarikh-i-Binagiti*, quoted by Raverty, p. 1225, note. The Christian missionary Rubrequious, then staying with Mangu, according to Raverty, noticed and even travelled back for some weeks with, "an Indian ambassador".

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⁴ Wassaf: *op. cit.* idem; Binagiti, f. 116b. Sudharah, or Sodhrah is probably the town of that name, on the ancient ford of the Chinab river, five miles above Wazirabad; Cunningham: *Reports*, XIV, p. 43.

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⁵ Elliot, III, p. 37, wondered if Hajner is not a corruption for Ajmer;

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Shortly after his return, while Sher Khan was still at the Mongol court, Masud is reported to have joined, "from the direction of Lahore", Ulugh Khan's party, assembled at Bhatinda for armed action against Rayhan¹, most probably on the proferred assurance of being raised to Mahmud's throne. After the latter's reconciliation with the party, the promise however, could not be implemented and the disappointed prince must have prepared for active hostility. This, at any rate, is the suggestion contained in Minhaj's statement, recording the settlement of the dispute, that "as a result of a party of amirs interposing between the two (the Sultan and his brother) ....after vows, pledges and stipulation, the latter presented himself and Lahore became his "iqta"²".

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¹ Minhaj, p. 300.

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² Ibid, p. 219; Raverty's trans. p. 700.

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It is unlikely that Masud felt constrained to repudiate his Mongol suzerains; Sher Khan, on his return "with honours" a little later, is stated to have joined him at Lahore. Their relations do not, however, appear to have been happy, a situation which Ulugh Khan must have exploited to win over his cousin and thus, by setting him against the Mongol protegee, to attempt the recovery of Lahore. Sher Khan, in any case, fell out with Masud who thereupon is reported to have "retired unsuccessful" leaving his family to be

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The Beas frontier.

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but there could be little doubt as to its identity with Janer, midway between Ludhiana and Firozpore, near the old bed of the Sutlej, on the road from Lahore to Kaithal; Cunningham: Reports, XIV, p. 67. Rashiduddin, in his Jamiut-twarikh, quoting obviously from al-Biruni who however, has Jajjaner (I, p. 206), wrote it as Hajner, and Cunningham noticed in some Mss., it was actually written Janer. Minhaj lists the place as one of Iltutmish's conquests; the printed text has Janjer, clearly a misreading for Hajner.

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captured by Sher¹. This accorded well with the plans of Mahmud’s government with whom Sher Khan was shortly after reconciled; he was even restorted to his former possession of Bhatinda from where Arslan Khan, who had repulsed Sher’s recent unauthorised attack on the fortress, was now transferred to Awadh².

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 277-78.

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² Ibid, pp. 266, 278.

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Masud’s elimination, however, did not mean an immediate extension of Delhi’s frontier on the west, for now the Beas, flowing in its own bed before the Sutlej joined it from the east³, is referred to as the frontier. In 655/1256 the Mewati rebellion could not be dealt with effectively because of the “Mongols having arrived to harass the frontiers of Delhi, namely, Sind, Lahore and the line of the river Beah”⁴.

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³ See JASB, 1886, p. 322, sq.; IA, 1932, pp. 168-69.

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⁴ Minhaj, 314; Raverty’s trans. p. 851.

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The control over Sind remained equally uncertain. Shortly after Sher Khan’s withdrawal from Sind, Uch and Multan were restored to Kashlu Khan. But within a year of his appointment he revolted, transferred his allegiance to Hulaku, and through the agency of Ruknuddin Kurt of Herat, even received a Mongol resident. After the failure of his attack in Delhi, made, as has been mentioned on a previous page, in alliance with Qutlugh Khan in 1257, he betook himself to Hulaku in Khurasan and presumably, sought armed assistance., The latter received him kindly but in accordance with the policy followed in assisting Jalaluddin Masud’s installation in the Punjab, did not countenance a full-scale attack on Delhi proper, and even issued strict orders to Sali Bhadur “not to allow a single Mongol horsemen to cross the Delhi border”⁵. Kashlu left his son as a hostage and returned with Sali Bahadur’s troops, obviously

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⁵ Ibid, p. 322.

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Mongol suzerainty over Sind.

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to protect him against a possible attack by Mahmud’s forces¹. On the receipt of the news of their crossing the Indus, Ulugh Khan made great military preparations but on learning that the Mongols had only destroyed the Multan fortifications and were not intending to cross the ‘frontier’, he took no further action and disbanded the specially recruited army².

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¹ Minhaj, p. 273.

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² Ibid, pp. 225, 310-11.

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This forbearance on the part of both Delhi and the Mongols suggests an understanding among them and some kind of agreement to respect each other’s territorial suzerainty. Delhi in any case tacitly acquiesced in the transference of the whole of Sind and western Punjab to the Mongols. Ulugh Khan was even constrained to take active steps to avoid hostility with their vassals. Ever since Sher Khan’s reappointment in Bhatinda he aimed at reacquiring Multan and Uch and was found to be conducting hostile operations against Kashlu Khan. As this was bound to involve Delhi in hostilities with the Mongols, Ulugh Khan, in 657/1258, had him transferred to Kol, Gwalior and the adjacent provinces to the east, “in order to avoid strife on the frontier”³. Malik Nusrat Khan, on whose prudence the government of Delhi could rely, was then placed in charge of the provinces of “Bhatinda, Sunam, Samana, Hajner, and Lakhwal (?) and the frontiers as far the ferries of the river Beah”⁴. The same year, an agent of Ulugh Khan, conveying his assent to the proposal of his son’s marriage with a daughter of Hasan Qarlugh’s son Nasiruddin, (who had finally settled down in Baniyan as a Mongol vassal,) on passing through Kashlu Khan’s territories was stopped by Mongol officers. He demanded to be sent to Hulaku in Khurasan, to whom he presented a friendly letter from Delhi containing, it may be presumed, assurances of non-aggression¹. Hulaku appreciated these gestures and next year, 658/1259, Minhaj records the arrival in Delhi of envoys from Hulaku who were received with great honour and ostentation². No resulting formal agreement, however, is recorded, but Hulaku, we are told, issued strict order to his commanding officers on this occasion to respect the Delhi frontier.

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³ Ibid, p. 278.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 274.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 320-23.

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² *Ibid*, pp. 317-319.

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At the close of Minhaj's account, therefore, Mahmud's government had practically reconciled itself to the loss of Sind and the greater portion of the Punjab beyond the Beas. Kashlu Khan is never heard of again; by what process Multan and Uch were recovered to appear, in Barani's account, as part of Balban's dominions, can only be guessed. Hulaku's death terminating the unwritten agreement may have been followed by a series of expeditions to which Isami seems vaguely to refer³. The reorganization of the Sind province which Balban placed under his eldest son, a few years after his accession, must have been one of his earliest achievements. The prince led almost annual expeditions across the border capturing Tatar horses and holding the Mongols in check, probably along the Indus waters.

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³ See p. 132 *supra*.

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In the Punjab, however, the Mongols proved difficult to dislodge. Barani, writing ninety five years later, speaks of Sher Khan as being in charge of Bhatinda, Dipalpur and Lahore at the time of Balban's accession; and until he was poisoned by the new king, he is described as having been like 'the walls of Gog and Magog to the Mongols' and also to have thoroughly curbed the lawless Jats, Khokars, Mandahirs, Bhattis and the Minas. In his enthusiasm for Sher Khan's marvellous feats, Barani even ascribes to him the conquest of Ghazni, a statement whose demonstrable inaccurancy should vitiate the rest of the account¹. In point of fact, these successes against the tribes must be ascribed to the period of Sher Khan's governorship of Bhatinda and the frontier provinces where he was replaced by Nusrat Khan in 1258. Barani's reference to his victories over the Mongols would presuppose his retransfer to the province after 1260 and the recovery of the entire area between the Beas and the Ravi. Dipalpur, at any rate, never figures again in the annals of Balban's reign except only as a frontier area; Lahore is mentioned only once, when, two years after his expedition into the Salt Range undertaken early in the reign, he proceeded thither to rebuild the town and appoint administrative officers². It neither formed part of the Sind viceroyalty, nor is any governor mentioned by name. When Sher Khan died, 'four or five years after Balban's accession and thirty years after Iltutmish's death'³, Barani mentions the appointment of Tamur Khan to the "frontier iqtas" of Sunam and Samana, the rest of Sher's possessions being given to other officers. "But," he adds "they were no match for the Mongols and they never achieved the success obtained by Sher Khan"⁴.

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¹ Barani, p. 65. The tribes mentioned are known to have inhabited northern Rajputana, from Bikaner to Bhatinda; see Cunningham; Reports, VI, p. 8 and XXIII, p. 223. Sher Khan is reported to have built the Bhatner fortress.

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² Barani, p. 60 and 70.

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³ See p. 169, supra.

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⁴ Minhaj, pp. 65-66.

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Even towards the end of Balban's reign his western boundary could not have extended much further than the Beas. In the same year in which prince Muhammud was appointed over Sind, Bughra Khan took over the province of Samana and Sunam, evidently in succession to Tamur Khan. He received special instructions to increase the number and efficiency of his troops so as to be constantly ready for the Mongols. This province remained the frontier for the rest of our period; the following passage from Barani’s history will make it abundantly clear: “Often in those days the Mongol horsemen used to cross the Beas and enter the territory (of Delhi). Balban used to despatch Bughra from Samana, Khan-i-Shahid (prince Muhammud) from Multan and Malik Bektars from Delhi (to fight them). They would then march upto the waters of the river Beas and expel the Mongols. (In this manner) they obtained several victories and as a result, the Mongols never dared approach the river any more”¹. Defence measures on this region were further improved when Balban decided to transfer Bughra to Lakhnauti. For greater facility of resistance, the province was converted into a military command under Malik Sunj, with smaller military districts placed under officers of proved ability. This Sunam-Samana command, detailed to hold the Beas line, was to work under the orders of the viceroy of Sind who, as the officer commanding the frontier force, was made responsible for the defence of the entire northwestern frontier².

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¹ Minhaj, p. 81; Elliot’s translation of the passage is faulty; 111, p. 112.

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² Ibid, p. 75.

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This co-ordination proved effective and the Mongols were held back. In the last year of Balban’s reign, they launched a large-scale attack under the leadership of Tamur Khan, the new commander of the Afghanistan forces. From the north they entered the Sind Sagar Doab and after plundering the Lahore and Dipalpur region advanced to within three farasangs from Multan¹. In the battle that followed, prince Muhammud's forces, after an initial success, were routed and the prince was killed, an event which forms the theme of one of Amir Khusrau's famous elegies². A large number of Muslims were slain and, in the poet's language "in Multan, in every house there was some dead to be wept for"³. The defeat, though disastrous for the number of casualties it entailed, was, however, nothing more than a local reverse, for the Mongols did not follow up their victory by an occupation of the area. The hold on Multan remained unaffected and Kaikhusaru found no difficulty in entering on his father's viceroyalty.

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¹ Barani, p. 109 and Ferishta, I, p. 82, state that the battle was fought between Lahore and Dipalpur but TM, p. 45, quoting in full Amir Hasan's description of the event, places the site three farasangs from Multan near a garden, on the Lahore waters (Ravi) adjoining (partly enclosed by) the great sheet of the waters of the Dihandah: The translator of the TA, adds in a note that Dihandah was the name of a river near Ajodhan, S.W. of Dipalpur; Trans. Tabaqat-i-Akbari, I, p. 114.

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² See Mirza: Life and Works of Amir Khusrau, pp. 56-59, for a translation of the poem which is quoted in full in Budauni: Muntakhabut-twarikh, I, p. 138.

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³ Mirza: op. cit. p. 63. The poet himself was taken captive but managed to escape.

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At the end of Balban's reign therefore, the boundary of Delhi in the Punjab remained, roughly, along the water-parting between the Ravi and Beas; as on his accession, most of the province formed the Mongol sphere of influence. In-spite of Kaiqubad's incompetence and the consequent laxity of vigilance, the defence system remained intact and refused to yield further advantage to the invaders. Ferishta⁴, quoting from two earlier sources which are no longer extant, states that following his forced removal from the throne, Kaikhusaru entered into correspondence with Tamur Khan the

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⁴ Tarikh, I, p. 84.

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Western frontier on Balban's death.

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Mongol general, and in the hope of obtaining armed assistance, even paid him a visit at Ghazni. The latter had realised the strength of Balban's frontier force and showed little enthusiasm over the proposal, and the prince, it is added, had to return disappointed. According to Amir Khusrau, Kaikhusrau's successor in Multan reported a victory over the Mongols within six months of Kaiqubad's accession¹. On the eve of the king's departure to meet his father in Awadh, news was brought of another Mongol invasion; Tamur Khan had again overrun the territory from Multan to Lahore and had laid waste "the whole country as far as Samana"². Malik Bektars was at once despatched at the head of thirty thousand troops, who easily routed them on the Ravi and took a great number of prisoners³. He is even said to have pursued the Mongols as far as the Salt Range⁴.

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¹ Amir Khusrau: Qiranus-Sadain, p. 48.

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² Ibid, p. 49. TM, p. 54.

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³ Amir Khusrau: op. cit., p. 50.

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⁴ TM, p. 54. Yahya adds that on the Delhi force reaching the limits of Lahore, the Mongols fled without battle and were then pursued as far as the foothills (Kohpyah) of 'Jammu'. 'Jud' undoubtedly must be the word meant here.

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These successes however, only emphasised the strength of Balban's frontier defence; they meant no appreciable advance into the trans-Ravi tract. The end of the Memeluke dynasty thus found the Mongols firmly established over the greater portion of the Punjab and also along the western bank of the lower Indus. As yet they had shown a consistant disinclination—either for military reasons or in view of a political truce—to attack Delhi proper. The Khalji dynasty was to find them get over this restraint and, from their base in the Punjab, launch determined assaults on the capital and, in a series of final all-out efforts, expend their fury.

Linked texts (4)

Tārīkh-i Firishta — Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Firishta 1606, Persian
Muntakhab al-tawārīkh — ʿAbd al-Qādir Badāʾūnī 1590, Persian
Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī — Minhāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī
Fawāʾid al-fuʾād — Amīr Ḥasan Sijzī Dihlavī