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Later Mughals v2.c18: Chapter XII. Nadir Shah's Invasion of India.

Later Mughals v2.c18

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Chapter XII. Nadir Shah's Invasion of India.

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[ By the Editor ]

Sec. 106.—Nadir Shah Captures Peshawar and Lahor.

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On 6th November 1738, the march towards India was resumed. The main army under Nadir Shah passed Jalalabad on the 12th and halted a mile beyond it. From this stage a vanguard of 12,000 picked cavalry proceeded ahead, followed by another body of 6,000 men to guard the royal tents. Then came the Centre and the Rear.

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Nasir Khan, the Mughal governor of Afghanistan, was, according to his usual custom, living at Peshawar when he heard of Nadir's conquest of Kabul and projected invasion of India. He assembled some 20,000 Afghans of the Khaibar and Peshawar districts and blocked the pass between Ali Masjid and Jamrud,—the last outpost being 12 miles west of Peshawar. His half-starved soldiery and hastily-raised tribal levies were in no condition to oppose the Persian veterans flushed with a hundred victories and led by a heaven-born general.

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In the afternoon of 14th November, after the asar prayer, Nadir Shah left his camp and baggage at Barikab (20 m. east of Jalalabad) under Nasr-ullah Mirza and made a rapid march with light kit by the Seh-chuba route. Though the path was steep and extremely rough, he covered fifty miles before eight o'clock next morning, and fell upon the Indian army in the Khaibar Pass most unexpectedly from the flank. One charge of the Persians scattered Nasir Khan's raw levies ; but he resisted with his regular troops for some hours ; in the end he and several other nobles were captured ;* the rest of his army fled, leaving their entire camp and property in the hands of the victors. [*Jahankusha* 341-342, Ali Hazin 290.]

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∗ Mahdi says that Nasir Khan drew up his troops in line of battle and resisted the Persians for some time. Siyar (i. 95) says that this general was captured wounded and then revealed his name and rank. Anandram (13) asserts that Nasir Kh. was surprised while asleep in bed, and fled in

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Three days after the victory, the Persian camp and rear-guard arrived there by the regular road. On 18th November Nadir entered Peshawar without opposition and occupied the governor's palace. On 12th December the advance was resumed. A strong column under Aqa Muhammad was sent ahead to raid and ravage the country and build a bridge over the Indus at Attock. During this onward march the other five rivers of the Panjab were crossed on foot, as they were all fordable in that season. The Chinab was crossed at Wazirabad about 60 m. n. w. of Lahor, (8th January, 1739).

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Zakariya Khan, the governor of Lahor, though unsupported by his master, had made what defensive arrangements he could with his own limited resources. Some five thousands of his men, under Qalandar Khan, held the fort of Kacha Mirza* at Yaminabad, 30 miles north of Lahor as an advanced post, while the governor himself stood with the bulk of his army (probably ten or twelve thousand men) ten miles south, at the Bridge of Shah Daula. The Persian vanguard† took the fort, killed Qalandar Khan, and drove his troops away. At the news of it, Zakariya Khan fell back on Lahor, and Nadir advanced to the Bridge of Shah Daula, 20 miles north of that city. From this place, Abdul Baqi Khan, the Persian Wazir, wrote to Zakariya Khan advising him to submit and thus avoid useless bloodshed. [*Jahankusha*, 343; Hanway, ii. 365-66; Anand-ram 16-20.]

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† Led by Nasir Kh., acc. to Hanway. Zakariya's total army is put by Ali Hazin at 14 or 15 thousand regular horse and his own militia.

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confusion with Chiragh Beg Khan and a few other attendants. Hanway (ii. 362) tells us that Nadir bought over the pass Afghans whom the Dihli Court had kept in arrears for 4 years, and thus he could cross the pass easily and unopposed. Nasir Khan, deserted by his raw levies at the unexpected approach of Nadir, entrenched himself near Peshawar with 7,000 men, and fought for some hours; but his lines were stormed and his men slain or captured. Ali Hazin (290) says that an immense crowd of the Afghans and of Nasir Kh.'s troops were cut to pieces in the valley.

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∗ There is a *Kot Mirzagan*, a little east of Yaminabad, in the *Indian Atlas*.

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The bank of the Ravi north of Lahor had been entrenched by Zakariya Khan and big pieces of artillery mounted there to oppose the Persian advance. On 10th January 1739, Nadir marched from the Bridge of Shah Daula, made a wide detour round Lahor, leaving the Mughal defences a long distance on his left, forded the river further downstream and encamped in the Shalimar garden, five miles east of the city. All that day Zakariya Khan succeeded in repulsing the attempts of the Persians to enter Lahor. The fighting was resumed next day (11th January), but early in the morning the governor's son with a handful of men left the field and made his way to Dihli by long marches. A large force of Indians under the zamindar of Adina-gar were coming to reinforce Zakariya Khan, when they were overtaken by the Persian skirmishers at Mulkpur, 12 miles from Lahor and dispersed, losing some captives.*

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Zakariya Khan found resistance vain. No aid could come from Dihli. So, in the afternoon he sent Kifayat Khan, his agent, to Nadir's camp to offer submission and beg for safety. Next day (12th January), he himself went to the victor, delivered the keys of the fort and presented some large elephants and rare commodities. Nadir treated him kindly, but fixed a contribution of 20 lakhs of Rupees on the city, part of which was paid out of the Government treasury and the balance assessed on the rich people. On the 14th, the Khan visited the Persian king a second time, paid the money and thus saved the city from the horrors of a sack.† He was received graciously, presented with a robe of honour, an Arab horse with a gold embroidered saddle and costly trappings, and jewelled sword and dagger, and retained in the governorship of Lahor. But his second son, Haiyat-ullah Khan, was kept in the Persian king's train at the head of 500 retainers, evidently as a hostage for his father's fidelity.

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∗ The *Jahankusha*, p. 344, is obscure, and the lithographed text is corrupt. Adina Beg was faujdar of Sultanpur, 66 m. s. e. of Lahor, at this time [Tilok Das's poem]. I do not know any Adina-gar. There is a Narowar 14 m. e. of Lahor, but no Mulkpur. Pur may be Haibatpur—Pati. The text of the *Jahankusha* may also mean that these Indian troops forced their way to Lahor.

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† Anandram 23; *Jahankusha* 344; Ali Hazin, 293. But Tilok Das says that Lahor was plundered after Nadir's entry into it, and that the Persian king, though appealed to, did nothing to restrain his soldiers. At Lahor the invaders first saw the wealth of a large Indian city.

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Nadir spent sixteen days at Lahor. Fakhr-ud-daulah, the dismissed governor of Kashmir, who had been living here in great poverty and neglect, was reappointed by Nadir to his post. Nasir Khan was released from captivity and restored to the viceroyalty of Kabul and Peshawar. A Persian force was detached to guard the ferries and seize the boats on the rivers of the Panjab and see that travellers to and from the Persian army during its stay in India could easily pass. Thus the flanks and Rear of the invaders were completely secured.

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At Lahor it was definitely learnt that Muhammad Shah had decided on war and was assembling his troops from all sides of his kingdom to oppose the Persians. Nadir then wrote a letter to the Emperor, saying that as he was a Turkoman and of the same race as the house of Timur, his intentions were entirely friendly to the Emperor of Dihli. He repeated his former assertion that he had crossed the Mughal frontier solely to punish the Afghans who were as much the enemies of India as of Persia, and he again complained that Muhammad Shah had treated all his three envoys in violation of friendship and diplomatic usage. Lastly, Nadir warned the Mughal Court of the consequences of going to war, though he held forth hopes of his pardon should the Indian army chiefs, after their defeat, submit to him. [Jahankusha, 345-346.]

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Nadir's invasion spread ruin and disorder throughout the Panjab. A cavalry screen was by his order sent ahead to make swift raids (turk-tazi) and plunder the cities and richer villages of the province and at the same time reconnoitre the country 30 or 40 miles in advance of his army. At Attock he had instructed his vanguard to plunder and ravage without mercy. "Cities like Wazirabad, Yaminabad, Gujarat &c. and big villages (each like half a city) were reduced to black ashes. All over the land property was plundered and women outraged." [Anandram, 16 and 21.] Tilok Das bears witness to the plunder of Lahor Jalandhar and evidently other towns on his route. But this was not the only misery of the province.

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A foreign invasion gives the wished-for opportunity to the lawless; oppressors and predatory classes, so long controlled by Government, raise their heads when they see the Government engaged in self-defence. Shaikh Ali Hazin, who was travelling from Lahor to Sarhind at this time, thus describes the state of things (p. 292): "The whole province was in complete revolution. Every person put forth his hand to plunder and pillage, and some thousands of robbers beset the public roads. ...... The whole of that time, whether on the road or at the [halting] stations, passed in fighting and contention."

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SEC. 107.—NADIR MARCHES FROM LAHOR TO KARNAL.

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Leaving Lahor on 26th January 1739, Nadir Shah reached Sarhind on 5th February. Here he learnt that Muhammad Shah was encamped with his army at Karnal, eighty-two miles from him. A force of 6,000 cavalry was sent ahead to reconnoitre the country up to the imperial camp and report on the enemy's strength and dispositions. Next day the main army reached Rajah Sarai [modern Rajpura], 16 miles south-east of Sarhind, and on the day following (7th February) Ambala, 13 miles further east. Here the Persian king left his harem and heavy baggage under a strong escort, while he himself marched out on the 8th with a mobile fighting force and light artillery carried on camels, and reached Shahabad, 17 miles east of Ambala, at the end of the day. This place was only 36 miles north of Karnal.

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Meantime the Persian scouts had reached the outskirts of the Mughal camp in the night between the 7th and the 8th. They had fallen upon the artillery, killed some men and taken some others captive, and finally retired to Sarai Azimabad,* 12 miles north of Karnal. The following night these captured Indians were produced before Nadir who questioned them about the Mughal army. The party at Azimabad was strengthened and warned to scout cautiously without precipitating a battle.

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∗ Azimabad is placed in the map accompanying Thorn's Memoir of the War and also Lett's Atlas about 3 miles north of Taraori and 10 miles south of Thanesar. The Chahar Gulshan gives it as the stage next to Thanesar on the Dihli-Lahor road. (India of Aurangzib).

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On the 10th Nadir resumed his march from Shahabad and reached Thanesar (13 m. south) that evening and Sarai Azimabad (10 m. further south) an hour and a half after sunrise on the 11th.

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This Sarai was a big stone and brick house, in which the faujdar and chief men of Ambala had taken refuge. But as soon as the Persian artillery began to play upon it, they cried quarter. Here full information was obtained about the imperial encampment at Karnal, which was only twelve miles off. We must now turn to the doings of Muhammad Shah and his advisers. [*Jahankusha* 346-348.]

Sec. 108.—Proceedings of the Imperial Court During Nadir's Invasion.

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The proceedings of the Dihli Court during Nadir's invasion form a tale of disgraceful inefficiency, amounting to imbecility. The news of the loss of Kabul (19th June 1738) must have reached Dihli in the first week of July, but for several months nothing was done to guard the frontiers. When Nadir crossed the Khaibar Pass (15th Nov.), his motive could no longer be mistaken, and yet for two months afterwards no energetic step was taken to meet a danger now manifest to all. True, on 2nd December 1738 the Emperor had formally given leave to his three highest nobles, Itimad-ud-daulah Qamar-ud-din Khan (the Wazir), Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf Jah (the Wakil or Regent) and Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran (the Amir-ul-umara and Bakhshi or the head of the military department), to set out against the invader, and one *kror* of Rupees had been granted to them for their expenses. They encamped outside Dihli in the Shalimar garden near Sarai Baoli and wasted full one month there.*

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The news of Nadir Shah having crossed the river at Attock must have reached Dihli on 10th January, 1739. Then the imperial army was urged to hurry on. The Court still hoped for much from the stand to be made by Zakariya Khan whom they had refused to reinforce. But when that poor governor proved no match for the world-conqueror, the cry of treachery was raised: the Hindustani party at Court falsely accused the Khan of having disloyally surrendered Lahor fort to the Persians, as he was a man from Khurasan like Nadir himself. [Shakir.]

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∗ Hanway (ii. 360) says that Khan Dauran stopped here owing to the Nizam's jealousy and discord. The Dihli Chronicle says that accountants for their armies were appointed as late as 14th and 20th December,—they took things so leisurely. No doubt this month (2-31 Dec.) was Ramzan or the month of fasting. But Aurangzeb had campaigned in Ramzan.

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At the first bruit of Nadir Shah's invasion, the imperial Court had discovered its incompetence and summoned the Nizam to give it counsel. He was the last survivor of the great age of Aurangzeb, a grey-haired veteran of many fights, a man rich in the experience of life, and an expert in diplomacy. But the Nizam was not given the supreme command and dictatorial authority which such a crisis required, nor did he enjoy the confidence of his master, whose ears were possessed by Khan Dauran and the Hindustani party. This Khan Dauran had a very high opinion of Rajput valour. He caused farmans to be sent summoning to the Emperor's aid his own protegés the Hindu Rajahs, especially Sawai Jai Singh. But Rajputana had been hopelessly alienated since Aurangzeb's time, and Jai Singh and other chieftains were now aiming at political salvation by declaring their independence and calling in the Mahrattas to help in dissolving the Empire. The Rajahs made excuses and delayed coming. Muhammad Shah even appealed to Baji Rao, as we learn from the following letter of the Peshwa to his general Pilaji Jadon:—

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"I shall march to Northern India by regular stages. The Persian sovereign Tahmasp Quli has come to conquer the world. To help Muhammad Shah I am sending the Malwa force under Malhar Rao Holkar, Ranuji Sindhia, and [Udaji] Puar. It is a glory to this monarchy [i.e., the Mahratta State] to help the Emperor of Dihli at such a time." [Raj. vi. No. 130.] But reliance on the Mahrattas, even if seriously contemplated, proved like leaning on a broken reed. No Dakhini force came to the Emperor's assistance at Karnal, or even in time to defend Dihli after the imperial defeat in the field. On the contrary, the Mahratta envoy in the Emperor's camp at Karnal was glad to make his escape by jungle paths on 25th February and seek safety by retreating as far south as Jaipur. Baji Rao himself, in his next letter, is found contemplating the defence of the Narmada line to bar the southward advance of Nadir. A Mahratta defence of Northern India was not to be thought of.

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The imperial forces passed the month of Ramzan [December 1738] outside Dihli in utter idleness. Then came the news of the Persians having crossed at Attock. So, at last, on 10th January 1739, the three nobles began to march towards Lahor, after urging the Emperor with one breath and extreme emphasis that he should join the army in person. On the 18th they reached Panipat, 55 miles north of Dihli.

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On that day (18th January), Muhammad Shah himself issued from Dihli, and on the 27th he reached Panipat, where his generals had been halting for nine days in expectation of his coming! Nadir's capture of Lahor had already been learnt by the Court, and it was found too late to save that city. So, it was decided to encamp and wait for the enemy at Karnal, where there was an abundance of water from Ali Mardan's canal and the extensive plain around supplied opportunities for manœuvring large bodies of cavalry. A halt was also necessary to enable Saadat Khan, the governor of Oudh, to join with his 30,000 horsemen. Reinforcements were also expected from Rajputana.

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The Emperor's advisers, particularly the Nizam, therefore, decided to entrench at Karnal instead of risking a battle. Under the direction of Sad-ud-din Khan, Mir Atash, the camp was enclosed with a mud-wall many miles in circuit. Along this line the guns were ranged side by side; soldiers were posted in the trenches to keep watch day and night. [Anandram, 25; Shakir 40; Chronicle; Siyar, i. 96; Bayan 32, Jauhar-i-samsam in Elliot viii. 74.]

Sec. 109.—The Rival Forces at Karnal; The Imperial Encampment.

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The Persian army at Karnal is estimated by Rustam Ali at 55,000 horse. This number is nearest the truth. We know from Mirza Mahdi's history that Nadir Shah had started from Persia with 80,000 troops, and though he had enlisted Afghans on the way and possibly also received drafts from home, he had to detach large forces to garrison the many conquered forts and guard the long line of communication in his rear, as well as to escort his eldest son on his return to Persia. Hanway says that Nadir reached Tilawri (i.e., Taraori near Azimabad) with 40,000 men; this was, clearly, exclusive of his vanguard and Rear. The entire Persian camp contained 160,000 souls, of whom one-third were servants, but these were all mounted and some of them completely armed, so that they could take part in plunder and the defence of their baggage. There were also more than 6,000 women, dressed with great coats (barani) of crimson cloth, like the men, and not to be distinguished from the latter at a distance. [Hanway, ii. 367.]

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The imperial army is put by Nadir's secretary at three hundred thousand 'renowned soldiers',* 2000 fighting elephants and 3000 pieces of artillery. Rustam Ali's figures are two hundred thousand horse, innumerable foot, 1500 elephants and many guns. [Elliot, viii. 60.] The numbers are still further exaggerated by the later Lakhnau historian Ghulam Ali, who gives five hundred thousand horse and foot, 8000 pieces of artillery of all calibres, and 11,000 tents. [Imad 24.] Anandram who was a secretary to the Wazir and accompanied the army to Panipat, puts the number as 50,000 horsemen besides the personal contingents of the three nobles. We know that the Nizam had brought with himself only 3000 men. So, the total Indian fighting force at Karnal could not have exceeded 75,000 men.

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But the number of non-combatants with it was excessive. Even at the end of the 18th century a modern European army operating in the same area carried nine non-combatants to one fighter. Lord Lake's camp contained three hundred thousand souls, out of whom only 30,000 were soldiers. As the Emperor himself with his harem and the luxurious grandees with their families were present, we shall not be wrong in estimating the population in the camp at Karnal at a million men.

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The circuit of the Indian camp is said by one authority to have been twelve miles. [Hanway, ii. 364.] But such an enormous length of wall could not be adequately defended against an active enemy with a very mobile cavalry and light artillery carried on camels. The result was that the Indian army from the very outset lost its mobility and aggressive power, and became helplessly beleaguered like the Mahratta army of Sadashiv Bhao in the town of Panipat 22 years later.

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∗ So many could not have been all 'renowned'! Hanway gives "nearly two hundred thousand, the great part of which was cavalry."

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The wrong strategy of the Emperor became evident as soon as the enemy came into touch and made the neighbourhood unsafe for small parties. The Indian army, owing to its vast number,—a million souls, besides animals,—could scarcely find space to encamp on. The Persian horsemen made attacks from all sides, and carried off corn grass and fuel, so that the price of grain rose enormously in the camp.* [Rustam Ali.] Within four days of the battle of Karnal this huge mass of men had eaten up all their store of food, and then after five days of fasting the entire army surrendered.

Sec. 110.—Nadir Comes into Touch with the Indian Army at Karnal, 12th February.

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The city of Karnal lies on the ancient highway from Dihli to Lahor, about 75 miles north of the Mughal capital, 20 miles north of Panipat, and nine miles south of Taraori, where so many historic battles for deciding the lordship of Northern India have been fought. Even Kurukshetra, the scene of the mythical warfare between the Pandavas and Kauravas, is only 22 miles north of it. Hence it was in the natural fitness of things that the decisive encounter between India and Persia took place at Karnal.

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The canal of Ali Mardan Khan skirts the eastern side of the town. Between this canal and the river Jamuna east of it, there is a plain five to seven miles in breadth, fit for cavalry manœuvres on a large scale. Muhammad Shah had formed his entrenched camp along the western bank of the canal, with the walled town of Karnal immediately south of him. Sarai Azimabad, the last station of the invaders, stands 12 miles north of Karnal and some ten miles west of the canal. The first eight miles of the ground between Azimabad and Karnal were then covered with a dense jungle* with a single narrow path crossing it. The four miles immediately north of Karnal were a level plain free from jungles. Muhammad Shah's front and right were, therefore, naturally protected by the jungle and the canal respectively. The disposition of the Indian army was—the Nizam in the Van facing the north or slightly north-west with artillery on two sides of him, the Wazir in the left or west, the Emperor in the centre, and Khan Dauran in the right or east. [Jahankusha 346, 348 ; Hanway, ii. 364.]

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∗ Ali Hazin, then at Dihli, says the same thing: "The Indians having gathered their artillery around, were closely hemmed in by their own field-pieces, and as a division of the Qizilbashes had also formed a ring on every side of them, all intercourse with the outside was closed to them, and dearth and famine fell on that army.........Muhammad Shah and his innumerable multitude, finding the Qizilbash cavalry spread around them on all sides, were afraid to stir, and although they saw themselves unable to maintain their position, they remained on the spot."

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Nadir Shah had arrived at Sarai Azimabad early in the morning of Sunday, 11th February, 1739. A force of 6,000 horsemen, composed of the best troops of Kurdistan, led by Haji Khan, divided into two bodies, had previously reconnoitred the country along both banks of the canal up to the very edge of the imperial camp. These scouts now reported on the state of the ground and produced prisoners captured outside the Mughal lines.

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Learning the exact dispositions of the imperial army and the condition of the ground in its environs, Nadir Shah decided to avoid a frontal attack and make a wide detour along the east of Karnal, so as to keep touch with the Jamuna and its abundant water supply on his left flank and also to cut the Mughal line of communication with Dihli by seizing the town of Panipat in the rear. His strategy was intended to force Muhammad Shah to come out of his lines and accept battle on a field chosen by Nadir or to remain helplessly shut up in Karnal while the Persians would march to Dihli unmolested. [*Jahankusha*, 348.] This plan succeeded admirably and much sooner than was expected.

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∗ This jungle continued till the early years of the 19th century. Thorn (Memoir of the War, p. 480) writes in 1805 about the tract from Dihli to Sonepat, "The whole of this country, which was formerly fertilized by a canal dug by Ali Mardan Khan, is now overgrown with jungle, and is generally in a very desolate state."

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Before sunrise on Monday 12th February, the Persian army marched out of Sarai Azimabad, crossed the canal some nine miles east of that town, and encamped on a level plain six miles north-east of Karnal, evidently a little north of Kunjpura and within sight of the Jamuna. While the main division halted here, Nadir with a small escort galloped to the neighbourhood of Muhammad Shah’s position which was indicated by his standards and flags and the concentration of artillery round it. After reconnoitring the enemy’s numbers and dispositions, he returned to his own tents.

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In the evening a report was brought to him that Saadat Khan, who was coming from Oudh to the aid of the Emperor with 30,000 cavalry artillery and stores, had reached Panipat. Immediately a division of the Persian army was told off to intercept him. A second and very strong division was detached that very night to threaten the eastern flank of the Mughal camp, though small bodies of skirmishers had been already hovering round it at a mile’s distance, cutting off stragglers. [*Jahankusha* 349.]

Sec. 111.—Karnal : Indians Issue for Combat.

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The fatal Tuesday, the 13th of February, 1739, dawned. The Persian army advanced from its position in three divisions along the plain between the canal and the Jamuna, a belt nearly five miles in breadth. Prince Nasr-ullah, in charge of the Centre, was ordered to march from the bank of the Jamuna* and take post north of Muhammad Shah’s camp, facing the Nizam’s division. Nadir Shah himself, at the head of the vanguard, first arrived opposite the Indian position on the canal, but learning on the way that Saadat Khan had joined the Emperor at midnight, he swerved aside to his left and pitched his camp on a spacious field, three miles east of the enemy and a mile or two west of the Jamuna. Here his son joined him with the Centre. In these movements the forenoon was passed, and the sun had begun to decline from the meridian, when suddenly the Indians were seen coming out of their lines to offer battle.

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∗ Mirza Mahdi says "from the northern side of the river Jamuna," which implies that the Prince's division had been thrown across the river the day before, in order to protect Nadir's left flank. Not likely.

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To understand how this happened it is necessary for us to know the events in the imperial camp. On receiving his master's appeal for aid, Saadat Khan had left his province of Oudh at the head of 20,000 horse, artillery and materials of war, and made successive marches for one month to reach Karnal. He had arrived at Dihli on 7th February and halted there for one day only. The 55 miles between Dihli and Panipat were covered in three days, and then on the 4th day, the 12th of February, he made a supreme effort and passed the remaining 20 miles, reaching Karnal at midnight with the main part of his army, while his camp and baggage slowly straggled behind, in a long line insufficiently guarded, one day's march behind, as was the usual thing with Indian armies.

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We have seen that on the 12th the Persian scouts had advanced 32 miles from their own camp and secured news of Saadat Khan's position at Panipat. But the intelligence department of the Indian army seems to have been hopelessly careless or inefficient. Saadat Khan had not found out the enemy's whereabouts, nor taken care to protect his baggage train against a possible attack. The Emperor himself at Karnal had been equally careless. As Ghulam Husain writes, "None in the imperial camp knew of the near arrival of Nadir from Lahor, till one day some men of the corn-dealers (banjaras) who had gone six or eight miles outside to bring in fodder, came back wounded and panic-striken after a sudden encounter with the Persian scouts, and the cry ran through the encampment 'Nadir has come! Nadir has come!' A mortal fear seized the army and the longing for Saadat Khan's arrival became keener." [i. 96.]

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About midnight, 12th February, Saadat Khan arrived near Karnal. He was welcomed a mile in advance by Khan Dauran and conducted within the lines. In the morning he waited on the Emperor. After the usual courtesies had been exchanged, a council of war was held in the imperial presence and plans of operations were being discussed, when news arrived that the Persian advanced skirmishers had fallen upon Saadat Khan's baggage and were carrying off 500 loaded camels. [Harcharan.]

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The Khan immediately took up his sword which he had laid down on the carpet before the Emperor, and asked for permission to depart and fight the Persians.* The Nizam counselled delay, urging that the Oudh soldiers were worn out by one month's incessant marching and required some days' rest to become fit again. Moreover, the sun had already begun to decline, and they would have only three hours of daylight left for fighting after reaching the field. Khan Dauran also pointed out that as the imperial troops had not been previously warned to be ready to fight that day, they would take a long time to assemble arm and form line of battle. It was (the two nobles urged) therefore better to fight the next day, when they would be able to advance in proper array with artillery and full preparations and to follow their accustomed tactics. One courtier even told Saadat Khan that 500 camels were nothing to a man like him, and that if he could defeat Nadir Shah,—as they hoped to do easily by a pitched battle the next day,—the entire Persian royal camp and its wealth would be their prey.

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But he would not listen to this advice and insisted on going out to the rescue of his camp-followers. Sending out some heralds to proclaim in his camp that all his soldiers should assemble and follow him, he hastened to the point of attack with only his escort and the troops within call, amounting to a thousand horse and a few hundred foot, but without any artillery. The Indian cavalryman's employment depended upon the life of his horse, which was his own property, and therefore he was most reluctant to risk it or fatigue it too much. After a month of fast riding, they refused to stir out that day, saying that as their master had gone to visit the Emperor he could not possibly have issued for battle. Still, nearly 4000 cavalry and 1000 infantry joined him in the end. [Bayan 34, Anandram 27.]

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∗ Harcharan says that the Emperor distrusted Saadat Khan for being a native of Persia and made him swear fidelity on the Quran in his presence. Siyar asserts that Saadat had taken leave of the Emperor and was waiting for his baggage in the quarters assigned to him (behind those of Khan Dauran) when he learnt of the attack. But Shakir Kh. (then in the camp) Abdul Karim and Harcharan say that he heard the report in the Emperor's darbar. The Dihli Chronicle says that the Emperor ordered Saadat to go out and attack the Persians. Anandram says that the Emperor overruled Khan Dauran's objection to fighting on that day. All other authorities hold that the Emperor agreed with the Nizam to defer the action till next day.

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As Saadat Khan came to the field, the Persian skirmishers pretended flight; he gave them chase and was thus lured away to a distance of two miles from his camp. He sent off couriers to the Emperor begging for reinforcements to complete the victory. Muhammad Shah took counsel of the Nizam, who replied that as the fight was in the east of the imperial camp, Khan Dauran who commanded the division nearest to that point, viz., the Right Wing, should go. Khan Dauran obeyed the order* and issued forth on an elephant without waiting to assemble his full contingent or drag out his artillery. As he was very popular with the soldiers, many of them, on hearing of his having issued to battle, armed and joined him of their own accord in successive drafts, till at last he had some 8,000 horse round him.

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Later in the afternoon, the Emperor himself marched out of his tents with the Wazir and stood with marshalled ranks by the side of the canal, but more as a distant spectator of the battle than as a participator in it. The delay in the starting of the different divisions, the absence of a common pre-arranged plan of battle and the lack of one supreme director of operations on the Indian side, led to their three divisions being separated from one another by more than a mile's interval. Saadat Khan formed the Right Wing which was in the extreme east and near the Jamuna, Khan Dauran's division now became the Centre and stood in the middle of the plain, while the Wazir and the Emperor formed the Left Wing bordering on the canal. Gradually, by the end of the day, when the successive groups of imperialists had marched up to the field, they formed a vast concourse of men, filling the wide plain from their own camp to the place of conflict, with two intervals as described above. The Left Wing (under the Emperor) had dragged out field artillery from behind the shelter of the trenches and had also pitched small tents in the plain for its chiefs; it did not however, engage the enemy at all.

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∗ Immediately (according to Bayan), or after some grumbling, according to Anandram.

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But this army was a mob; it lacked cohesion; it had no animating soul, no unity of command nor indeed any leading at all. The main portion of it stood stock-still, far away from the point of impact, without contributing anything to the struggle, and their vast number only caused a vaster butchery during the retreat. The extremely mobile enemy, led by the greatest living general in Asia, struck the Indian host or evaded it as they found most advantageous to them. Nadir Shah's genius neutralized the superiority in numbers and the desperate valour of many of the Indian soldiers.

Sec. 112.—Battle of Karnal, 13th February.

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When, a little after midday, Saadat Khan's army was seen to come forth to the plain, news of it was at once carried to Nadir. He was highly elated to hear of it. He had been wishing for such a day, as his Court historian remarks, and it had come unexpectedly soon. The Indian army had been drawn out of its strongly entrenched position, and at last a battle of manœuvres was possible in which the Persian general could show his genius.

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Nadir's arrangements were swiftly made, so as not to let the enemy escape through night-fall before his work of destruction was fully done. He left a division to guard his camp; his Centre was placed in charge of his son Nasr-ullah with many noted warriors and a powerful artillery. The vanguard was under his own command. Three thousand of his best troops were formed into three different bodies and placed in ambush. Two small bodies, each consisting of 500 swift horsemen, were sent against Saadat Khan and Khan Dauran in order to draw them further into the field.* Nadir himself, clad in full armour and wearing an ornamented helmet, mounted a fleet horse and marched into the fight with one thousand picked Turkish horsemen of his own clan (the Afshar), to direct the battle. The Persian army was entirely composed of cavalry, and their artillery consisted of jazair, i.e., long muskets or swivel-guns, seven or eight feet in length with a prong to rest on. In addition there were zamburaks or long swivels firing one or two pound balls; "each of these pieces, with its stock, was mounted on a camel, which lay down at command; and from the backs of these animals, trained to this exercise, they charged and fired these guns." [Jahankusha 351; Hanway, ii. 368,153.]

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In order to baffle the elephants, on which the Indians mostly relied for effect, he caused a number of platforms to be made and fixed each across two camels. On these platforms he laid naphtha and a mixture of combustibles with orders to set them on fire during the battle. The elephants were sure to flee away at the sight of the quickly approaching fire and put the Indian army behind them in disorder. [Hanway, ii. 369.]

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The Persian skirmishers had effectively screened their main position where Nadir had stationed 3000 of his best troops, dismounted his swivels and ranged them along the front with their barrels resting on prongs.

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The battle began a little after one o'clock in the afternoon, with a discharge of arrows on both sides. The Persian scouts pretended flight, turning back in their saddles and discharging their bows and muskets while galloping, in the manner of their Parthian ancestors. Saadat Khan gave chase and was thus drawn to the ambush three or four miles east of the imperial camp and the support of its artillery. Suddenly the cavalry screen drew aside in front and Saadat Khan's army was assailed by the discharge of many hundred swivel-guns at point-blank range. [Harcharan.] The bravest of his troopers who rode foremost fell. After standing this murderous fire for a short while, the Indian vanguard fled. [Anandram.] But Saadat Khan maintained his ground for some time longer, amidst a band of devoted followers, who fought to the death. But early in the evening he was forced out of the field, and the fight in the extreme Right of the Mughal army ceased.

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∗ Bayan differs: "Nadir's Right Wing was placed under Tahmasp Quli Jalair, Left under Fath Ali and Lutf Ali Afshar, Centre under Nasr-ullah, and the vanguard, consisting of 4,000 cavalry carrying jazair, under himself."

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The same fate overtook Khan Dauran's division in another part of the field (the Centre), though he made a longer stand. The rapid fire of the Persian swivel-guns carried death into his ranks, without a chance of reply. The masterly tactics of Nadir, aided by the recklessness and utter want of generalship of the Indian chiefs, had separated the three divisions of the imperial army from one another by more than a mile's interval, so that the soldiers of each division merely heard the sound of firing in the other parts of the field, but could learn nothing of the plight of their brethren, much less hasten to their aid. Khan Dauran could not co-operate with his friend Saadat Khan, however much he wished it. The Nizam, though the ablest general on the Indian side, was absolutely inert throughout the day and gave no help to Khan Dauran or Saadat Khan, probably because he hoped (as Abdul Karim suggests) to take the places of these rivals at Court if they perished. The Emperor was imbecile and stood like a wooden figure in the extreme Left. At the points of contact the Indians had a numerical inferiority and were far away from the aid of their heavy artillery. Their generals mounted on tall elephants became targets for the enemy's fire, while the nimble Persian horsemen hovered round beyond the reach of the weapons of the Indians.

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The murderous fire of Nadir's gunners continued for two hours. The Indians fought bravely, but gave up their lives as a vain sacrifice, because (in the words of Abdul Karim) "arrows cannot answer bullets." When the situation became absolutely hopeless and most of their officers had fallen, about 1000 of the bravest soldiers of Khan Dauran dismounted and, in the Indian fashion, tying the skirts of their long coats together fought on foot till they all died. [Bayan.] Khan Dauran himself had been mortally wounded in the face and fallen down unconscious on his howda. But a party of devoted retainers, under his steward Majlis Rai, surrounded his elephant and by desperate fighting brought him back to the camp, near sunset, but only to die. [Anandram.]

Sec. 113.—Defeat and Casualties of the Indians.

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Saadat Khan had been suffering for the last three months from a wound in the leg which prevented him from riding or walking, and he used to be carried about in a chair or on an elephant. Though he had received two wounds in this battle, he could have retired in safety but for an accident. His elephant was charged by the infuriated elephant of his nephew Nisar Muhammad Khan Sher Jang and driven into the Persian ranks, though his men stabbed it with sword and dagger to make it stop. Surrounded by enemies, Saadat Khan continued to shoot arrows from his seat, to resist capture, when a young Persian soldier of his native city of Naishabur boldly galloped up to his elephant, and addressing him by his familiar name, cried out, “Muhammad Amin! Are you mad? Whom are you fighting? On whom are you still relying?” Then driving his spear into the ground, and throwing the reins of his horse round it, he climbed up to Saadat Khan’s howda by the rope hanging down from it. The Khan now surrendered and was taken to Nadir’s camp. [Siyar, i. 97.]

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At the disappearance of these two leaders, the Indian army melted away, pursued by the Persian horsemen with heavy slaughter. The Emperor with his other nobles stood in battle order by the side of the canal (in the extreme west of the field) expecting an attack. But Nadir Shah kept his men back from assaulting such a strongly fortified position and its heavy artillery; he had a surer and easier means of compelling the Emperor’s submission. At sunset, Muhammad Shah retired to his camp, after having all that day done absolutely nothing to save his throne and his people.* The battle was over in less than three hours : it had commenced at the time of the zuhar prayer and ended at the asar prayer. [*Jahankusha* 351.]

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The slaughter in the Indian army was terrible. Nadir's Court historian gives the exaggerated figures of 100 chiefs and 30,000 common soldiers slain and a vast number taken prisoner. [*Jahankusha*, 353.] Hanway shortly afterwards heard in Persia of 17,000 Indians having been killed. Harcharan-das gives 20,000 and the Mahratta envoy in the imperial camp 10 to 12 thousand men in one account and seven to eight thousand in a later report. [*Brahmendra S. C. No. 41.*] Rustam Ali says that Khan Dauran alone lost 5,000 men, to which we must add at least 3000 for Saadat Khan's division, making a total of 8000 slain.

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Among the officers slain were Muzaffar Khan (a younger brother of Khan Dauran), three sons of Khan Dauran (Ali Hamid, Muhataram and another), Aslih Khan (the commander of the Emperor's bodyguard), Ali Ahmad Khan,† Shahdad Afghan, Yadgar Hasan Khan (Koka), Ashraf Khan, Itibar Khan, Aqil Beg Kambalposh (‘‘Blanket-wearer’’), Mir Kalu (son of Mir Mushrif) and Ratan Chand (son of the historian Khushhal Chand, who was office-assistant to the imperial Paymaster). Saadat Khan and his nephew Sher Jang, as well as Khwaja Ashura (a son of Khan Dauran) were captured alive.

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† So called by Mahdi and *Bayan*, but spelt as Hamid Ali in Anandram and the *Chronicle*. *Bayan* and Anandram call him Koka.

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The loss on the Persian side was 2500 slain and twice as many wounded, according to Hanway, who estimates the Indian casualties in slain as seven times the number of the Persians killed. This relative proportion seems to me to be nearest the truth, though the figures for both sides are exaggerated.‡

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∗ I reject the absurd story told in *Bayan* p.

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⁴¹ Hanway (ii. 369) says that in the night following the battle the Indian camp was so very thin that from the Emperor's own quarters to those of the Nizam, which was nearly two miles off, hardly any people were found.

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‡ The bed-ridden invalid Ali Hazin, who is eternally cursing India,

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The gains of the victor were immense. Of the elephants, field treasury, guns, baggage and stores of all kinds taken outside the entrenchment, nothing escaped. The booty was beyond count. As soon as Saadat Khan and Khan Dauran were seen to leave the field, their camps were plundered by their own followers and the miscellaneous rabble that accompanied Mughal armies. In a twinkle no trace of these two nobles' vast encampments, not even a tent, was left on their sites. [Shakir, Siyar i. 96.] When the half-dead body of Khan Dauran was brought back, his servants had to borrow a small poleless tent from elsewhere to shelter his head in.

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A great terror befell the Indian army. All night long the remaining soldiers stood on guard along the camp enclosure, armed and with their horses saddled, ready to meet the enemy's attack. [Shakir ; Chronicle.]

Sec. 114.—Causes of the Indian Defeat at Karnal.

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The defeat of the Indians at Karnal was due as much to their being outclassed in their weapons of war and method of fighting, as to their bad generalship.

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Nadir was not really a Persian, but a Turk of a tribe settled on the Persian soil for centuries past. His soldiers were Turks and other nomads (like the Kurds), and not Persians proper. He conversed with Muhammad Shah in Turkish. [Harcharan.] Indeed, the Persians themselves designated his army accurately by calling them Qizil-bashes or Red Caps,* from the scarlet broad-cloth caps worn by them,—the very caps which we see to-day on the heads of the Turks and their imitators in Egypt and India. The true Persians are an Aryan people, with a strong Semitic strain infused into them after the Muslim conquest, but they have little Turanian or Turkish racial admixture. Their language is not akin to Turkish, their manners are different from those of the Turks, and their

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its climate and people, says that the Persians lost only 3 killed and 20 wounded! Siyar and Ghulam Ali blindly copy these figures.

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∗ "The battle-field became a bed of poppies from the crowd of Qizilbash troops, all of whom wore Turk-like [?] caps of red sqarlat." [Anandram, 29.]

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religion is the opposite of that Sunnism of which Turkey and the Turks are the orthodox champions. The Persians proper (the same race as the Parsis now settled in India) are very intelligent, refined, proud, and possessed of a delicate sense of humour, but no soldiers. Nadir's troops, the Qizilbashes, were men of the same race and same method of warfare as the so-called Pathan and Mughal conquerors of India, namely Turks and Turkomans from Central Asia, capable of making long and rapid rides and bearing every privation on the way.

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In addition to this, Nadir's army contained a large proportion of men equipped with fire-arms, several thousands of jazair-chis or swivel-gunners. Their discipline was strict and their fire control was of the European type. They used to reserve their fire till the word of command and then deliver a volley. The effect on their enemy was as disconcerting as it was deadly. At Karnal, the Persian swivel-guns were planted in rows on the ground and kept ready for the Indians, who were lured there by the skirmishers, and then their rapid fire completely overthrew the enemy without giving them a chance to retaliate.

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The Indian cavalry prided itself on its swordsmanship and cultivated sword-play and fancy riding, as if war were a theatrical show. They fought with the sword only and felt a contempt for missile weapons and those who used them. In describing the battles with the Persians for the possession of Qandahar in the middle of the 17th century, the Dihli Court historian sneers at the Persian troopers for declining sword-combats with the cavaliers of Hindustan. He taunts the Persians with cowardice pretty nearly in the same tone as the English writers employed during the last war in speaking of the German soldiers, who did not stand up to receive the bayonet charges of the British infantry.

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The Indian Musalman and Rajput soldiers were very inefficient in the use of fire-arms. The only musketeers of any value in the Mughal army in the 17th century were the Hindus of Buxar, the Bundelas, the Karnatakis (of whom there were many in the service of the Bijapur Sultans, but none under the Later Mughals), and a small class of hunters called Bahelias usually recruited in the Allahabad province. The immense majority of the Indian soldiers did not fight with muskets, nor did they, as a rule, carry into the field portable light artillery of the *jazair* class in large numbers. The Indian ordnances were heavy cumbrous and of a more antiquated type than those of Persia and Turkey, and therefore the fire delivered by them was usually slow and inaccurate enough to be neglected. The Indian soldiers were trained to stake everything on the shock charge of heavy cavalry and hand to hand grapple. They had little mobility. Not so the Qizilbashes in the Persian service. Like their fellow-Turanians in Trans-oxiana or in the armies of the Usmanli Sultans of Constantinople, they formed the best cavalry in Asia,—hardy and fast horsemen, mounted on the fleetest and strongest breed of horses, and trained to the saddle from their childhood, as became a nomad race. They were also capital archers, accustomed to shoot from the saddle and fight while fleeing. They had a decisive advantage over the Indians, as men fighting with missiles have over those who can employ side-arms only.

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The superior mobility of Nadir's soldiers enabled them to assume the offensive from the very beginning. They out-manœuvred the Indians and drove them to the place most advantageous to the attacking party; they fought or deferred engagement as it suited them.

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The Indians' crowning folly was the employment of elephants in this modern age of muskets and comparatively long-range artillery carried on camels. Elephants had failed against mobile cavalry using missiles in the almost pre-historic times of Alexander the Great when fire-arms were unknown, and more recently against Babar's horsemen with their few slow and primitive guns. They were a sure engine of self-destruction when ranged against Nadir Shah in the year 1739.

Sec. 115.—Negotiations for Peace with Nadir Shah.

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When Nadir Shah returned to his camp from the battlefield Saadat Khan was brought before him, after the *isha* prayer (8 p.m.) The king spoke contemptuously of the Indian army as a 'host of beggars' and remarked of their general Khan Dauran that he knew how to die but not how to fight. [Imad.] He then inquired about the resources and intentions of the Emperor. Saadat Khan diplomatically replied "The Emperor's resources are vast. Only one of his nobles came out to fight to-day and has gone back on being accidentally wounded by a shot. But there are many other amirs and brave Rajahs with countless hosts still left." Nadir Shah remarked, "You are my fellow-countryman and fellow-believer. Advise me how I can get a ransom from your Emperor and go home to fight the Sultan of Turkey." Saadat Khan then advised him to summon the Nizam who was "the Key of the State of India" and settle peace terms through him.* Next day, 14th February, Nadir Shah sent a man with the Quran to Muhammad Shah to take an oath on it as to his good faith, and call the Nizam. Saadat Khan also wrote to the Emperor, advising him to send the Nizam and make peace.

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The Nizam was now the last of the great nobles at the side of the Emperor, and the latter was naturally alarmed at the thought of sending him away. He asked, "If any treachery is done to you, what steps should we take?" The Nizam replied, "The Quran is between us. If there is treachery, God will answer for it. Then your Majesty should retreat to Mandu or some other strong fort, summon Nasir Jang from the Dakhin with a strong force, and fight the Persians."

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