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History of the Qaraunah Turks in India c12: Chapter VII. The Institutions

History of the Qaraunah Turks in India c12

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English

Contents

Chapter VII. The Institutions

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The Muslim state in the middle ages was a theocracy. It was a state which aimed at serving the cause of God, and those who enlisted in its service were comrades united by the bond of a common faith and ideal. The Church exercised a powerful influence on the state. The orthodox legists called the 'Ulama expounded and interpreted the Holy law and upon their decisions often depended the weal or woe of millions of human beings conquered by the Muslim rulers. The ideal Muslim state according to them was that which waged war against the infidels, crushed their independence and reduced them to the status of Zimmis.¹ The repression of the Zimmi, the declaration of Jihād² for the extirpation of infidelity, the conversion of Dār-al-Harb into Dār-al-Islam³ was the highest service which a true Muslim could render to the cause of God. Those Muslim rulers whom the Muslim historians delight to honour were men who tried to approximate to this ideal according

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¹ In the Islamic system the non-Muslim subjects of Muslim states are called Ahl-uz-Zimmah or Zimmis, i.e., " people living under guarantees."

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² Jihād literally means an " effort or striving." It means a religious war with those who are unbelievers in the mission of Muhammad. It is an incumbent religious duty, established in the Qurān and in the traditions as a divine institution and enjoined especially for the purpose of advancing Islam or of repelling evil from Muslims. Hughes' Dictionary of Islam, p. 243.

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³ According to the Dictionary Ghiyas-al-Lughat Dār-al-Harb is a country belonging to infidels which has not been subdued by Islam. According to Qāmus, it is a country in which peace has not been proclaimed between Muslims and unbelievers. The Dār-al-Islam is the land of Islam. According to the Raddu'-i-Mukhtar (III, p. 391) it is a country in which the edicts of Islam are fully promulgated. Hughes' Dictionary of Islam, pp. 69-70.

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To turn Dār-al-Harb into Dār-al-Islam is the object of Jihād and theoretically the Muslim state is a state of constant warfare with the non-Muslim world. But practically that is now impossible. The rulers of Islāmic states are not in a position to keep up a constant warfare contra mundum. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 1913.

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to their lights and opportunities. The Hindus had to pay the Jeziyah⁴ and accept virtually the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water to their Muslim masters.

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⁴ The word Jeziyah is variously translated into English as ‘capitation tax and poll-tax’ and sometimes as a tax on Conscience. It is in reality a tax which is levied by a Muhammadan ruler upon subjects who are of a different faith, but to whom protection (aman) has been granted. It is sanctioned in the Qurān.

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The Prophet's ordinances regarding toleration and conversion by means of persuasion were seldom followed by mediaeval rulers. Here and there we come across a ruler with an original turn of mind who rejected the dogmas of the ‘Ulama and tried to shake off the ecclesiastical trammels, but the general trend of the policy of early Muslim governments in Hindustān was to humiliate the Hindus, for in the humiliation and abasement of the Zimmi consisted the glory of the faith.’ ‘Ala-al-Din asked Qazi Mughis of Biyanah as to the position of the Hindus in a Muslim state. The canonist replied:

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“ The Hindu is a *Khiraj-guzār* of the state. If the tax-collector (*muhassal*) chooses to spit into the mouth of a Hindu, his duty is to open his lips submissively so that he may do so. To show submission like this and to allow the muhassal to spit into his mouth is the

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“ Make war upon such of those to whom the scriptures have been given, as believe not God or in the last day, and forbid not that which God and his Apostles have forbidden, and who profess not the profession of truth, until they pay tribute out of their hands and be humbled.”

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According to the Hidāyah Jeziyah is of two kinds—that which is established voluntarily and that which is enforced, the usual rate is one *dinar* for every male person, females and children being exempt according to Abu Hanifah, but included by As-shafi. It should be imposed upon Jews, and Christians, and Magians, but it should not be accepted from the Arabian idolators or from apostates, who should be killed. But from the idolators of countries other than Arabia it may be accepted. It should not be levied upon monks, hermits, or paupers, or slaves. He who pays the Jeziyah and obeys the Muhammadan state is called a Zimmi. Hughes’, p. 248.

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When the Muslims conquered an infidel country they offered three alternatives to the vanquished people . . .

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(1) the reception of Islam;

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(2) the payment of Jeziyah;

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(3) death by the sword.

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Naturally a great many people who stuck to their beliefs and wished to save their lives paid the Jeziyah. The payment of the Jeziyah both according to the Hanafis and Shafis is accompanied by humiliation and degradation. The Jurists lay down in detail the procedure which is to be followed in making the payment. Aghnides, Muhammadan Theories of Finance, Vol. LXX, pp. 398–407 highest kind of obedience.⁵ God has commanded the abasement of the Hindus. Their degradation is especially enjoined by Islam, because they are the worst enemies of the Prophet. The Prophet has also enjoined their spoliation, plunder and enslavement. They should either be compelled to embrace Islam or they should be killed and their goods should be seized. None of our great jurists except Abu Hanifah has ordained the imposition of the Jeziyah. There is no alternative between Islam and death."

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⁵ Barani, Calcutta Text, p. 290. Barani uses the word خوني for spitting which Elliot (III, p. 184) translates into throwing dirt into the mouth.

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The Sultan did not accept the Qazi's advice, for he was too wise to play into the hands of the clericalists. Again when Maulana Shams-al-Din Turk, an exponent of Hadis came from Egypt to wait upon the Sultan, he heard at Multan that the august monarch whom he was going to visit did not observe the prescribed prayers. He decided to go back, but he sent to the Sultan a small tract written in Persian which, in addition to his reasons for the abandonment of his proposed visit, contained the following observations which clearly indicate the attitude of a typical mediaeval canonist towards the non-Muslim population. He wrote:—

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" I have heard of your two or three qualities which I have never seen in any religious king. One of these is that you have degraded the Hindus to such an extent that their wives and children beg their bread at the doors of Muslims. You are, in doing so, rendering a great service to religion. All your sins will be pardoned by reason of this single act of merit and if it be otherwise, hold my skirt on the day of judgment.⁶"

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⁶ Barani, p. 297.

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Such was the attitude of Muslim Churchmen in the 14th century towards the non-Muslims. Their advice was not literally followed by capable and sensible rulers who consulted their interests, but there was always a temptation before bigots and weak men to be swayed by their influence. Under Muhammad Tughluq the 'Ulama failed to gain the upper hand, but after his death the pendulum swung back in the opposite direction and his priest-ridden cousin adopted a policy which was fraught with disastrous consequences to the empire notwithstanding his comprehensive schemes of reform.

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Though theologians and divines were considered as oracles of the law by Muhammadan rulers, a great change came over the position of the *‘Ulama* towards the close of the thirteenth century. The insecurity of the state caused by the fear of internal revolts and repeated Mughal raids tended to increase the authority of the crown. The temporal power gradually eclipsed the ecclesiastical and under *‘Ala-al-Din Khilji* the state claimed omnipotence and the claim was forcibly expressed by him. *‘Ala-al-Din* symbolised the unity of his people and the position which he occupied was the result of the unprecedented achievements of the monarchy. The memorable words which he spoke to Qazi Mughis,—"I do not know whether this is lawful or unlawful: whatever I think to be for the good of the state, or suitable for the emergency, that I decree"—succinctly sum up the new political doctrine. The first two Tughluqs were strong men who refused to follow in every thing the doctors of the divine law. Muhammad was a man of great ability well-versed in philosophy and dialectics and his masterful nature resented all dictation and encroachment upon his authority. He seldom consulted the *‘Ulama* and never followed their advice.

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It was impossible for a man of his rational frame of mind to submit to the cramping influence of a narrow sectarianism, and his mind, liberalised by his wide culture and contact with men of different nationalities, refused to give assent to what was inconsistent with public interest and his own authority. He laid his hands freely upon the members of the clerical party when he found them guilty of sedition or embezzlement of public funds in utter disregard of the inviolability which they claimed. Ibn Batūtah has recorded several instances in which the members of this sacrosanct order were severely punished by the Sultan and in some cases the severest penalties were inflicted upon them. The Sultan's view was sound, for how could he govern his large empire with its conflicting interests according to the canon law? He saw clearly the mischief which the adoption of ecclesiastical dogmas was likely to cause to the administration. War with the *‘Ulama* was inevitable. They could not approve of the acts of an administration which placed them on a level with the unbelievers. Their lament finds clear expression in the *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi* of Zia Barani which is full of references to the ‘irreligious projects’ of the Sultan and the degradation of the priestly class brought about by his policy.

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Muhammad rejected with unrivalled courage the orthodox formulæ and freely associated with men who applied to religion the cold test of reason, and we see the bitterness aroused by his policy in the condemnation which Barani pours upon his advisers, whom he holds responsible for his alleged aberration from the right path. He deprived the priestly class of its long-enjoyed monopoly of the administration of justice, constituted himself into the Supreme Court of Appeal and freely revised, altered and rescinded the decisions of Qazis and muftis. He imposed a strict supervision over the administration of waqf properties and cashiered the mutawalis, who were mostly Shaikhs and Maulvis for their malpractices. Taxation was not to be restricted to the four taxes—Khirāj, Zakāt, Jeziyah and Khams, because the needs of the state were many and varied and could not be met unless more money came into the treasury.⁷ The share of the faithful in the booty captured in war was after ‘Ala-al-Din’s fashion restricted to one-fifth instead of four-fifths on which the clericalists laid much stress.⁸ The ordinary law of the land from which the priestly class had so far been exempt was rigorously applied to them and the new government insisted on the principle of efficiency and justice. Such treatment was bound to give offence to the class which considered itself the repository of all religious and civil law.

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Hence the malignant conspiracy which was formed by the ‘Ulama to traduce and disparage the Sultan. By the force of his personality and by means of drastic measures he maintained to the last day of his life the non-sectarian character of his government.

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⁷ The Bankipore MS. of the Sirat mentions a large number of taxes which were abolished by Firuz who reduced them to the prescribed number. Firuz in his Fatuḥāt also makes mention of them. Fatuḥāt, Elliot, III, p. 377.

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⁸ Fatuḥāt, Elliot, III, p. 377.

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Nothing illustrates the waning influence of the ‘Ulama more than the absence of religious persecution and conversion of non-Muslims by means of official agency during Muhammad’s reign. No contemporary writer speaks of frequent forced conversions of Hindus or the prohibition of worship in accordance with the tenets of their faith. The theocratic activities of the state were restricted within narrow bounds. The Sultan confined himself to the regulation of the religious life of the Muslims alone; he enforced the daily prayers and punished those who neglected them.⁹ Yet Barani to whom the Sultan's liberalism was nothing short of a disaster to Islam writes that he was profuse in shedding the blood of innocent believers.¹⁰ Muhammad's reign represents a struggle between philosophical rationalism and ecclesiastical dogmatism. For a triumphant vindication of the former, the age was not yet ripe and the entire policy of the Sultan was reversed after his death. Firuz's sectarianism was the orthodox answer to his predecessor's liberalism.

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⁹ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 286. The author of the Masālik agrees with Ibn Batūṭah. Paris, MS.

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¹⁰ Barani, Calcutta Text, p. 460.

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The empire was organised on a feudal basis with the Sultan as the apex of the whole system. He was the fountain of all authority and justice and his government was of an autocratic character. The institutions of government were well-organised; they were based upon the Persian model and their proper working was ensured by the ability and energy of the autocrat. The Sultan, though he enjoyed unlimited power, had a small council which advised him in important matters. Barani pours his cold scorn upon the members of this council whom he holds responsible for the unorthodox acts of his reign. They were¹¹ :—

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¹¹ Barani, Calcutta Text, p. 472. Ibn Batūtah also mentions some of these names. Ill, p. 231

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(1) Yusuf Bughra.

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(2) Khalil, son of the Sardawātdār or keeper of the king's ink and pen.

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(3) Zainbandah Mukhlis-al-Mulk.

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(4) Muhammad Najīb.

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(5) Shaikh-zādah Nahāwandi.

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(6) Qaran-fal, the Executioner.

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(7) Aibā.

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(8) Majīr Abu Rajā.

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(9) The son of the Qazi of Gujarat.

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(10) The three sons of Rukn-al-Din of Thanesar.

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Besides these close associates, the Sultan surrounded himself with nobles whom he appointed to high offices. Soon after the completion of the preliminary political settlement of the empire, he realised the incompetence of the native nobility and began to show preference for foreigners who came from Khorasan, 'Iraq, Persia, Bokhara, Samarqand and other countries beyond the Hindukush. These men were invested with important commands. Though the Sultan was guided by the sole consideration of efficiency, his policy produced disastrous consequences. He failed to hold the scales even between the two sets of nobles—the foreigners and the Hindustanis. Ibn Batūtah tells us that the revolt of 'Ain-al-Mulk was a duel between the Hindustanis and the foreigners.¹² The experiment of creating an aristocracy of foreigners depending upon the Sultan's bounty for subsistence failed, as it was bound to fail, and the greatest troubles of his reign were due to the disloyal proceedings of these amirs in some of the important provinces of the empire.

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¹² Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 344.

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The whole territory included in the dominions of the Sultan was parcelled out into provinces, each of which was placed under a viceroy (naib Wazir) who was answerable to the Sultan for his actions. There was no line of demarcation between the civil and the military departments. Neither the jurisdictions of these two branches of the administration nor the duties of officers were clearly defined and the military functionary was also invested with civil duties like the amirs sadah who were captains of one hundred with power to manage the collections of revenue in the provinces. The author of the Masālik, basing his statement on the information of Shaikh Mubarak, who was acquainted with the affairs of the Sultan of Dihli mentions four principal grades of officers whose duties seem to have been primarily of a military character. His account is not exhaustive. It leaves out a number of functionaries who were entrusted with important business. But it gives us some idea of the basis of organisation of the civil and military departments. He mentions four principal grades of officers without drawing any distinction between the civil and the military branches of the administration. These were the Khans, the maliks, the amirs, the Isfahsālārs or Sipahsālārs and the Jund. The Sultan was assisted by a nāib who was chosen from among the Khans and who bore the title of Amriyah and held a Jagir as large as 'Iraq. He was as it were, the alter ego of the Sultan and acted for him during his absence. He had also a Wazir or chief minister who enjoyed a similar Jagir and who was assisted by four deputies called Shiqdars¹³ who received from twenty thousand to forty thousand tankahs per annum. It appears that the author of the Masālik has made a mistake in calling these officers Shiqdars, for these were sometimes governors of provinces and sometimes officers responsible for the collection of revenue. The minister had four Dabirs or secretaries, each of whom was allowed a Jagir for his maintenance. Each of the Dabirs had a staff of three hundred clerks and the lowest pay of these officers was ten thousand tankahs a year. The Dabirs possessed large powers; all ambassadors, travellers, men of letters, and poets, both native and foreign, were under them. Some of them held Jagirs and some were granted both Jagir and salary. It is difficult to vouch for the accuracy of the figures given by the author of the Masālik but there is no doubt that the Sultan maintained large and costly establishments and a confirmation of this view is to be found in the pages of Ibn Batūtah. From the writings of Barani, Ibn Batūtah and other contemporary and later writers we learn that the number of officers was formidably large and that the various departments of the state worked with regularity and efficiency under the personal supervision of the autocrat. The principal officers of the state were:—

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¹³ The Arabic text of the Masālik has only the word Shiq but Shiq is literally a territorial sub-division for administrative convenience.

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(1) The Nāib Sultan or the King's vicegerent whose duty was to act in the King's place during his absence. When Sultan Tughluq Shah marched towards Lakhnauti towards the close of his reign he appointed Prince Juna (Muhammad Tughluq) his nāib to look after the affairs of the capital.¹⁴ Khan Jahan Maqbūl held this office under Firuz. The Provincial governor was also called a nāib.

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¹⁴ Barani, Calcutta Text, p. 451.

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(2) The Qazi-al-Quzāt or Lord Chief Justice.¹⁵

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¹⁵ According to the author of the Masālik this officer held a Jagir of ten villages which yielded a revenue of six thousand tankahs. Paris MS.

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(3) The Amir Kohi or Director of Agriculture.¹⁶ (4) The Mīrdād or Amīrdād, an officer whose duty was to present before the Qazi any big amir or noble against whom a complaint was instituted.¹⁷

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¹⁶ This was an office to manage the department of agriculture which was organised mainly with a view to mitigate the severity of famine. Barani, Calcutta Text, p. 498. The Lucknow text of Firishta has Amir Koī (p. 140). The word is variously spelt in various histories. In the Arabic History of Gujarat it is Amir Karohi. Briggs makes it Amurgo which is entirely wrong.

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¹⁷ Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 400.

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(5) The Barbak or Grand Usher. This office was held by the Sultan's cousin Firuz.

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(6) The Mir 'Arz or Lord of Petitions.

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(7) The 'Ariz-i-Mamālik or Muster-master, an officer who reviewed the troops.

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(8) The Mustaufi or Auditor General of Imperial finances. This officer had important duties to perform. According to Shams-i-Siraj 'Afif, the Mustaufi in Firuz's time superintended the accounts of Diwan-i-Risālah or the office of correspondence and the Diwan-i-Bandgān or the office of slaves.¹⁸

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¹⁸ 'Afif, Calcutta Text, p. 464.

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(9) The Bakhshi-i-Fauj or paymaster of the forces.

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(10) The Mir 'Imārat or Chief Engineer of the State.

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(11) The Sharaf-al-Mulk or Financial Secretary.¹⁹

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¹⁹ The Sultan appointed Amir Bakht to this office. He was to supervise the work of the Diwan-i-Khānah and was permitted to occupy the same masnad with the Wazir. His salary was forty thousand dinars a year and a Jagir yielding an equal amount of revenue. Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 401.

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(12) The Vakil-i-dar or keeper of the keys of the palace-gates. This was an important office in the middle ages.

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(13) The Diwan-i-Ashrāf or Accountant General.

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(14) The Amir-i-Ākhur or Superintendent of Stables.

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(15) The Amir-i-Shikār or Lord of the Hunt.

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(16) The Hājib or Lord Chamberlain.

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(17) The Amir-i-Filān or Lord of Elephants.

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(18) The Akhbār Nawis or Recorders of news who wrote a full account of the foreigners who visited India. They entered in their registers full particulars about them—their identity, their dress and the number of their retainers.

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(19) The Shaikh-al-Islam or Principal Religious officer of the realm. All mendicants and darveshes were under him.

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To these officers along with several others were assigned the various departments of the state. They may be roughly classified as follows :—

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The officers of the revenue department :—

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(1) The Shiqdār.²⁰

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²⁰ The Shiqs were sub-divisions of a province for purposes of revenue. We read in Barani that when the Sultan returned from Saragdwāri, he divided the Mahratta country into four Shiqs. The office of Shiqdar is mentioned in the Āin-i-Akbari. He was an officer appointed to collect the revenue from a certain division of land under the government. It was sometimes applied to the chief financial officer of a province or to a viceroy in his financial capacity.

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(2) The ‘Āmil.

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(3) The Muhassal.

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(4) The Khūt.

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(5) The Muqaddam.

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(6) The Chowdhari.

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(7) The Patwārī or village accountant.

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(8) The Khazānchi or Treasurer.

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(9) The Diwan-i-Mustakhrij,²¹ an officer who realised arrears from ‘Āmils.

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²¹ Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 259.

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(10) The Faujdar is mentioned as a revenue officer who exercised magisterial jurisdiction also.

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The officers of the court and the royal household were the following :—

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(1) The Dādbak.

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(2) The Bārbak or Grand Usher, an officer who has already been noticed.

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(3) The nāib Bārbak.

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(4) The Hājib-al-Hujjāb or Lord of the Hājibs.

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(5) The Hājib or Lord Chamberlain.

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(6) The Sardawātdār, an officer who kept the king's pen and paper.

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(7) The Sarjāmdār, an officer whose duty was to wave a chowri over the king's head to ward off the flies. Ibn Batūtah says this office was held by Malik Qabūlah.

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The traveller was informed by his Secretary ‘Ala-al-Din ibn Sharsi of Egypt that he held a Jagir and spent 36 lakhs a year on his troops and household establishment.²²

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²² Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 231. This office is frequently mentioned by Barani. Malik Qabūlah is described as Sarjāmdār. Malik Kabir also held this post. The *Masālik* says he was the principal keeper of the Sultan’s wardrobe. Paris MS.

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(8) The Sharbdār or keeper of the royal drinks.

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(9) The Muhardār or keeper of the royal seals.

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(10) The nāib Hājib or Deputy Lord Chamberlain.

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(11) The Kharitadār, an officer who carried the Sultan’s letter-bag. This office was held once by Ibrahim, son of Jalal-al-Din Ahsan Shah, governor of Ma‘bar. Elliot translates it into purse-bearer.²³

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²³ Elliot, III, p. 243.

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(12) The Shahnah-i-bārgāh or Superintendent of the royal Court. According to the *Sirat-i-Firuz Shahi* and Ibn Batūtah the Sultan’s slave Taghi held this office for some time.²⁴

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²⁴ Sirat, Bankipore MS. Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 236.

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(13) The Mutsaddis—these were the clerks who regulated entrance to the royal palace. They sat at the gate of the palace and did not allow any one to enter unless his name was entered in a register. In addition to the name they recorded the number of his attendants and the date and time of his arrival. The king himself inspected these registers. If any incidents occurred at the gate, they were also recorded. These registers were laid before the Sultan by a member of the royal family.²⁵

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²⁵ Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 219.

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(14) The Chāshnigir, an officer who supervised the food of the Sultan and probably tasted it before it was served on the royal table.²⁶ (15) The Naqīb-al-Nuqbah, an officer who held an embroidered staff in his hand and regulated entrance into the palace.

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²⁶ Barani also mentions this office. The Bankipore MS. has Chāshnagir

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(16) The Pardadār, an officer who was chief of the durbāns (gatekeepers). Ibn Batūṭah says this post was held by big amirs.²⁷

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²⁷ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 280.

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(17) The Khaṭīb-al-Khuṭbah or chief of the Khaṭībs, *i.e.*, the head of those who read the Khuṭbah or prayer for the sovereign.²⁸

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²⁸ Khaṭīb is a Turkish word which means an officiating priest or clerk who pronounces the Khuṭbah or public prayer for the sovereign. Redhouse, Turkish Dictionary, p. 553.

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(18) The Rasūldār or Ḥājib-al-Irsāl, an officer who probably introduced persons to the Ḥājib.²⁹

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²⁹ Ibn Batūṭah speaks of a certain occupant of this office who was given a salary of 24 thousand dinars a year and a Jagir of equal value. Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 402.

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(19) The Bashmaqdār, or the Sandal-bearer of the king. The author of the *Masālik* says, the Sultan had 1,000 bashmaqdārs who were all armed and who marched by his side on foot.³⁰

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³⁰ Masālik, Paris MS. Quatrèmere, Notices des Manuscrits, XIII, p. 181.

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(20) The Mir Majlis³¹ or the chief officer of the Durbār.

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³¹ According to Ibn Batūṭah this office was once held by ‘Imād-al-Mulk Sartez, III, p. 295.

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Besides these there were several others among whom may be mentioned the *Nāzir-i-fal-Huḅs*,³² an officer who looked after the management of *Sadqah*, the Nāzir of royal gardens,³³ the *Khazāin-i-Khās* or the keeper of the royal jewellery³⁴ and *Shahnah-i-bāzār*.

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³² Huḅs means *Sadqah* or charity. Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 295.

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³³ When the Sultan pardoned ‘Ain-al-Mulk after his revolt he appointed him Nāzir of the royal gardens. Ibn Batūṭah, III. p. 357.

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³⁴ Barani, Bankipore MS. F. 34

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The officers of the departments of Justice and Police were the following:—

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(1) The Qazi-al-Quzāt or Sadr Jahan.

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(2) The Qazi or Judge who pronounced judgment in cases.
(3) The Mufti, an officer who expounded the law.
(4) The Mirdād, an officer who assisted the Qazi in bringing to trial amirs and nobles.
(5) The nāib Qazi.
(6) Mufti Diwān-i-Siyāsat, an officer who superintended the execution of sentences.
(7) The Kotwāl or minister of Police and Public prosecutor.
(8) The Muhatsib,³⁵ an officer of Police who controlled the market and acted as the censor of public morals. He kept himself informed of everything that took place at the capital.
(9) The Hākim or Magistrate.
(10) The Manhis or spies who mixed with the army and also with the civil population and reported everything to the Sultan.

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³⁵ This useful office was created by Khalifah Mahdi and has existed ever since in Islamic countries. The Muhatsib went through the city accompanied by a detachment of his subordinates to see that the police orders were duly carried out. He examined the weights and measures and suppressed nuisances. According to the Masālik the Muhatsib held a village in Jagir which yielded an income of eight thousand tankahs. Paris MS. The more probable figure seems to be eight hundred given by Elliot (III, p. 579). The office of the Muhatsib or prefect of police existed under the Khalifahs, and its functions are described fully by Kremer in his Orient under the Caliphs (p. 292).

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No post was hereditary in the state. Efficiency was in the Sultan's eyes the sole test of public employment. To achieve this object he disregarded the claims of the native nobility in favour of foreigners of merit from the countries of western Asia. There was a dearth of capable officials in Hindustan. A great many of the statesmen, ministers and generals of 'Ala-al-Din's time had died in the ordinary course, and during the reigns of Qutb-al-Din Mubarak and Khusrau nothing was done to encourage talent. The veteran Tughluq Shah had found a few officers of his own calibre, but even he felt the want of capable men. Muhammad Tughluq on his accession found the empire understaffed and turned to the upper classes and the foreigners for help. When these failed him, he

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The Imperial Service.

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revised his policy and raised to positions of eminence men of humble origin.³⁶ Barani's bitter complaint against these men is based on personal reasons. The Sultan had defied the 'Ulama and challenged their claim to be sacrosanct; he had ceased to repose confidence in the classes from which recruits to the service of the state had been obtained in the past. In view of these circumstances the contemporary chronicler's sweeping condemnation loses much of its force. It is stated by him and he is supported by all later writers, who have copied him, that when revolts broke out in the empire, the Sultan appointed to high offices men of low origin in the hope that they would serve him loyally and carry out his orders unhesitatingly. All MSS. of Barani's *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi* mention the names of men of low origin who were elevated to high office by the Sultan.³⁷ The chronicler falls foul of the Sultan for appointing Maqbūl, a slave of Ahmad Ayaz, the Khwajah Jahan, deputy Wazir of Gujarat, a position of great trust and responsibility. He is astonished at this conduct of the Sultan whom he deemed in ability and wisdom the equal of Jamshed and Kai Khusrau, the famous kings of Persia. He concludes his account by saying that the results of this policy soon became manifest in the dissatisfaction of the native amirs and the rebellions of the 'centurions.' Barani's exaggerated tirade misrepresents the real state of affairs. The Sultan may have sometimes erred in the selection of some of his officers; he may have been deceived by appearances as persons in his position and circumstances are likely to be, but to characterise this policy as a piece of unsurpassed folly is a travesty of facts. The credit which we might have otherwise attached to Barani's statement is diminished by his condemnation of Maqbūl's appointment to high office, for he was a man of great abilities who afterwards rose to eminence

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³⁶ Barani, Calcutta Text, p. 505.

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³⁷ The names are written with slight variations in the various MSS. Bankipore MS. f. 251 b. India Office MS. f. 317 b. Calcutta Text, p. 505.

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Barani says the Sultan appointed to high offices men of ignoble birth. He raised to eminence the son of a fiddler and assigned to him the fiefs of Gujarat, Multan and Badaon. Several other men of low origin were similarly elevated among whom were 'Aziz Khummār, Firuz, a barber, Manakā or Manikalā, a cook, Mas'ūd, a vintner, and Ladhā, a gardener. Other intimate associates of the Sultan mentioned by Barani are Shaikh Bāboo, son of a Paik (foot soldier) and Pirā, a gardener.

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under Firuz as is proved by the testimony of Shams-i-Siraj ‘Afif and ‘Ain-al-Mulk Multani, his great rival and opponent.³⁸

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³⁸ ‘Afif, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi, Biblioth, Ind., pp. 394—428. Insha-i-Mahru, Asiatic Society of Bengal MS.

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In reorganising the services of the state the Sultan made a marked departure from the accepted policy. The introduction of the alien element in the state to such a large extent was induced by two reasons—the competence of the foreigners to manage properly the affairs of his growing empire and the desire of the Sultan to make himself famous all over the Muslim world. The former was the stronger motive. When a foreigner came into the country, he had to enter into a covenant with the Sultan that he would join his service, otherwise he was not allowed to proceed on his journey. This agreement was attested by the Qazi and signed by the person concerned.³⁹ The highest offices in the state were thrown open to the foreigners. At times the Sultan carried his partiality towards the foreigners too far and showed a lack of discrimination, as is evidenced by the appointment of Ibn Batutah as the Qazi of Dihli. The traveller protested that he was not competent to administer justice according to the Hanafi law of which he was ignorant, but the Sultan overruled his objections and appointed Baha-al-Din Multani and Kamal-al-Din Bijnori to assist him in the performance of his duties.⁴⁰

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³⁹ Ibn Batutah, III, pp. 121-22. Barani laments this change of policy and with characteristic exaggeration dwells upon the favours shown to the foreigners by the Sultan. Calcutta Text, p. 499.

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⁴⁰ Ibn Batutah, III, p. 403.

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However unexceptionable the Sultan’s motives, his policy was fraught with serious consequences. It produced discord in politics and divided the administration into two hostile camps—the Hindustanis and foreigners, both pursuing their own selfish aims and bent upon their own aggrandisement. The Sultan who was anxious to promote the efficiency of his government failed to see the unwisdom of excluding the native element from high offices. The foreigners ill-requited his beneficence and stirred up strife everywhere which threw the administration into a state of disorder.

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Though merciless in punishing wrong-doers, the Sultan enjoyed a reputation for his love of justice. Unbiassed contemporary writers are unanimous in praising his love of justice and impartiality. The author of the Masālik says that the Sultan held a special darbār for administering justice and his remarks are amply corroborated by Ibn Batūṭah. Justice was as usual administered by the Qazi who was aided by the Muftis who expounded the law. The head of the judicial department was the Sadr-i-Jahan Qazi-al-Quzāt (Lord Chief Justice) and below him were Qazis and nāib Qazis who administered justice at the capital as well as in the provinces. The Sultan's brother Mubarak Khan sat with the Qazi in the Diwan-i-Khānah to assist him in deciding cases. He occupied the office of Mirdād whose duty was to produce in the court any big amir or nobleman against whom a complaint was instituted or a suit was filed and who was too powerful to be controlled by the Qazi. The salary of this officer was fixed at fifty thousand a year, and he was granted a jagir which yielded an equivalent income and a robe of honour embroidered with gold.⁴¹ The Qazi was treated with great regard.⁴² The arm of the law was strong enough to reach the most powerful dignitary of the empire, and it was with a view to secure the fearless and independent discharge of duty that the Sultan created the office of Mirdād. He cared nothing for the Shaikhs and the 'Ulama; he rejected the doctrine of the inviolability of the sacerdotal order and severely punished its members, if they were found guilty of any wrong—a policy which caused much dissatisfaction in reactionary circles. Justice had so far been a monopoly of the clericalists, but Muhammad Tughluq deprived them of this monopoly and constituted himself into the Supreme Court of Appeal. Ibn Batūṭah and Shihāb-al-Din both testify to the Sultan's desire to administer equal justice to all classes of his subjects, and the former gives a detailed account of the manner in which the Sultan suppressed privilege. The author of the Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi, whom Badāoni copies, writes that there were four *muftis* stationed in the royal palace. When a case was brought up for trial, the Sultan discussed it with the *muftis* and so strict was he that he gave them a warning that they should be held responsible, if an innocent man's life was destroyed. The *muftis* never hesitated to express the correct view, and if they were defeated in argument, the accused was executed immediately, even if it were the middle of the night. But if the king failed to answer the arguments of the *muftis*, he sent them away and tried to think out an answer to rebut their arguments. If they were unable to convince the Sultan, he forthwith pronounced the sentence, but if he was defeated in argument, the release of the culprit was ordered forthwith.⁴³ This statement regarding the Sultan's love of justice by one who describes him as bloody (Khūnī) points to the fact that he loved justice and it is corroborated by contemporary chroniclers.

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⁴¹ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 400.

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⁴² When Ibn Batūṭah was appointed Qazi of Dihli, his pay was fixed at 12,000 dinars a year in addition to a Jagir consisting of five villages which yielded an equal income. Besides these the Qazi was the recipient of numerous gifts and rewards. He was expected to know the Hanafi law and the customs and usages of the people. III, p. 403.

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⁴³ The passage in the MS. of the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* is to this effect. The king himself became the Supreme Judge and Crown Counsel. If he succeeded in convincing the *muftis* in his first argument, the accused was immediately punished, but if he failed, he thought over the matter again, and had a second discussion. If in the second discussion, he succeeded in convincing the *muftis*, the accused was punished, but if the *muftis* succeeded in worsting him, he released the accused. The passage in Badāoni substantially agrees with that in the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh*, I. (Biblioth. Ind., pp. 239-40.)

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The author of the *Masālik* and Ibn Batūṭah both speak of the easy accessibility of the Sultan and his desire to give even the meanest of his subjects an opportunity of laying his case before him. Khojandi informed Shihāb-al-Dīn that in his public *durbār* which the Sultan held every Tuesday, surrounded by his nobles, judges and other officers of state, he gave a general permission to the people to lay their grievances before him. Petitions were presented to him and his orders were recorded by the *Dabīrs* or secretaries.

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Ibn Batūṭah, whose evidence is more reliable because he himself held the office of Qazi at the capital writes that twice a week on Monday and Thursday the Sultan held his court of justice in the Hall of Audience (Dīwān-i-Khānah), when only four *amirs* were allowed to be present near him.⁴⁴ These were *amir-i-Ḥājib*, Khās Ilōjib, *Sayyid-al-Ḥujjāb*, and *Sharaf-al-Ḥujjāb*. The Sultan knew that the aggrieved persons would find it difficult to obtain access to him and therefore he posted four amirs at the four gates and ordered them to record the complaints of the public. If a complainant could not get his complaint recorded at the first gate, he went to the amir at the second gate, and if he failed there also then to the third and lastly to the fourth, if the former refused to admit his complaint. In case the last refused, the complainant was permitted to go to the Sadr-i-Jahan and failing him he could approach the Sultan. A great many men must have been denied justice in this system of checks and counterchecks, but it illustrates the Sultan's solicitude for justice and his readiness to redress grievances. The Sultan used to examine all these records in the evening, and if any case in which an officer refused to do his duty was brought to his notice, he strongly reprimanded him.

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⁴⁴ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 289.

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The Sultan was in many respects far in advance of his age. At a time when no government would have tolerated suits against itself by its subjects, Muhammad permitted aggrieved persons to bring their claims against him in law courts, and Ibn Batūtah has recorded three cases in which he saw the Sultan with his own eyes, anxiously endeavouring to meet the ends of justice. The instances cited by the Moor may be dismissed as wholly fictitious, but they go to illustrate the Sultan's impartiality, his love of justice and his desire to redress the grievances of both Hindus and Muslims.⁴⁵ Shaikh Zadah Jāmi's confinement in an iron cage and his ultimate execution related by Yahya bin Ahmad (and reproduced by Badāoni) for calling the Sultan a tyrant to his face will cause no surprise to students of mediaeval history. We might have hesitated to accept Yahya's unsupported testimony, but for the reason that the barbarous punishment inflicted by the Sultan on the Shaikh is in agreement with the tenor of his policy as reflected in the pages of Ibn Batūtah. The Sultan did not punish the Shaikh immediately. He applied to the Qazi to call upon the Shaikh to prove the charge of tyranny. When the Shaikh persisted in repeating the charge, he ordered his imprisonment and execution. The method of punishment was barbarous, but mediaeval rulers were accustomed to punish persons guilty of sedition in this fashion all over the world. The colour given to the story by later writers indicates an attempt on the part of the 'Ulama to malign the character of the Sultan against whom they had declared a revolt. The Sultan's justice made no exceptions. He punished the Shaikhs and Maulvis who broke the law, and we can easily follow Barani's statement that not a day passed when the Sultan did not shed innocent Muslim blood, if we bear this in mind.

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⁴⁵ Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 286. Ranking, Al-Badāoni, I, pp. 318-19.

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The Penal law was barbarous. No offender however high his position, could escape his wrath. Neither learning nor piety, nor birth was a claim to immunity from punishments which he inflicted for breaches of law or opposition to his own authority.⁴⁶ The Qurānic law was not always followed and the Sultan was guided mainly by considerations of policy. Murder, decapitation, and death were the usual penalties, and sometimes the subordinate officers extorted confessions from the accused persons by force as happened in the case of the two Sindhi Maulvis.⁴⁷ Torture was employed, and from such victims certificates were obtained to the effect that their confession was voluntary and the officers of the state went through the farce of getting them attested by the Qazi.⁴⁸

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⁴⁶ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 290.

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⁴⁷ Ibid., III, pp. 301-2.

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⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 301-2.

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There was no law of evidence and no definite procedure. Summary trials were common, and cases were started without sufficient investigation.⁴⁹ Gross mistakes were sometimes made on account of haste and want of proper investigation, as is shown by the case of Malik-al-Iltijār who was murdered on a charge of treason. The Sultan afterwards regretted his action and cast into prison the informant and confiscated all his goods. The Diwān-i-Siyāsat worked vigorously, and every day hundreds of culprits were brought for punishment.⁵⁰ Outside the first gate of the Hazār Situn (the thousand-pillared palace) there were platforms on which the executioners were seated. When any person was slain, his head was suspended outside the gate for three days.⁵¹ The corpse of the victim was removed after three days by the Kafirs who were specially appointed to do this work and was thrown into a ditch outside the city. The Kafirs lived near the ditch and did not allow the relatives of the deceased persons to bury their dead bodies unless they were offered some bribe.⁵² The corpse of such a man as Ibrahim Kharitadār was buried after the payment of a bribe. Punishment for lapses from virtue was severe, and the mother of Prince Masud was ordered by the Sultan to be stoned to death⁵³ for adultery, and the verdict was pronounced by Qazi Kamal-al-Din. Mutilation was common, and Sultan Fīrūz writes in his Fatūhāt that he appeased by means of gifts the heirs of those who had been deprived of a limb, nose, eye, hand or foot in the time of his late Lord and patron Sultan Muhammad Shah.⁵⁴ Flogging was in vogue, and Ibn Batūtah relates that on one occasion he himself as judge gave eighty stripes to one Rāzi of Multan for making himself drunk and stealing five thousand dinars from the house of the treasurer of ‘Aziz Khummār where he had put up.⁵⁵ The punishments inflicted upon foreigners were comparatively lighter, and Ibn Batūtah relates instances in which they were excused even when they were guilty of serious offences.⁵⁶

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⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 305.

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⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 312-13. Fatuhāt-i-Firuz Shahi, Elliot III, p. 385 Sirat, Bankipore MS. Chapter II.

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⁵¹ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 218.

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⁵² Ibn Batūtah, III, pp. 339-40.

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⁵³ Ibid., pp. 292.

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⁵⁴ Fatuhāt and Sīrat, Bankipore MS.

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⁵⁵ Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 440.

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⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 333 and pp. 278-80.

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The Kotwāl was an important officer of police. This office had existed under Balban and ‘Ala-al-Din. Malik-al-Umra Fakhr-al-Din, Kotwāl of Dihli, played an important part in the politics of his time and ‘Ala-al-Mulk, the Kotwāl of Dihli, was consulted frequently by ‘Ala-al-Din about public affairs. The Kotwāl exercised the functions of a Justice of the Peace and had great influence with the people at large, being the custodian of peace and order. Another important officer of municipal police was the muhatsib who is mentioned by Barani, Ibn Batūtah and the author of the Masālik. His chief duty was to control the market, to examine the weights and measures, and watch the conduct of the people. Besides the police officers, the Sultan had in his service a large number of spies. They reported to him all that happened in his dominion. There were manhis or spies of different grades who mixed with the army and the civil population and reported all that the people did and said. They submitted their reports to their superior officer who in turn sent them to his superior officers and in this way they finally reached the Sultan.⁵⁷ These intelligencers were very active, because the Sultan was anxious to know the position of all those who surrounded him.⁵⁸ At the house of amirs big or small there was a royal slave who informed the Sultan of all their doings. Similarly maidservants were employed in the harams of the nobles whose duty it was to inform the sweeper women of what happened in the private apartments, and who in their turn communicated this information to the chief officer of the Criminal Intelligence Department. This officer reported all matters to the Sultan and kept him informed of the movements of 'Ain-al-Mulk Multani on the eve of his rebellion.⁵⁹ The fear of the spies was great, and even the highest officers felt afraid of them.⁶⁰ Great care was taken to acquire full information about the foreigners. When a foreigner came into the country, the *Akhbār nawis* or news-recorders entered in their registers a description of his appearance and dress and the number of his companions, servants and beasts. His movements and actions were carefully watched, and in due course reported to the Sultan. The office corresponded to some extent to the *Wāqa'nawis* of the Mughals.

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⁵⁷ Masalik, Paris MS.

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⁵⁸ Masālik, Paris MS.

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⁵⁹ Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 343.

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⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 386-87.

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There were not many jails. The number of prisoners was not large, for the usual punishments were mutilation and death. But the administration of the old forts and castles which were treated as prisons was by no means satisfactory. The regulations were lax and corruption prevailed among the officers. In the capital itself the Sultan interested himself in the welfare of the prisoners. He used to summon them to the Diwān-i-Khānah every day and allowed them to bathe and shave themselves on Friday which was observed as a day of rest.

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The law of debt was severe in the middle ages in India. Marco Polo who wrote in the thirteenth century observes that when a debtor refused to pay his debt, the creditor went to the king's palace to invoke his protection. Concerning the law of debt, which prevailed in Ma'bar when Marco Polo visited it, he writes: "If a debtor shall have been several times asked by his creditor for payment and shall have put him off from day to day with promises, then if the creditor can once meet the debtor and succeed in drawing a circle round him, the latter must not pass out of his circle until he shall have satisfied the claim, or given security for its discharge. If he, in any case, presumes to pass the circle, he is punished with death as a transgressor against right and justice." The traveller himself witnessed a case of this kind, when a foreign merchant drew a circle round the king, which the latter would not pass until the merchant was satisfied.⁶¹ The practice of *Dohāi* or seeking royal protection to enforce the payment of debt was prevalent in India in Ibn Batūṭah's time.⁶² Bonds were properly executed and attested by the Qazi. When the creditors failed to recover their money, they resorted to the royal palace to seek the king's protection. When a big man was in debt, his creditors stood before the gate of the palace, and when the indebted nobleman came, they shouted aloud ' *dohāi hai Sultan ki*,' implored royal protection and did not allow their client to enter the palace without paying his debts. Reduced to such an awkward position at the palace gate, the debtor either paid the money or requested time for payment. Sometimes the king also paid off the debts of insolvent debtors, and it appears from Ibn Batūṭah's statement that some of these men had recourse to this stratagem in order to avoid paying their debts out of their own money. It was considered nothing disgraceful, for Ibn Batūṭah himself conspired with his creditors to avoid paying them from his own pocket and asked them to cry ' *dohāi* ' at the royal gate and prevent him from entering it. The clerks at once communicated this to the Sultan, and forthwith an order was issued that the traveller's debts amounting to fifty-five thousand *dinars* be paid out of the public treasury. Officers were appointed to examine the bonds and documents in possession of creditors, and when they submitted their report regarding the genuineness of the debts the *Khat-i-Khurd* or certificates of payment were issued. Frauds were practised and bribes were demanded and paid.⁶³ From Ibn Batūṭah's writings, it appears that public opinion did not condemn it, and in the absence of any restraint on public opinion there was nothing to foster probity among the servants of the state except the fear of the Sultan.

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⁶¹ Yule, Marco Polo, II, pp. 279-80. Colonel Yule's note is very interesting. Marco Polo, II, p. 287. This is supported by Rashid-al-Din who refers to the same practice in his *Jām-ut-Tawarikh* which was completed in 1910 A.D. Elliot, I, p. 88.

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⁶² Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 411.

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⁶³ Ibn Batūṭah, III, pp. 413-14.

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The Sultan's acts of munificence surpass all belief. Whosoever went to pay his respects to him carried with him presents, and because the Sultan gave rich rewards in return, the practice became common. Even those who could not afford to buy a large number of presents borrowed money to procure them. The merchants of Sindh made it their occupation to lend thousands of dinars to intending visitors to the royal court, and furnished them with all the necessary equipments.⁶⁴ The amirs, officers of state as well as pious men Shaikhs and Maulvis made presents to the Sultan. The former brought camels, horses, arms, while the latter brought copies of the Holy Book and amulets to ward off evil. Foreigners who came to India, attracted by the Sultan's bounty, brought rich presents with them and were loaded with gifts in return. The practice of making presents increased to such an extent that a separate department grew up and business-like management became necessary.

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