New History of the Marathas v2.c33: Chapter XXIV. Maratha Ambitions Completed in the North [1761-1772]

New History of the Marathas v2.c33

Language: English

Chapter XXIV. Maratha Ambitions Completed in the North [1761-1772]

1 Maratha set back in North India. 2 Malharrao Holkar worsted. 3 Clive and the Diwani. 4 Raghunathrao before Gohad. 5 Expedition of Ramchandra Ganesh and its results. 6 British opposition to Maratha plans. 7 The Emperor restored to Delhi.

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1. Maratha set back in North India.—Writes Dr. Dighe,—" The consequences of the Maratha disaster of Panipat did not long remain concealed from friends or foes alike. Maratha dominant position in Hindustan was no longer tenable. So long as Marathas could not support their authority by armed might, the northern potentates were not going to respect their commands. Maratha dominion in the north,—Delhi, Agra, Doab, Bundelkhand, Malwa—became aflame with revolt of petty rulers, rising of local militias and disturbances of hill-tribes, and the next few years witnessed the shrinking of Maratha frontiers and withdrawing of their rule to the south of the Chambal.

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" Ahmad Shah Abdali the victor of Panipat was hardly in a better plight. The year 1761-62 proved that this best Asiatic general of his age could win battles but not the subsequent dominion. He failed to reap the harvest of his amazing successes. His vision was bound by the narrow limits of his mountainous homeland of Afghanistan with the Punjab if he could possibly annex that province. Hence when his soldiers mutinied for arrears of pay and pressed for immediate return, the Shah Abdali retraced his steps and marched back to his country throwing back his life's chance. His withdrawal from the scene of his recent successes let loose pent up forces, brought new personalities on the stage and effected such a change in the situation that the Shah no longer remained the master of it."¹ His advance through the Punjab was so successfully held up by the Sikhs, that he gradually lost all that he had gained during ten years of hard fighting. Between 1762 and 1767 he struggled manfully to put down the Sikhs but was beaten in the end. He had by then lost both his health and vigour, sank into inertia and died rather a miserable death a few months before the Peshwa Madhavrao.

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¹ Allahabad History, Peshwa Madhaorao.

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Among northern opponents of the Marathas the Rajputs were the most powerful with Madhosinh of Jaipur at their head; but Malharrao Holkar soon succeeded in putting them down. Madhosinh and his confederates sustained a severe defeat at the hands of Holkar at Mangrol near Kota on 29th and 30th November 1761, and could no longer stand in opposition to the Marathas. Holkar was, however, called away to the south and Mahadji Sindia was for long crippled by not being at once recognized as the heir to his ancestral estates. It therefore took several years for the Maratha power to regain its pre-Panipat position in the north. The natural result of this Maratha deterioration was the easy ascendancy which the British acquired in Bengal and Bihar, where the three legitimate owners, the Emperor, the Wazir of Oudh and the Nawab of Bengal, were quickly put down during the three years following Panipat. Neither the Bhosles of Nagpur nor the Peshwa offered the least resistance to this British aggression. For young Madhavrao on gathering the reins of Government in his hands after his victory at Rakshasbhuvan (August 1763), the aggression of Haidar Ali became the most pressing problem and he was compelled to leave the northern affairs to Sindia and Holkar. Sindia, however, was for some years disabled from taking a bold action by Raghunathrao interfering in the succession dispute of the Sindian fief and declaring Mahadji a rebel.

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The Emperor Shah Alam lived then at Allahabad, enjoying the hospitality of the Wazir, while the British managed the revenues of Bengal and Bihar on behalf of the Nawab. The deposed Mir Qasim had tried in vain to resist the British pretensions, but his fall left the entire field open to British ambition. If it suited their purpose, they openly interfered in the concerns of the Indian powers, but if it did not, they put forth the cogent and plausible excuse that they must refer the matter to their home authorities for orders, which meant a delay of years. Even in India they never neglected to support one power against another. They professed to act in the name of the Emperor, when they meant to put down the Nawabs of Bengal and Oudh. The successes they gained at Plassey and Baxar drove them from one height to another. Their position was peculiarly safe in comparison with the Indian powers they had to deal with. If they found their move disadvantageous, they could easily retrace their steps and offer the plea of orders from home. Indian powers once involved in an affair could have no choice but to reap the fruit of their action.

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Mir Qasim whom the British themselves had raised to the Nawabship, soon became odious to them, when he began to assert his legitimate rights. The two became open enemies and went to war. Mir Qasim was defeated in two successive actions at Katwa and Gheria in July 1763 with the result that the British made Mir Jafar the Nawab a second time. Mir Qasim thereupon secured the aid of Shuja-ud-daula, and the two under the direction of the Emperor made a bold effort for regaining the lost provinces of Bihar and Bengal. In this venture they secured the co-operation of the Marathas and renewed hostilities against the British. The latter took up the challenge. Major Carnac advanced upon the combined armies of the confederates. On 3rd May 1764 a battle was fought near Patna in which the allies suffered a defeat. But no decision was reached : the two armies remained camping in Bihar during the monsoon and as soon as the rains were over, they came for a final action, which was fought at Baxar on 23rd October 1764. Maj. Hector Munro utterly routed the three potentates and compelled them to fall back upon Benares with their hopes of recovering their eastern possessions finally extinguished. The Emperor submitted to the dictates of the British and sought their protection.

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Thus the battle of Baxar completed the process begun at Plassey seven years before. The Bhosles of Nagpore were for long demanding the Chauth as overlords of the province. To them Mir Qasim had long been appealing for support. But Janoji neglected this important responsibility and busied himself with destroying the Peshwa's capital of Poona in alliance with Nizam Ali. The result was that the British could easily establish their permanent sway on the two rich eastern provinces of India.

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When the two rivals, the Marathas and the Afghans, retired from the Indian contest, there was a kind of vacuum in the centre. But nature abhors vacuum. New forces rushed in to seize the central authority vacated by the two powerful antagonists. Najib Khan Rohilla assumed supreme authority in Delhi, which was challenged by the Jat of Bharatpur, who had now gained strength. Both the chiefs solicited Maratha help: and Malharrao Holkar was asked to handle the situation. This Maratha chief looked upon Najib Khan as his adopted son and had no mind to support the Jat. After some fighting Malharrao patched up a treaty of peace between Najib Khan and the Jat ruler Jawahirsinh and became free to answer a more urgent call.

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2. Malharrao Holkar worsted.—After Baxar the English ardently tried to capture Mir Qasim and punish him severely for the bloody massacre he had perpetrated of Ellis and other Englishmen at Patna. But Shuja protected Mir Qasim from British vengeance. Thereupon Major Fletcher marched against Shuja and chased him right up to Allahabad, taking possession of that chief's strategic post of Chunar, which formed the base for any conqueror descending upon Bihar from the north. The British also took the precaution of declaring that they were acting on behalf of the Emperor, whose territories they professed to protect against his treacherous servants Shuja and Mir Qasim. The proclamation which they issued at this time is an amusing piece of political chicanery.²

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² Persian Calendar 1. 2609.

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The English having captured Allahabad now began their march upon Lucknow the capital of Shuja. In his extreme peril that Prince learnt that the two Maratha captains Malharrao Holkar and Mahadji Sindia had been near Agra, negotiating the terms of peace between Najib and the Jat. As Holkar's force was already in the Doab, Shuja turned to that chief for aid. Writes Holkar on 30th March 1765, "I have arrived at Anupshahr where Shuja-ud-daula came and met me. I have agreed to lend him my armed aid and with this purpose am now proceeding towards the Ganges."

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Thus Shuja and Malharrao joined their forces to which Ghazi-ud-din the ex-Wazir brought his own quota also. Major Fletcher who was keenly watching these movements marched upon them from Allahabad. The two opposing armies came face to face on the plain of Kora : Malharrao Holkar with his guerilla tactics at first severely harassed Fletcher. But the latter brought his excellent artillery rapidly into action on 3rd May and compelled Holkar to retire to Kalpi for safety. Says a Maratha newswriter, "the English possessed a powerful artillery, before which our men were unable to stand firm and took to flight. Malharrao has reached Kalpi in great distress." The guerilla warfare of the Marathas came to be doomed.³

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³ Khare 575 ; P. D. 29. 90, 98.

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At the moment of Holkar's reverse Mahadji Sindia was near Kota in Rajputana and ran immediately to that veteran's support. But as the affair had been finished, he could do little to retrieve the position. He wrote to the Peshwa on 10th August, "Holkar is at Datia, where I am going to meet him and with his co-operation I am anxious to undertake some grand projects." Most of the Indian politicians and potentates of the day watched the change with anxious dismay. Shuja-ud-daula in his perplexity asked for advice from Ahmad Khan Bangash. The latter told him, "Don't entertain the false hope that others would come and fight your battles. If you have the nerve, stand forth boldly against the English, even if you perish thereby. If you have not such a daring in you, you must go unhesitatingly to the English General and quietly accept whatever terms he imposes upon you." Shuja acted up to this latter course.⁴

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⁴ Dr. Shrivastav, *Shuja-ud-daula* II, p. 2.

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3. Clive and the Diwani.—Politics in north India assumed a rapid change in the autumn of 1765. The Emperor grew most impatient to reach Delhi and occupy his throne. All India breathlessly watched whether the victorious English would halt at Allahabad or proceed to convey the Emperor to the imperial capital. At this moment there arrived on the Indian scene the great architect of the British Empire, Clive, now in the capacity of the Governor of Bengal with full powers to handle the situation. The English nation had already come out victorious in the Seven years’ war (1763) and acquired unrivalled supremacy on the sea. Clive had keenly observed contemporary events and possessed unsurpassed knowledge of the political complexities of India. He landed at Calcutta on 3rd May, the very day that Fletcher inflicted the signal defeat upon Holkar. He correctly gauged how bitterly every Indian potentate resented British aggression, and with a resolve to disarm all hostility Clive left Calcutta on 25th June for the theatre of war. He reached Allahabad at the end of July.

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Clive, separately interviewed the various persons concerned and fixed his line of action. He met the Emperor and obtained from him for the East India Company the office of the Diwani of the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, that is, the exclusive power to collect the revenues and dispose of them, without the responsibility for the provincial administration and without the appearance of complete annexation. Clive put this in a solemn document and had it sanctioned by the Emperor. He similarly dealt with Shuja-ud-daula and the Nawab of Bengal and bound them in separate treaties, which formed the basis upon which the future Empire was to be gradually built up. This was indeed a clever stroke of policy quickly executed within the first week of August⁵ by which the British rulers obtained the substance of power without accepting the administrative management. The Emperor, the suzerain authority, the Wazir of Oudh and the Nawab of Bengal, who were the links of an indivisible chain, the central master and provincial servants in the traditional Mughal hierarchy, came to be permanently separated under the scheme of Clive, having nothing to do with one another and at the same time unable to stand independently on one’s own resources without the Company’s armed help for their sustenance.

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⁵ The agreement with Najmud-daula of Bengal was effected in July: that with Shuja is dated 2nd August and the grant of Diwani is dated 12th August.

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Clive spent about a month in quieting the ruffled feelings of the various parties and impressed upon them that a new era of peace and good-will had taken the place of that of a ruinous war. He recognized the power of the Emperor himself, but removed the two Nawabs from his control. As the former was impatient to go to Delhi, Clive assured him that this would be accomplished as soon as circumstances permitted. Raghunathrao appeared on the scene only a few months after these important transactions, but he hardly understood the significance of the changes and concerned himself with the usual old routine of internal politics.

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Having accomplished an enormous amount of diplomatic work, Clive returned to Calcutta in September. A Maratha agent at Allahabad thus reported on Clive’s performance, “the whole of Bengal from the sea coast up to Benares has become English, with no impediment between. Those who were hostile have become their creatures.” Thus the scheme of the conquest of Bengal upon which the Peshwa Balajirao had set his heart, was executed by a foreign power.

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4. Raghunathrao before Gohad.—The powerful Jat Raja Surajmal perished at the height of his greatness in fight against Najib Khan on 25th December 1763. His chief Queen Hansia alias Rani Kishori adopted Jawahirsinh as her son, who succeeded Surajmal and continued his vigorous career defying all his three opponents, the Mughals, the Marathas and the raja of Jaipur. The Marathas recovered their position in a few years and appeared on the northern scene in 1766 headed by R’rao who, as we have already seen, parted company from the Peshwa at Kolhapur in February, and taking Janoji Bhosle with him reached Jhansi in April, where Sindia and Holkar joined him. The Jat Rana of Gohad backed by the powerful arm of Jawahirsinh formed at this time a strong anti-Maratha coalition, which R’rao found it necessary to put down. As plans were being formed for the reduction of Gohad, Malharrao Holkar died near Alampur on 20th May, creating an additional problem about the succession. As R’rao’s arrival heartened Maratha friends, ambassadors arrived from the Emperor asking him to stand against the English and undo what Clive had accomplished the year before to the detriment of the Muslim powers. But R’rao did not agree to the task and contented himself with sending diplomatic missions to the various Indian powers and also one to the British at Calcutta for negotiating a common agreement.⁶ Gohad was besieged but no progress was made for several months, as the trans-Chambal Jats strongly supported the Rana of Gohad, and R'rao soon found it difficult to extricate himself from an awkward job. Holkar and Gaikwad two prominent Maratha captains left him in disgust as their troops had received no pay for several months and were on the point of revolt. Several surprise attacks launched against Gohad ended in failure. The situation was saved by the mediation of Mahadji Sindia, who arranged an accommodation with the Rana on 2nd January 1767. He agreed to pay a fine of 15 lacs and the siege was raised.

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⁶ Persian Calendar 2. 78, 145, 207.

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Raghunathrao then proceeded in the direction of Dholpur to meet the Jat Jawahirsinh. He was in severe distress for want of money and was operating almost in a vacuum. Just then news arrived that Ahmad Shah Abdali had appeared in the Punjab and the two parties became anxious to avoid hostilities. Jat envoys met R'rao in his camp and communicated to him their master's readiness to pay him some nazar and serve under him when necessary. The proposal was accepted and Jawahir was invited to a personal interview. But the latter suspected treachery and went away without meeting the Maratha generalissimo. A temporary truce was concluded, the Jat agreeing to pay the balance of the subsidy promised to Holkar the year before, and accepting a small jagir southwest of Bharatpur. Raghunathrao was compelled to retrace his steps to the south, in great embarrassment for money, without accomplishing any tangible results during one and a half years of his much trumpeted expedition. In March 1767 he arrived in south Malwa and learning that Ahalyabai's son Malrao had died on the 27th of that month, decided to improve the occasion to his own selfish advantage, by seizing the hoarded wealth of that pious lady, on the pretext that the Holkar State was now heirless and deserved to be confiscated.

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The spirited daughter-in-law of Malharrao Holkar who had given his very best to the Peshwa's house, was not to be easily cowed down. When Raghunathrao under the evil advice of Gangadhar Chandrachud and Chinto Vithal ordered an attack upon Indore, none of his followers would obey him. Ahalyabai prepared to defend Indore against the wanton aggression and received full sympathy in her resolve from all the Maratha captains in R'rao's camp. He felt extreme irritation at such a discomfiture and saved his face by himself offering to call upon Ahalyabai for a condolence visit without any armed following. The question of choosing an heir for the State of Indore was referred by the lady to the Peshwa at Poona, and the uncle could not override it. He hurried back to Nasik in summer utterly crest-fallen with no face to confront the Peshwa.

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This failure of R'rao had a disastrous effect upon the Maratha prestige in the north. The Jat Raja Jawahirsinh, finding that the Maratha armies had retired, invaded Bundelkhand during the autumn of 1767 and quickly effected the conquest of all the Maratha possessions in that region right up to Kalpi, whose guardian Balaji Govind Kher was powerless to oppose him. By October practically the whole of Bundelkhand was lost and it became now the first concern of the Peshwa at Poona to put down the Jats if Maratha power had to be saved in the north. A mere accident came to rescue the Maratha position at this time. Jawahirsinh was attacked by the Raja of Jaipur and was severely defeated at Maondha near Narnol on the Jat frontier on 14th December 1767. Jawahir's stormy career came to a tragic end soon after, when in July 1768 he was suddenly cut down by a favourite soldier whom he had disgraced.

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5. Expedition of Ramchandra Ganesh, its results.—Madhavrao was all along anxious to rectify the Maratha position in the northern sphere and was able for the first time to make necessary preparations during the monsoon of 1768 after he had disposed of his uncle. But a few more months were lost in settling the rebellion of Janoji Bhosle by the treaty of Kankapur in March 1769. Then the Maratha armies under two able commanders Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna began their march towards the north. Mahadji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar had preceded them by a few months.

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The Emperor at Allahabad, sulking under British restraint, felt encouraged by this Maratha advent and promised to pay 50 lacs if the Marathas would put down the Jat rebels. Madhosinh, the Raja of Jaipur, who had for several years dominated the politics of north India, died on 21st December 1767, leaving behind him a chaotic legacy. His successor Pratap Sinh now joined the Marathas and so did the Nawab of Bhopal.

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Madhavrao’s orders to his commanders were to proceed straight to Delhi and take possession of the capital. But the Jat State opposed the Maratha advance in the region of Agra. Torn by dissensions that State had lost its former cohesion and could no longer present a formidable barrier. The fratricidal war between Nawalsinh and Ranjitsinh had reduced the strength of the Jats and invited foreign intervention. Ranjitsinh courted Maratha aid and with these allies defeated Nawalsinh in a closely fought action at Govardhan on 5th April 1770. This spectacular victory over the Jats produced immediate results. The Marathas occupied Agra and Mathura, and Najib Khan who held the imperial capital opened negotiations and offered his co-operation in recovering the old Maratha possessions beyond the Jamuna. Accordingly the Maratha armies crossed that river near Mathura in April 1770, and entered the territory of Ahmad Khan Bangash of Farrukhabad. The Marathas established their camp at Ramghat near the Ganges on the advice of Najib Khan, who now began to play the same old tactics that he had employed at Shukratal eleven years before, the only factor against him now being that there was no Abdali to back him from beyond the Indus. Ahmad Khan Bangash had his camp on the other side of the Ganges and kept up a secret understanding with Najib Khan in order to bring about Maratha ruin. For a time the Marathas found themselves in a critical position at Ramghat, having been completely surrounded by hostile Pathan elements. Being informed of this situation of his armies, the Peshwa immediately prepared to despatch from the south another strong force for their relief. Happily, however, the Maratha captains had grown wiser by past experience, and with clever tactics managed to save their situation on the Ganges by slowly retiring to safer positions on the Jamuna. Just at this moment of crisis, Najib Khan died on 31st October 1770 on his way to his home at Najibabad, thereby greatly relieving Maratha anxieties. His son Zabeta Khan inherited his father’s power and property.

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The Peshwa on learning of the safety of his armies in the north, gave up the idea of sending relief to them.

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The Bangash Nawab failed to grasp the import of the clever tactics which the Maratha commander had followed in planning a temporary withdrawal and effecting a complete separation between the two Pathan wings, the Bangash and the Rohilla. Ramchandra, as soon as he learnt that Najib Khan was dead, placed Zabeta Khan, who was then in the Maratha camp, in detention. But Tukoji Holkar true to the traditions of Malharrao, managed to save Zabeta Khan by secretly removing him away and setting him free from his confinement.

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As soon as Zabeta Khan became free, he repaired to the Emperor and wrested the office of Mir Bakshi from him. With this additional authority he marched against Ramchandrapant in the Doab. The rains were over by this time, the Maratha strategy was perfect. Ramchandra and Mahadji acted in full co-operation and completely overcame the forces of the Bangash and the Rohillas. They captured Etawa and marched on Farrukhabad on 15th December 1770. Ahmad Khan now in a subdued mood, begged for life, ceding to the Marathas all the territory that they had possessed before the day of Panipat. Ahmad Khan felt this mortification so severely that he died in grief on 11th July 1771. The former Maratha position was completely retrieved.

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How keenly Madhavrao watched and how anxiously he directed the operations of this northern expedition, is found clearly explained in a recent find of a letter addressed by him on 21st December 1770 to his commandants Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna.⁷ He writes,—

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⁷ Ait Sankirna Sah. 7 p. 42.

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"It is now over twenty months since you were asked to proceed to the north with a force numbering some fifty thousand led by picked captains. Never since the celebrated expedition of Bhau Saheb to Panipat had such a large force advanced to that region. You were invested with full powers and asked to reduce the Jat and other rulers who had thrown off their allegiance to our government and to impress upon the Rajputs, the Sikhs and the Abdali king that the Maratha rule

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had again been as vigorously restored in north India as before. Full confidence was reposed in your capacity and valour to achieve these objects, and thereby to bring in a plentiful supply of money contributions. The two experienced chiefs of the houses of Sindia and Holkar, the main props of our State, were purposely associated with you in your present undertaking.

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"It seems, however, that you have not all been working in full co-operation. Holkar and Sindia are openly at loggerheads and you two are not working in perfect union either. Fortunately you have obtained a grand victory over the Jat raja, but in the end little substantial benefit has resulted from that victory. You have also had consultations with Shuja-ud-daula, but have not succeeded in taking from him the possession of the two holy places, Benares and Prayag, a longstanding claim which you should have obtained. Your dealings with the Rohillas have yielded no better results, although the death of the wicked Najib-ud-daula offered you a most favourable opportunity of obtaining satisfaction for all the past wrongs. You can now easily take possession of Delhi and give the Wazirship to Shuja and not to Ghazi-ud-din who has lost all credit. You must control Najib's son Zabeta Khan without doing him any harm or indignity. In fact, you have now a golden opportunity before you and you must turn it to the best advantage. This is possible only if you all act in perfect concert. You all well know how disunity and self-seeking have ruined our interests in the past. You must realize that each one's personal interest is best served by working for the united good of all. Rest assured that your master the Peshwa will amply reward your individual merit."

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6. British opposition to Maratha Plans.—During all these events the antagonism between the two leading Maratha sardars, Sindia and Holkar, continued to hamper Maratha operations, with no master on the spot to control their activities. Neither Ramchandra Ganesh nor Visaji Krishna could dictate orders to these powerful hereditary chiefs : but for a time these two Brahman commanders and Mahadji brought severe pressure upon Tukoji and compelled him to give up Zabeta Khan whom he had sheltered. The Jats who had been humbled early in the year, were negotiating for peace. A treaty was signed on 8th September 1770, by which Nawalsinh agreed to pay 65 lacs by way of expenses to the Marathas; and his brother Ranjitsinh gave up his claim to the Jat Kingship, receiving for his maintenance a jagir worth twenty lacs. In this way the two wars, the one with the Jats and the other with the Rohillas and the Pathans, came to a successful close, thereby clearing the ground for the settlement of the Emperor's position. So long as these neighbouring powers of Delhi were hostile, no headway could be made with the central plan of restoring Maratha influence at the capital.

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Readers may be aware that for some years, the Emperor Shah Alam's affairs were managed by his chief adviser Mirza Najaf Khan, who was a protege of the British and, being in their pay, opposed any plan of the Emperor to trust his fortunes to Maratha management, in preference to the British protection which he was enjoying at Allahabad. Another strong supporter of the British cause was Balavant Sinh, the Raja of Benares, whose death on 23rd August 1770 removed the last obstacle to the establishment of Maratha influence at the imperial Court. The British always dreaded a combination of northern powers under Maratha hegemony, and had since the day of Plassey made it the main object of their policy to oppose such a combination. Mir Qasim and the Nawab of Bengal also worked strongly against their British antagonists. As the Emperor would be the central figure of any hostile combination, the British held him tightly in their grip at Allahabad. None understood these currents and cross-currents of the political situation better than the Emperor himself. Twelve years had passed since the murder of his father and yet he, a homeless wanderer all the time, was no nearer the goal of his ambition. He had amply judged what benefits he could expect from his British protectors, and what faith he could place in their sweet professions. Now as the Marathas appeared on the northern scene, swiftly restoring their lost prestige, the Emperor called upon his British patrons either to advance and oppose the Maratha aggression openly, or allow him freely to choose his own way. Mere soothing promises had been too much for him to bear with patience. He would no longer be satisfied with specious promises and demanded immediate action, not advice. He said he was no Emperor without the possession of Delhi.

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So when the Maratha forces were camping in the Doab in 1770, Shuja-ud-daula visited Ramchandra Ganesh on behalf of the Emperor. On 10th August the Emperor himself wrote to Ramchandrapant, “we are glad to receive your assurance that the strictest harmony exists between you and our brother the Wazir Shuja-ud-daula and your promise to outrival the Wazir and the English in serving the interests of our Empire. We have full faith in your loyalty and attachment. If you act as you profess, we will also look upon you as graciously.” The Emperor wrote similar letters to the other Maratha leaders and to the Peshwa also, showing how impatient he had become to reach the capital under their protection.

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7. The Emperor restored to Delhi.— The Emperor’s mother Zenat Mahal also urged him to the same course, viz., to accept Maratha protection. He deputed Mirza Najaf Khan to meet the Maratha generals and arrange the details. In order to put pressure on Shah Alam, Sindia threatened to raise another Emperor to the throne and make Ghazi-ud-din then living in the Maratha camp the Wazir. This threat had immediate effect. Early in 1771 Mahadji directed his attention to the capture of Delhi, which was then held by Zabeta Khan. Sindia advanced with his forces and took possession of the capital on 10th February. He placed Jawan Bakht (Shah Alam's son) on the throne and offered him nazar. The occupation of Delhi proved highly beneficial to the Maratha cause. On 12th February Shah Alam ratified a formal agreement with the Maratha agents and left Allahabad on Friday 12th April on his journey for Delhi. He reached Farrukhabad on 26th July and halted there for some time arranging his affairs for his eventual position. On 16th November he reached Anupshahr, where Mahadji Sindia came and made his obeisance. Thence they travelled together to Delhi and made a formal entry into the capital on 6th January 1772 (n.s.). The Marathas thus regained the position which Sadashivrao Bhau had lost by the disaster of Panipat. The Peshwa on hearing of this development communicated some pertinent reflections to his general in the north :

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“ I quite appreciate the value of a performance which the English desisted from undertaking. I should, however, like to know what amount of money and territory the Emperor has given you. You have now been out there for three saesons. The Emperor has attained his cherished object, but I don't see what you have gained. Our men have shed their blood, in return for which you must acquire money and territory proportionate to the sacrifice. Have you at least freed the holy places of Kashi and Prayag from Muslim control ? You must likewise recover the cost of the troops employed and the debts our Government have incurred in this venture. The English if they had been so minded, did certainly possess the strength to place the Emperor on his ancestral throne : but as their power is mainly based on the sea, they declined to go a long way inland without a corresponding advantage. Now, you must remember never to allow the English to make a lodgment at Delhi. If they once obtain a footing, they can never be dislodged. Of all the European nations, the English are certainly the strongest. They have seized strategic points and have formed a ring round the Indian continent, from Calcutta to Surat.” These prophetic words of the Peshwa exhibit his grasp of the political situation of this country and his impatience to prevent their further aggression.⁸

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⁸ *Kaifiyats and Yadis*, p. 159.

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The Emperor was thus firmly seated on his hereditary throne, and as Zabeta Khan was now the only person who was capable of doing mischief towards the Marathas, Mahadji and Visaji Krishna with the Emperor at their head, marched against him in the Doab in February 1772, and subdued all his territory of Rohilkhand. Again did Zabeta Khan entrench himself at Shukratal, which Mahadji captured on 4th March. The Khan eccaped in the darkness of the night to the territory of Bijnor. He was hotly pursued right up to Najibabad, known then by the name of Patthargad, or stone fort, which also the Marathas captured in April, along with Zabeta Khan's family. He then escaped to the northern jungles. At this time Mahadji avenged the wrongs and atrocities that the traitor Najib had formerly inflicted upon the Sindian house. The Rohilla's tomb was opened and his remains scattered. Whatever was found existing from the spoils taken at Panipat was recovered, including, as the report goes, even some Maratha women. Immense booty was obtained including horses, elephants, guns and valuables. Mahadji ever after felt a legitimate pride as an avenger of past injuries. The Rohillas were a race celebrated for valour, but not a single member of that race would come forth boldly to stand in opposition to the Marathas at this time. Zabeta Khan thereupon sought shelter with the Jats and the Sikhs. The news of these successes reached Poona in May and gladdened the dying Peshwa's heart. The Maratha forces returned to the capital for the rains.

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It was no small comfort to the Peshwa to feel that he was after all able to wipe off fully the disgrace of Panipat and to restore Maratha power to a position which his three great ancestors had toiled to build up. Zabeta Khan alone remained as a disturbing factor in the sphere of Delhi. The Emperor too out of selfish motives would not allow him to be crushed. Shah Alam was perhaps the most faithless and intriguing person known to Indian history, and proved a perennial problem for Mahadji to handle. He alone, however, served him to the last and did his best to save his life and dignity in the most dangerous situations. Nor was Shuja-ud daula happy at the rising tide of Maratha fortunes, and instead of joining the Marathas in resisting British aggression, became the foremost Indian chief in planting British supremacy in India.⁹

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⁹ History amply records how Indian liberties were bartered away mainly by the four Muslim potentates of Oudh, Murshidabad, Arcot and Haidarabad. Not a single Hindu joined in this unholy game until the end of the eighteenth century, when, at the advent of Wellesley, there remained not a single Hindu leader to resist the onward march of the British power.

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It is not necessary to emphasize the weakness of the Maratha character as evidenced by the divided counsel existing in the Maratha camp during the momentous expedition that has just been described. There was no controlling voice of a respected master on the spot, and it is no wonder if divergent views prevailed in questions of war and policy. Holkar never gave up his old game of shielding the Rohilla chiefs and exasperated Mahadji beyond measure. Visaji Krishna's sane and conciliatory attitude alone saved the situation. He befriended Zabeta Khan and restored his family to him on payment of a ransom. The Emperor continued to practise his treachery and managed secretly to bring about a wanton attack upon the Maratha camp at Delhi on 18th December 1772. The attack miserably failed of effect and the Emperor was compelled to make abject submission. But before the imperial administration at Delhi and in the north could settle down to normal conditions, the Peshwa was dead at Poona, and his brother the next Peshwa came to be sadly murdered, which led to the withdrawal of the Maratha forces then in the north.

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The first of these, the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, was used by the Jewish Christians of Palestine, and was probably a version of the Gospel of Matthew, though it contained some traditions not found in our canonical books. The *Gospel of the Egyptians* was used by the ascetic sects of Egypt, and was marked by a strong tendency towards mysticism and asceticism. The *Gospel of Peter* was used by the Docetists, and taught that Christ did not really suffer, but only appeared to do so.

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These gospels, and others like them, were not accepted by the Church as a whole, and were gradually lost or suppressed. The Church, however, felt the need for a standard collection of writings that would serve as a guide for faith and practice. This led to the formation of the New Testament canon, a process that took several centuries to complete.

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The first step in this process was the collection of the letters of Paul, which were widely circulated among the churches. Then came the four Gospels, which were accepted as the authoritative accounts of the life and teachings of Jesus. The Acts of the Apostles and the other epistles were gradually added, and finally the Book of Revelation.

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By the end of the second century, the core of the New Testament was generally accepted by the Church. The process of canonization was not a formal act of a council, but rather a gradual recognition by the churches of the writings that were most valuable for their life and worship. It was only in the fourth century that the canon was formally closed by the councils of the Church.

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The formation of the New Testament canon was a crucial event in the history of the Church. It provided a standard of faith and practice that helped to unify the Church and to protect it from the influence of heretical sects. It also ensured that the teachings of Jesus and the apostles would be preserved for future generations.