History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c74.s14: § 20. Emperor's treatment of Kam Bakhsh and Asad Khan.
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c74.s14
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§ 20. Emperor's treatment of Kam Bakhsh and Asad Khan.
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We may here complete the history of this episode in Kam Bakhsh's life. The officers of the Karnatak army, especially Asad and Zulfiqar, lay quaking in mortal anxiety as to how the Emperor would take the arrest of his favourite son. The wildest rumours circulated as to his wrath towards his generals. A story ran in the Wandiwash camp that Asad Khan, on being sentenced to disgrace by the Emperor, had poisoned himself (July).
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Aurangzib at first ordered the prince to be brought to his presence in charge of Asad Khan, and fresh equipment and furniture to be given to him on the way, to replace what had been abandoned or looted at Jinji, but no order was passed regarding Zulfiqar and his officers. [Dil. 111b.] Meantime, Prince Azam had been posted to Kadapa district to support the Jinji army from the rear. He encamped at Saddam at the southern frontier of his charge; and thus, after the arrival of Qasim Khan at Wandiwash, the Mughal line of communication from the Eastern Karnatak to the Emperor's Court was again secured from interruption.
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When the wazir reached Sagar on his way to the Court, he received an order to stop there* and send the prince alone to the Emperor at Galgala. Kam Bakhsh arrived there on 11th June and was presented to his father in the harem through the intercession of his sister Zinat-un-nissa. [M. A. 359.] Here the spoilt child tried to justify his late conduct by charging Zulfiqar with treachery and the collusive prolongation of the siege for enriching himself. Aurangzib was too experienced a soldier and too good a judge of men, to credit Kam Bakhsh's words. [Dil. 112a.]
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∗ This was a mark of censure. In addition, the Emperor taxed Asad Khan a huge sum as the price of the prince's stores which had been looted and the guns and material abandoned at Jinji; two mahals of the wazir's jagir were attached for recovering this amount. [Dil. 112a.] Asad Khan was permitted to come to the Emperor as late as 8th Jan. 1694. "On account of the affair of Kam Bakhsh, he anticipated the severe anger of the Emperor. On the day of interview, when Asad reached the place for making his salam, Multafat Khan, who was standing close to the throne, recited in a low tone the verse, 'Forgiveness has a sweet taste which retaliation lacks.' The gracious Emperor replied, 'You have recited it at the right time,' and looking benignantly at his prime minister ordered him to kiss his feet, and raised his head out of the dust of distress." [M. A. 365.] Dalpat Rao, in his anxiety, sent Bhimsen to the imperial camp to learn about the Emperor's
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Zulfiqar used the reinforcements brought by Qasim Khan to reassert Mughal authority over the neighbourhood and fill his chest. His disastrous retreat from the walls of Jinji had been a signal for the numerous petty zamindars of the Karnatak to rise in rebellion and lawlessness. They plundered banjaras bringing grain to the Mughal camp and seized certain forts. Zulfiqar now chastised them, exacted fines, and returned to Wandiwash. [Dil. 111a. and 112b.]
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§ 21. Operations during 1693.
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The Eastern Karnatak from the latitude of Madras to that of Porto Novo, was at this time occupied by three sets of authorities, often in conflict with one another,—namely, the representatives of the old Hindu local chieftains and Vijaynagar viceroys, whom the conquering armies of the Bijapur and Golkonda Sultans had imperfectly
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feelings towards the Jinji army and the chance of Government supplying its officers with what they had lost during the retreat. The historian brought back reassuring news. [Dil. 112a.]
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subdued ; the officers of the lately subverted Bijapur and Golkonda Governments, who were loth to recognise their new Mughal master ; and the Maratha intruders representing the houses of Shivaji and Vyankoji. To the first of these classes belonged Yachapa Nayak,[*] whose ancestors claimed to be Rajputs of Qanauj and had obtained the fort of Satgarh (26 miles west of Vellore) from the ministers of Rajah Pratap Rudra of Warangal. [Dil. 116a.] The Qutb Shahi Government had recognised his position by creating him commander of its local levies (sehbandi.) After the fall of Golkonda he had resisted the Mughal conquest of the Kadapa district [Dil. 98b] in the company of Md. Sadiq, but had been won over to the imperial side and sent with a considerable force (early in 1690) to expel the Maratha plundering bands infesting the Conjeveram district. [Mad. Diary, 1st May 1690.] Soon afterwards these two officers had revolted from the imperial side, and Yachapa had usurped the country up to the Madras coast. [Mad. Diary, 21st July.] When Rajaram reached Jinji, Yachapa joined him and lived in that fort for some time as his chief military supporter. [Dil., 112 b ; Mad.
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∗ His name is spelt as Yachapa Nair and also Nayak in Z. S., as Achap Nair in Bhimsen's Persian memoirs, as Arsumma, Eachuma, Yausomo and Arsemo Nayak in the Madras Diary, Achna Nayak in Akhbarat (28 Oct. 1693, offers to surrender Satgarh fort to Zulfiqar, who arrives there), and Achap-nar by Manucci [iii. 271.]
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Diary, 9th Jan. 1693.] But in January 1693 he was thrown into the background by the arrival of Dhana and Santa, and so, in March, he left Rajaram, recovered Satgarh, and began to fight for his own hand. In extending his territory eastwards to Vellore, he came into conflict with Rajaram in June. [Z. S.] At the close of the year Zulfiqar Khan won him over, by securing for him a mansab of 6-hazari and a jagir of 3 lakhs of hun in the Karnatak. [Dil. 112b; Mad. Diary, 20th Feb. 1694.]
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To the second category belonged Ismail Khan Maka, an ex-general of Golkonda and a local zamindar, as well as the sons of Sher Khan Lodi, the former Adil Shahi governor of Valikanda-puram. These joined the Mughals whole-heartedly. The temporary eclipse of the Muhammadan power at the beginning of 1693 was turned to good account by the Marathas. Santaji Ghorpare besieged Trichinopoly in March, Rajaram himself arrived there soon afterwards, and on 10th April the Nayak of Trichinopoly made peace with the Maratha king, who then went to visit his first cousin and friend Shahji II. at Tanjore (May 1693). But a quarrel now broke out in the Maratha ranks; Santaji's temper was found intolerable and he left for Maharashtra in anger, Dhanaji being appointed Senapati in his place. [Z. S.]
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§ 22. Mughal successes against the Tanjore Rajah, 1694.
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Zulfiqar had rashly begun the siege of Jinji, without first bringing the country around under his control. His stay before the fort had necessarily involved his army in the risk of destruction in a hostile neighbourhood. But now, strengthened by the adhesion of these men of local influence, he set out in February 1694 to conquer the South Arcot district. The fort of Peru-mukkal, on the top of a steep hill 300 feet above the plain, 18 miles north of Pondicherry and 6 miles east of Tindivanam, was stormed for him by Dalpat Rao's Bundelas under his eyes.* Thence he went to the beach to gaze on the ocean for the first time. Then he marched down the East Coast, towards Tanjore, by way of Pondicherry and other European factories†, capturing many forts in the South Arcot district, and skirting Cuddalore at the end of February. Yachapa co-operated with him.
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† He only looked at their outside from a distance. "These forts of the Europeans were mere shops," as Bhimsen says. (Dil., 114a.)
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When (in March 1694) Zulfiqar with his army arrived near Tanjore, Maharajah Shahji II. found resistance vain, especially as his ever-hostile neighbour, the Nayak of Trichinopoly, joined the Mughals, helped them with men and money, and besought them to recover for him some forts and districts which the Maharajah of Tanjore had seized from him. The imperialists did this service to their ally. Then they invaded Tanjore itself. [Dil., 114.] Rajaram had sent (March) Baharji Ghorpare (the younger brother of Santa) to the assistance of his constant friend Shahji, but Zulfiqar was now irresistible. Shahji had to yield; on 22nd May he signed a letter of submission, promising to obey the Emperor's orders like a faithful vassal in future, to cease from assisting Rajaram in any way (such as sending provisions into Jinji through the Vetavalam wood), to pay the Mughal Government a tribute of 30 lakhs of rupees annually, (of which 20 lakhs were to be paid down in cash, jewels and elephants, and 10 lakhs next year), and to cede the forts of Palamkota, Sittanur (?) and Tunganur with their dependent districts as well as Kul-Manargudi, Shri-mushnam, Tittagudi, Trinnanur (?), Elavanasore, Kalakurchi, Pandalum*, etc., which had been mortgaged to him by Rajaram. This cession of territory was to take the place of a contingent of 1000 horse and 4000 foot which he had originally agreed to supply for the Emperor's service. The Mughal general, on his part, granted the Maharajah a *qaulnama* or letter of assurance, accepting the above terms and promising to procure for him an imperial *farman* pardoning his offences and recognising his title and kingdom.* [Mackenzie Collection.] Shahji II. made, in addition to the above, large gifts to Zulfiqar Khan and his officers. Out of the stipulated tribute 17 lakhs were paid down and the remaining three lakhs were promised when the invaders would retire beyond the Kolerum. [Mackenzie Collection, Mad. Diary.]
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∗ This is on the authority of Bhimsen, an eye-witness, who, however, does not give the date. (Dil. ii. 112b.) But Akhbarat, 14 Nov. 1694, records that the Emperor received a report from Zulfiqar that in the storming of Perumukkal, Aziz Khan, the son of Bahadur Khan Ruhela, had distinguished himself and entered the fort.
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∗ Palamkota, 15 m. s. w. of Chidambaram. Sittanur, 10 m. w. of Tindivanam, (the English records spell it Cittoners, which may also stand for Chidambaram). Tunganur, 4 m. s. w. of Chidambaram, (spelt in the English records as Tank). Kul-Manargudi, 13 m. s. w. s. and Shri-mushnam, 19 m. w. of Chidambaram. Tittagudi, on the n. bank of the Vellar, 17 m.
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But Rajaram, who had mortgaged Palamkota to Vyankoji, sent two or three thousand horse, and seized the fort for himself, so that when (middle of June) Zulfiqar's army appeared before it he was refused admission and had to lay siege to it. After six days of trench warfare, Dalpat Rao by one charge seized the fortified village (*petta*) before the fort-gate, losing 150 of his Rajputs in killed and wounded. The garrison then capitulated, but
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s. w. of Vriddhachalam. *Trinnanur* (in English *Imrapur*), 27 m. n. e. e. of Trichi. *Pandalum*, 11 m. n. of Kalakurchi, which is 15 m. w. of Elavanasore. *Elavanasore*, 17 m. n. w. of Vriddhachalam.
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∗ A robe of honour, a jewelled pendant and an elephant were ordered by the Emperor to be presented to Shahji. [Akhbarat, 27 Aug. and 3 Sep. 1694.]
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escaped by the postern gate under cover of the night, 23rd June 1694. [*Dil.*, 114b; *Akhbarat*, 18 July.]
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Then the Mughal army returned to its base at Wandiwash by way of Tiru-vadi, and made another attack on Jinji in September,—this time taking care to plant outposts in the Vetavalam forest through which provisions used to enter the fort. [*Dil.*, 115b, *Akhbarat*, 22 Sep.] In this month Zulfiqar suddenly arrested Yachapa at a darbar and had him beheaded on the charge of treason, with the previous sanction of the Emperor; "of the Nayak's family then with him all slew one another, and his property was looted by the camp."*
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§ 23. Zulfiqar's movements and difficulties, 1695.
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Zulfiqar Khan renewed the siege of Jinji towards the close of the year 1694, but it was a mere show intended to deceive the Emperor. The fact of his treasonable collusion with the Marathas was notorious in the country. Francois Martin, the founder of Pondicherry, who was in close and constant touch with the Court of Jinji "frequently in his letters and Memoirs, expressed the opinion that Zulfiqar Khan had, during the course and particularly at the end of the siege of Jinji, an understanding with Rajaram; in expectation of the death of the very old Aurangzib and the civil wars that would fatally follow among his sons, he had conceived the ambition of carving out for himself an independent principality, and with that object he wished to placate (manage) the Marathas." (Kaeppelin, 295 n.) So, too, the English merchants of Madras record on 5th November 1696: "Zulfiqar Khan has been frequently ordered to take Jinji, and it has been in his power to do so and destroy all the Marathas in the country. But instead of that it appears plain that he hath joined council with them." Even Bhimsen, the right-hand man of Zulfiqar's right-hand man Dalpat Rao, frankly charges the Khan with treasonable neglect of duty: "If he had wished it, he could have captured the fort on the very day that he reached Jinji. But it is the practice of generals to prolong operations (for their own profit and ease)." And, again, "God alone knows what policy he adopted." [Dil., 123a and 106a.] Manucci says the same thing [iii. 271.]
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∗ *Dil.* ii. 116a; *Madras Diary*, 18 and 22 Sep. 1694. Manucci (iii. 271—2) gives horrible details of this suicide and also asserts that Zulfiqar falsely accused Yachapa of treason and killed him, because the Nayak had written a letter to the Emperor exposing Zulfiqar's treasonable collusion with the Marathas and deliberate prolongation of the siege of Jinji, and offering to capture the fort in eight days by his own troops alone, but the letter had been intercepted by Asad Khan.
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In October 1694, Zulfiqar suddenly marched out of Wandiwash and encamped north of the Changamon fort and pass (42 miles west of Jinji), the Marathas hovering round him and making daily incursions into his camp, in which they carried off horses. The Mughal cavalry, in its turn, harassed and plundered the country round, carrying away both men and goods. "At Wandiwash the people fled in fear of the Muhammadan army and took refuge in the Changamon hill." There was much disagreement at this time between Zulfiqar and his chief officers,—especially Daud Khan Pani, Kishore Singh Hada, and Dalpat Rao Bundela,—who were absurdly credited in public rumour with a design to seize him and send him in chains to the Emperor. The Khan, so it was reported, had sent ten camels laden with rupees for Rajaram, but they had been intercepted by Daud Khan. Another report was that the Marathas, by poisoning the waters and mixing milk-hedges in some of the tanks, had killed a great number of people. [Mad. Diary, 10 Nov. 1694.] Then after taking two or three small forts from the Marathas and receiving three lakhs of Rupees sent from the Court, the Mughal general marched to Saddam (at the end of December, 1694).
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Early in April 1695 one of his chief officers, Sarafraz Khan, quarrelled with him and marched away to the Court without his permission. We read in the Court news-letters reports about other desertions from his army. Nothing was achieved by the Mughals during 1695, while the scarcity of grain which raged there for the entire year intensified their sufferings. Siege was laid to Vellore in October, but it held out for many years. Early in December came the alarming news that a large Maratha army of 15,000 men under the dreaded Santa and Dhana was marching to the Eastern Karnatak and that they had already crushed Qasim Khan, the governor of the uplands of Mysore, (capital Sera). On hearing of this disaster, the imperialists took fright and prepared to decamp and send their families to places like Madras for protection. [Mad. Diary, 5 Dec. 1695.]
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§ 24. Operations during 1696.
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Dhana Jadav arrived near Vellore at the end of December. Zulfiqar immediately raised the siege, sent off his camp baggage and family to Arcot, and prepared for action. The Maratha general had turned aside towards Jinji, and then roving further south had besieged the Mughal faujdar in Tiru-vadi. Zulfiqar, coming up promptly in pursuit, relieved the outpost, drove Dhana away,* and fell back on Arcot. But the situation changed entirely against the Mughals in March, when Santa Ghorpare arrived on the scene. The Maratha bands spread to several parts of the country, the imperialists with their depleted numbers could not defend so many places. [Mad. Diary, 20 Jan. 1696.] Zulfiqar wisely concentrated his forces; but throughout this year 1696 he was hampered by his extreme want of money, "having received no supply from the Emperor." He vainly begged the English merchants of Madras for a loan of one lakh of *hun*, for which he offered to mortgage to them any part of the country. [*Mad. Diary*, 3 March.] In October he became exasperated by their persistent refusal, and threatened an attack on their city.
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∗ Akhbarat, 18 Jan. 1696.
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In April 1696 Zulfiqar had beaten back Santaji near Arni, but thereafter he confined himself solely to the defensive in the fort of Arcot, as his strength was still further weakened by the death of his captain Rajah Kishore Singh Hada. [*Dil.* 118*b*.] The Marathas, as usual, hovered round him, there being a secret understanding between the two sides to spare each other.
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In November it was reported that treasure sent by the Emperor for Zulfiqar had reached Kadapa. Santa immediately marched in that direction to intercept it. Zulfiqar set out after him, but Santa changed his plan and the Khan after three marches fell back on Arcot. Santa entered the Bijapur uplands or Central Mysore instead, and Zulfiqar, under orders of the Emperor, pursued him there and co-operated with Prince Bidar Bakht, who had reached that province from the north-west for expelling the Marathas from beyond the Tungabhadra. These two Mughal forces united near Penu-konda (75 miles north of Bangalore). The elusive Marathas disappeared without offering battle, and Zulfiqar returned to Arcot in February 1697. [*Dil.*, 121*b* ; *Mad. Diary*, 31 Dec. 1696.]
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§ 25. Operations during 1697 : Siege renewed.
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But his money difficulties were as great as ever, and he again left Arcot to collect tribute from Tanjore and other places in the south. This source was soon exhausted, "he spent all this money in a short time, but could not clear the arrears of his soldiers' pay." [Dil., 121b.] Then by way of Trikolur and Trinomali he returned to Wandiwash to canton for the rainy season. Happily for him, the Marathas were now very much weakened by a bitter and final rupture between Dhana and Santaji, the rivals for the post of commander-in-chief. Rajaram sided with Dhana, an internecine war raged among the Marathas, and finally Dhana was defeated by his rival and driven back to Maharashtra (May 1696). "Among the Marathas not much union was seen. Every one called himself a sardar and went out to plunder (on his own account)." [Dil., 122a ; Z.S.]
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Rajaram was as much in want of money as the Mughals. In August he sent his natural son Karna to Zulfiqar (through the mediation of Ram Singh Hada), offering to make peace on certain conditions. But Aurangzib was inexorable: he rejected the terms, and issued peremptory orders to Zulfiqar to capture Jinji without further delay. So, the Mughal general sent Karna back to his father in the middle of October, and early in November 1697 renewed the siege of Jinji in right earnest. [Dil., 122b, Z. S., Mad. Diary, 26 Oct.]
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He himself took post opposite the northern gate towards the Singhavaram hill; Ram Singh Hada west of the fort, facing the postern gate Shaitan-dari (*Port du Diable*); and Daud Khan Pani before Chikkali-durg, a mile south of Jinji. Though Daud Khan's division lacked artillery and siege-materials, he captured Chikkali-durg in one day by a reckless assault at close quarters, and then, coming to Jinji itself, entrenched opposite Chandrayan-garh, the southern fort. If Zulfiqar had wished it, he could have taken the entire fort the next day. But his secret policy was to prolong the siege in order to keep his army together, enjoy his emoluments, and escape the hardships of active duty on some new expedition. He let the Marathas know that his attacks were for show only, and that he would give Rajaram sufficient notice to escape before he captured the fort. Thus, the siege dragged on for two months more.*
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∗ Wilkes (i. 133),—"To preserve appearances it was necessary to report [to the Emperor] frequent attacks and repulses. On the other side, Daud Khan, second in command of the Mughal army, drank largely of the best European liquors, and when full of the god would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of the infidels. Zulfiqar necessarily assented to these enterprises, but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and place of attack; and the troops of Daud Khan were as often repulsed with slaughter." But Bhimsen, who was present in the camp and accuses Zulfiqar of collusion with the Marathas, does not report more than one assault by Daud Khan.
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§ 26. The fall of Jinji fort and escape of Rajaram.
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At last this sham warfare could not be kept up any longer, and it became necessary for Zulfiqar to capture the fort if he wished to avoid disgrace and punishment by his master. Rajaram received timely warning, and escaped to Vellore, with his chief officers, but leaving his family behind. Then Zulfiqar gave the order for the assault. While Daud Khan with a large force was noisily exploring a track for scaling Chandrayan-garh from the south and had drawn the defenders to that side, Dalpat Rao scaled the northern walls of Krishna-giri and captured the outer fort after a severe struggle. The garrison retreated to an inner fort called Kalakot, which Dalpat's Bundelas entered pell-mell with them and occupied. The surviving Marathas took refuge in Rajgarh or the highest fort.
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Meantime Daud Khan had made his way into Chandrayan-garh and advanced through the city or the low inner plain of Jinji towards Krishna-giri. The inhabitants fled to the top of Krishna-giri, but finding no safety there, capitulated. A vast amount of booty in horses, camels and things fell into the hands of the imperialists.
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Rajaram's family was now invested in Rajgarh, the highest and strongest of the three forts in Jinji. But their situation was hopeless. Dalpat held the gate of Kalakot; Zulfiqar who had entered by the northern* gate, held the entrance to Rajgarh fort; and finally Ram Singh Hada made his way to the summit of Rajgarh by crossing the chasm at its foot by means of a wooden gangway. The Maratha royal family begged for safety, which was promised to them, and *palkis* were sent for their conveyance. Four wives, three sons and two daughters of Rajaram now came out of the citadel and were kept in honourable captivity. Another wife of the Rajah avoided surrender; she flung herself down from the summit of the fort into the sheer depths below. Her head struck a projecting rock and she was killed instantly, but her mangled corpse was caught in the branches of a tree on the hillside at an inaccessible place and there it lay without funeral. Nearly 4000 men, women and children were found in the fort, but very few combatants.† [*Dil.* 124.]
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∗ Bhimsen (124a) says that the commander-in-chief entered by opening the Shaitan-dari, which had been bricked up: then he met and congratulated Dalpat Rao, and the two entered Kalakot together. I think that this is a mistake for the Vellore gate, because Ram Singh was posted opposite the Shaitan-dari, while Zulfiqar's post was a mile north-east of it, near the northern or Vellore gate.
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† *M. A.* 391 explicitly says that Jinji was captured on 6th Shaban 41st year of Aurangzib (=7th Feb. 1698). The *Madras Diary* of 2nd January 1698 records: "A letter from Amir Jahan from the Mughal camp received to-day advises that the Nawab has taken the Jinji forts all but one which also offers to capitulate." If we read *Rajab* instead of *Shaban* in *M. A.*, we get 8th Jan. Bhimsen (135a) says that the fort fell on a *Sankranti*, which would give 2nd or 31st January.
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Zulfiqar then supervised the collection and safe storing of the property and war-materials found in the captured fort. He put to death many of the Maratha officers who had fought against him. The ravages made by the siege in the fort-walls were repaired and the foot-tracks for scaling the hill were all closed. Rockets and gunpowder manufactured at St. Thome were accumulated in the fort for its defence. [Dil. 124b; Mad. Diary.]
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From Jinji Zulfiqar returned to his base at Wandiwash, and then pursued Rajaram from Vellore to Garamkonda.* But the Maratha king had a good start of him and escaped to Vishalgarh in safety (Feb.). Thus the entire work of the Emperor's long siege of Jinji was undone. The bird had flown away.
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Chitnis (ii. 58), as usual is grossly incorrect, giving Chaitra pratipad Sudi 1618=23rd March 1696 as the date of the capture!
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∗ On the way back from Garamkonda, Zulfiqar made an attack on Vellore [which, however, fell to Daud Khan as late as 14th Aug. 1702, see Storia, iii. 420], and reached Wandiwash about 7th April. He was recalled to the Emperor's side a year later, and leaving Jinji in charge of Jamshid Khan, started for the Court on 25th April, 1699. [Akhbarat.]