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Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c16: Chapter XII. Downfall of Ahmad Shah

Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c16

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Chapter XII. Downfall of Ahmad Shah

§ 1. Difficulties of imperial Government after Safdar Jang's departure

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The Emperor Ahmad Shah reigned for six months only after the end of Safdar Jang's rebellion, and these were months of unceasing disorder in and outside the capital and increasing misery and degradation of the Crown. The retreat of the vanquished ex-wazir from the contest with his sovereign did not bring peace and prosperity back to the Delhi Government, nor could this single cause effect such a miracle. This hectic struggle had exhausted the wealth of the Emperor, dried up the sources of revenue, and left his Government overwhelmed with debt. In the course of it, he and his advisers had to concentrate all their thought and resources on the one task of defeating the enemy at the gate and had to neglect everything else. When this danger had at last rolled away, it was found that the work before them was nothing less than the building up of a new empire out of chaos. For such a task neither Ahmad Shah nor his Chancellor or army Chief was gifted. To the utter bankruptcy of the Treasury was added the deadly jealousy between the two highest ministers of State which was unmasked in all its shamelessness by the exit of their common foe. As early as a month before Safdar Jang's breach with the Emperor, the shrewd Marātha agent at Delhi had noted that the Turāni party was internally divided and formed four factions none of which would obey or work with any other. [S. P. D. xxi. 55.] During the war with Safdar Jang, Imād had openly taunted the new wazir with cowardice for preferring to remain with the Emperor within shelter of Delhi's walls while throwing the brunt of the actual fighting upon him and his personal contingent. He had later suffered from the wazir's duplicity and mischief-making in secretly negotiating a peace with Safdar Jang, while the Emperor's publicly declared policy was that of war to the death with that rebel. The timid powerless sovereign, placed between these two strong rivals, tried to save himself by lying to Imād, while he secretly followed Intizam's counsel. After Safdar Jang's departure, an open clash between the wazir and the Bakhshi was inevitable, and when Ahmad Shah chose to side with Intizām he was bound to be involved in his wazir's fate.

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This civil war had left a legacy of debt which it was beyond any man’s power to liquidate. The new imperial levies and allies, numbering 80,000 fighting men, cost* at the lowest estimate 24 lakhs of Rupees a month and they had been embodied for seven months, so that the total charge under this head amounted to one kror and 68 lakhs. In addition to this, the existing old army had been in arrears of salary for over two years at the outbreak of the civil war. And this happened at a time when the Emperor could hardly raise two lakhs by selling his plate and jewellery, the bankers were refusing to advance money on the strength of an order on the revenue of any province, and even the Delhi agent of the chief banker of Bengal (called Nagar-seth in TAh. but better known as Jagat-seth) had been drained dry in the lean years before the war. Therefore, the last six months of Ahmad Shah’s reign were continually disturbed by the tumults of the starving unpaid soldiery in an even more aggravated form than during Jāvid Khan’s regime. The officials and menials of the palace were unpaid for 32 months (1753.) The Court accused Imād and his right hand man Aqibat Mahmud of putting the soldiers up to make these demonstrations against the Government, in order to increase its helplessness. The Emperor gave the blank reply that he had placed all his treasure and territory in charge of Imād and had nothing with him now to give to anybody. As he told Imād on 28th December, 1753, "Pay the musketeers of the Top-khānah from the 15 lakhs I have entrusted to you. Pay the salaries of the other regiments, especially the Sin-dāgh risāla out of the revenue of Ballamgarh and the subah of Allahabad which I have conferred upon you. I leave you full power, but do not practise oppression." [TAh. 103b.]

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∗ The Marātha agent in Delhi reported that a trooper cost one Rupee a day in Delhi (S.P.D. xxi. 55, Aiti Patr. ii. 89.) Ghaziuddin reduced the pay of his troopers to Rs. 30 a month in 1751. The pay of the Ruhela soldiers was, as a matter of grace to a bankrupt State and a temporary concession, fixed at 12 annas per trooper and 4 annas per infantryman in Sep. 1753. [TAh. 67 a.] The normal monthly salary of the cavalry was Rs. 50 each.

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The most pressing creditors of State were the Ruhela and Maratha auxiliaries and the Badakhshi brigade lured away from Safdar Jang's side, for whose monthly salary Imād as Bakhshi was directly responsible. Imād, therefore, first set himself to reconquer the district south of Delhi where Jāt usurpers predominated in the villages, and he planned to attack thereafter the great Jāt kingdom of Bharatpur and levy a large tribute. At the same time the Ruhela leader Najib Khan* tried to recover his dues by violence. Aqibat Mahmud reported to the Emperor that the Ruhelas were dunning Imād for their arrears and had practically kept him in confinement on 16th and 17th November. Soon afterwards a settlement was made: "The dues of Najib Khan Ruhela and Bahādur Khan Baluch, amounting to 15 lakhs, were assigned on the revenue of the Ganges-Jamunā doāb and certain villages east of the Ganges, which had formerly been in the possession of the Ruhelas. So the Ruhelas left Delhi for their homes (26th Nov.) But immediately after crossing the Jamunā they invested Patparganj and seizing the headman of the place demanded lakhs of Rupees from that mart and beat him; they did the same thing at Shāhdara, and after forcibly occupying the toll-offices (nāka) on the river bank robbed the wayfarers. They left Patparganj only after taking Rs. 35,000." In March next, Najib Khan dispossessed the official collector of Sarhind, and in April occupied Saharanpur and the wazir's jagirs in that region, but restored them in May 1754. [TAh. 87a-88b, 121a, 125a.]

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∗ As early as 13th Sept. 1753 the Emperor owed 25 lakhs to the Ruhela soldiery and could pay only 4 lakhs on the 16th [TAh. 67 a].

§ 2. Imād's conquest of the district south of Delhi; murder of Balu Jat

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Imād's chief agent Aqibat Mahmud Khan opened the campaign of reconquest in the Faridabad district, south of Delhi, which lay in the Bakhshi's *jāgir*. Here the leading disturber of law and order was Balu Jāt. When Aqibat went with 500 Badakhshi and 2,000 Maratha troopers and demanded the revenue of the district and the tribute due to the Emperor, Balu resiled from his promise and showed fight. Imād sent 7,000 more troops and 30 pieces of light artillery with rockets to Aqibat to match the guns of Ballamgarh. After some fighting Balu made his submission, saw Aqibat and agreed to pay the rent and tribute due from him. Then Aqibat advanced to Palwal, 14 miles south of Ballamgarh, but found the peasants afraid to pay him rent lest Balu should demand it again. The revenue-collector of the place, whom Balu had ousted, told Aqibat that unless he captured Ballamgarh and killed Balu he would fail to get control over the administration of the district. A *thānahdār* sent by him to Fathpur village was turned out by the *ryots* at Balu's bidding. Aqibat, therefore, marched back to a plain near Ballamgarh and asked Balu to come and settle the revenue demand. Balu arrived with his *diwān*, one son and an escort of 250 men. Aqibat demanded payment, saying that as Imād had made the peace for him and the Emperor was pressing Imād for the tribute, Imād in his turn was censuring Aqibat for negligence at this delay in collecting the money. The Jāt chief replied defiantly, "I have not brought the money in my pocket. I only promised to pay the tribute after collecting the rents. If you want to wrest this tract from me, you will have to fight for it." High words were exchanged and Balu in anger laid his hand on the hilt of his sword. But the Badakhshis surrounding Aqibat’s *pālki* fell upon him and slew him with his son, his *diwān* and nine other men* (29 November, 1753.) The garrison of Ballamgarh kept up a fire till midnight, after which they evacuated the fort. Aqibat took possession of it with all its artillery and armament and gave the other property within up to plunder by his soldiers. The district was conferred upon Imād.

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Aqibat quickly followed up this success. In the following week he sacked the walled villages of Mitnaul and Hathin (12m. s. and s. w. of Palwal), the refractory peasants of which had offered fight all day and fled away at night. He then attacked the small mud-forts of the Jāts all around Palwal and brought them under his rule. Then after a visit to Delhi, he started (27 December) again for the Faridabad district, taking Khandoji Holkar and his troops to assist him in the campaign. But he could not control the Faridabad district, as his soldiers refused to obey his agents, and the Jāts seized this opportunity to expel the outposts set up by him at Garhi Hathin and other newly conquered places. So, he appealed to his master to come in person, and Imād issued from Delhi to Ballamgarh.

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∗ *TAh.* 89a-92a. Khwājah Aftab Kh, the jamadar of Badakhshis, who had cut off Balu’s head, was rewarded with the two pearl pendants taken from the Jat’s ears. The head was exposed on a pillar by the roadside near Faridabad (92b, 98b.) Ballamgarh was named *Nizamgarh* after Imād’s new title Nizamulmulk Asaf Jah. (106b.)

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Khandoji encamped at Hodal (17m. s. of Palwal) and sent detachments which plundered the Jāt villages all around, even as far as Barsāna and Nandgāon (12 and 17 miles south), ousting Suraj Mal’s son from them and establishing Marātha posts there (end of December 1753.) This strengthened Aqibat’s position and he sacked the Jāt village of Ghangaula (9m. s.w. of Ballamgarh) belonging to a brother of Balu and planted his own thānah there (5 Jan. 1754.) On 8th January, Imad advanced from Ballamgarh to Palwal and got into touch with Khandoji at Hodal. The fort of Ghāsera (15 miles due west of Palwal) had been wrested by Suraj Mal from Bahādur Singh Bargujar on 23 April 1753, after that chieftain had slain his women and rushed to death in battle at the head of 25 desperate followers. Imād appointed Bahādur’s son Fath Singh master of his father’s fort, which the Jāt garrison had now evacuated in terror. Thus a mortal enemy of the Jāts was planted there with orders to attack their hamlets around. In short, most of the Jāt homes on both banks of the Jamunā now fell into Imād’s hands and his rule was established even as far south as Mathurā and Agra, from which the Jāt usurpers fled away. Another officer expelled the Jāt force that had seized Koil (Aligarh) and Jalesar. Imad sent his men to restore the civil administration in all these long-disturbed places and to induce the peasants to return to cultivation (middle of January.) Soon afterwards the Marāthas laid siege to Kumbher and Khandoji was called there. [TAh. 93b, 94b, 102a, 104b-107a.]

§ 3. New Maratha army arrives in the North; its policy

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At the outbreak of Safdar Jang’s rebellion, the Peshwā had received an appeal for help from the Emperor and repeated letters from his agents in Delhi to send a strong force to Hindustan in order to maintain the Maratha position there, retain hold of the concessions previously granted, and to improve them by taking advantage of the civil war. Both sides sent agents to bid for Marātha armed support, but the Peshwā wisely decided not to back the rebel wazir. Of his troops, however, only 4,000 had reached Delhi early enough to take part in the opening battles and to receive regular pay from the imperial Government. These were reinforced later by fresh detachments, probably not exceeding 6,000 horse. The main Maratha army, however, was directed to sit on the fence, watch for the end of the civil war and then join the victor or take advantage of the exhaustion of both sides, so as to increase the Maratha domination in the North. This main army, led by the Peshwa's younger brother Raghunāth Rāo, was joined by Malhar Holkar on the Narmadā (22 Sep.-5 Oct., 1753), traversed a part of Malwa, and then crossed the Mukundarā pass (29 Oct.) into Jaipur territory, because he heard that peace had been made between the Emperor and Safdar Jang. But a body of 4,000 horse under Khandoji, the son of Malhar Holkar, arrived near Delhi and encamped at the tank of Kishandās on 21 November.

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By this time Safdar Jang had withdrawn from the field, and now began a shameful scramble between Intizām and Imād for winning this Maratha force over to his side. Imād visited Khandoji the day after his arrival. On the 25th the wazir sent Rajah Jugalkishor to the young Marātha chief, who refused to see him, saying, "Malharji has sent me to the Mir Bakhshi. I have nothing to do with any one else." On 1st December, the Emperor called Bāpu Rao Hingané, Antāji Mānkeshwar and other Marātha agents in Delhi and held a prolonged discussion with them and the wazir. The wazir desired that the Marātha generals who had come should dissociate themselves from the Bakhshi, and follow the wazir's directions. The Deccanis refused, as they wished to be friendly with the Nizām's family for guarding their interests in the South and had designs against Suraj Mal whose protector was the wazir and enemy the Bakhshi. So they ended the conference with the evasive reply, "After the arrival of Raghunāth Rao and Malhar whatever is considered expedient by them will be done." Not daunted by this rebuff, the Emperor led by his wazir, sent to Khandoji 22,000 gold coins and robes of honour and other presents on 10th December; but the Maratha scornfully rejected them with the remark, "I am not a servant of the Emperor that he should bestow *khilats* on me. I have come here at my father's order to join the Bakhshi in his campaign against Suraj Mal. My father will arrive after a few days. Speak to him and give him what you have to say and to give." The gold coins offered as an inducement for his going back from Delhi and saving the environs from daily pillage, were also rejected, at the Bakhshi's instigation. Three days later, the desperate wazir sent Rajah Devidat to the *diwān* of Khandoji to negotiate for an alliance with him. Nothing could kindle a sense of shame in this degraded Court. On the 23rd the Emperor sent a eunuch to sound Khandoji, but he answered as before that he had come to assist the Bakhshi and had no concern with the Emperor's service. Then the Emperor appealed to Imād, and Aqibat was sent to persuade Khandoji to visit the Emperor. [*TAh.* 88a-98b.]

§ 4. Khandoji Holkar's audience with the Emperor

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The 26th of December was fixed for the interview, which was held in a tent in the Nili Chhatri garden, close to the Jamuna, north of the fort. The chamberlain of the audience hall, before ushering him in, asked the Maratha what he had brought as present (*nazar* and *nisār*) for the sovereign. Khandoji replied that he had brought no gold coin with himself as he had no idea of an interview, but had come to bathe in the Jamunā for the conjunction of the moon, when Aqibat Mahmud brought him by importunity to the Presence. The chamberlain took 21 mohars out of his own pocket, placed them before the Emperor, and cried out "Khandoji presents a *nazar* of a hundred *mohars*, an elephant, and a horse." The Emperor ordered the customary *khilat* for him, but when Khandoji was taken to an anteroom to be invested in this robe of honour, he declined it, saying, "If Antāji Mānkeshwar, who was once our servant but has been created a peer of this Court, is never allowed to come to the Presence in future, then only can I accept a *khilat*." After a long wrangle the helpless eunuchs agreed to this condition, robed him, and led him back to the Presence, where the new courtier made only two bows of thanksgiving in the place of the customary four. When a sword was ordered to be presented to him, he at first demanded that the Emperor should sling it round his neck with his own hands and could be made to accept it from the hands of the armoury officer with the greatest difficulty. Thereafter he again made only two *taslims*! The Emperor at last said, "I had called you only to assist me in fighting Safdar Jang. Now that by the grace of God that business is over, I give you *conge* to return home. When I need you again, I shall summon you." Khandoji replied, "I am now under your blessed feet, and wish to remain here." The Emperor repeatedly gave him formal leave to depart but he made no reply.

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In fact, Khandoji, besides being immoderately proud of his troops and bravery, used to remain day and night under the intoxication of wine and could not hold any polite conversation with the Emperor. At last he made two bows and was dismissed. He was next taken by order to the wazir's house where he was hospitably entertained till midnight.[*TAh.* 99*b*-100*b*.]

§ 5. Maratha siege of Kumbher, death of Khande Rao Holkar

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The Marathas had imposed claims to *chauth* or contribution upon various Rājput States ever since Bāji Rāo's visit in 1736 and particularly in connection with the succession disputes in the three States of Bundi, Jaipur and Mārwār. At the end of September 1753, a powerful army under the Peshwa's younger brother Raghunāth Rāo crossed the Narmadā to realise these dues. Joined by Malhar Holkar, he entered Jaipur territory and spent over two months there (9 Nov. 1753-15 Jan. 1754), securing payment from Jaipur (12 lakhs) and several smaller States. Suraj Mal, who had formed a secret defensive understanding with Mādho Singh during their return from Delhi after making peace with the Emperor, had sent his envoy Ruprām Kothāri to the Maratha camp. Malhar had demanded two *krores* from him on the ground that Suraj Mal had gathered much more than that amount in his plunder of the suburbs of Delhi. The Jāt envoy offered four lakhs for buying the Marathas off, in addition to the Emperor's regular tribute; but Malhar would not accept it and invaded the Jāt country. Inspired by Suraj Mal, the heir and minister of the old king Badan Singh, the Jāt nobles decided on resisting this illegal demand and put their forts in a strong posture of defence, while their common soldiers were animated by a keen sense of brotherhood and the proud consciousness of never having been defeated.

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When the Maratha army approached the famous Jāt forts of Dig (16 Jan. 1754), Bharatpur and Kumbher, they were driven back by the fire of the artillery on the walls. One pitched battle was fought in the plain with heavy slaughter on both sides, after which Suraj Mal, overcome by the enemy's superior numbers, shut himself up in Kumbher. The Marathas sat down before it, but they had no siege guns, and merely plundered and occupied the country round. Raghunath Rao encamped at Pingaré (near Kumbher) on 20th January and removed to the plain before Kumbher on 28th February, where he continued to stay till 22nd May. Khandé Rāo Holkar was encamped at Hodal early in January, engaged in expelling the Jāt outposts in that district. He was now ordered by his father to march with his 4,000 horse and join in the siege of Kumbher, where he arrived after looting parts of Mewat on his way. Malhar, through his ally Imād-ul-mulk, begged the Emperor for the loan of siege-guns from the imperial arsenals in Delhi and Agra, but Ahmad Shah, tutored by his wazir, delayed compliance on the plea of lack of money to pay his artillerymen and replenish the munitions exhausted during the war with Safdar Jang.

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In March Imād at the call of Malhar marched from Mathura to Kumbher, where Aqibat joined him. But the daily efforts of the allies failed against the fort, because of their want of breaching artillery, while complete investment for stopping ingress and egress was impossible. Khandé Rāo having made covered lanes approached the walls. One day (c. 15 March 1754) he had gone in a *pālki* to inspect his trenches, in his usual tipsy condition, when the fort opened fire and he was killed by a *zamburak* shot. Nine of his wives burnt themselves on his pyre, the only survivor being the little girl Ahalyā Bāi, destined to rise to fame as one of India’s noblest queens and purest saints. Malhar was frantic with grief at the death of his beloved son and vowed to extirpate the Jāts in revenge. He first went to Mathura to perform the funeral rites of his son in that sacred city. Imād came to condole with him, remarking, "Henceforth look upon me as your son in the place of Khando." Suraj Mal, too, professed the deepest sorrow for this issue of war and sent mourning robes for Malhar and Khandé's son. The Emperor, on 9 April, presented robes to Malhar and ornaments to Malhar's wife, through Bāpu Rāo Hingané, in token of his sympathy.

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But the mud-walls of Kumbher laughed the Marātha siege to scorn, as those of Bharatpur did the British half a century later. Skirmishes took place between the rival foraging parties, in which many were slain. The siege dragged on for four months. At last in the middle of May, peace was made; Ruprām, on behalf of his master, gave a written bond to pay the Marāthas Rs. 30 *lakhs* by instalments in three years. In addition to this, the two *krores* which had been previously imposed by Imād as *peshkash* due from the Jāt Rājah to the Emperor, was now agreed to be paid to Imād and the Marāthas instead. So the siege ended; Imād left the place on 18th May and Raghunāth Rāo on the 22nd, and both came to Mathurā. [*TAh.* 108*b*-110*a*, 114*a*, 117*b*, 121*b*, 128*a*. *Sujān Charitra*, Jang vii. incomplete. *S.P.D.*, xxvii, 79, and p. 94.]

§ 6. Conflict between Emperor and Imād

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In the meantime a complete estrangement had taken place between the Emperor and his Bakhshi and an open conflict between the two was shortly to be precipitated which ended in the ruin of Ahmad. In the months following Safdar Jang’s departure, the star of Imād was steadily in the ascendant. He was the organiser of the imperial victory, he was the vanquisher of Safdar Jang, he had thereafter subjugated the turbulent Jāt population of the district south of the capital, and Malhar Holkar was his constant ally. There was no noble in the empire who could stand against him. His one difficulty was from lack of money. He had exhausted all his ancestral hoards and had saddled himself with debt during the six months’ life and death struggle with the ex-wazir. But the public treasury was empty, revenue had ceased to come in from the provinces. The only course open to Imād was to seize the rents of the Crownlands and the other nobles’ jāgirs in the districts within easy distance of the capital. This fact separated the Emperor from him more quickly than his sovereign’s alarm and jealousy, fomented by Intizām, at his growing power.

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When the war with Safdar Jang broke out, it was agreed in the presence of the Emperor and his ministers that all the wealth of the realm should be first devoted to the work of crushing the rebel, and that on his downfall the revenue of the Deccan should be paid by Imād (as Nizam-ul-mulk) into the imperial treasury after deducting the dues of the soldiers, old and newly recruited; the wazir (Intizām) agreed to do the same in respect of the revenue of his provinces of the Panjab and Kashmir; the *subahs* under Safdar Jang would be taken away from him and given, Oudh half and half to the new wazir and Bakhshi, and Allahabad for paying the salary of the *Sindāgh* troops. [*TAh.* 96*a*.] But this scheme did not work as it was based upon many calculations which proved futile in practice, and the trouble about money continued to grow worse. On 20th December 1753, Aqibat went to the Emperor to reassure him and counteract the efforts of his master's enemies at Court. Two days later Imād himself waited on the Emperor, who promised him the *subahdāri* of Allahabad if he remained true to his king and paid him the surplus revenue regularly. [97*b*.] At this time Imād used to make troublesome requests in almost every affair out of enmity to the wazir and thus increased the Emperor's difficulty, though Ahmad Shah very tactfully smoothed these conflicts or overlooked Imād's perversity. But Imad gradually grew disloyal and in the pride of power even dreamt of seizing the throne by setting aside such a cowardly imbecile and false sovereign as Ahmad. [102a & b.]

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On the question of clearing the soldiers' arrears, there was a sharp conflict of opinion between the Emperor and the Paymaster. Imād pressed him to go with him, chastise the rebels in the districts near the capital, collect the rents, or else sell the Jāt kingdom to Muhakam Singh (the son of Churaman) dispossessed by Churaman's nephew Badan Singh. But the Emperor would not leave these affairs in Imād's hands; he listened to the wazir's counsels and often negatived Imād's proposals, holding that the Bakhshi could easily meet his army charges from the estates placed under him. Even when the Emperor entrusted 15 lakhs to Imād for paying the soldiers, the Bakhshi kept the money for himself and provoked daily riots by the starving soldiery against the Emperor, his household officers, and his wazir. [103a—104b.] Early in February 1754, Imād sent a detachment to take possession of Koil and Sikandrabad, which were estates of the Emperor's privy purse, while Aqibat Mahmud squeezed the peasants of Rewāri, another Crownland district. This usurpation dried up the royal income and brought the inmates of the palace to the brink of starvation. At the same time the row of the soldiers in arrears continued for two months in the city of Delhi. The Emperor could do nothing to remedy it; he wrote to the Bakhshi to keep his promise and pay these men, but Imād merely put off a settlement from day to day. [TAh. 109 b, 111b, 113b.]

§ 7. Aqibat Mahmud enters Delhi and terrorises Emperor

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From Kumbher Imād sent repeated requests to the Emperor for the loan of big guns for the siege of that fort, but the Emperor, as advised by the wazir, evaded a reply. At last Aqibat was sent with a strong Maratha force to visit the Emperor and personally press the request for the guns. The Emperor feared that Aqibat was coming in such strength to insult and oppress him. So, he at first thought of offering armed opposition to his entry; he inspected the muster-rolls of the troops available and ordered the city of Delhi to be guarded in force at vital points, as during the war with Safdar Jang. But his officers shrank from the idea of facing Aqibat's superior forces* and nothing was done. And yet the foolish Emperor would not make peace by giving up the guns!

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∗ "16th March 1754. The Emperor was alarmed, but nothing was done to prevent Aqibat from entering the city." "24th March, 1754. Aqibat's agent came to the fort gate and invited the officers of the imperial artillery to join the mutineers

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Aqibat Mahmud entered Delhi on 16th March. The city had then been for several weeks past in the hands of the mutinous soldiery demanding their pay, now 26 months in arrears; law and order had disappeared; the Emperor and the wazir lived besieged in their palaces. The Badakhshi soldiers with Aqibat began to oppress the Hindu jewellers for money (20 March.) On the 24th these troops roved in the suburbs, throwing the city into alarm and driving the Emperor to order his fort artillery men to stand to arms ready for repelling any possible attack. "Aqibat continued to send his servants to seize all men who were reported to be wealthy and extort money from them on the false charge of their being depositories of the wealth of Safdar Jang. In concert with Antāji Mānkeshwar, he used to send men to levy rent and contributions from the Emperor's Crownland and privy purse villages east of the Jamunā. The

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as they had come to secure the due salaries of the latter as well. But the appeal failed and the fort artillery remained loyal. In the evening, the imperial artillery captains (so long on guard) went back to their places. The Emperor was alarmed, but sent no order to any one [against Aqibat] as he knew that none would obey him." [TAh. 115b, 119b.]

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Emperor and the wazir considered it a great gain that they could remain confined in their own houses! To their protests, Aqibat gave a defiant answer, pointing out the huge arrears of the soldiers’ salary and the wazir’s refusal to supply the cannon needed at the siege of Kumbher.” [TAh. 118a—120a.]

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§ 8. Street fighting in Delhi, 8-9 April, 1754.

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At last on 8th April, Aqibat got up a demonstration by his rowdy Badakhshi troops to terrorise the Emperor into yielding the guns. At his instigation the full strength (5,000) of these foreign mercenaries went to all sides of the fort and closed all its entrances and exits. One body of 500 of them appeared below the jharoka window of the palace with loaded muskets and lighted matches and replied to the challenge of the guard above, “We are the Emperor’s soldiers of the Sin-dāgh regiment and have been unpaid for a year. Give us our salary!” Groups of them gathered at every custom-barrier of the city and in the plain outside the fort, stopping traffic and plundering whoever came within their reach. “The Emperor ordered his men not to fight unless attacked. During that day and night none of the men of the imperial artillery and stores who were within the fort could come out for eating any meal, but remained prisoners without food till the noon of next day. The Emperor quaked in extreme alarm.

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After sunset, the Emperor’s palace superintendent Khwājah Bakhtāwar Khan went from the fort to the wazir’s house to arrange for some means of paying these soldiers. When returning, he borrowed five light guns from the wazir by way of defence and carried them in front of his party. When he arrived near the Jama Masjid the Badakhshis by a rush seized these guns, and his handful of guards was borne down by the superior number of the mutineers, many of them being slain in offering resistance. The wazir sent up reinforcements under his artillery officer Mir Barkhurdār Khān, who fired on the rioters, but finding the street blocked cut his way with his Mughalia followers through the crowd and entered the Jama Masjid for safety. The Badakhshis, finding that he had escaped, stood in force in the Faiz Bazār nearby. But they were subjected to a double fire, by Bakhtawar and Barkhurdār, from the houses on the two sides, as they lay unprotected in the street below. The thatches of the shops in the Khās Bazār before the gate of the Jama Masjid caught fire from the discharge of muskets and guns, and at last the Badakhshis fled away losing many men and abandoning the wazir’s *rahkala* they had seized. Bakhtāwar then re-entered the fort, and coming out in full force bombarded the Barādāri house where Aqibat had taken post. The thatched roofs projecting below that building were burnt down by artillery fire and the wall of the Barādāri was breached. Aqibat left it and went to his men on the river bank. Here the Badakhshis attacked a party of imperialists under the eunuch Basant Khan standing below the *jharoka* window, but fire was opened on them from the fort walls and they fled away. At last Aqibat admitted defeat, evacuated the city two hours before dawn, and retreated to Jaisinghpura, after sending a letter protesting his loyalty to the Emperor and pleading the excuse that the rising was due solely to the Badakhshi troops who were starving at not getting their pay. Then the Emperor ordered his men to cease fighting.

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A host of men, including soldiers, sightseers, and bazār people, were slain or had their houses burnt down and their property looted both in the Khās Bazār and also in the Khāri Bāoli quarter,—where another body of Badakhshis had looted, killed and burnt during the course of this night’s street fighting, before they were defeated and driven out by the Lahor Gate. Next morning Delhi looked like a city taken by storm and sacked.*

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Even after his expulsion from Delhi, Aqibat did not cease to give trouble. In the environs of the capital he continued to plunder traders and extort money from well-to-do men wherever heard of,—at Ghāziud-din-nagar on 16th April, Sikandrabad on 27th and 28th April, and so on,—pretending all the time that he was helpless as his unpaid Turkish troops (Badakhshis) had taken the reins out of his hands. [*TAh. 125a, 127a.*] Thus, all things were steadily working up to an open clash between the Emperor and Imād, or the total dissolution of government; but it was a polar difference of State policy between them that actually precipitated the catastrophe.

§ 10. Wazir's plan for rescuing the Emperor from Imad and the Marathas

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The civil war had left Imād as indisputably the most powerful and renowned noble at the Court of Delhi. His large and seasoned personal contingent and his close and staunch alliance with the Marathas (who now stood aloof from the Emperor) would have made his power irresistible if the Jāt Rājah could be crushed and the fabulous wealth hoarded in his strongholds seized by the Bakhshi, because the Jats now remained as the only people capable of opposing Imād’s overgrown strength. Nothing could then prevent him from deposing the house of Timur and taking the throne himself. Intizām, who was an intriguing politician, though no soldier, therefore contrived from the outset to save Safdar Jang from total annihilation, maintain the Jāt power intact, and rally these two and the Rājput Rajahs in a coalition under the Emperor’s banners for expelling the Marathas from Hindustan and effectually guarding the imperial dominions from their encroachments in future. If Imād persisted in allying himself with these enemies of the State, he was to be crushed. The sword-arm of this new imperial defensive policy was to be the Hindu princes of Rajputana ‘‘whose lands were every year worse ravaged by the Marāthas than the imperial territory’’ [Muz. 88], and the Jats of Bharatpur, whose accumulated hoards had excited the envy and greed of the professional spoilers from the South. This bold plan of action was to be stiffened by the adhesion of Safdar Jang’s long experience, eminent position in the peerage, and command of a body of veterans. For building up this coalition it was necessary for these late enemies to meet together, exchange personal assurances and oaths with the Emperor, and settle the terms quickly at a conference. Intizām, therefore, arranged that the Emperor should go out of Delhi (where he was no better than a prisoner of the soldiery), to Sikandrabad on the plea of hunting and visiting the State gardens, and there meet Suraj Mal and Safdar Jang to whom secret letters of invitation had been sent, and then their combined forces would open the campaign. For this the imperial heavy artillery was to be taken out of Delhi, ostensibly for the Sovereign's escort, but really for giving the necessary support to his attempt to recover the Crownlands on that side from the hands of the rebels who had seized them.

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∗ *TAh. 112a-124a. D.C. (differs in details.) Muz. 85-86.

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In pursuance of this policy, the new wazir had persistently influenced the Emperor to evade Imād's demand for taking away all the provincial governments from Safdar Jang and turning him into a beggar, and also to save Suraj Mal from destruction by withholding the big guns so pressingly demanded by Imād for helping the Marathas to take Kumbher. He had also secured the Emperor's reluctant pardon for Safdar's two foremost Hindu officers Rajah Lachhmi Narayan and Jugalkishor as early as 19th December 1753, and an order for the restoration of their escheated house and property on 17th May 1754. [T Ah. 96b; DC.]

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Such a policy of action required for its success courage and initiative on the part of the leaders. But the Emperor was constantly absorbed in drink or pleasure, his wazir was incompetent, and both were extremely timid and fond of ease. The Queen-mother, too, with feminine obstinacy and pique now opposed the idea of coming to friendly terms with the ex-rebel Safdar Jang [Siyar, iii. 49.] The result was that Intizām’s fine paper-scheme of a confederacy and restoration of imperial authority broke down when put in operation, and this one event of the march to Sikandrabad caused the instant and irretrievable ruin of Ahmad Shah and his wazir. Delhi historians have charged Intizām with treachery to his master for this failure; but there is no valid ground for this view. The character of these two chiefs made such a catastrophe as inevitable as the working of destiny.

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§ 11. The Emperor marches to Sikandrabad.

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But how was the insolvent sovereign to make this royal journey with all his family, household staff and artillery? The gunners refused to move unless their arrears were paid; the royal elephants had been kept fasting for four days at a time and grown too weak to carry loads; there was no draught bullock left in the artillery department; the imperial stores were denuded of their materials; no menial or porter could be secured and no cart hired except for cash, of which there was none in the Treasury. But somehow or other, the Emperor with his mother and wazir made a start from Delhi and went to Luni on 27th April; the other princesses and the royal artillery arrived a few days later. Aqibat Mahmud then fell back from Ghaziabad (10m. s. e. of Luni) to Sikandrabad, plundering the wayfarers and the carts of food-stuff coming to Delhi. The wazir kept urging the Emperor to advance to Sikandrabad for recovering that tract of Crownlands from the usurpers. The Emperor at last consented, in spite of his lack of the money and material necessary for the journey and the projected compaign. Leaving Luni on 8th May, he reached a camp a few miles beyond Sikandrabad on the 17th. Meantime, Aqibat, after extorting Rs. 50,000 from the local traders in cloth and ghee by attaching their waggons of goods on the roads, had fallen back further south to Khurja, and the Emperor's administration was restored at Sikandrabad.

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Here came the alarming news that Imād and the Marāthas having made peace with the Jāts had reached Mathurā, evidently intending to attack the Emperor or his capital with their overwhelming forces. Aqibat now sought an interview with Ahmad Shah through the wazir, who always "preferring peace to fighting," agreed. The Emperor felt himself utterly helpless and faced with ruin. On Friday the 24th of May, he prayed long in his tent and wept before God.

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Aqibat came and interviewed him. The subtle Kashmiri wore a *darvish's* frock ("a long *gul-ārmāni* robe known in India as the badge of a man who has abandoned the world," *Muz.* 89), and whined that he was bent on retiring to a life of asceticism as his master Imād did not appreciate him. The Emperor was taken in and gave him a post in his own service! Then Aqibat took leave for Khurja, promising to bring that district under his new master's control.

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Next day Aqibat wrote to inform the Emperor that Malhar Holkar was marching on Delhi with 50,000 horse, intending to release some prince from the State-prison of Salim-garh and crown him. At this news Ahmad Shah was unnerved and decided on returning to Delhi; but he took no precaution, nor posted patrols round his camp, as no Maratha had been reported within 50 miles of him. He only sent his advance-tents on the 25th towards Jhaunsi (10m. n. of Sikandrabad) on the way to Delhi, intending to march there the next day. [*TAh.* 125b-128b. *Muz.* 89-90. *Siyar*, 49.]

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§ 12. Malhar surprises imperial camp at Sikandrabad, 26 May 1754.

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But in the night between, spies brought the news that 20,000 Maratha light horse under Malhar had arrived within 24 miles of the camp.* Ahmad Shah called his wazir for counsel, but the latter was sick of his worthless master and exasperated at the failure of his plan of campaign, and gave an angry reply. The Emperor controlled himself and immediately ordered the drums to beat a march, called for his portable chair (*takht-i-rawān*), and ordered that that night they would go to Shorajpur, 7 miles north of Sikandrabad. At this sudden order, for which none had been prepared before, his servants became utterly confused and disturbed. The camp stood at the crossing of two roads, and every one, in the absence of guidance or concerted plan of marching, went away some one way, some another.

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The Emperor had arranged that Udham Bāī (his mother), Ināyetpurī Bāī (his favourite wife), Mahmud Shah alias Prince Bankā (his son), and Sāhiba Begam (his half-sister) should mount with him from the royal gate; the other princesses were ordered to enter their carriages at the Khawāspurā gate of the camp and to be conducted by the nāzir Roz-āfzun Khan. After the Emperor had started, his wife's sister, with his daughter Dilāfroz Banu (or Muhammadi Begam) and some other ladies and maids got into a bamboo-covered waggon at the royal gate and followed him. "During this confusion some arrived and some were left behind, none knew or cared who came and who did not. At the Khawāspurā gate a large party of royal ladies, including Malika-i-zamāni and Sāhib Mahal (two widows of Muhammad Shah), two daughters of Ahmad Shah, and Sarfarāz Mahal and Rāni Uttam Kumari (two of the Emperor's secondary wives) had mounted their covered waggons (rath) when the Marathas were sighted and an alarm was raised." It was two o'clock in the morning of the fourth day of the new moon, which had set long ago. The numerous munition carts and the waggons of the imperial stores and workshops and a vast crowd of followers blocked the road and caused indescribable confusion, which was heightened by the darkness of the night and the horror of the Maratha attack who had opened fire with their matchlocks. Every one fled wherever he could find an opening, forgetful of duty or friendship.

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∗ *TAh.* 128b-131a, most detailed and accurate, followed here. Shākir (77) present, but gives no detail. Siyar iii. 49. Muz. 90-92. D.C. Bayān 283-284 (incredible.) S.P.D. xxi 60 (Maratha side.)

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The numerous waggons ridden by the ladies of the harem could not maintain one unbroken line of caravan, but became dispersed, so that they could not be guided or protected. Roz-āfzun Khan (though a septagenarian and invalid)

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guarded the princesses’ carriages as far as he could. "But how could a hundred resist a thousand?" Malika-i-zamāni was captured by the Marathas and conveyed back to the imperial camp now in Maratha possession. The carts of Sāhib Mahal and some other ladies along with Roz-āfzun himself were overtaken by Aqibat’s brother and conducted to the house of the qāzi of the city. Thus the night passed, none getting anything to eat.

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After Ahmad Shah had reached Shorajpur with his few companions, spies brought the report that the Marathas were coming up in pursuit. He immediately mounted two fast-paced female elephants,—himself and his son on one with an open haudā, and his mother and wife on the second which carried a covered litter on its back,—and fled to Delhi with the utmost speed. About 2 o’clock in the afternoon of 26th May he sneaked into the palace of Delhi by the side of the octagonal tower; the few waggons following him entered by the southern gate. Only the royal jewellery had been brought away in safety, all other kinds of property, both of the State and of individuals, as well as all the artillery (said to be over 500 pieces of all calibres, Bayān 283), stores, treasure (some lakhs in gold and silver coins), tents &c. fell into the enemy’s hands. But the greatest loss was that of the honour of the imperial family; queens and princesses were held in captivity by the rude spoilers from the South. Such a calamity had never before fallen on the house of Timur and it lowered the head of every one in Delhi.

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Three hours after the Emperor's arrival, the wazir, the Chief of Artillery (Samsām)* and some other officers reached Delhi and came to him. Ahmad Shah asked, "Why did you not bring with yourself the people of the harem and my 'honour' (i.e., wives and daughters) who were there?" The wazir replied, "In the darkness of the night nothing could be learnt and nobody brought me news of their plight."

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From the capital we turn to the captives who had not been so fortunate as to escape. Many of the *raths* of the women which had been scattered during the confusion of the night, were overtaken by the Marathas who tore off their screens and took away the money in their carriages and the ornaments on their persons; many women were outraged. Some escaped to different sides, and some came to Delhi on foot. Malika-i-zamāni and other captives were honourably treated by Malhar and placed under the care of the imperial officers of Sikandrabad, but guarded by Maratha soldiers. The change of linen of many of these ladies had been plundered, and as communication with Delhi was cut off for some days, the women of the harem, high and low, who remained captives in the camp suffered extreme hardship.

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∗ According to D.C., during the attack on the camp, Samsām had fought for an hour and thus enabled some Begams to reach the capital in safety.

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It shamed Imād even. On 28th May he came to Malhar’s camp, went to Malika-i-zamāni, presented five mohars to her, laid his turban on the ground before her, and wept, professing shame and disgrace to himself at the hardships that had befallen her, and pleading in excuse, “I was helpless in the matter. The Deccanis would listen to none. I am like their servant. My face has been blackened.” The ex-queen stoically laid the blame on Fate.

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§ 13. Imad-ul-mulk terrorises Emperor with Maratha help.

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On 30th May, the head clerk of the captive Rozāfzun Kh. brought to the Emperor a letter from Malhar making certain demands, which Rozafzun had strongly recommended as the only means of saving the capital from sack and the female captives from dishonour. Intizam gave bellicose counsel and said that he was ready to fight the Marathas, though his troops had mutinied and threatened to mob him only a few days before! The Emperor, therefore, asked for a day’s respite before giving a reply to Malhar.

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The next day (31st May) brought the news that a Maratha force had crossed the Jamunā and was plundering Jaisinghpurā and other suburbs south-west of the city. In fear that the capital would be sacked and the Emperor overthrown, Ahmad Shah wrote a *farmān* granting all the demands of Holkar. This first Maratha detachment withdrew in the afternoon, when another body forded the Jamunā near Khizirabad and plundered the *katra* of Nizamuddin Auliya’s shrine and some other places and burnt the Khurma mart. Imād, on hearing of it, went to Malhar and asked, "What is this? Why are your men plundering the city?" The Maratha general replied, "These are soldiers. They always do so." Then Imād passionately cried out, "Either slay me, or withdraw your hand from such work," and drawing his dagger placed it before his ally. At this Malhar took horse, forded the Jamunā at the time of the sunset prayer, chastised the Maratha raiders and took them back across the river. The tumult ceased, but all who could fled from the environs into the walled city of New Delhi, so that "the suburbs became totally ruined and desolate like the homes of the head, from the hands of these unclean people."

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The Emperor was stupefied and utterly helpless. On 1st June Aqibat Mahmud came to him and got his consent to making Imād wazir, while Roz-āfzun Khan would be appointed superintendent of the Privy Council, thus relieving Intizām of both his high offices. In return, Aqibat swore on the Qurān that Imād and Malhar would never play him false nor trouble him and his kingdom in future. [*TAh.* 131*b*-134*b*.]

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§ 14. Fall of Emperor Ahmad Shah.

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The second of June, Imād-ul-mulk came to the Court with Tātyā Gangādhar (Holkar's *diwān*) Aqibat Mahmud, and his brother Saif-ullah, three hours after dawn.* Ahmad Shah first placed the Holy Book in the hand of Imād and called upon him to swear that he would not practise treachery against him. Imād did so, with the strongest oaths, and was next invested with the robe of the wazir. Then he went to the Chancellor's office, where its clerks were in attendance, signed a few papers as required by the rules, and retired to an ante-room behind it, dismissing the Mir Atish and all other officers present. Immediately after this he sent Aqibat Mahmud with the harem superintendent's assistant and a guard of 50 Badakhshi soldiers to the gate of the princes' quarter in the palace where all the grandsons of the Emperors lived in confinement.

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∗ *TAh.* 135*a*-136*a*. D.C.

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Aqibat sent his own eunuch inside and brought out Muhammad ‘Aziz-ud-daulah, the son of Muizz-uddin, the son of Shah Alam Bahadur Shah I, and went back to his master with him. Imād came out of the wazir’s office, made humble obeisance to the prince and followed him. By way of the triple-arch gate, they entered the *Diwān-i-ām*, where this prince was seated on the throne, the royal umbrella held over his head, and he was proclaimed Padishah Alamgir II.

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The new Emperor immediately ordered his predecessor to be brought under arrest. Saifullah with his Badakhshis entered the harem by the Khās-mahal porch and discovered Ahmad and his mother hiding among the trees of the small garden in front of the Rang-mahal. The soldiers first seized the ex-Emperor and confined him in a room outside, and then throwing a *shāl* to cover his mother’s face dragged her into the same prison. Mother and son were not parted in this their last adversity. The fallen monarch cried out for water in the agony of thirst and mental anguish. Saifullah held up to his lips some water put in the sherd of a broken earthen pot lying in the dust there, and the King of Kings of an hour ago was glad to drink from it. “What a revolution of fortune!” cries the annalist of his reign.

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SIR JADUNATH SARKAR'S WORKS.

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History of Aurangzib

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Complete in five Volumes, sold separately.

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Professor Sarkar's History of Aurangzib is based mainly on original contemporary Persian Marathi and European sources, viz., the Mughal State-papers, daily bulletins of the Mughal Court, the records of impartial non-official writers (such as two Persian memoirs by contemporary Hindu writers), the letters of Aurangzib, his father, brothers, sons, grandsons, officers and vassal kings, and other makers of Indian history, revenue returns &c., the Marathi historical papers, Assamese chronicles (Buranjis) and English, French and Portuguese archives.

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