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Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c8: Chapter III

Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c8

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English

Contents

Chapter III

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MARATHA INCURSIONS INTO BENGAL BIHAR AND ORISSA UP TO 1746.

§ 1. How the Maratha Power spread over the Mughal Empire

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The decline of the Mughal Empire presented an opportunity by which the Marāthas profited more than any other people of India. Already, before Aurangzib was dead they had arrested the imperial expansion in their home-land and forced the Delhi Government to acknowledge defeat. The successors of that monarch were too weak to make any attempt at recovering their lost suzerainty in the Deccan and had much difficulty even in holding their own. Selfish quarrels among the Delhi nobility, no less than the moral decadence of the later Emperors and their army, hastened the collapse of the imperial authority in the South. When noble fought noble for the *subahdāri* of Gujrāt or the Deccan, whichever side won, the invariable result was to increase the relative strength of the Marāthas. Thus, the Mughal Government failed to derive any benefit from the utter anarchy that devastated the Mahārāshtra country for several years after Shāhu’s return home from captivity (in 1707) and the factious jealousy that raged among the Marātha nobles.

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And soon the genius of his wazir Bālāji Vishwanāth, the Peshwā, placed Shāhu above his rivals and secured for his Government a practical control over his country and its people. The next Peshwā, Bālāji Rāo’s son Bāji Rao I, was an ambitious schemer, a daring soldier, and a most enterprising leader. During his term of office (1720—1740) the Marāthas completely overshadowed the legitimate Government in Gujrāt, Malwa and Bundelkhand, while the Deccan proper was as good as ceded to them. The jealous opposition of his rivals, especially the Senāpati Trimbak Rāo Dhābādé and the Senā Sāhib Subah Raghuji Bhonslé,—both of the Marātha caste, while the Peshwās were Brāhmans,—retarded the establishment of Bāji Rāo’s own supremacy in the administration and the unchallenged imposition of Marātha authority over these subahs. But this set-back was temporary. After some fluctuations of fortune and even bloody internecine wars (like the battle of Dābhoi where Dhābādé was killed on 1st April, 1731, and a fight with Raghuji Bhonslé in February, 1739), Bāji Rāo near the end of his life wisely realized the practical limits of his own power and agreed to a scheme for amicably partitioning the Mughal provinces among the rival Marātha generals as their "spheres of influence," so that each sardār would be free to plunder tax and dominate over his special hunting ground without the fear of encroachment or obstruction by any other officer of his master. As a result of this arrangement Gujrāt, Berār and Dhār passed to the Dhābādé the Bhonslé and the Pawār families respectively, while Malwa and Bundelkhand remained the Peshwā's own preserve, with direct access to the Court of Delhi. The plunder of the Madras Karnātak was to be the joint enterprise of several chiefs. Shāhu completed and sanctioned this partition of the Mughal Empire as the best course for the Marātha people as a whole.

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Raghuji Bhonslé's ambition of ruling at Satārā as his master's master in the place of the Peshwā having been defeated by Bāji Rāo's superior education and inborn genius for war and organisation, he naturally pursued the path of expansion left open to him in the north-east and east of his domain of Nāgpur, namely by raiding Bengal, Bihār and Orissā across the intervening jungles and hills. And soon he received invitations from domestic enemies of that subah on the eastern-most frontier of the Mughal Empire. It was a God-send to Raghuji. His recent Karnātak venture had brought him no gain owing to too many greedy rivals having entered that field; his raids into the Peshwā’s spheres of influence had failed; and he was now sunk over head and ears in debt from his inflated army expenditure. Only one path of relief seemed to be open before him, namely the plunder of Bengal, whose wealth was proverbial throughout India and which had paid no *chauth* to the Marāthas up to now.

§ 2. Independent governors of Bengal subah

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At the time of Aurangzib’s death (1707), Murshid Quli Khān (surnamed Jafar Khān Nasiri, Nāsir Jang, Mutaman-ul-mulk) was deputy governor (*nāib nāzim*) of Bengal and Orissā, as well as *diwān* or revenue chief of these two provinces. The absence of the governor, Prince Azim-ush-shān, at the imperial Court during the next four years made Murshid Quli the virtual ruler of Bengal. Farrukh-siyar on his accession (1713) made him the substantive governor of Bengal in addition to his *diwān*-ship. In 1719 the full governorship of Orissā was conferred upon him. [Siyar, ii. 8, Riyāz, 250-252, 273-276.] Murshid Quli’s strong, honest and efficient administration, love of justice, and strict enforcement of peace and order greatly increased the wealth and happiness of the people and fostered the growth of trade in the country. When he died (30th June, 1727) he was succeeded by his son-in-law Shujā-ud-din Muhammad Khān (surnamed Shujā-ud-daulah, Asad Jang) in the rule of the two provinces, to which Bihār was added by the Emperor about 1733. Shujā also enjoyed a peaceful and prosperous reign.

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On the death of Shujā (13th March, 1739), his son, Sarāfrāz Khān (entitled Alā-ud-daulah Haidar Jang) became *subahdār* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissā. But this youthful ruler's excessive licentiousness, which (as so often happens in the East) he indulged in under the cloak of constant devotion to religious practices and resort to the society of theologians, caused a rapid decline in the administration. The evil was aggravated by the new Nawāb's jealous hostility to Alivardi Khān and his elder brother Hāji Ahmad, who had been the ablest and best-equipped officers during the last two reigns. Alivardi, knowing that his life and honour would be attacked by his worthless master whenever he could be caught at a disadvantage, decided to strike the first blow in self-defence. With remarkable skill and courage, he led an expedition from Patna (where he was deputy governor) into Bengal, defeated and slew Sarāfrāz at the battle of Gheriā (10th April 1740), and made himself Nawāb of the three provinces, afterwards securing the recognition of his act of might from the Emperor by profuse bribery. This act of usurpation opened the flood-gate of trouble on Bengal by encouraging in others the desire to imitate his illegal violence and open defiance of the imperial Government. [*Siyar*, ii. 101—105.]

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§ 3. How Alivardi won and lost Orissa and won it again in 1741.

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Rustam Jang (originally named Murshid Quli), the son-in-law of Shujā and deputy governor of Orissā, was goaded on by his wife Dardāna Begam to avenge her half-brother Sarāfrāz’s death. He refused to acknowledge the authority of the successful regicide in Bengal, declared his own independence, and in the ensuing cold weather marched from Katak to Balesar with the object of conquering Bengal. Alivardi advanced from his capital to meet the danger. For some weeks the two armies lay facing each other in their trenches near Balesar, with occasional skirmishes between their patrols. At last, on 3rd March, 1741, a battle was precipitated by Rustam’s impetuous son-in-law, Bāqar Ali, who left his impregnable trenches and numerous artillery behind him and attacked Alivardi on the plain of Fulwāri (four miles north of Balesar town), but was routed after a severe fight. Rustam Jang fled to Masulipatam in a friend's ship then happily lying at anchor off the port. Alivardi occupied Katak and installed his son-in-law Said Ahmad (surnamed Mahām-ud-daulah Saulat Jang) as deputy governor there. [*Siyar*, ii. 107-109.]

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But in August, Bāqar Ali, after hiring Marātha helpers from the Karnātak, returned to Orissā, captured Katak by a sudden attack, made its worthless and unpopular governor and his entire family prisoners, and seized the government of the province. Alivardi, in great distress, collected a strong force, marched into Orissā again, defeated Bāqar Ali on the bank of the Mahānadi,* rescued his son-in-law, and drove Bāqar Ali and his Marātha allies into flight to the Deccan (early in December, 1741). [*Siyar*, ii. 111—114; *Riyāz*, 327—338.]

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Meantime, in another corner of his dominions his local deputy had sent an expedition to bring the refractory Rājah of the jungly district of Rāmgarh (modern Hazāribāgh) under subjection. The zamindār who was thus antagonised naturally offered no opposition to the Marāthas of Nāgpur on their way to invade Bengal through his territory. [Siyar, ii. 116.]

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∗ At a place called Riāpur in Bengal letter of 23rd December, 1741 and Ghāt Choprā in *Riyāz*, 335. The Nizām's reception of the fugitive Rustam Jang and his family (*Hadiqat-ul-ālam*, ii. 173.)

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§ 4. First Maratha incursion, 1742.

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After recovering Katak from Bāqar Ali, the Nawāb passed two or three months there restoring the administration and making the necessary arrangements, and then he set out on his return to Bengal. On the way he halted near Balesar to send detachments into the Mayurbhanj country to punish its Rājah for his unfriendly attitude during the recent war. While thus delayed, the Nawāb heard at Jaygarh that Raghuji Bhonslé had sent his prime minister, Bhāskar Rām Kolhatkar, with a strong force to invade Bengal and collect *chauth* from the province. Further on the way, at Mubārak Manzil,* he learnt that the Marāthas had already passed through Pachet and entered the Bardwān district. By a forced march of one night and day the Nawāb arrived at Bardwān and encamped outside that town on the bank of the Rāni's tank (15th April, 1742). [Siyar, ii. 116-117.]

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∗ Its modern name is *Shāhin-bandi*, in the Arāmbāgh sub-division of the Hughli district, as proved by Mr. Md. Anzam in the *Prabasi* magazine, (Asharh, 1338, p. 382).

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¹ Bhāskar Rāo's force is estimated by Grant Duff (ii. 11) on the basis of Marātha records as 10,000 to 12,000. *Siyar* (ii. 117) gives "25,000, which rumour swelled to 40,000." Chandarnagar factory letter based on rumour gives 80,000!

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² My history of the Marātha incursions is mainly based upon *Siyar*, ii. 116—190, with some additions from Salimullah's *Tārikh-i-Bangāla* (I.O.L. MS., 2995 used, as F. Gladwin's trans. entitled *Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal* is shorter and gives wrong variants and mistranslations.) Important additions and corrections have been made from the Marathi records (S.P.D.) and the English and French factory letters. The contemporary

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Early next morning he was astonished to discover that during the preceding night the Marātha light horse had completely encircled his camp. Their march had been so swift and secret that the Nawāb's spies had failed to get any news of their position and line of advance till it was too late.

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Alivardi was now in a situation of extreme peril. After his reconquest of Orissā, as he had no enemy in view, he had sent back most of his troops to Murshidābād in advance of himself. At this time he had only 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 to 5,000 foot musketeers with him. The Marātha horde immediately hemmed this small force round and effectually cut off its food supply, without venturing on any pitched battle. The daily skirmishes of his foraging parties with the

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sources written by Bengalis are the Mahārāshtra Purān by Gangārām (ends with 1744) and the Chitra-champu (in 1744) by Vāneshwar. Riyāz-us-salātin (340-362) gives some useful details of its own, but more often repeats Salimullah, and is much too brief.

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enemy could produce no decision nor clear a way for his escape. A week passed in this way. Bhāskar himself took post at Bardwān with 14 of his captains to continue the investment of the Nawāb's camp, while his other ten captains with their contingents roamed over the country plundering the villages far and wide. The result was that not only could no grain-dealer reach the Bengal camp but all the sources of grain supply around Bardwān were also destroyed. Alivardi at last realised that to remain stationary in his encampment was to court death by starvation.

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From Bardwān (north of the Dāmodar river) the old Mughal road proceeds north-east to Katwā, 35 miles off. On this road, 21 miles from Bardwān, is a half way station at Nigun-sarāi, from which Katwā is only 14 miles distant. At Katwā the old course of the Ganges, called Bhāgirathi or the river of Murshidābād and Calcutta, is crossed and the road runs 40 miles northwards to Murshidābād, the capital of Bengal under the later Mughal dynasty. Eleven miles up from Katwā, on the eastern bank of the river stands the village of Palāshi (Plassey), the scene of the historic battle which gave Bengal to the English. The entire country is a dead flat alluvial plain.

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§ 5. Alivardi fights his way to Katwā.

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Alivardi, therefore, decided to make a night march in light equipment with a select force, surprise the Marātha cordon, and cut his way through it. The success of this plan depended entirely on his being able to move with strict secrecy and superior mobility, and he failed in both respects. When he led his army out of his camp, ordering the countless servants and other non-combatants to remain at Bardwān, they feared that the Nawāb was running away with his escort, abandoning them to the mercy of the invaders without any means of defence. Every one in the camp, therefore, pressed close on the detachment and it soon became a noisy, unwieldy and slow-moving body. The projected surprise entirely failed.

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In this condition the Bengal column was discovered in the morning and enveloped by the Marātha light horse. By four o'clock in the evening its advance was entirely stopped, and it came to a halt in a muddy rice field. When Alivardi ordered a charge to clear a path in front, the Afghān soldiers who formed the backbone of his army made a mere show of fighting without really engaging the enemy. The reason was that they were discontented with the Nawāb for his not satisfying the greed of their leaders. The Marātha horse circling round forced the stragglers and rearguard to crowd for safety upon their own centre, abandoning the baggage and tents which were slowly coming up from behind. The enemy seized the opportunity, set fire to the tents, looted the property in the camp, and cut down the stragglers, only a few of whom escaped. The column passed all that afternoon and the following night in the rice-field, without food or shelter and unable either to advance or to retreat.

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Alivardi now became a prisoner in deed. In order to gain time for reinforcements to reach him, he opened negotiations with the Marāthas. But Bhāskar knew the strength of his position; he demanded as the price of peace all the Nawāb's elephants in addition to one *kror* of Rupees. Next night Alivardi made an appeal to the generosity of his Afghāns. He went to their tents in utter humility, unaccompanied by a single attendant or torch-bearer and taking his little grandson Sirāj-ud-daulah by the hand, and placed his honour and the lives of both at the feet of their captains. This move won over Mustafa Khān, their leading general. Roused by Mustafa's eloquent and chivalrous speech, the Afghān soldiers vowed to defend their master to the death.

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In the morning the Bengal army resumed its march towards Katwā. All its tents, baggage and provisions had been lost, but the artillery still remained and proved very useful in forcing the Marātha spearmen to keep at a respectful distance. In this way, these men, now greatly reduced in number, cut their way to Nigun-sarāi, where a desperate rear-guard action was fought to check the enemy and Musāhib Khān fell. Next day Katwā was reached. During this march, whenever the Bengal army halted, the pursuing Marāthas used to halt likewise, just beyond the range of the jizails, while their roving bands plundered and burnt the villages for ten miles on each side of the road at every stage. Fighting daily on empty stomachs in this manner, the Nawāb and his army reached Katwā with their bare lives. This small town had been previously sacked and burnt by the Marāthas; but the famished Bengal troops were glad to appease their hunger with the half burnt rice that they could rake up among the ashes of the houses. Soon provisions, artillery and fresh troops reached Katwā from Murshidābād, and the Nawāb’s army was restored to strength and comfort. [Siyar, ii. 117—121.]

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§ 6. Mir Habib, his career and character.

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In the retreat from Bardwān Mir Habib, an officer of the Nawāb, had been captured by the enemy. This man at once transferred his services to them and proved their most useful ally and the greatest scourge of Bengal. His local knowledge, ability and persistence alone gave to the Marātha invasion of these three eastern provinces its long-drawn relentless and desolating character. Mir Habib was a native of Shiraz in Persia. Emigrating to Hughli he at first earned a scanty living by hawking from house to house such goods as he could get on credit from the merchants of his own country settled at that port. Though an absolutely illiterate man, his ready wit, extreme suavity of speech, and perfect command of the Persian language (which was his mother tongue) soon enabled him to make his way into the highest circle of society. The pedlar discarded his original profession and blossomed forth into the chief confidant and deputy (nāib) of Rustam Jang, rising as his master rose in the service of successive Nawābs. When Rustam Jang was appointed governor of Dacca, Habib by his attention to details and strict economy effected large savings in the expenditure of the Government flotilla, artillery and military departments. At the same time he enriched his master by unauthorised encroachment on private trade and a predatory incursion into Tipperā, till he was raised to the peerage. During Rustam Jang's governorship of Orissā, Habib as his agent (nāib) ran the entire administration and distinguished himself by ably managing the public business, keeping the zamindars under control, and greatly increasing his master's income. His ability and tireless activity were only equalled by his boundless ambition, implacable enmity to Alivardi Khān, and utter lack of moral scruple or generous sentiment. [Riyāz, 299-303.]

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§ 7. Maratha dash upon Murshidabad, May 6, 1742.

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It was now the beginning of May (1742), in which month the heavy rains begin in Bengal and quickly render the roads unfit for passage and the rivers too deep to be forded. Bhāskar, therefore, wanted to retire in haste to Nāgpur through the uplands of Birbhum. But Mir Habib pointed out that the rich and defenceless capital of Bengal would prove an easy prey if the Marāthas made a lightning raid on it during the Nawāb's absence. He took this task on himself, as he know all about the city and his wives and children were living there in charge of his brother.

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With 700 well-mounted Marātha horsemen, Mir Habib made a night march from Katwā and reached Dāhāpārā, opposite Murshidabad, in the morning of 6th May, burnt its bāzār, and then crossed over at the ferry of Hājiganj, to the city of Murshidābād, which had no wall around it. The city, denuded of troops, could make no defence, mainly owing to the cowardice of its governor Hāji Ahmad, the elder brother of the Nawāb. The greatest alarm and confusion raged in the capital of Bengal throughout that day and night. Hāji Ahmad fled to the fort, leaving the city to its fate. The Marāthas plundered from the house of Fathchand (surnamed Jagat Seth or the Chief Banker) in the suburbs nearly three lakhs of Rupees, and also several other richmen's mansions without the least check, and in the evening recrossed the river to Tirathkonā (west of Murshidābād), where they halted for the night.

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But Alivardi had, immediately on hearing of this movement of the Marāthas, hurried up from Katwā on their heels and arrived at his capital in the morning of the 7th. The raiders then beat a hasty retreat to Katwā, after sacking and setting fire to Tirathkonā and the villages around it.

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Early in May, after the Nawāb had cleared his capital of the enemy, the Marāthas retired to Katwā and then set out on their return home in order to avoid the monsoon rains of Bengal. But Mir Habib brought them back from the way (Birbhum) with reproaches for their lack of spirit and holding out alluring hopes of plunder. So, from the month of June, Katwā became their head quarters and Mir Habib their chief adviser and centre of all affairs (*madār-ul-mahām*). The districts west of the Ganges now passed into their hands. "They set up outposts in many places and occupied the country from Rājmahal to Medinipur and Jalesar. All rich and respectable people abandoned their homes and migrated to the eastern side of the Ganges in order to save their family honour." [Salimullah, 120a; Siyar, ii. 121-122; Eng. F.R.]

§ 8. Marathas capture Hughli fort

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Hughli was the most important station of the Mughal Government on the west bank of the Ganges in Lower Bengal. Within its jurisdiction lay Calcutta, Chandarnagar and Chinsurā, the chief factories of the English, the French and the Dutch respectively, and all ocean-going trade-vessels in Bengal had to do the necessary official business with it. It was also the seat of the Mughal naval power in West Bengal and the chief centre of foreign commerce to the subjects of the Nawāb. The commandant (*faujdār*) of Hughli at this time was Muhammad Razā who used to pass his nights in drinking deep and making merry with dancing-girls and singers, to the total neglect of his duties.* Mir Habib had many old friends among the Persian merchants here, their leader being one Abul Hasan. He sent secret emissaries to them, and these traitors formed a conspiracy to deliver the fort up to the enemy. On the appointed night, Mir Habib with 2,000 Marāthas under Shesh Rāo arrived silently outside the fort. According to their plot, Abul Hasan reported to Muhammad Razā, "Your old friend Mir Habib is standing at the gate begging for a private interview with you." The drunken *faujdār* ordered the gate to be opened without making any inquiry or taking the usual precautions. As Habib passed into the gateway, a number of Marāthas suddenly rushed in with him, overpowered the guards, occupied the fort, and made the Nawāb's officers prisoners (early in July).

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§ 9. All West Bengal in Maratha occupation.

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Thus Hughli passed into Marātha possession and Shesh Rāo was installed there as the conqueror’s governor. Unlike other Marātha chiefs, he was polite, considerate to others, just, and merciful. His good administration soon won the landholders and even the European traders of these parts over to his side. Mir Habib acted as the diwān of Bengal on behalf of the Marāthas, sent bailiffs to summon the zamindārs to his presence to arrange for the payment of the land revenue to him, and in all matters acted as the supreme agent of the Rājah of Nāgpur.

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∗ The governor (*hākim*) of the port, acc. to *Siyar*, ii. 122, was Md. Yar Kh. reputed brother of Alivardi, popularly called Mirza Piaré (as we find from Pondicherry letter of 4th April, 1743 N. S.) Chandarnagar factors sent Rs. 4,000 to ransom him from the Marathas. *Riyaz* 344 calls Md. Raza *naib faujdar*. Salimullah 119b wrongly writes that Hughli was then under "Md. Raza and Mirza Piaré the *faujdar*." Maharashtra Puran wrongly speaks of Sher Kh. as *faujdar* of Hughli.

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Mir Habib also took away some pieces of artillery and a sloop mounting guns from Hughli to Katwā, and thus strengthened the invading army of light raiders with two arms which they had hitherto totally lacked and which they could not have dreamt of securing in Bengal but for him.

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The Nawāb’s rule ceased in West Bengal, but in Upper Bengal, i.e., from Murshidābād northwards and eastwards as well as in East Bengal, his authority was maintained. But even the country east of the Ganges did not always remain safe from Marātha ravage. On Bhāskar’s return in June, the main body of his troops halted at Katwā, but small parties roamed about the island of Qāsimbāzār. They once or twice penetrated as far as Palāshi and Dāudpur (seven miles north of Palāshi and 20 miles south of Murshidābād), burnt the villages around and then returned to Katwā. A bridge built by Mir Habib at Dāinhāt, with boats commandeered from far and near, enabled the raiders to cross easily from one bank to the other. After a month the Ganges became swollen with rain and the Marāthas could no longer cross over to its eastern side.

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§ 10. *Atrocities and devastation committed by the Marathas.*

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All over the country from which the Nawāb’s authority had disappeared, the Marātha hordes committed wanton destruction and unspeakable outrage on the roads and villages.

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Utter terror raged throughout Bengal in consequence of their atrocities. The state of the country is thus graphically described in the English factory letters: "The Marāthas are plundering Birbhum (July, 1742) which has put a stop to all business, the merchants and weavers flying wherever they can."

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An eye-witness, the Bengali poet Gangārām, thus describes the sufferings of the people: "The *Bargis* began to loot the villages. Every class of men took to flight with their property, . . . when suddenly the *Bargis* came up and encircled them in the plain. They snatched away gold and silver, rejecting everything else. Of some people they cut off the hand, of some the nose and ears;

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some they killed outright. They dragged away the beautiful women, tying their fingers to their necks with ropes. When one *Bargi* had done with a woman, another seized her;* the women shrieked in the agony of ravishment. The *Bargis* after thus committing all sinful acts, set these women free. Then, after looting in the open, the *Bargis* entered the villages. They set fire to the houses, large and small, temples and dwelling-places. After burning the villages they roamed about on all sides plundering. Some victims they tied up with their arms twisted behind them. Some they

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* *Bargi* is a corruption of *Bārgir* (a Persian loan-word in Marāthi), meaning a horseman supplied with his mount and arms by Government, as opposed to a *silāhdār* who was equipped and mounted at his own expense.

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The Marātha soldiers were notorious for their practice of gang-rape in invaded territories from a very early time. In 1683 when they invaded the Goa districts under the eyes of their king Shambhuji, they committed this kind of outrage. A contemporary Portuguese account of that war states: "These enemies were so barbarous that when a woman appeared very beautiful (lit., best) to them, five or six of them violated her by lying with that woman alone. Up to now nowhere else in India has such barbarity been seen, nor even among the Kafris (Negroes). For this reason, many women of Margaon . . . threw themselves into pools, where they died of drowning. Others who bravely resisted the lewd intentions of some of the enemy soldiers, were killed with strokes of the broadsword, and of some others the breasts were cut off." (Tr. from Pissurlencar's *Portugueses e Maratas*, ii. 49. There is another Eng. tr. in I. O. L. *Portuguese Records*, *Noticias da India*, vol. i. part. 2.) *Mis. du Madure*, iii. 270.

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flung down and kicked with their shoes. They constantly shouted, ‘Give us Rupees, give us Rupees, give us Rupees.’ Where they got no Rupee, they filled their victims’ nostrils with water or drowned them in tanks. Some were put to death by suffocation. Those who had money, gave it to the *Bargis*; those who had none had to give up their lives. It was only after crossing the Bhāgirathi that people found safety.”

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Another contemporary, Vāneshwar Vidyālaṅkār, the Court Pandit of the Mahārājah of Bardwān, wrote in November, 1744: “Shāhu Rājah’s troops are niggard of pity, slayers of pregnant women and infants, of Brāhmans and the poor, fierce of spirit, expert in robbing the property of every one and in committing every sinful act. They created a local cataclysm and caused the extirpation of the people of the Bengal villages like an (ominous) comet. . . . In one day they can cross a hundred *yojans*. They slay the unarmed, the poor, women and children. They rob all property and abduct chaste wives. If it comes to a battle, they secretly flee away to some other country. Their main strength lies in their marvellously swift horses. Such was the tumultuous ocean of *Bargi* troops.”

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The Muslim historians Salimullah and Ghulām Husain Salim confirm this account.

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They write, "The *Bargis* cut off the ears, noses and hands of multitudes of people, or killed them with many kinds of torture and suffering,—by gagging their mouths with bags of dust or drowning them. They destroyed the honour of the people" (*i.e.* outraged the women.) The letters from the French factory at Chandarnagar and the English settlement of Calcutta tell the same tale of oppression.

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§11. *The Nawāb surprises the Marātha camp at Katwā on 27th September.*

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While all this was happening to his subjects, Alivardi at first confined himself to defending his capital by forming a camp outside it, at Amāniganj and Tārakpur, and decided to put off the campaign against the enemy till the coming winter, when the reinforcements called up by him from his deputies in Purniā and Patna would reach him, and the Emperor also, who had been urgently appealed to for help, was expected to cause a diversion from the direction of Upper India. Alivardi distributed ten *lakhs* of Rupees to his troops and replenished their equipment. From Purniā and Patna his deputies reached him accompanied by 5,000 and 12,000 men respectively, before the rainy season was over.

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Pressed by Zainuddin Ahmad (the *nāib* nāzim of Patna), Alivardi wisely changed his plan, and decided to attack the Marāthas before the drying of the roads and the fall of the river-level would restore to the light Deccani horse its natural advantage. Meantime, Bhāskar, secure in the possession of West Bengal, was celebrating* the Durgā pujā, the greatest festival among the Hindus of Bengal, in the most gorgeous style with forced contributions from all the zamindārs. Here the Nawāb surprised him early in the morning of the third day of the ceremony, the Navami, 27th September, 1742.

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Katwā stands at the junction of two rivers, the Ganges running from north to south, and a smaller stream called the Ajāy flowing into it from the west. The Nawāb, coming from Murshidābād, would have to cross the Ganges only if he attacked Katwā from the south, and both the rivers if he tried to reach the place from the north and the west. The presence of an armed sloop of the enemy in the Ganges alongside Katwā and the alertness of the Marātha troops on that river-face made it impossible for him to cross the Ganges at that place. He had entrenched the eastern bank of the river facing Katwā and fired for eight days upon the Marātha position across with no result. So, he decided on a wide detour by the north and west in order to reach the enemy in secrecy and attack their unprotected western flank by surprise. Some miles above Katwā both banks of the Ganges were in the Nawāb’s possession, with no Marātha band in sight. Here the Nawāb built a bridge of large boats across the Ganges at Uddharanpur and transferred his “storm troops,” ten thousand picked men, to the north bank of the Ajay.

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∗ At Dāinhāt, according to Gangārām.

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About a mile above the western or left wing of the Marātha camp the Nawāb had gradually collected a number of smaller boats unsuspected and unopposed by the enemy, by following the cunning device of sending them to creep from the Ganges up the Ajay river one at a time. With these boats a bridge was swiftly and silently completed at midnight by the strenuous exertions of his engineers, and then the Nawāb’s troops began to cross over to the Marātha side of the Ajay. A boat in the middle of the structure broke down and sank under the weight of the passing men and beasts, and before the moving troops could be halted 1500 of the Bengal soldiers were drowned. The Nawāb immediately extinguished all his lights and prevented any alarm from reaching the Marātha camp. The damage was repaired in a few hours and the crossing was resumed. By the earliest streak of dawn some 2,500 of his men had reached the south bank of the Ajay. They waited no longer for the rest of the army to cross over, lest the growing light should reveal their small number to the Marāthas and defeat their attempt. Quickly crossing the intervening mile of ground, the Bengal army charged the Marātha camp with loud shouts. The surprise was complete. The Marāthas fled without waiting to ascertain the strength of the attacking force or strike a blow. "There was little loss on either side", as the English factory letter reports; but the Nawāb's victory was complete, the Marāthas had to leave all their tents, equipment and property behind. In the course of the morning the Nawāb pushed up reinforcements from the other side of the Ajay in boats, and himself arriving on the scene took up the pursuit of the enemy for some distance, and then came back to their deserted camp. [Siyar, ii. 124—126; Maharashtra Puran; Salimullah 121a—122a.]

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§ 12. Province cleared of Marathas up to Chilka lake, December, 1742.

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Bhāskar fled by way of Pachet; his scattered detachments also vacated Bardwān, Hughli, Hijli and other places. But the jungle hindered the Bengal troops in pursuing him. Bhāskar then turned south and moving by way of Chandrakonā raised his head in the Medinipur district, where he looted and burnt Rādhānagar and other large places, making Nārāyangarh his base. Thence he sent a detachment to Katak, which captured that town after defeating and slaying its governor, Shaikh Masum, at Jājpur. On hearing of this development, Alivardi turned aside from Pachet towards Medinipur. The Marāthas immediately retreated towards Balesar. They turned back and attacked the Nawāb when he was four miles from Medinipur, but were routed by him. Thereafter they never again stood up to a fight, but were incessantly pursued and driven back beyond the Chilkā lake into the Deccan (December, 1742.) Bengal and Orissā were thus at last totally freed from the raiders. Then the Nawāb halted at Katak for a few weeks to restore its government, and returned to Murshidābād in triumph about 9th February, 1743.

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§ 13. Oudh army comes to Patna, December, 1742.

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The first Marātha incursion into these provinces was beaten back by the end of December, 1742, but in the meantime an unexpected danger had threatened Bihār, which revealed the utter rottenness of the State of Delhi.

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At the first coming of Bhāskar, Alivardi Khan had appealed to the Emperor for help and the Emperor had ordered Safdar Jang, the *subahdār* of Oudh, to go and guard the province of Bihār, and then, if necessary, advance into Bengal. Safdar Jang had left his headquarters at Faizābād with 6,000 Persian cavalry (formerly of Nādir Shāh’s army) and 10,000 good Indian soldiers and a powerful artillery. The greatest terror was felt by the people of Bihār from the ferocity and greed of their pretended defenders, as Safdar Jang’s troops were quite unruly and committed all sorts of outrages.

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After visiting Patna city and viewing its fort (*c.* 7th December, 1742), Safdar Jang encamped at Bānkipur, five miles west of it, and began to act as if he were already the lawful master of the province. On receiving the news of Alivardi’s return from Orissā and the report that the Peshwā Bālāji Rāo, was rapidly coming to Bihār to aid Alivardi, Safdar Jang beat a hurried retreat from Patna. Crossing the Ganges at Munir by a bridge of boats (*c.* 15 January, 1743), he re-entered his own province. [*Siyar*, ii. 127-129.]

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§ 14. Second Maratha invasion, 1743.

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In 1743, at Bhāskar’s call, Raghuji Bhonslé himself marched with a large army by way of Rāmgarh towards Katwā (where he arrived at the beginning of March), bent upon exacting the *chauth* of these three provinces which had been promised to Shāhu by the Mughal Emperor and assigned by that Rājah to Raghuji. To counteract it, the Emperor had appealed to the Peshwā Bālāji Rāo, who was the rival and personal enemy of Raghuji, and the Peshwā had agreed (as early as November 1742) to lead an army into Bengal for the purpose of opposing Raghuji.

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§ 15. *Peshwa Balaji Rao enters Bihar, February, 1743.*

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Early in February 1743, the Peshwā entered Bihār from the south with a strong force, which rumour put at half a *lakh* of men. The news of his coming, though in the guise of an ally, caused the greatest consternation throughout the province. And with good reason. His army was irresistible, and "along his route those who gave him blackmail or costly presents saved their life and property, while those who attempted defence were killed and their houses were given up to plunder." (*Siyar*, ii. 129.) Patna city trembled for its life; the one anxiety of the citizens was to save their families from outrage by sending their women elsewhere across the river. "Not a family of note left in the town," as the English factory reported. Happily, the Peshwā did not come to Patna. From Benāres Bālāji hastened to Bengal by way of Saseram, Dāudnagar, Tikāri, Gayā, Mānpur, Bihār and Mungir,—causing great loss and disturbance to the towns on the way. Issuing from the hills and jungles on the plain of Birbhum, he took the road to Murshidābād, while Raghuji occupied the Bardwān district with his camp at Katwā.* Thus, two vast Marātha forces, each under a first grade chief, were assembled close to each other in Bengal and a collision between them seemed imminent. [Siyar, ii. 129-130.]

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∗ The Peshwa's route through Bihar and Bengal is thus given in his Diary, [Vad, ii. pp. 242-243, corrected] :—1743, January 26-30, Allahabad south bank—Feb. 4, Vindhyāchal near Mirzāpur—8-10, Rāmpurā near Benares, (Rāmnagar)—13-14, River Durgāvati (near Jahanabad)—15, Saserām—16-17, River Son (crossed near Dāudnagar)—18, River Punpun—23, Gayā—March 8-9, River Ganges (? near Mungir)—14, Jamdā in Khargpur hills (22 m. n. e. of Baidyanāth-Deoghar)—15, Gokulā in pargana Lakshmipur—16, Dhanvā in parg. Handuā (25 m. n. of Dumka)—17-18, Sārangpāni (? tappa Sarath or Dumka sub-division)—19, Fathpur (9 m. s. of Dumka)—20, Bhādu (Baharu, 10 m. n. of Nagar and 15 m. n. w. of Suri, on n. bank of Mor river)—21, Rangāon Pathrā in Birbhum (prob. Pathardang, 7 m. w. of Suri)—22, Purānā in parg. Loni, Birbhum (prob. Parangāon, 10 m. n. e. of Suri)—23-25, Kālpipurā in Kot Mamaleshwar, Birbhum (Kālkāpur, 2 m. s. of Mayureshwar, wh. is 15 m. n. e. of Suri; Rennell reads Kot Mowlishwar here)—26, Duhalia in parg. Fathsingh (2 m. s. of Kandi Gopinathpur)—27-30, Chauriāgāchā (4 m. s. of Rāngāmāti, on w. bank of Ganges.) On 30th March Peshwā visited Alivardi Khan.—April, 1-2, Basurā (3 m. w. of Palāshi, on w. bank of Ganges, and 13 m. s. of Chauriagacha)—3, Barod in parg. Mokad ?—4, Barhānpur in Bardwan (prob. Udhanpur ferry, 3 m. n. of Katwā)—5-7, Paltiyā, (13 m. w. of Katwā.) On 7th April Alivardi visited Peshwa in camp.—9, Dignagar (18 m. n. w. of Bardwan.) Hence Peshwā marched rapidly alone.—10-13, Kakshā (15 m. w. of Dignagar)—15, Bāmhani in parg. Vishnupur ?—16, Mājgāon in parg. Pachet

§ 16. Interview between Peshwa and Nawab; Raghuji expelled

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Alivardi, on learning that Bālāji had arrived 20 miles from Murshidabad, sent his jamadār Ghulām Mustafa with the Peshwā's envoys, Gangādhar Rāo and Amrit Rāo, to Pilāji Jādav, the commander of the Marātha vanguard. Pilāji came to the Nawāb with these men, exchanged mutual oaths of fidelity and assurance of friendship, and then returned to his chief. The Nawāb, advancing further, encamped at Lawdā (7 miles south of Berhampur Cantonment), from which village Bālāji's camp was only six miles distant.

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(prob. Rajgaon, 3 m. s. w. of Bānkurā)—17, Sirāpur in Pachet ?—18, Bero in Pachet (Beroo, 6 m. s. of Pachet hill)—19, Sākā in Pachet ?—20, Bhāigathā, parg. Chhadrā, Pachet ?—21-24, Hisak in parg. Sikarbhui ?—25, Began Kodār in parg. Pachet (20 m. w. of Purulia and 7 m. e. of Jhalda)—26-27, Barishā, parg. Rāhishā, kingdom of Rajah Naval Shah (prob. Burgah, 11 m. n. w. of Jhalda)—28, Bedugarh in Chutia Nagpur (prob. Rāmgarh, 26 m. s. s. e. of Hazaribagh)—29, Jinti, in parg. Siri (? river Jainti)—30, Siyā in parg. Bishengarh (prob. Sila Ichak, 12 m. w. of Hazaribagh)—May, 1, Govindpur? —3, Gori Anantpur (prob. Joree, 10 m. s. of Hunterganj, e. bank of Lilajan river)—12, Akbarpur (4 m. e. of Rohtasgarh, on w. bank of Son river)—14, Saserām—15, Jahanabad on Durgāvati river—18, Mughal Sarāi—19, bank of the Ganges—21, Mirzāpur.

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Midway between these two places pavilions were set up for the interview.*

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On 31st March Bālāji came to the meeting place with Pilāji Jādav, Malhar Holkar and other generals. At the end of the interview the Peshwā was sent back with a present of four elephants, two buffaloes and five horses. It was agreed that the Nawāb would pay Shāhu Rājah the *chauth* for the province besides 22 *lakhs* of Rupees to Bālāji for the expenses of his army, while the Peshwā would effect a final settlement with Raghuji, who would not trouble Bengal in future. Alivardi could not at first provide such a large sum at once, and it was only the Peshwā’s threat to march away leaving Bengal to the tender mercies of Raghuji that compelled the Nawāb to make the payment.

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Then these two new allies set out together to expel Raghuji. The latter, on hearing of their advance, broke up his camp between Katwā and Bardwān, and fled to Birbhum. After one or two marches, Bālāji told the Nawāb that the Bengal troopers could not keep pace with the fleet Deccan horse and therefore Raghuji would slip away unless the Peshwā pursued him with his own cavalry alone. This was agreed to, and next day (10th April Bālāji began a rapid march, overtook Raghuji, beat him in a battle, and drove him in flight into the western hills with heavy loss of men and of much of his baggage and camp which were abandoned to plunder. Many officers of the Nāgpur army also came over to the Peshwā.

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∗ “The Maratha generals demanded the *chauth* of Bengal in Shahu Rajah’s name. Bala Rao proposed a conference with the Nawab which was held on 31st March at Plassey, when the Nawab agreed to allow Shahu Rajah the *chauth* and pay Bala Rao 22 *lakhs* of Rupees for the expenses of his army,—he promising to accommodate affairs with Raghuji, who retired to Birbhum.” Bengal letter, 13th August, 1743. For Balaji in Bengal, see *Akhbarat*, 25th, 26th, 29th April and 4th, 10th, 11th, 17th, 20th and 28th May, 1743, as tr. by me in *J. B. & O. R. S.*, December, 1931. Also Siyar, ii. 131.

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Alivardi turned back from Dignagar (32 miles south-west of Katwā) and on reaching Katwā (24th April) made it his base. Soon afterwards he received despatches from Bālāji reporting that Raghuji had passed through Mānbhum and taken the road to Sambalpur, after which Bālāji had marched by way of Pachet to Gayā, where he offered the customary oblations to the souls of his dead ancestors and then took the way to Punā.

§ 17. Condition of the country under Maratha terror

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This second Bargi invasion (March to May, 1743) repeated the misery of the previous year's raid, though in a smaller theatre and for a shorter time. The English merchants of Calcutta write, “An entire stop was put to (our) business for some time at Calcutta, Qāsimbāzār and Patna.” The defensive measures at Calcutta are thus described: “On the Marāthas’ return we on 17th March (1743) ordered the batteries to be put in good order and entertained a hundred Baksaris. We raised a militia of the inhabitants on 4th April. The merchants proposed at their own expense to dig a ditch round the town to secure their houses. (The Council) agreed thereto on 29th March and lent them Rs. 25,000 on four persons’ security to repay it in three months; which is completed as far as the Great Road that leads from the Fort Gate towards the Lake and is begun to be carried on as far as the extent of the Company’s bounds at Govindpur.” This was the origin of the famous Marātha Ditch of Calcutta. [Bengal letter, 3rd February, 1744.] At Patna the nāib nāzim, Zainuddin Ahmad Haibat Jang, constructed a mud wall round the city.

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§ 18. Third Maratha incursion, March, 1744.

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The nine months from June 1743 to February 1744 passed in peace for these three provinces, and then at the beginning of March, 1744, Bhāskar renewed the invasion of Bengal by way of Orissā and Medinipur. He was now in a fierce mood by reason of his having lost all his booty and camp property in his hurried flight from Katwā (27 Sep. 1742) in his first year's campaign, and his having been expelled bag and baggage from Bengal by Bālāji in the second year (April, 1743). The Peshwā had easily secured 22 *lakhs* of Rupees from the province, while the Bhonslé had hitherto gained not a pice in return for his vast expenditure on the Bengal adventure. Therefore, Bhāskar began his third year's raid with brutal ferocity and the Nāgpur troops ranged through the country like mad dogs.

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As the contemporary Gangārām writes: "As soon as Bhaskar arrived again, he summoned all his captains and ordered them, "Draw your swords and kill every man and woman that you see." When the commander spoke thus, they plundered and slew on every side with shouts of *kill! kill!!* Brahmans, Vaishnavs, Sannyāsis, women and cows were slaughtered by hundreds." The universal outrage committed on women by the raiders as reported by this observer has been mentioned already.

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In their attempt to escape from such rape and slaughter, the fugitive population had to undergo unspeakable privations.

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§ 19. *Alivardi deceived by the Peshwa—his helplessness.*

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Alivardi was utterly bewildered by this revival of the Marātha menace. Only a year ago he had paid a huge subsidy to Bālāji on condition that the Peshwā would effect an enduring settlement with Raghuji and insure Bengal against all risk of *Bargi* raids in future. Bālāji had, no doubt, driven Raghuji out of the province for the occasion (April 1743), but next year these human locusts reappeared in their myriads as before.

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The reason was that in the meantime these two Marātha chiefs had met together at their king's Court and Shāhu had imposed upon them a compromise, dated 31 August, 1743, by which the four *subahs* of Malwa Agra Ajmir and Allahabad as well as the two estates of Tikāri and Bhojpur (inclusive of Dāudnagar) in *subah* Bihār, *i.e.*, the tract lying west of Patna and east of Allahabad and yielding 12 lakhs of Rupees a year, were assigned to the Peshwā, while Raghuji was to enjoy the two *subahs* of Bengal (including Orissā) and Oudh in their entirety and all Bihār except the *mahals* yielding 12 lakhs reserved for the Peshwā; and each was strictly forbidden to interfere with the other's share. [*Aitihāsik Patravyavahār*, ii. 35 and 36.]

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This meant in effect that the province was merely partitioned between these two Marātha leaders as their respective spheres of influence; each of them simply contracted not to encroach on the other's special hunting ground, but was left free to do what he liked in his own part of the subah, without any moral or legal responsibility to protect the payer of the blackmail in the other parts of his dominion.

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The Nawāb found that in return for all his expenditure he had now got not an assured protector, but only two blood-suckers instead of one. The Peshwā's breach of his promise and callous desertion of the Nawāb's cause threw Alivardi into an agony of despair and rage. Smarting under the 'Punic bad faith' of the Marātha race, he decided to use the same weapon to free his people from their intolerable tyranny. His own situation was well nigh desperate. The two successive years' invasions had more than half dried up his revenue, and at the same time his coffers had been exhausted by the heavy tribute that he had to pay to the Emperor on his accession,[*] the subsidy exacted by Bālājī in 1743, the pay and bounty of the vastly increased army that he had now to maintain for the defence of the province, and the cost of the munitions and equipment consumed in the war. His Government was bankrupt. His soldiers were worn out by the fatigue of campaigning every year. He himself was in poor health and unable to march out at their head. Therefore, a new campaign against the elusive Marāthas in the fierce summer just then commencing, had to be avoided by all means.

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∗ Alivardi had paid the Emperor 40 lakhs of Rupees on account of the property of the deceased Sarafraz Khan and 40 lakhs as his own peshkash, in addition to the annual surplus of the revenue of the three provinces (which was one kror of Rupees acc. to Siyar, 107). He also presented, at his accession, 3 lakhs to the imperial wazir and one lakh to the Nizam, besides smaller sums to other nobles (Riyaz, 325; Siyar, ii. 107).

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§ 20. Alivardi massacres the Maratha generals at an interview.

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The Nawāb took counsel with his leading Afghān general, Ghulām Mustafa Khān, who undertook to bring Bhāskar and his chief officers to a friendly interview and there massacre them, if he was promised the governorship of Bihar as his reward for the deed. Alivardi agreed, and the plan was matured in strict secrecy. Under Bhāskar there had come this year twenty Marātha generals and two Muhammadans, namely Shahāmat Khān and Alibhāi Qarāwwal. Alivardi sent Rājah Jānakirām (his *diwān*) and Mustafa Khān to Bhāskar’s camp at Dignagar. The two envoys declared that the Nawāb was anxious to end these disputes by paying an annual *chauth* that may be fixed by mutual agreement and that for such a settlement a personal discussion between the two chiefs was necessary. Jānakirām and Mustafa took the most solemn oaths possible for a Hindu and a Muslim respectively that no treachery would be done to Bhāskar’s party if they visited the Nawāb. Then Bhāskar agreed to come and an auspicious day (the second day of the Bengali new-year, 31st March, 1744) was fixed for the interview.

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The place selected for the meeting was the plain of Mankarā, four miles south of the modern Berhampur Cantonment station. By way of Katwā and Palāshi, Bhāskar reached Mankarā on 31st March. Portions of his army remained behind at Katwā and Palāshi (18 miles south of Mankarā.

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Bhāskar advanced on foot to the big tent of interview and was welcomed at its door by Jānakirām and Mustafa Khān. With him were 21 generals, the only absentee being Raghuji Gāikwād, who had always suspected Alivardi of treachery and on this day had stayed behind on the plea of illness. Besides these, there were some twenty other attendants of lower rank. The party began to walk up the carpeted floor of the tent towards the far end of it where the Nawāb was sitting on a dais with his officers. They had barely crossed one-fourth of the way, when the Nawāb, after satisfying himself that Bhāskar had really come, cried out, "Kill these wretched misbelievers." Then the Nawāb’s soldiers rushed out of their places of hiding in the wings, hemmed the Marātha visitors round and after some exchange of blows cut all of them down.

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