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Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27: Chapter XIX

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27

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Contents

Chapter XIX

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DATTAJI SINDHIA'S CAMPAIGNS IN THE NORTH, 1759—1760.

§ 1. Dattaji threatens to attack Delhi and oust Imād

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We have seen in Chapter 18 how Dattāji, with his young ward Jankoji Sindhia, had left Rajputana and reached Najafgarh, south-west of Delhi on 26th December, 1758. His arrival at the capital effected a complete reversal of Maratha policy in Hindustan. The smooth-spoken conciliatory practical politician Malhar Rao Holkar, who had so long guided Maratha diplomacy in the North, was replaced by the rough impatient hustling soldier Dattāji Sindhia. In addition, while Malhar had publicly befriended Najib Khan as his adopted son, Dattāji was under orders to crush Najib altogether as the sole remaining thorn in the path of Maratha predominance in the northern empire,—after which the Marathas would be free to send their main forces into the Panjab and Bihar and realize untold amounts of tribute from these provinces, in order to remove the Peshwā's crushing burden of debt which had been only increased by Raghunāth's barren expedition of 1757-1758. Dattāji was not the man to tolerate the delay or evasion of payment, which had now become a habit with the Delhi officials. Besides, every friend of Malhar was a suspect and every arrangement made by Malhar was a mistake in his eyes. *

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Arrived within four days' march of Delhi, Dattāji sent word that he had been appointed by the Peshwā to replace Malhar as the subahdar of Agra, and that the capital must pay its tribute or be put to plunder. Imād in great alarm strengthened the guards at the gates of Delhi in order to keep the Marathas out; the residents of the southern suburbs (or Old Delhi) took refuge within the city of Shah Jahan. The wazir opened negotiations with Dattāji, offering to pay 7 or 8 lakhs if he avoided the capital and made a detour round it in his march to Lahor. On 4th January 1759 the Maratha army reached Barāri Ghāt, some ten miles north of the city, and here the wazir had a long talk with Dattāji two days later. After 2 or 3 days a Deccani corps crossed over to the eastern bank of the Jamunā and raided Luni and the country around. The wazir protested to Dattāji against these acts of hostility "at a time when there was friendship between your sovereign and mine," and Dattāji recalled his men. He next detached a large force to the Saharanpur district, which was Najib’s jagir, ordering them not to molest any village on the way. On 14th January, Dattājī came southwards, close to the northern gate of Delhi, but refused to see the wazir and spoke scornfully about him. So the wazir guarded the city more vigilantly than before, entrenching in the environs and posting artillery to meet any assault. Roving bands of Marathas threatened Shāhdara (from which all the rich men fled away) and robbed the villages in the north-west of Delhi and the wayfarers. The sturdy peasantry retaliated, “in many places lonely Maratha soldiers were robbed of their mares and bullocks by the villagers.”

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∗ Aiti. Patren, 166, 167. TALS. 192-198. DC. Nur-ud-din, 21b. Jankoji being the legal successor of Jayapa, all official letters were issued in his name and under his seal, and the writers of the time used the word Jankoji where Dattaji was the person really concerned. I have made the necessary change of name throughout as Dattaji was the executive head of the Sindhia's army and affairs in the north. The Peshwa aptly characterized Dattaji thus in a letter of 30 Aug. 1755, "Dattābā's nature is that of a [mere] soldier; hence he presses violently on at the wrong time and place." [Aitihasik Patren, 139].

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The Maratha headquarters had been shifted from Barārī Ghāt to Takia Majnun (19th January.) From this base, a large detachment appeared near Kālī Pahārī (beyond the Idgāh) and attacked the outposts of Phatak Misri Khan and Jinsi Topkhānah (near Sarāi Ruhelā.) The imperial troops in the trenches here made the mistake of sallying forth, with the result that they were defeated and driven back, suffering heavy losses. The exultant Marathas pursued them up to the city gate, burnt the carriage of the largest imperial cannon (named Attock), and plundered Sarāi Ruhela and other suburbs outside the Delhi Gate, “where the traders had stored grain and other merchandise beyond calculation.” This sort of irregular fighting and plunder of the western suburbs went on for four days, small Maratha bands and stragglers being occasionally cut off by the wazir's troops. On 23rd January Dattāji sent Antāji Mānakeshwar, Purushottam Hingané and other mediators to renew the peace negotiations, but no agreement was reached.

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In the course of three or four days, the food supply of the Maratha camp failed altogether, "as the traders ceased to convey grain there for fear of plunder, and extreme scarcity appeared. Nine or ten thousand Deccani troopers, crossing the Jamunā, went to Ghaziabad, but the inhabitants opposed them with artillery and matchlocks. The Marathas, baffled here, went on and looted Dāsna, belonging to the wazir . . . They sent the captured grain and other provisions from that place to their own camp [near Delhi.] . . . The wazir protested to Dattāji against this outrage during peace negotiations, and the raiders were recalled. On 29th January, the Maratha army, which lived only by foraging, recrossed the Jamunā and went towards Shāhdara and Patparganj. A force sent by the wazir effectually guarded the markets in these two places, but some traders who were bringing grain to Delhi were intercepted on the way and robbed of their goods. Next day an agreement was reached as to the amount of money contribution payable by the wazir, and on 1st February Dattāji began his northward march, and peace returned to Delhi." [TALS. 197b-198b.]

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§ 2. *Dattaji's policy after returning from the Panjab.*

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The Sindhias next entered the Panjāb, and after effecting the reconquest of that province returned towards Delhi in May 1759. Crossing the Jamunā at the Rāmrā Ghāt (east of Pānipat), they halted at Shāmli and opened negotiations with the wazir. At the end of this month, Dattāji proceeded south to Bāghpat and induced Najib to pay him a visit.* It was at first agreed that Najib would support the Marathas with his troops in the invasion of Bihar by way of Oudh, if the Sindhias respected his possessions. It was necessary for Dattāji to keep Najib in hand, because he had decided to overthrow the false and incompetent wazir Imād, and take over the administration of the empire, in order to secure a more regular collection of tribute. On 1st June he sent Abdul Ahad Khan and Antāji Mānakeshwar to the wazir with an ultimatum calling upon him to resign his post and place the empire under his (*i. e.*, Dattāji's) control, as "Imād was unfit for the management of the empire and all his comrades were peculators." In case of refusal, the Maratha chief threatened war. But after some days, he was induced in return for a bond for the payment of an indemnity, to turn back from Bāghpat, and Delhi escaped an attack.

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∗ Dattaji reaches Kairana, 23 May [*SPD.* xxvii. 239.] Najib's visit to him and rupture described in Nur-ud-din 22 and *TALS.* 208*b*. Dattaji's detailed plans for the future (letter to Peshwa, *c.* 15 May), *SPD.* ii. 104. *TALS.* 209*a*. *SPD.* ii. 102 (*c.* 22 April) gives important details.

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§ 3. Rupture between Dattāji Sindhia and Najib.

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But there could be no real union of hearts between Dattāji and Najib. The Ruhela chief was naturally unwilling to go away with his troops on the distant Bihar expedition, leaving his territories in the upper Doab within easy reach of the greedy and faithless Maratha local officers posted lower down that tract. An example of their unscrupulous rapacity had occurred in March 1759, when Govind Ballāl Bundélé in his northward march from Etāwa had wrested the outpost of Sikandrabad from Najib’s agent, though the two sides were then at peace. On this occasion Dattāji had been induced (by Antāji) to restore the usurped territory, so as not to antagonize Najib, whose services he was then proposing to utilize. A shrewd observer like Najib could not but suspect the secret intentions of the Marathas in the Doab. He also came to fear that Dattāji, angry at his refusal to cede his jagirs, was planning to arrest him during a friendly interview. The plot failed before it could be attempted, because Najib’s chief officers forced their way into Dattāji’s tent along with Najib, brushing aside the opposition of the guards at the gate. The Marathas were cowed into quiescence and terminated the interview very quickly. On returning to his own camp, Najib remarked, “It is not safe to visit these men ; their looks seem malignant to me.” So, he marched away to his own territory.

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From Shāmli Najib returned to Saharanpur, while Dattāji advanced to Mirat, and near that city attacked a fort built by Jetā Gujar. "The garrison, overcome by superior numbers, fled away. Thence Dattāji went and encamped near the home of the Barha Sayyids,* who were the hereditary enemies of the Ruhelas [end of June.] He asked Najib to cede some parganahs of Saharanpur, but the Ruhela offered to pay the fixed tribute only if the Marathas vacated his country, and he refused to alienate any of his villages. Dattāji did not agree to this; he sent detachments to the outposts of Najib, from which the Ruhela's agents retired without a blow." [TALS. 209, Nur-ud-din 22.] Thus, at last open war was precipitated by Dattāji's hustling tactics.

§ 4. Najib Khan's defences at Shukartal described

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The sagacious Ruhela veteran matured a masterly scheme of defence, which enabled his small force to withstand the myriads of Mahārāshtra for nearly six months and triumph in the end. Some sixteen miles due east of the city of Muzaffarnagar, there is a low place on the right bank of the Ganges, named Shukartal.†

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∗ These Sayyids were Shias, while Najib was the Sunni champion. Moreover, he had snatched away many of their estates in the district round Mirānpur.

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† Shukartal,—N.W.P. Gazetteer, iii. 444-446, 641-642 (description.) Siege,—TALS. 210-213. SPD. xxix. 56. Raj. i. 142-146; ii. p. 153. DC. Nur-ud-din, 22b-27b. Govind Ballal's raid east of the Ganges,—TALS. 210b. Mux. 171-174. Raj. i. 138-142.

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Along the western side of it stretches the edge of the upland running north to south parallel to the river. North, east and south of Shukartal there are numberless tortuous ravines sloping down to the river, the loose sandy bed and sides of which render the terrain impossible for cavalry, while they afford excellent opportunity to foot musketeers to dig themselves in and form perfect ambushes. In the north of the place, a bend in the Salāni (a feeder of the Ganges) formed an effective natural cover, while the entire eastern flank for many miles above and below was protected by the mighty Ganges and its network of channels, parted by sandy islands. Najib completed this natural fortress by forming entrenchments and redoubts, and mounting guns and posting his sharpshooters towards the west and south-west, whence only an enemy could approach. Thus, a perfect sunken fort was formed which only starvation could have made untenable in the age before the invention of modern shells. But the fear of starvation was removed by Najib throwing a bridge of boats over the Ganges south-east of his entrenchments, in an absolutely safe position, unless the enemy could cross the mighty river and storm the fortified bridgehead on the left bank, which was impossible during the rainy season just then beginning.

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Here Najib retired with his army at the end of June, and here the Marathas followed him up in a few days. Dattāji encamped two miles west of Shukartal. Finding the enemy's position impregnable to assault, he prepared to besiege it, and built a large redoubt of his own a mile from the first line of Najib's trenches. Skirmishes began on the debatable land between the two camps, accompanied by a fruitless exchange of gunfire.

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¹ SPD. xl. 126. Nur-ud-din, 25-26. Husain Shahi, 47-48. Siyar, iii. 62.

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§ 5. Dattāji's siege of Shukartal ; fighting.

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A severe engagement took place on 15th September, when the Ruhela skirmishers advanced too far into the Maratha lines, and Dattāji, after detaching a small force to keep them in play in front, made a detour with 7,000 select cavalry to cut off their retreat. But the eagle eye of Najib detected the manœuvre from the line of dust raised by these horsemen, and he prepared for it by posting ten thousand Ruhela infantry with loaded flint-locks in ambush in a dry *nālā* bordering the path of Dattāji's advance. The Ruhela skirmishers fell back towards their entrenchment and the front division of the Marathas gave them chase. Just then Dattāji arrived on the scene at the gallop, and "from the midst of the dust cloud the naked *pattas* (long swords) and spears of the well-mounted Deccani troopers flashed like lightning. As soon as they approached the Ruhela trenches and the artillery was turned on them with effect, they swerved aside towards the *nālā*. Two thousand muskets [at a time] were discharged at them when only twenty paces from the ambush, so that in the force under Dattāji corpses were piled up in heaps. It came to such a pass that a Ruhela seized the bridle of Jankoji with one hand and slashed at him with his sword with the other, inflicting a wound on his arm. The assailant was cut down and Jankoji brought back to safety.” The Bārha Sayyid allies fought with their customary valour in the van of the Marathas and were mostly cut off. Five hundred Deccani troopers and many good horses were killed, while the loss on Najib’s side was 50 killed, and one hundred wounded. His manœuvre having failed, Dattāji retreated in order to his camp. “From that day the Marathas ceased to make assaults.” * But skirmishing went on as before, with no result.

§ 6. Govind Bundele’s raid near Najibabad fails

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The war thus dragged on indecisively during the height of the rains, throughout the three months of July, August and September. Then when the river level began to fall and the uppermost course of the Ganges became fordable, Dattāji (about 20 October) detached ten thousand horse under Govind Ballāl to cross the river a little below Hardwār (32 miles north of Shukartal) and make a raid upon Najībābād, where Najib had built a city and fort and lodged his family as well as those of his followers and their property. Its only defender was his son Zābita Khan with a handful of troops, as all the military resources of Najib had been concentrated at Shukartal. The Maratha hordes, descending from the north-west, swept away the feeble defence of Sakalgarh, a half-way fort, and burst into the environs of Najībābād, plundering and burning. There was no field army of the Ruhelas to oppose them. But the Afghan clansmen of Rohilkhand proper, came forward under Sadullah Khan (Ali Muhammad Ruhela’s successor), Dundi and Hāfiz Rahmat, and held Najībābād in full strength. So, the light raiders shrank from approaching the city, turned back from Jalālābād, 8 miles west of Najībābād, and swerved south-westwards to the bridgehead opposite Shukartal, ravaging the defenceless country on the way. They captured about a hundred horses and even destroyed two boats of the bridge,—no very serious damage.

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∗ Nur-ud-din, 23b-24b, TALS. 210a. The former asserts that from that day assault was stopped, but the latter says that two or three pitched battles took place. The latter gives 15 September as the date of the battle, and DC. 1st September (evidently a mistake for 15 September, as the news reached Delhi on 19 September acc. to DC.)

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Ten days passed in this way, and though Hāfiz Rahmat mediated for terms, Najib was not induced to abandon Shukartal for the defence of his home. During this raid the food supply of Shukartal was for a time cut off and wheat sold there at four seers a Rupee and the besieged mostly lived on peas boiled whole (ghughni) ; the Afghan garrison became alarmed for the safety of their families left behind in the threatened villages, and began to give way to bewilderment and despair. But their veteran chieftain held on with a grim tenacity of will and reassured them, saying, “Remember God. Ahmad Shah is coming. From the first day of the siege, I have set my heart on death. Whatever is destined will happen. Seek no other course than fight.” The military effect of Govind Ballāl’s raid was therefore nothing.

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Then, as the Maratha raiders, with no enemy in sight, were lying scattered and careless in fancied security, early one morning (c. 3 November) they were surprised by the vanguard of the Oudh army, 10,000 strong, under Umrao-gir and Anup-gir Gosain. Rumours about the approach of the main body of the Oudh army, (30,000 strong) under Shujā himself, magnified the terror felt by the raiders. They offered no resistance ; some fell under the enemy’s sword, but most took the direct road to the river, and missing the ford, about half of their number was drowned, while the rest, abandoning all their provisions baggage and spoils fled northwards and found safety only on reaching Dattāji’s camp, having “undergone great hardship and imminent risk to their lives,” as their leader Govind Ballāl wrote. Five thousand Oudh horse under Umaraogir rode into beleaguered Shukartal over the bridge of boats and afterwards took post at a fortified camp of their own a little to the south of that place.

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A few days after this, Shujā himself arrived on the opposite bank in full strength. The terror of the returned raiders infected the Maratha siege army. A rumour arose that Najib, thus reinforced and now secure about his eastern flank, was preparing to make a sortie. At the mere report of this, before a single enemy had been sighted, all the followers in the camps of the three Maratha generals crowded together and fled in uncontrollable confusion for eight miles to the rear. It was only when Dattāji overtook them after his morning reconnaissance that the panic was arrested and the army induced to halt.

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§ 7. Dattaji is compelled to raise siege of Shukartal.

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More alarming news now came from the west: Abdāli’s troops in overwhelming force had again entered the Panjāb, and the Maratha governor of Lahor, Sābāji Sindhia, bowing before the storm, was hurriedly escaping to Dattāji’s side after abandoning the Panjāb to the invaders. Who could say that the Afghans would stop at the Satlaj and not come to Delhi, as they had done in 1757?

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The fugitive governor of the Panjab arrived in the siege camp on 8th November. Dattāji was utterly bewildered. His work in the Panjab had been undone at one stroke, and his five months' siege of Shukartal had proved barren of any result except a heavy loss of men and money to him. And now, if Abdali occupied Delhi in his rear, with the unsubdued and reinvigorated Najib in his front, his own army would be crushed between the two enemy hosts. And yet he could not show his face at Puna if he retreated from Shukartal without realizing any indemnity. It was Jayapa's position before Nagor once again.

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Dattaji, therefore, held a council of war on 9th November, at which it was decided that the camp and baggage should be stationed at a safe distance, sixteen miles in the rear, while the general with his troops in light equipment should continue to hold the siege lines and present a bold front to the enemy. Shuja offered his good offices as a peacemaker, threatening to enter into the war on the side of Najib if any attempt was made to crush the Ruhela chieftain altogether. An indemnity of 25 lakhs was demanded from Najib, but no agreement was reached, and the war was resumed.

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Dattaji turned to securing allies. A Jat force of 5,000 men sent by Suraj Mal (under Rupram Kothari) joined him on 8th November. Ahmad Bangash, the Nawab of Farrukhabad, too, arrived about the same time. Fast camel-riders were sent to hasten the coming of Malhar from Rajputana. Envoys were despatched to Delhi to urge the wazir to go to the siege-camp and join in the attack on Najib, their common enemy. Dattaji wrote to Imad, "In what sleep of negligence are you sunk ?... I am engaged here in fighting at your request, and you are planning to flee away to Bharatpur !" His envoy was authorized to offer the wazir two lakhs for his travelling expenses if he would start for the Maratha camp. On 16th November, Imād took formal leave of the Emperor and went to Murādnagar on the eastern side of the Hindan, *en route* to Shukartal. Here he received definite news of the Afghan invaders having taken possession of the entire Panjab up to Sarhind and of the Marathas having everywhere fled away before them without striking a blow.

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§ 8. *Imad murders Alamgir II. and Intizam-ud-daulah.*

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Imād saw the danger of leaving the Emperor in Delhi, to be captured by Abdali and used as his tool against the wazir, as had been done in 1757. He got the harmless crowned puppet murdered on 29th November and his long powerless old rival Intizām-ud-daulah strangled the next day.

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Zafarullah Khan (the brother of Ubaidullah) at the command of Mahdi Quli Khan (the chief adviser of Imād) tempted the Emperor Alamgir II to visit the Kohtila of Firuz Shah, by falsely telling him that a very saintly darvish possessed of miracle-working power had come from Lahor and taken up his residence there. When in the afternoon the party from the palace reached the spot, the Emperor entered a chamber under one of the bastions of the Kohtila, the door of which was guarded by a party of Central Asian troops of Bālābāsh Khān, the wazir's captain. Only one eunuch was admitted with him and all his other attendants (including Prince Mirzā Bābā) were detained outside. Bālābāsh Khan stabbed the Emperor to death with his dagger, came outside, disarmed Mirzā Bābā, and seizing him by the wrist took him back to Delhi. The Central Asian troops plundered the horses and all other property of the imperial cortege, and flung the Emperor's corpse down on the river bank below the Kohtila, circulating a false story that he had died (like Humāyun two centuries ago) by an accidental fall from the wall of that ruined fort. The murder of Alamgir II was an insane and absolutely profitless crime, because, if Imād had spared that meekest of meek usurper's hoary head, it would not in any way have added to the number of his enemies, nor weakened his own strength, which was already reduced to nothing.

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Alamgir II was buried at midnight in Humāyun's tomb. Mirzā Bābā was kept under guard by Bālābāsh in the Delhi palace, without food or drink all that night. The next morning the regicides crowned Muhi-ul-millat, the son of Muhi-us-sunnat and grandson of Kām Bakhsh (the youngest son of Aurangzib), under the title of Shāh Jahān II. Intizām the ex-wazir and Mirzā Lutfullah Beg, when engaged in reading the fatiha prayer in their prison in the artillery office within the fort, were strangled by these foreign mercenaries of Imād, and their corpses were thrown into the Jamunā with heavy stones tied to their feet, from the Salimgarh gate. The murderers falsely gave it out that Intizām had secretly fled away. [*TALS.* 214a-215a. *DC.*] A reign of unrelieved weakness and misery for sovereign and subjects alike thus fittingly closed in a bloody sunset, amidst the ruin of the imperial family and the old nobility and invasion and chaos in the country. Even for the arch-traitor Imād, Delhi ceased to be a refuge after this.

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§ 9. *Dattaji's position at Shukartal becomes untenable.*

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Meantime Dattāji Sindhia had been dreaming the vain dream that when the Emperor and the wazir would arrive in his camp and strengthen his legal position with their prestige, he would detach a large force under that constant failure Govind Ballāl to Farrukhabad, with orders to absorb the feeble levies of the lame invalid Ahmad Bangash, throw a bridge over the Ganges at Farrukhabad, and sack and burn the Ruhela country east of that river. This was the very strategy that had failed at the end of October. But rumours about Shujā having decided to make a counter-attack by crossing the bridge below Shukartal and joining Najib, kept Dattāji in alarm and suspense and detained Govind Ballāl in his camp for some days. While the two sides were higgling for the amount of the war-indemnity, events moved apace. The murder of the Emperor hastened the advance of the justly incensed Abdali upon Delhi for punishing the traitors and rebels. In the past two months the Afghan hold upon the Panjab had been fully established, the Sikhs brought under control,—at least along the main route,—and the conqueror was free to cross the Satlaj in person. On 23rd November, five hundred troopers, stripped of all their clothing above the waist and all their baggage,—the sole remnant of the six thousand Maratha soldiers posted in Multan,—straggled into Dattāji’s camp, proving beyond any doubt that “a great disaster has befallen us.”*

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§ 10. Abdali defeats Sindhia near Thaneshwar and crosses into the Doab.

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There was nothing left for Dattāji now but to raise his futile siege (8th December.) He effected the withdrawal of his camp in safety, because Najib, with his smaller army, wisely abstained from tempting Fate by coming out of his trenches† and meeting the Maratha horse in the open before he could be reinforced by the invincible legions of Abdali. From Shukartal, by way of Muzaffarnagar, the Bārha Sayyids’ country, Dattaji marched northwards and crossed the Jamunā at Rāmra-ghat near Pānipat (c. 20 Dec.) Here he got the correct intelligence that Abdālī’s vanguard under Jahān Khan, Shāh Pasand Khan, and Abdus Samad Khan had entered the Banur and Chhat district (16 miles north of Ambālā city) on the 15th, and that their front skirmishers had occupied Ambālā and “were advancing, daily foraging right left and in front, beating the jungle and shouting for 20 or 30 miles on each hand.”

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∗ Letter of Govind Ballal, 24 Nov. [Raj. i. 146.] † We find Najib at Shukartal up to 16 Dec., if not later. SPD. ii. 114a. Dattaji after leaving Shukartal,—Raj. i. 147, 150, 157. SPD. ii. 109, 111 (at Kunjpura), xxvii. 243 (at Sonepat.) DC. Battle near Thaneshwar,—SPD. ii. 112 (= xxi. 178), 117. Nur-ud-din, 28a—29a. Husain Shahi, 49.

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From Ambālā the Maratha position at Kunjpurā was only 48 miles south south-east, and the first encounter with the enemy could not be delayed beyond four days. Dattājī immediately divided his army into two bodies; he kept with himself one corps of 25,000 chosen and dependable troops, under noted and well-mounted officers, all lightly equipped, without tent or heavy baggage. The second corps was placed under Jankoji as a support twenty miles to the rear with the artillery and Imād and his contingent, while the camps of the wazir and the Maratha generals were stationed still further behind for safety. Govind Ballāl, who had been given leave for Etāwa at the end of November and then detained in the upper Doāb with the main army, accompanied Jankoji, crossed at Kunjpurā on 22 December, and was charged with the duty of conducting the camp baggage and families back to the South in the case of a disaster in the field.

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This arrangement was completed on 22nd December, and Dattājī immediately advanced from Kunjpurā to seek the enemy out, while Jankoji with the baggage took the road to Karnāl.* The Afghan vanguard was 20,000 strong, but their movements were completely hidden by a wide-spread screen of skirmishers. After some preliminary brushes between the rival scouts, the first battle was fought on 24th December. The scene of this encounter was not far from the historic plain of Tarāori (south-east of Thāneshwar) where six centuries earlier the Hindu chivalry of Delhi had first confronted the invader from Afghanistan. The most advanced troops of the Marathas were 5,000 horse under Bhoité with a thousand Turkish auxiliaries from the wazir's contingent led by Md. Said Khan Qipchāq. They charged and swept back the hundred front skirmishers of Abdāli's army. The practised Afghan horsemen fell back fighting, while the Marathas, in the pride of ignorance, pursued them shouting in tumultuous disorder. At the first news of the conflict, Abdali had pushed up 4,000 horsemen from his vanguard under Shah Pasand Khan, and "at the sight of that famous general's banner, the Mughalia [i.e., Central Asian] troops of the wazir, who had often beheld battles with the Durrānis, slipped away." Shah Pasand opened a hot fire with his flint-locks in front, while a second squadron detached by Abdāli took the Marathas in flank. Bhoité was out-numbered outgeneralled and outclassed in weapons, and fled away utterly broken, after giving up four hundred of his men to slaughter. Their heads were severed and carried away to Abdāli, as the first fruits of his victory. Dattāji himself then rode up to the battlefield, and saw the headless trunks of his soldiers strewing the ground. But by this time the short winter day had come to a close, the battle which had lasted a little over two hours could not be renewed, and each side fell back on its own camp with twenty miles between. It was the first clear defeat of the Marathas in an open engagement.

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∗ Dattaji's plan was "to come face to face with the enemy, watch their tactics and strength and then decide whether to fight immediately or follow Fabian tactics. He would take his own steps according to the indications of Abdali's plan of war." SPD. ii. 109.

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Next morning (25th December) when the dust-screen lifted over the country, it was found that during the preceding night Abdāli with all his troops had forded the Jamunā near Buriā (18 m. n.w. of Saharanpur) and entered the Doāb. By moving along the foot of the Himalayas and striking the river shortly after its outflow from the hills, he had secured the easiest crossing possible. Najib, with whom he had been in constant correspondence and who had pressed this move upon him by letters, had already started from Shukartal and now joined his protector near Saharanpur. The Afghan invader and his Indo-Afghan ally marched down the east bank of the Jamunā towards Delhi. Najib acted as the guide; he had his own revenue collector at every town in the upper Doāb, and the invader's food supply was assured.

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§ 11. Dattāji falls back towards Delhi; his defence plan.

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Thus Dattāji found that while his front was blocked by the Afghan conquest of the Panjāb and Sarhind, his right flank was uncovered by the enemy’s occupation of the entire Doāb. The invaders might easily cross over to the western bank at Delhi, or further south near Mathurā, and cut into the Maratha rear. Dattāji quickly fell back upon Delhi, in order to avoid the very trap in which the Bhau was caught ten months later. Leaving Kunjpurā on 27th December, he reached Sonepat on the 29th and halted there for five days to observe the enemy. The wazir re-entered his mansion in Delhi on 28 December and set about entrenching the eastern face of the capital along the bank of the Jamunā. Ahmad Shah Abdali, who had now been joined also by Hāfiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan, Mullā Sardār, Sadullah Khan and other Ruhela chieftains of Rohilkhand proper, encamped at Luni, six miles north-east of Delhi, on the other side of the Jamunā. So, Dattā fell back from Sonepat to Barāri, some ten miles north of Delhi, on 4th January 1760.

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The Maratha chief now prepared for the worst. He was clearly outnumbered; his enemy’s strength was daily growing by Indian adhesions, while his own followers had been thoroughly demoralized by the severe handling they had received at Tarāori and their constant retreats without one victory over Najib or the Durrānis. Reinforcements under Malhar, which had been urgently called for, would take at least a fortnight to join him. On 6th January Dattāji paid a visit to Delhi and started his camp, heavy baggage, accumulated spoils of a year's campaigning, and the families of himself and his officers,—including his pregnant wife Bhāgirathi Bāi,—for Rewari under proper escort. Thus freed from anxiety about his non-combatants and camp impediments, Dattaji set his face to the fight in the same formation as before,—himself with the light division of picked troops taking the front line, while Jankoji stayed some miles behind with the rest of the troops and the barely necessary baggage.

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The fog of war hid the entire eastern bank of the Jamunā, where the Marathas had not a single friend or news-reporter. There was no knowing what step Abdāli would take next, or where he would cross the river. The Maratha general posted small parties to watch the fords of the Jamunā; seven hundred men under Sābāji holding the Barāri-ghāt, nearest to Dattāji's own position, with other bands at two or three places further down the river and nearer Delhi. In the depth of winter the river level was at its lowest and the Jamunā opposite Barāri had been parted into two channels by a broad island; the main volume of its water flowed by the eastern bed, while a shallow stream running along the western or Delhi bank had dried and left a marshy nālā behind it. The island was covered with a jungle of the *jhāu* shrub and tall reed-bushes, “so dense that one horseman could not see another” in it.

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§ 12. Battle of Barāri-ghāt ; Dattāji slain.*

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Here Sābāji was surprised at his post on 9th January 1760. Najib crossed the river unperceived and arrived at the western side of the island about three hours after daybreak, his own Ruhelas leading the van and the Durrāni supports bringing up the rear. The island was impossible for cavalry action ; the Ruhela chiefs came mounted on elephants, with their light artillery (swivel-guns) tied to the sides of these beasts for convenience of crossing. To the Maratha patrol at the Barāri-ghāt, the sky above the *jhāu* bushes on the western edge of the island suddenly became alive with the fluttering pennons of the Indo-Afghan infantry, every officer of which, however humble, carried a banner of his own. Sābāji immediately engaged the enemy, but was driven back by the pressure of numbers and the dominance of musketry fire over sword and spear, across the *nālā* to the Barāri side, with heavy slaughter. He had waged this losing combat for an hour, when reinforcements came up from the rear, three miles away, under Dattāji himself, to restore the battle. The new-comers charged at the gallop and forced the victorious Ruhelas back over the *nālā*. A small band of Marathas advanced before the rest and pressed the counter-attack to the very edge of the island. At their head rode a very dark short and thickset man, barely forty years of age, who was foremost in darting his spear at the enemy. This seasoned warrior could no more restrain himself amidst the din of battle than an old war-horse that hears the trumpet note to charge. He was too good a target to be missed by the Ruhela sharpshooters lying concealed among the *jhāu* bushes with loaded muskets. As his horse was ploughing its way up the loose sand on the further bank of the *nālā*, the Afghan *jizails* rang out at point-blank range and Dattāji fell down with a bullet through his eye.* With him fell many of his brave companions. At this psychological moment, Najib charged with fresh troops into the mingled mass of Afghan infantry and Maratha horsemen in the bed of the *nala*. Once again the tide of battle turned against the Deccanis ; they fled away giving up their chieftain's body to crows and jackals ; Sābāji's entire contingent was destroyed, though he himself escaped. As Dattaji lay on the ground, Miān Qutb Shah cut his head off and took it to Abdali.

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∗ Last battle of Dattaji,—Raj. i. 156, 165, ii. p. 154 (list of the slain.) *SPD.* ii. 114, xxi. 181, 182, 185, xxvii. 247. *Muz.* 176. *Husain Shahi*, 50-51. *Nur-ud-din*, 29b-31a (very useful.) Miskin, 203.

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Roused by the fatal news, Jankoji hurried up with the reserve and tried to renew the fight. But there was no heart left among his troops. The Maratha army, 20,000 strong, stood in the background, looking at the fate of their vanguard, without venturing to advance to their support. Jankoji himself pushed on, but the story of spear against musket was repeated. After an hour and a half of renewed conflict, he received a bullet through the fleshy part of his upper arm and was dragged out of the field by his followers. The Maratha army now totally broke and fled towards Delhi; "the enemy gave chase and there was a heavy slaughter." Imād left Delhi for Bharatpur on hearing of the ruin of his ally.

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∗ According to Nur-ud-din, 30b. But Raj. i. 165 has 'in the neck.' Purushottam M. Hingané at the same time received a bullet in his thigh. *SPD*. ii. 114.

§ 13. Flight of Jankoji Sindhia to Kot Putli; Malhar Holkar joins him

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From the fatal field of Barāri-ghat the Maratha army fled headlong towards the south-west, with the fresh Durrāni horsemen on their heels. The pursuit was kept up for about 24 miles. But Dattāji's wise foresight now bore abundant fruit: he had kept his fighting force lightly equipped and ready for rapid movement, and Jankoji soon succeeded in rallying them and bringing them in some sort of order to Paniālā, five miles north of Kot Putli (which latter is 25 m. south of Nārnol) in the Jaipur kingdom, on 14th January, after catching up on the way his baggage train, women and other non-combatants who had been sent off from Delhi four days before the battle. A day after his arrival here, he was joined by Malhar Rao Holkar, who had started from Jhilāré in Rajputana on the 3rd. Some time was necessarily taken up by the funeral rites and condolence for the dead Sindhia chief and the discussion of the future plan of operations. It was decided to send off the baggage tents and non-combatants to the Deccan in charge of Govind Ballāl. This party started from Kot Putli on 23rd January, and after passing through the friendly territory of Kerauli crossed the Chambal river near Sabalgarh (48 miles due west of Gwālior) on 3rd February. The following night a posthumous son was born to Dattāji. *

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Malhar and Jankoji, thus freed from encumbrances, undertook to follow the traditional Maratha system of war, by discarding artillery and tents and moving in light kit; so as to be able to rove round the enemy's flanks or make lightning raids on his distant and undefended grain-depots and revenue collection offices, or even, if favoured by the enemy's slowness or ignorance, to ravage the dominions of his Ruhela allies in the upper Doab and trans-Ganges. For such a task Malhar was eminently fitted by his lifelong experience and settled belief. It was also necessary for the Marathas to shape their movements by watching carefully for indications of Abdāli's plan of action, because before the arrival of heavy reinforcements from the Deccan their forces in North India were too small and too demoralized to face the victorious invaders in a pitched battle. Jankoji, by reason of his youth and inexperience, remained safe in the rear, while Malhar took the command of the operating force, and began his advance on 24th January. He avoided a direct march on Delhi, but, passing through Kanaud (where he levied a ransom of Rs. 10,000), he hovered south-west of Delhi, in the broken Mewāt district, watching for opportunities.

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∗ Raj. i. 153, 156, 162. SPD. ii. 114, xxi 181.

§ 14. Ahmad Shah Abdali proceeds against Suraj Mal

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Meanwhile, after the victory of 9th January, Ahmad Shah halted for a few days to complete his arrangements for the temporary government of the kingless and wazir-less capital of the empire, and to secure his communications and regular provision supply. Then, skirting the city of Delhi, instead of entering it, he encamped at Khizirabad, south of the capital, on 14th January, and sent off letters to Suraj Mal Jāt and the Rajahs of Rajputana calling upon them to pay him tribute and present themselves before him. "If only his promise of safety could be relied upon, everyone of the Rajahs would gladly wait upon him," writes Badrinath (the son of Keshav Rao), so greatly were the blood-sucking leeches of the South detested by the Hindu potentates of the North. But in equal fear of the Afghan king's faithlessness and his military power, and not knowing how soon he would leave India and abandon them to the vindictive fury of the Marathas, these princes decided to sit on the fence, prolong their negotiations with Abdālī for settling the amount of their tribute, and thus gain time till they could see how the decisive contest between him and the Marathas would end. It was, therefore, necessary for Ahmad Shah to visit the territories of the Hindu Rajahs if he hoped to get anything out of them. Najib Khan acted as his medium in his dealings with the Indian princes.

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Leaving Khizirabad on 27th January, Abdali first marched * against Suraj Mal, by way of Shergarh (20 m. n. of Mathurā, 4 Feb.) to Dig (6 Feb.), which fort he invested but not very earnestly. From this base a detachment of his troops made a rapid march and completely defeated a Maratha force in their west by a night-attack (c. 11 Feb.) Abdali next moved into Mewāt, on the way to Nārnol, where Malhar was reported to be. But the Maratha vanished into the north and Abdālī proceeded to Rewari (c. 18 Feb.) On the 22nd he marched eight miles towards Delhi in ignorance of the elusive Maratha’s position. But the Southern light horse again gave him the slip : Malhar was at Bahādurgarh (40 m. north of Rewari and 18 m. west of Delhi) on 22nd February, and two days later he appeared near Kālka Devi (close to the Qutb Minār), and on the 26th-27th crossed the Jamunā into the Doāb. Abdālī marched to Dhankot (20 miles s. w. of Delhi) on 27th February, reached Khizirabad on the 29th, and sent Jahan Khan across to the eastern bank of the Jamunā the next day.

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∗ Abdali’s campaign against Malhar, Feb. 1760.—DC. (very imp.) SPD. xxi. 182, 186. ii. 118 (=xxvii. 251.)

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§ 15. Malhar Holkar routed near Sikandrabad by Jahan Khan.

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The Maratha raiders under Malhar reached Sikandrabad on 28th February, sacked that large city totally, and halted for news of Abdālī's movements. Here they learnt that ten lakhs of treasure sent from Najib's estates in trans-Ganges had arrived opposite Anupshahar on the way to Abdālī's camp, as the Ruhela chief's contribution to the war-expenses of his protector. Malhar immediately sent out scouts to search for a ford near Anupshahar and halted for three or four days. This delay ruined him. Ahmad Shah sent a strong cavalry detachment under his best general Jahān Khan, who after a forced march surprised Malhar's vanguard, under Gangādhar Tātyā (Chandrachud), eight miles in front of Malhar's camp, at the dawn of 4th March. The Maratha resistance was short; they fled away "on unsaddled horses, giving up all their property to plunder." Three high officers,—Anand Ram Jādav, Shethyāji Kharādē and his son (named Faqirji in a Persian MS.),—besides many common soldiers, fell * in the fight and the pursuit. Malhar himself fled away at a breakneck pace, and came to Agra after crossing the Jamunā, while Gangādhar reached Mathurā behind him.

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∗ Malhar surprised near Sikandrabad,—SPD. ii. 120, 121, xxi. 187, 188. Raj. vi. 403, i. 178 (false rumour of survival.) Muz. 178.

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The light foray plan of campaign even under Malhar Holkar, the ablest cavalry leader among the Marathas, had entirely failed against Abdālī. Returning to Bharatpur, Holkar called for Hāfiz's envoy and resumed the discussion of the peace terms proposed by that chief. As Purushottam Hingané wrote on 12th March, “Hāfiz offers to come and meet our sardār and set Abdali on the path of return, and then join us with his troops for humbling Najib. He promises never to help Najib. Our sardār has agreed not to cross his path, nor to molest his territory. This has been sworn to by both sides.... When Malhar arrived about 30 miles from Bharatpur, Suraj Mal came and met him, and was given assurances of friendship and protection, sworn on *bel* leaves and Ganges water. Then the Jāt Rajah was dismissed with robes of honour to Bharatpur, while Malhar marched to Sāroti 11 m. s. w. of Bayana.” [SPD. ii. 121.]

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Jahān Khan followed up his victory by pushing on to opposite Mathurā, his master moving one day's march behind him. On reaching Koil (Aligarh), Abdali was

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Nur-ud-din, 31b (Faqirji captured alive.) Siyar, iii. 65. Kharé, i. 17 and 20 (which speaks of Shethyaji, Anand Ram and Gangadhar's nephew as slain.) Miskin, 209.

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advised by Najib,—his supreme confidant and guide on Indian questions,—to canton here for the approaching hot weather, which had been so fatal to the Afghan invaders in 1757, and the following monsoon. A large Maratha army was reported to be coming up from the Deccan to restore their lost predominance in the North and account must be settled with it before Abdali could leave India, unless he wished to abandon Najib to Deccani vengeance.

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I. The Peshwa's North-Indian policy in 1759.

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The Peshwa's letter to Rāmāji Anant (the manager of the Sindhias), correct date 23 Feb. 1759 :—

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Dattaji was to have realized a large sum from Marwār. What has he done there?… Lead an expedition into Bengal and Bihār; realize vast sums of money there for repaying my debts. Bengal is a province capable of yielding one *kror* or a *kror* and a half. It ought to be [your master's] determined aim to collect a large sum, clear my debts and sustain our troops. Occupy Bihār, it is a country fit to be retained. Dattaji himself and Jankoji with a strong force should go there, capture Patna and remain encamped there. From that place make your plans about Bengal. Raghunath Rao Dāda will go to Hindustan when the rainy season is over. Thereafter he will march into Bengal and collect a vast sum. If, as in the past, the envoy [of the Bengal ruler] comes to you for making a compromise about the Bengal tribute, do not agree to any settlement. My debts would not be cleared unless a huge amount is extracted from Bengal. It is (therefore) necessary to march with a vast army and secure a *kror* or a *kror* and a half [from that province.] If without an expedition a tribute of 50 or 60 *lakhs* is promised, then accept it. If not, plan [your campaign] after Dāda's arrival. For the present you should go to Bihār and seize Patna.

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There are two or three undertakings to be achieved in connection with Shuja-ud-daulah. Take Benares, Ajodhya and Allahabad from him. He had promised to Dāda [in 1757] to cede Benares and Ajodhya, but the case of Allahabad is still under discussion. If a settlement on the last point can be easily reached, make it.

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Vital Shivdev had settled the tribute [of Bihar] at 12 lakhs only, because at that time we were not free [to lead an expedition there.] But now we have a grand opportunity of collecting money. If [the ruler of Bengal and Bihar] agrees to pay down 50 lakhs within one year at Delhi, then accept the settlement. He will not pay at the mere demanding; but if the generals mentioned above go in force up to Patna, then he will soften and pay a large contribution.

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I have to repay a debt of one *kror* of Rupees. Half of my troops have been sent to their homes as without employment. I have retained 20,000 men for necessary services and must pay them. My creditors have received only 30 lakhs. You must extinguish 50 lakhs of my debt. I am relying upon Dattaji’s assurance to me on this point, at the time of his taking leave to depart.

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The Peshwa’s letter to Dattāji and Jankoji Sindhia, dated 21 March 1759:

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The wazir [Imad-ul-mulk]'s heart is not sincere. Mansur Ali Khan’s son will pay 50 *lakhs* if he is given the wazir-ship. If I order you to make this change, effect it on your return from Lahor. Formerly, when Dada was near Delhi, Mansur Ali Khan’s son had voluntarily offered to cede Benares to us. If he is now made wazir [by us], he must cede both Benares and Allahabad and pay 50 *lakhs*. If he refuses to make the above territorial surrenders and asks for 2 or 3 years to complete the payment [of 50 lakhs], do not give him the wazir-ship. But give it if he pays 50 lakhs and at least Allahabad.

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You have written that if Najib is made imperial Pay-master-General he would pay 30 lakhs. But he is very treacherous. He alienated Dada in the past. If he is established in Delhi, know that an outpost of Abdali has been planted in that city. Advancing him is like feeding a cobra with milk. Crush him.

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If you can go towards Bengal with the Emperor and the wazir after the rainy season, a great impression would be created; many Ruhela zamindars would join our side. From here Dada will go towards Allahabad via Bundelkhand. You march through the Doab, and this our superior strength will enable you to seize Allahabad by surprise. Thereafter, if Shuja-ud-daulah, on being thus threatened from two sides, cedes Benares and Allahabad and pays a heavy nazar, do you persuade the Emperor and the wazir to give him the Bakhshi-ship. This is our second alternative plan.

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The third course is that, if the wazir refuses to leave Delhi [for Bihar], then you should go and join Shuja, take from him Benares and Allahabad only but do not demand a money contribution, promise him half of Bengal and Bihar, make him accompany you, wrest Bengal and exact a large tribute from that province.

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Out of these three plans, adopt whichever is found to be soundest.

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Your going to the Panjab, where there is heavy work to be done, has thrown this [Bengal] enterprise into delay. Take it in hand after the rains.

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[Aitihāsik Patren Yādi Wagairé, 166 and 167. Cf. SPD. ii. 104, Dattaji's reply to the second letter above.]

II. Was Malhar Holkar responsible for the disaster to Dattaji Sindhia on 9 Jan. 1760?

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No. That Malhar did not join Dattaji before this fatal battle was due solely to Dattaji's pride and miscalculation of enemy forces. When Datta first heard of Abdali's invasion of the Panjab, he was at Shukartal and Malhar near Sawai Madhopur. This great distance between them and the fact of Malhar being then involved in the siege of Barwara and therefore unable to disentangle himself from his Rajput enemies and to march to Datta's assistance at a day's notice, should be carefully borne in mind.

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Datta first asked Malhar to come to him, [SPD. ii. 115] and the latter sent his siege-guns back to Rampura and got ready to march away. "On the day he joined his van" he received a letter from Datta to say that there was no report of Abdali's coming soon, and that he was still holding the trenches against Najib. So, Malhar, "feeling reassured about that quarter," recalled his guns and laid siege to Barwara. But on 27th Dec. he, all of a sudden, received Dattaji's frantic call to come to his aid in the campaign against Abdali, and began his march towards Delhi five days later. [SPD. ii. 117.] He could not possibly have been in time to join in the battle of Barari-ghat. And, from the fact of the Marathas being hopelessly outclassed in weapons and outgeneralled by Abdali, I am convinced that if Malhar had joined Dattaji, he would have merely led larger hecatombs to the slaughter. What Malhar could have done by his guerilla tactics (ghanimi) was seen at Sikandrabad on 4th March 1760.

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