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The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c24: 18. Administration of the Sultanate

The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c24

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18. Administration of the Sultanate

Central Government

The Sultanate : a theocracy

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The Sultanate of Delhi was a theocracy and not a secular state. Throughout the period the State had its own religion, which was Islam. It did not recognise any other religion, such as Hinduism, the followers of which constituted an overwhelmingly vast majority of the Sultanate's population. The ruling family and dominant ruling class were the followers of this religion and, in strict theory, all the resources of the State were meant for the protection and propagation of the Muslim religion. A modern writer (Dr. I. H. Qureshi) maintains that the Sultanate of Delhi was theocentric and not a theocracy on the ground that "the rule of the ordained priesthood," which is the essential feature of a theocracy, was absent in the Sultanate. This agreement ignores both the letter and the spirit of the Islamic polity. There is no denying the fact—and Dr. Qureshi admits it—that in every Muslim State the canon law is the supreme law; civil law is subordinate to it, and, in fact, it merges its existence in the latter. The Muslim *ulema*, though not ordained and hereditary, were as fanatical and biased as, if not more than, any ordained clergy and insisted on the enforcement of the Quranic law and extirpation of idolatry and heresy. The conduct of the ruling authority in the Sultanate of Delhi was governed by the Quranic injunctions. The Sultan was not only expected to follow this law in his own personal life,¹ but also in the administration. In fact, he was to administer this law, and if, in the opinion of his subjects, he failed to follow it in administering the country, he ceased to be their lawful king. The ideal of the Islamic State in India, therefore, was to convert the entire country to Muslim religion and to destroy the indigenous religions root and branch by turning *dar-ul-harb* (infidel lands) into *dar-ul-Islam* (Muslim lands), and compelling the people therein to embrace the faith of Muhammad.

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¹ If they could not follow it and drank wine and indulged in other forbidden pursuits it was due to human frailty and not to want of zeal for religion.

The Caliph as the nominal sovereign

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According to the Islamic theory of sovereignty, there is only one Muslim king of all Muslims wherever they might be living. He is the Caliph or the *Khalifa*. During the heyday of the Caliph's power he used to appoint governors to the various provinces of the Caliphate. Even when a governor set himself up as an independent ruler or a Muslim adventurer conquered any land and became its king, he invariably envoked the sanction of the Khalifa's name, called himself his vassal and received investiture of his office from him, though, in actual practice, he exercised the authority of an independent king. This fiction of the unity of the Khilafat was kept alive even when the Caliphate came to an end and the last Abbasid Khalifa, Mustasim, was put to death by the Mongol leader, Hulagu Khan, in 1558. In conformity with the practice of the age, the Sultans of Delhi styled themselves as the Caliph's deputy or assistant, received investiture from him and had his name inscribed on the coins and read in the *khutba*. The first Sultan of Delhi to make a departure from this practice was Ala-ud-din Khalji. His son, Qutub-ud-din Mubarak, did not believe in the fiction of the Caliphate and actually assumed the title of Khalifa for himself. Barring these two examples, almost all the Sultans of Delhi during our period recognised the nominal sovereignty of the Khalifa. Modern Muslim writers have stretched the point too far in their desire to show that the so-called unity of the so-called Islamic World was a potent reality. The fact, however, is that no Sultan of Delhi ever considered the Khalifa to be his real sovereign. He did not derive power from the nominal Khalifa and was himself the real sovereign of the realm. Nevertheless, as the rulers of this period were foreigners and Muslims, they thought it advantageous to maintain formal relation with the Islamic World outside.

The Sultan

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The head of the Sultanate of Delhi was called the Sultan. Sovereignty was supposed to reside in the entire Sunni population of the country, called the *millat*. The Sultan was to be elected by this brotherhood. In actual practice, it was difficult, if not impossible, to get together all the Sunni Musalmans in the country to exercise their right, and, therefore, the franchise was restricted and became confined to a few notable men and, eventually, to only one man. The right of nomination by the dying king was also recognised. Thus both the methods were resorted to in choosing the Sultan of Delhi. There was no hereditary principle of succession and the office of the Sultan was open, at least in theory, to any *bonafide* Muslim. But, in practice, it was restricted to the immigrant Turks, and then to a still smaller oligarchy and, in the end, to members of the ruling family. In the 15th and 16th centuries, however, the scope was extended and there were rulers of the Arab and Afghan descent.

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In strict Islamic theory the true king of a Muslim State is God. The Sultan is His agent and exists to enforce the so-called divine law as expressed in the *Quran*. The Sultan was, thus, the chief executive of the Sultanate of Delhi. He was not only to enforce the law, but he was also its interpreter. In this work he was guided by the *Hadis*, the decisions of the well known jurists and the consensus of opinion of the learned divines, whenever there was a controversy about the interpretation of a particular rule. The Sultan was, also, the highest judicial authority. In fact, he was the fountainhead of justice in the country. Besides, he was the commander of the army. His powers were very wide, indeed. He was a perfect autocrat and his authority was unfettered. The basis of his power was religious and military. As long as he followed the Quranic law, his authority was supreme. There were, however, certain Sultans of Delhi, notably Ala-ud-din Khalji and, for some time, Muhammad bin Tughluq, who defied the Quranic law and yet no one dared to remove them, because they had the support of a powerful army. Thus, even when the Sultan went against the Quranic injunctions, he could not be deposed as long as he was the master of a powerful military establishment. There was no constitutional device to remove an erring king peacefully from the throne. The only way to do it was by a successful rebellion which meant a civil war.

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The immensity of the power of the Sultan during our period is clear from the fact that he was not only king of all the people in his dominions, but he was also the religious head of the Muslim section of the population. Thus he was "Caesar and Pope combined in one."

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The Sultan was a thorough-going military despot. All power in the State was concentrated in his hands. Inspite of the original democratic nature of an Islamic State, the government of the Sultan of Delhi had to be a centralized organisation owing to the circumstances. The Sultan had to live and function in the midst of a hostile Hindu population. There were powerful Hindu chiefs who were, naturally, anxious to resist the expansion of the foreign government and even to make a bid for the recovery of their independence. There was danger from outside, too, and the north-western frontier of the Sultanate was almost continuously battered by the Mongol inroads. Under these circumstances, the Sultan had to maintain a large force for defence and to centralize the administration.

The Ministers

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There were ministers to assist the Sultan in the work of administration, whose number varied from time to time. During the so-called Slave period, there were four ministers, namely, the *wazir*, the *ariz-i-mamalik*, the *diwan-i-insha* and the *diwan-i-rasalat*. There was, sometimes, the *naib* or *naib-i-mamalik* also whose office was next only to the Sultan and, therefore, superior to that of the *wazir*. The *naib* wielded great authority when the Sultan happened to be weak; but he was only a nominal deputy Sultan in normal times and much inferior to the *wazir*. Subsequently, the *sadr-us-sudur* and *diwan-i-qaza* were raised to the status of ministers. Thus, there were six ministers at Delhi in the heyday of the Sultanate's administration. There was a seventh office which, though not technically a ministership, yet its occupant wielded greater power than most of the ministers. It was that of the comptroller of the royal household.

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The Wazir

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The prime minister was called the *wazir*. He stood “midway between the sovereign and his subjects.” He enjoyed great authority and exercised the powers and prerogatives of the Sultan with some restrictions. He appointed important officers in the name of the Sultan and heard complaints against all officials. He acted for the king when the latter was ill or absent and also when the Sultan was a minor. His next important duty was to keep the Sultan informed of the sentiments and needs of the people and to act as his adviser in the affairs of the government. Besides being in charge of the general administration, he was, particularly, the head of the finance department. In this capacity he was responsible for laying down rules and regulations of revenue settlement and fixing the rates of other taxes and for controlling the expenditure of the realm. In addition, he had to superintend the civil servants. He controlled the military establishment also, as all the requirements of the military department had to be referred to him. His subordinates kept accounts and disbursed salaries of the military officers and troops. The *wazir* was also in charge of stipends and subsistence allowance to learned men and the poor people. Thus, every branch of public administration came within the *wazir’s* purview and every man, from the governor to the menial servant, had directly or indirectly to deal with him. In view of these wide powers, he enjoyed a great prestige and was paid handsomely by assignment of the revenues of a large estate.

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The office of the wazir was called *diwan-i-wazarat*. He had an assistant, called *naib-wazir*, who was in charge of this office. Next to the *naib-wazir* was the *mushrif-i-mamalik* (accountant general). Then came the *mustaufi-i-mamalik* or auditor general. The accountant general used to enter the accounts received from the provinces and the various departments, while the auditor general used to audit them. During the reign of Firoz Tughluq, however, a change was introduced. The accountant general dealt with income, while the auditor general with the expenditure. There was a *nazir* to assist the accountant general. The auditor general, too, had assistants. Both had big offices with numerous clerks.

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Diwan-i-ariz

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The next important minister at the capital was *diwan-i-ariz* or *diwan-i-arz*. He may be called the army minister or the controller general of the military establishment. His main work was to recruit troops and to maintain the descriptive rolls of men and horses and to hold military review in order to inspect the forces. As the Sultan was the commander-in-chief of the army, the *ariz-i-mamalik* was, generally speaking, not required to command the royal troops; but, sometimes, he commanded a part of the army. He particularly looked after their discipline and equipment and their disposition on the field of battle. This department was so important that sometimes the Sultan personally performed some of the duties relating to it. Ala-ud-din Khalji, for instance, was greatly interested in the organisation and upkeep of his military establishment and, hence, paid personal attention to it.

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Diwan-i-insha

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The *diwan-i-insha* was the third minister. This minister was in charge of royal correspondence. He was assisted by a number of *dabirs*, that is, able writers who had established their reputation as masters of style. All correspondence, much of which was of a confidential nature, between the Sultan and the rulers of other States and important vassals and officials of the kingdom passed through this department. Important royal orders were drafted in this department and then forwarded for the Sultan’s sanction, after which they were copied, registered and despatched. Owing to the confidential nature of the work in his charge, the head of this department was a very trusted official.

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Diwan-i-rasalat

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The next minister was *diwan-i-rasalat* or *diwan-i-risalat*. There is a difference of opinion regarding the functions of this minister. According to Dr. I. H. Qureshi, he dealt with religious matters and was, also, in charge of grant of stipends to scholars and pious men. Dr. A. B. M. Habibullah, on the other hand, maintains that he was a minister for foreign affairs and was, therefore, in charge of diplomatic correspondence and the ambassadors and envoys sent to and received from foreign rulers. Dr. Habibullah’s view seems to be correct, for, apart from the error of interpretation committed by Dr. Qureshi, the theory would have made duplication inevitable, as there was, from the very beginning, an officer in charge of religious affairs, endowments and charity. He was called *sadar-us-sudur*. The *diwan-i-rasalat* was a very important officer, as the Sultans were anxious to maintain diplomatic relations with Central Asian powers besides those in the country.

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Sadr-us-sudur

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The other two ministers were the *sadr-us-sudur* and the *diwan-i-qaza*. Very often only one minister was appointed to carry on the work of these two departments, that is, the department of religious endowment and charity and the department of justice. The chief *sadr* (*sadr-us-sudur*) was required to enforce Islamic rules and regulations and to see that the Muslims observed them in their daily life and that they said their five daily prayers regularly, kept the fast of Ramzan and so on. He had, also, to disburse a large amount of money in charity and to reward learned Muslim divines and grant subsistence allowance to scholars and men of piety. The chief *qazi* was the head of the judicial department and had to supervise the administration of justice in the kingdom.

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The Majlis-i-khalwat

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The ministers were not all of the same rank and status. The *wazir* enjoyed a definitely higher status and privileges. The five other ministers were ministers by courtesy and were, more or less, like secretaries to the Sultan. There was no council of ministers as they were not called to advise the king at one and the same time. As they were appointed and dismissed by the king at will, the advice of any one of them or all of them combined was not binding on the Sultan. Moreover, the king had a large circle of advisers, many of whom were non-officials and they constituted what is known as the *majlis-i-khalwat*. It consisted of the Sultan's personal friends, his trusted officers and some of the notable *ulema*. They were called to give advice to the Sultan from time to time. Their advice, like that of the ministers, was not binding on him. Nevertheless, sometimes they exerted some influence on the administration.

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Other departments

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Besides the four first-rate ministers and two second-rate ministers (chief *sadr* and the chief *qazi*) there were some other departmental heads at the capital who were entrusted with important duties. They were *barid-i-mamalik* (head of the intelligence and posts department), *diwan-i-amir kohi* or the department of agriculture which was created by Muhammad bin Tughluq, the *diwan-i-mustakhraj* or the department which had to look after and realise arrears from farmers or collectors, and which was established by Ala-ud-din Khalji, *diwan-i-khairat* or the department of charity, instituted by Firoz Tughluq and *diwan-i-istihqak* or the department of pensions.

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Controller of royal household

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The head of the royal household, though technically in charge of private affairs of the Sultan, wielded considerable influence on the administration. The royal bodyguard and slaves, who were commanded by officers, known as *sar-i-jandar* and *diwan-i-bandagan*, functioned under his supervision. These took part in battles. There were many *karkhanas* or workshops which manufactured articles required by the army and other departments of the State. The royal stables had horses and other animals which were used for transport and war. All these were under the controller of the royal household. Moreover, he was directly in touch with the Sultan, sometimes even more than the *wazir*. Hence he wielded great authority and enjoyed high prestige.

Provincial Administration

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At no stage in its history was the Sultanate of Delhi divided into homogeneous provinces with uniform administrative system in them. No Sultan of Delhi ever thought of rearranging the distribution of provinces on a uniform basis. During the thirteenth century the Sultanate consisted of military commands which were known as *iqtas*. Each *iqta* was under a *muqti* or a powerful military officer. The number of *iqtas* during the time of so-called Slave kings has been given in the chapter on their administration (12). Ala-ud-din Khalji who conquered practically the whole of the country, including the Dakhin, and who was, otherwise, an original and constructive statesman, allowed big and small provinces to remain as he had found them. Under him, therefore, two kinds of provinces came into existence, namely, the *iqtas* which he had inherited from his predecessors and the new principalities that he conquered. While he retained the old *iqtas*, he appointed military governors to the newly conquered provinces which were, naturally, larger in area and income, as they had been big and flourishing Hindu states before their conquest. Add to them the principalities of the Hindu vassals who, too, were reduced to the position of governors and we have, thus, three kinds of provinces in the Sultanate from the time of Ala-ud-din Khalji. The officer-in-charge of an *iqta* continued to be known as *muqti* as before. Those appointed in charge of the new military provinces were called *walis* and sometimes *amirs*. Obviously, a *walis* enjoyed a higher status and greater authority than a *muqti*. The number of the major provinces varied from time to time. The most important military governorship during the time of the Khaljis and the Tughluqs were Bangal, Gujarat, Jaunpur, Malwa, Khandesh and the Dakhin. Both the *muqtis* and the *walis* were required to keep powerful military establishments in their jurisdictions and to maintain law and order and punish refractory zamindars. They were empowered to appoint subordinate officers and were generally responsible for the entire administration of the areas in their charge. Their power was practically unlimited as long as they obeyed the Sultan and furnished him with military aid in times of need.

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They were also required to furnish an account of their income and expenditure and to pay the residue to the central government. The *walis* and the *muqtis* were advised to protect and enforce the Muslim law, to protect the *ulema*, to arrange for the administration of justice, to enforce the decisions of the court, to keep the highways free from robbers and to encourage trade and commerce and material prosperity. Firoz Tughluq advised his son, Fateh Khan, while sending him as governor of Sindh, to protect the peasants from undue exactions and tyranny, to help the learned and the holy, and to protect the people. Inspite of these pious injunctions, the governors, in normal times, enjoyed wide powers and were like petty despots in their respective areas. During the time of weak kings they behaved like *de facto* rulers and exercised unlimited authority. They engaged even in civil wars without the permission of the monarch. It was easy for some of these governors to set themselves up as independent kings during the weak days of Firoz Tughluq's successors.

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In each province there was a staff for the collection of revenue. It consisted of *nazirs* and *waqufs*. There was, besides, a higher officer, called *sahib-i-diwan* or *khwaja*. He was probably appointed by the Sultan on the recommendation of the *wazir* and was in charge of keeping accounts and furnishing detailed statements of the same to the central government. According to Dr. Qureshi he was responsible to the Sultan. There were a *qazi* and some other subordinate officers in every province.

Local Administration

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During the thirteenth century there was no lower unit of administration than the *iqta*. But with the growth of the Sultanate and the effective suppression of the Hindu chieftains, it was found necessary in the fourteenth century to sub-divide the provinces into *shiqs*. Perhaps this was not done in every province. We know that Muhammad bin Tughluq divided the viceroyalty of the Dakhin into four *shiqs* and that the Doab was divided into *shiqs*. At the head of a *shiq* there was a *shiqdar*. He was, probably, a military officer and his duty was to maintain law and order in his jurisdiction. A little later, a smaller unit of administration than the *shiq* came into existence. It was an aggregate of a number of villages and was called *pargana*. Ibn Buttuta refers to a 'sadi' or a collection of a hundred villages as an administrative unit. We do not know definitely about the designation and the duties of the officers of the *parganas*. There were a *chaudhari* and a collector of revenue in each *pargana*. The lowest unit was the village which had its own indigenous administration. There was in every village a *panchayat* to settle disputes. The people of the village constituted a small commonwealth and looked after their affairs and arranged for defence, watch and ward, elementary education and sanitation. Normally, they were not interfered with by the Sultan. Every village had then, as now, a *chaukidar* and a revenue officer, called *patwari*.

The Army

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As the Sultanate of Delhi was based primarily on force and not on the willing consent of the people, it had to maintain a much larger army than was necessary for the needs of an indigenous national State. During most of the period the army consisted of four classes : (1) regular soldiers permanently employed in the Sultan’s service, (2) troops permanently employed in the service of the provincial governors and nobles, (3) recruits particularly employed in times of war and (4) Muslim volunteers enlisted for fighting what was called *jihad* or holy war.

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The Sultan’s troops at Delhi were called *hashm-i-qalb*. They consisted of two categories of troops, namely, those belonging to the Sultan and those that were in the service of the nobles at Delhi, such as, ministers of the court and other high officials. The troops in royal service were known as *khasah khail* and comprised royal slaves, guards called *jandars* and *afwaj-i-qalb* or the troops directly under royal command. Though these troops were in the permanent employment of the Sultan, they could not be said to have constituted a standing army. Their number was small, and it was not possible for the Sultan to depend upon them entirely in times of danger or war. For the first time in the history of the Sultanate, Ala-ud-din Khalji laid the foundation of a standing army which was directly recruited, paid and officered by the central government. It numbered 4,75,000 horse, besides a vast number of footmen. The institution continued till the time of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Firoz Tughluq converted the army into a feudal organisation. The Lodi army was organised on clannish basis and consisted of tribal hordes of the Lodis, the Qarmalis, the Lohanis, the Surs, and other Afghan tribes. It was ill-organised and weak.

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The contingents of the troops maintained by the nobles and provincial governors were placed at the disposal of *diwan-i-ariz* in times of war. Their organisation, discipline and payment was a matter for the individual governor. There were no uniform rules for their recruitment, training and promotion. The recruits specially employed in the time of war were irregular troops. There was no fixed rule for their payment. Muslim volunteers were encouraged to join the Sultan's army whenever it had to fight with a Hindu ruler. The *maulvis* and the *ulema* were sent round the country to exhort the Muslim population to participate in a holy war against a Hindu chief. The volunteers were not paid from the royal treasury; they were allowed a share of the booty.

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The army was not a national army, as it consisted of soldiers of diverse nationalities, such as, the Turks of various tribes, the Tajiks, the Persians, the Mongols, the Afghans, the Arabs, the Abyssinians, the Indian Musalmans and the Hindus. It was a mercenary body which worked for money and whose only bond was the person of the Sultan. Being a heterogeneous body, it was not inspired by national sentiment. But, as most of its members and all its officers were Muslims, it was animated by a feeling of religious solidarity and fanaticism. Inspite of the exaggerated praise lavished on it by Dr. I. H. Qureshi, the army of the Sultans was not a homogeneous, scientifically trained and efficient force like that of Charles VIII of France or of Frederick William I of Prussia.

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The army consisted of cavalry, infantry and elephants. The cavalry was the most valued arm and formed the backbone of the military establishment. Each horseman was armed with two swords, a dagger, and a bow and arrows. Sometimes he carried a mace also. The troopers wore coats of mail and the horses were caprisoned with steel. As the value of a trooper depended upon his horse, many a cavalryman had an additional horse. In fact, the cavalry was divided into three grades, namely, (1) the *murattab*, that is, the trooper who had two horses, (2) the *sawar*, that is, the cavalryman with one horse, and (3) the *do-aspa*, that is, a soldier who had a led horse and was not a cavalryman properly so-called. Great care had, of necessity, to be bestowed on the supply of good horses which were imported from Arabia, Turkistan and, sometimes, even from Russia.

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The Sultan’s stables had many thousands of extra horses ready for service.

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The next section of the army was the infantry. The foot-soldiers were called *payaks*. Most of them were the Indian Musalmans, the Hindus and the slaves. They were armed with swords, spears and bows and arrows. The archers were called *dhanuks*, a corruption of the Sanskrit word *dhanush*.

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Then there were the elephants which were highly valued by the Sultans. It is said that Balban considered a single elephant as effective in a battle as five hundred horsemen. Muhammad bin Tughluq had 3,000 elephants. Firoz had almost an equal number. The possession of elephants was considered a royal prerogative. Sometimes permission was given to a great noble to keep an elephant which was a rare mark of honour. An elephant carried several armed soldiers who were seated inside a fort-like wooden structure, called *hauda*, placed upon the elephant’s back. The elephants were clad in plates of steel and armed with scythes attached to their trunks and tusks. They were trained to fight. There was an officer in charge of elephants, known as *shahna-i-fil*.

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There was nothing like modern artillery, but incendiary arrows, javelins and pots full of combustibles were used in battle. Hand grenades, fireworks, rockets and naptha balls were also common. There was a machine for discharging balls by the force of gun powder. Besides, there were *manjaniqs* or *mangonels* and *mangons* (a sort of mechanical artillery) through which fire balls, fire arrows and pieces of stones and rock and even iron balls were thrown. Sometimes poisonous snakes and scorpions were hurled against the enemy. The Sultan maintained a considerable number of boats for the transport of the troops and for use in river battles.

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The Sultan was the commander-in-chief of his force. He paid personal attention to its organisation and upkeep. There was, however, an army minister, known as *diwan-i-ariz*, who was in charge of recruitment of troops, their organisation and discipline and promotion. The army seemed to have been organised on decimal basis. A unit of cavalry was formed by ten troopers at whose head there was a *sar-i-khail*. The next rank was that of *sipahsalar* who had ten *sar-i-khails* under him. The third higher rank was that of *amir* who had ten *sipahsalars* under him. The next higher authority was *malik* with ten *amirs* under him, and at the head of ten *maliks* there was a *khan*. Probably, this arrangement existed only on paper and was never strictly adhered to during the reign of any of the Sultans of our period. By the time of Balban, most of the offices in the army had become hereditary. Many of the soldiers sent proxies in a battle or at a military review. Ala-ud-din Khalji took steps to do away with corruption by introducing the system of branding (*dagh*) horses so as to prevent a horse from being brought twice at a review or from being substituted by a worthless pony. He also ordered the descriptive roll (*huliya*) of each soldier to be taken and recorded in registers, so that no soldier or officer in his army could send a proxy. These reforms restored discipline in the army. But, in the time of Firoz Tughluq, they were disregarded and soldiers were allowed to send substitutes to the musters. The army continued to be disorganised and ill-disciplined till the time of Sikandar Lodi who insisted on the registration of *huliya* or *chehra* and the branding of the horses.

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The central government could be strict about the organisation and discipline of the army at the capital, but, so far as the contingents of the provincial governors were concerned, the centre had little control over them. They were brought to muster once a year, and it was only at that time that the *diwan-i-ariz* could enforce the regulations devised by him.

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A part of the army used to be stationed at strategic places in the provinces. Forts on the frontier were garrisoned with seasoned troops. It was the duty of the commandants of the forts to see that there were adequate provisions including fodder for the animals in the forts in their charge.

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The Sultans were adept in military strategy. The art of ambushing and surprise attacks were commonly resorted to. Before the army engaged in war, the general or officer-commanding almost invariably surveyed the prospective theatre of war and took geography into account in fixing a battle-field. There was the traditional practice of dividing the army into several divisions on a field of battle. There were, for example, the advance guard, the centre, the right wing, the left wing and the rear guard or reserve. Elephants were stationed in the front. They were preceded by armed infantry. According to Qureshi, there were flanking parties on either flank of an army, which seems to me to be doubtful. There was no flanking party in Ibrahim Lodi's army in the battle of Panipat. Their presence in Babur's army was a main reason of Ibrahim's defeat. Scouts and sepoys were attached to the army. The duty of the scouts was to reconnoitre and to bring news. They rendered useful service.

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The military officers were paid by assignment of land revenue, while the individual troops seem to have been paid in cash. The soldiers' pay varied from time to time. In Ala-ud-din's reign the salary of a well-equipped trooper was 234 *tankas* per annum. Muhammad Tughluq paid him 500 *tankas*. Soldiers were given food, dress and fodder free during the time of a campaign. The salary of the officers, too, varied from time to time. A *khan* was paid one lakh of *tankas* a year, and a *malik* fifty to sixty thousand *tankas* annually. Smaller officers received from one to ten thousand *tankas* a year. These included the pay of the troops under their command. The irregular troops, called *ghair-wajhis*, who were employed for short periods, were, sometimes, paid by an order on some local treasury and sometimes in cash from the central treasury. Firoz Tughluq revived payment by assignment for the soldiers also. The emoluments of the fighting forces were, on the whole, not only adequate, but also handsome.

Finance

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The fiscal policy of the Sultanate period was based on the theory of finance of the Hanafi school of Sunni jurists. The early Turkish rulers of India had borrowed the system from their Ghaznavide predecessors. The principal sources of revenue as sanctioned by the *shariat* and realised by the Sultans were: (1) *ushr*, (2) *kharaj*, (3) *khams*, (4) *zakat*, and (5) *jizya*. Besides these there were a number of other taxes, such as income from mines and treasure trove, heirless property and customs and excise duties. The *ushr* was a land tax, charged on land held by Muslims and watered by natural means. It was one-tenth of the produce. *Kharaj* was the tax on land held by non-Muslims. According to Islamic law its rate was to be from one-tenth to one-half. *Khams* was one-fifth of the booty captured in wars against the infidels. Four-fifths of it went to the army. The *zakat* was a religious tax levied upon Muslims only. It was charged on the property if its value exceeded a certain fixed amount. The value of the property which was exempted from this tax was called *nisab*. Its rate was one-fortieth or 2½ per cent of the property. The proceeds of this tax were spent on specified items for the benefit of Muslims only, such as, repair of mosques and tombs, expenditure on religious endowments and paying stipends and subsistence allowances to men of piety and poverty.

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**What is Jizya.** *Jizya* or poll tax was charged from non-Muslims only. There is a difference of opinion among scholars about the nature of this tax. Some maintain that it was a religious tax levied on the non-Muslims “in return for which they received protection of life and property and exemption from military service, as non-Muslims were not entitled, according to orthodox jurists, to live in a Muslim country.” Some of the modern Muslim scholars, however, hold that it was a secular tax charged from non-Muslims, as they were exempt from military service, which every Musalman, at least in theory, was liable to render to the State. Early Muslim jurists divided taxes into two groups—religious taxes and secular taxes—and they included *jizya* in the latter category. The religious tax was the *zakat* or the *sadqah*, which was charged from Muslims only. As *jizya* was not charged from the Muslims and as there was no fixed rule that its proceeds should be spent for religious purposes only, it was included by Muslim jurists among the secular taxes. The view that *jizya* is a secular tax on the basis of the above classification is evidently untenable. Whatever might have been the original intention with which this tax was levied in Islamic lands outside India, there is no doubt that, by the time the Arabs conquered Sindh, *jizya* had acquired a religious significance. It was imposed on the non-Muslims as the State gave them “protection of life and property and exemption from military service,” and the Sultans considered it to be a religious duty to realise this tax rigorously. Those of our modern writers who hold this tax to be secular conveniently forget the first part of the injunction, namely, the protection of life and property of the *zimmis*, and emphasize only the latter part, namely, exemption from military service. It is clear from the history of the Mughul period that the vassal Hindu rajas who furnished military assistance to the Mughul emperors in the time of Babur and Humayun and in the early days of the reign of Akbar and throughout that of Aurangzeb, were not exempt from the payment of *jizya*. We know definitely that the ruler of Udaipur was required to cede a certain part of his territory in lieu of *jizya* while, at the same time, he had placed a contingent of his troops at the disposal of Aurangzeb. It is, thus, obvious that *jizya* had a religious colour about it. The ruling of *qazi* Mughis-ud-din of Bayana about this tax has already been given in a former chapter. It will be too much in view of the facts of the history of the entire period to maintain that *jizya* was a secular tax like *Turush ka danda* or any other poll tax.

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Women and children, monks and beggars and the blind and the cripple were exempt from *jizya*. For purposes of this tax the entire Hindu population was divided into three grades. The first grade paid at the rate of 48 *dirhams*, the second at 24 *dirhams* and the third at 12 *dirhams*.

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*Other taxes.* There was a tax on import, which was 2½ per cent on merchandise; on horses it was 5 per cent. From the non-Muslims the excise or import tax was charged at double the rate of that from the Muslims. Then there were a house tax, a grazing tax, a water tax and a number of other minor taxes. The State charged one-fifth of all minerals and one-fifth of treasure acquired by an individual. The State also claimed a share of unstamped bullion minted and found in an area conquered by the Muslims. All the property of men dying in the State and without heirs went to the State. Another important source of income was the presents made to the Sultans by the people, officers and nobles. This brought in a large revenue every year.

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*Land revenue.* Land revenue was, of course, a most important source of the income of the Sultanate of Delhi, next only to plunder and booty acquired in the time of war. For the purpose of fiscal administration there existed four kinds of land, namely, (1) *khalisa* territory, (2) land divided into *iqtas* and held by *muqtis* either for a number of years or for lifetime, (3) the principalities of the Hindu chiefs who had come to terms with the Sultan, and (4) the land given away to Muslim scholars and saints in gift, such as *milk* or *inam* or *waqf*. The *khalisa* was directly administered by the central government. But the State dealt with local revenue officers, like *chaudharis* and *muqaddams*, and not with individual peasants. There was an *amil* or revenue collector in each sub-division (probably *shiq*) who collected revenue from the above named officers, while they, in their turn, realised it from the peasants. The State demand or scale of revenue was not based on any careful calculation and the ascertainment of the actual produce of the soil and seems to have been a summary assessment. In the *iqta* the administration, including assessment and collection of revenue, was in the hands of the *muqti* who deducted his own share and paid the surplus to the central government. It was in his interest to show a nominal surplus and to evade payment on one pretext or another. The Sultan, therefore, appointed, on the recommendation of the *wazir*, an officer, called *khwaja* in each *iqta* to keep an eye on the revenue collection and exercise some check on the *muqti*. The possibility of collusion between the *muqti* and the *khwaja* was minimised by the presence of spies who reported directly to the central government about the activities of the local officers. The Hindu rajas who owed allegiance to the Sultan enjoyed complete autonomy in their respective States and were required to pay tribute. Similarly, *zamindars* paid a fixed revenue to the government and the peasants in their jurisdiction did not know any authority except their own landlords. The land given away as *waqf* or *inam* was free from revenue assessment and was allowed to become a hereditary possession of the grantees.

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The system, as described above, continued throughout the period of the Sultanate of Delhi. The first ruler to introduce a vital change in the revenue policy and administration was Ala-ud-din Khalji. His revenue policy was guided by two main considerations, namely, (1) increasing the State's income to the utmost limit, and (2) keeping the people in economic want so as to prevent them from entertaining any thoughts of insubordination and rebellion. Accordingly, he undertook the following measures.

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Firstly, he confiscated the land held by Muslim grantees and religious land held as *milk* (proprietary right), *inam* (free gifts), *ibarat* (pensions) and *waqf* (endowment). Most of the land of the above description was annexed to the State; but some assignees seem to have remained untouched. Secondly, he withdrew the privileges hitherto enjoyed by Hindu *muqaddams*, *khuts* and *chaudharis* who were obliged to pay taxes, like others, on the land held by them and also the house and the grazing taxes. Thirdly, he increased the state demand to one-half of the produce. Fourthly, he imposed some other taxes on the peasants in addition to the land revenue and those that were already in vogue. These were the house tax and the grazing tax. *Jizya*, customs duties and *zakat* continued to be levied, as in the time of the previous Sultans. Fifthly, he introduced the measurement of land in order to ascertain the actual produce and had the *patwari's* records requisitioned to provide the revenue settlement. Sixthly, he established an efficient machinery for the rigorous collection of all kinds of revenue and did not make any allowance for any damage, natural or accidental, to the crops. Though measurement could not be applied to all the provinces of his dominion, the aim of his policy was to increase the revenue considerably and to make all classes of the people, such as peasants, landlords, merchants and traders, to shoulder the burden of taxation.

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Ala-ud-din’s policy, being too rigid and unpopular, could not be followed by his weak successors. Many of his harsh regulations were allowed to fall into decay; but the scale of revenue fixed by him was not altered. Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq softened the rigour of Ala-ud-din’s revenue policy and administration, though he did not, in any way, lessen his scale of demand of the State which continued to be one-half of the produce as before. In the first place, he recognised the principle of making due allowances for damages to the crops due to natural calamity or accident and remitted a proportionate revenue. Secondly, he allowed the *khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis* to enjoy exemption from the taxes on their land and on their grazing animals. Thirdly, he laid down that State demand from any *iqta* should not be enhanced more than one-tenth or one-eleventh of the standard assessment in a year. But Ghiyas-ud-din’s fiscal administration was marred by two defects, namely, the abandonment of measurement and reversion to the policy of assessing the revenue by guess or computation, and the resumption of the practice of granting assignment of land to civil and military officers.

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Muhammad bin Tughluq, who followed him, was animated by the desire of systematising the fiscal administration of the realm. Under his instructions the department of revenue undertook the compilation of a comprehensive register of the income and expenditure of the Sultanate with a view to introduce a uniform standard of land revenue and to make sure that no village remained unassessed; but his necessary and useful work remained unfinished. His next experiment was to increase the scale of taxes, other than the land revenue which continued to be charged at 50 per cent, in the Ganga-Yamuna Doab. The measure was bitterly resented; but the Sultan continued to realise the taxes at the enhanced rate inspite of a famine due to the failure of rains. The result was a fearful rebellion. Yet he would not withdraw the ordinance. He advanced loans and sunk irrigation wells, but it was too late. The entire doab was ruined. The Sultan’s other reform was the establishment of the department of agriculture, called *diwan-i-kohi*, with a view to extending the area under cultivation. But, this, too, failed.

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Firoz Tughluq's accession in 1351 marks a turning point in the agrarian policy of the Sultanate of Delhi. He paid great attention to the revenue affairs and sincerely desired to foster the material prosperity of the people. First of all, he healed the wounds inflicted by his late cousin and wrote off the *taqavi* loans, increased the salaries of the revenue staff and abolished the use of physical coercion to which the governors and revenue officers were subjected. Next he fixed the revenue of the entire *khalisa* land on a permanent basis after careful and laborious examination of local records. Thirdly, he abolished as many as twenty-four vexatious taxes, including the much-hated grazing and house taxes, and charged, in conformity with the Quranic law, only five taxes—*kharaj*, *khams*, *jizya*, *zakat* and irrigation tax. Fourthly, he constructed as many as five canals and sunk numerous wells for the irrigation of fields. Fifthly, he encouraged the cultivation of superior crops, such as, sugarcane, oil-seeds, poppy, etc. Sixthly, he planted many gardens and encouraged production of fruits. These wise measures greatly enhanced the royal revenues and brought about general material prosperity of the people.

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Firoz's administration, however, suffered from three great defects, namely, (1) the application of the principle of farming out of land revenue, (2) the pernicious customs of granting assignments of land revenue and permitting the public sale of the assignment deeds, and (3) the extension of the scope and the rigorous realisation of *jizya*.

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Although the just and generous rules of Firoz Tughluq's revenue administration fell into negligence during the weak days of his successors and the confusion following Timur's invasion, yet in essence they continued to be followed by the later Tughluqs and the Sayyids. When the Lodis came to power, they divided almost the entire land in their dominion among the important Afghan families. The *khalisa* land was greatly reduced in size and importance. Sikandar Lodi made an attempt to revive measurement, but otherwise, he made no important alteration in the revenue rules and regulations.

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There is a controversy regarding the scale of revenue demanded by the Sultans of Delhi. According to a modern scholar it was one-fifth of the produce during most of the period. This conclusion is based on guess and seems to be erroneous. The Muslim law, as expounded by orthodox jurists, lays down that the rate of *kharaj* should vary from one-tenth to one-half of the produce. We know that in every Muslim land as well as in India, the State demanded one-tenth of the produce from the Muslim cultivator, if his land was not irrigated from the waters of the State canals or public tanks or wells. On the other hand, if his land was watered by State canals or wells, he had to pay a water tax as well. As throughout our period Hindu traders had to pay the excise tax at a rate which was double of that chargeable from the Muslims, it can be legitimately inferred from this that the Hindu cultivators must have been charged double the revenue of what the Muslim cultivators were required to pay, that is, the scale of land revenue in the case of Hindu peasants must have been one-fifth of the produce. If this rule was at all followed, it could have been so during the rule of the so-called Slave kings only. Ala-ud-din Khalji increased the scale of land revenue to one-half of the produce and all his successors on the throne of Delhi down to the extinction of the Sultanate continued to make the same demand. It has been established by modern research that Sher Shah charged one-third,² which was considered to be a legitimate and just demand during his time and which was later adopted by Akbar the Great. Considering these circumstances, it seems probable that even during the days of the so-called Slave kings the State demand was one-third of the gross produce of the soil. But throughout the period several other taxes besides the land revenue were levied upon the peasants. The chronicles tell us that Qutub-ud-din Aibak had abolished all un-Islamic taxes and that they had to be abolished again and again by several other Sultans. It is, therefore, clear that throughout the period of the Sultanate of Delhi the peasant was required to pay many taxes over and above the land revenue. It is irrelevant to enquire as to who was responsible for the continuance of these taxes and whether they went to fill the coffers of the Sultan or were appropriated by corrupt revenue officers, governors and ministers. The irresistible conclusion, however, is that the peasants were not allowed to enjoy more than one-third of the fruits of their labour.

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² Refer to *Sher Shah And His Successors* by A. L. Srivastava, pp. 71-76.

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The main items of expenditure were the Sultan’s household, civil and military services, religious endowments and charity, wars and rebellions and huge presents sent to the Khalifa and to the religious places outside India.

Justice and Peace

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The *diwan-i-qaza* (department of justice) was the weakest and most ill-organised department of administration. The Sultan, being the fountainhead of justice, was responsible for upholding and maintaining the Quranic law which, in theory, was the only law recognised by the Sultanate of Delhi. He was, therefore, the head of the department of justice, held court twice a week and decided cases in person. But, though normally the highest court of appeal, he often tried original cases also. When called upon to decide religious cases, the Sultan was assisted by the chief *sadr* (*sadr-us-sudur*) and the *mufti*; but in secular cases he had the assistance of the chief *qazi* (*qazi-ul-qazat*). Throughout our period these two high offices, namely, those of the chief *sadr* and the chief *qazi* had one and the same person as their incumbent. This person sat with the king in two capacities—as chief *sadr* in religious cases and as chief *qazi* in secular cases.

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The chief *qazi* was designated as the head of the department of justice, but he was only its nominal head; for the department was, in fact, controlled by the Sultan himself. The chief *qazi* constituted himself as the highest court of appeal only when the Sultan's court was not in session. Even when he acted as the highest court of appeal, his decisions were liable to be revised by the Sultan. Nor was the chief *qazi* the real administrative head; for we are told that the Sultan appointed provincial and district *qazi* and *amir-i-dad* in important cities, may be on the chief *qazi*'s recommendation, and was the *de facto* incharge of their postings, transfer and dismissal. The chief *qazi* lived and held his court at the capital. He was assisted by a *mufti* (legal interpreter); he supervised the provincial judges and heard appeals from their decisions.

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