Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or the Central and Western Rajput States of India v1.c18.s1: Chapter 2
Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or the Central and Western Rajput States of India v1.c18.s1
- Language
- English
Contents
- v1.c18.s1.t1 Feudal Incidents — 114 parts
Chapter 2
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Legislative Authority.—During the period still called ‘ the good times of Mewar,’ the prince, with the aid of his civil council, the four ministers of the crown and their deputies, promulgated all the legislative enactments in which the general rights and wants of the community were involved. In these the martial vassals or chiefs had no concern : a wise exclusion, comprehending also their immediate dependents, military, commercial, and agricultural. Even now, the little that is done in these matters is effected by the civil administration, though the Rajput Pardhans have been too apt to interfere in matters from which they ought always to be kept aloof, being ever more tenacious of their own rights than solicitous for the welfare of the community.
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Panchāyats.—The neglect in the legislation of late years was supplied by the self-constituted tribunals, the useful panchayats, of which enough has been said to render further illustration unnecessary. Besides the resident ruler of the district, who was also a judicial functionary, there was, as already stated, a special officer of the government in each frontier thana, or garrison post. He united the triple occupation of embodying the quotas, levying the transit duties, and administering justice, in which he was aided at the chabutra ¹ or court, by assembling the Chauthias or assessors of justice. Each town and village has its chauthia, the members of which are elected by their fellow-citizens, and remain as long as they conduct themselves impartially in disentangling the intricacies of complaints preferred to them.
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¹ Literally ‘terrace,’ or ‘altar.’
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They are the aids to the Nagarseth, or chief magistrate, an hereditary office in every large city in Rajasthan. Of this chauthia the Patel and Patwari ² are generally members. The former of these, like the Dasaundhi of the Mahrattas, resembles in his duties the decanus of France and the tithing-man in England. The chauthia and panchayat of these districts are analogous to the assessors of [146] justice called scabini ³ in France, who held the office by election or the concurrence of the people. But these are the special and fixed council of each town; the general panchayats are formed from the respectable population at large, and were formerly from all classes of society.
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² [Headman and accountant.]
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³ They were considered a sort of jury, bearing a close analogy to the judices selecti, who sat with the praetor in the tribunal of Rome (Hallam).
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The chabutras, or terraces of justice, were always established in the khalisa, or crown demesne. It was deemed a humiliating intrusion if they sat within the bounds of a chief. To ‘erect the flag’ within his limits, whether for the formation of defensive posts or the collection of duties, is deemed a gross breach of his privileged independence, as to establish them within the walls of his residence would be deemed equal to sequestration. It often becomes necessary to see justice enforced on a chief or his dependent, but it begets eternal disputes and disobedience, till at length they are worried to compliance by rozina.
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Rozina.—When delay in these matters, or to the general commands of the prince, is evinced, an officer or herald is deputed with a party of four, ten, or twenty horse or foot, to the fief of the chief, at whose residence they take up their abode; and carrying, under the seal, a warrant to furnish them with specified daily (rozina) rations, they live at free quarters till he is quickened into compliance with the commands of the prince. This is the only accelerator of the slow movements of a Rajput chieftain in these days, whether for his appearance at court or the performance of an act of justice. It is often carried to a harassing excess, and causes much complaint.
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In cases regarding the distribution of justice or the internal economy of the chief’s estates, the government officers seldom interfere. But of their panchayats I will only remark, that their import amongst the vassals is very comprehensive; and when they talk of the ‘panch,’ it means the ‘collective wisdom.’ In the reply to the remonstrance of the Deogarh vassals,¹ the chief promises never to undertake any measure without their deliberation and sanction.
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¹ See Appendix, No. III.
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On all grand occasions where the general peace or tranquillity of the government is threatened, the chiefs form the council of the sovereign. Such subjects are always first discussed in the domestic councils of each chief; so that when the [147] witenagemot of Mewar was assembled, each had prepared himself by previous discussion, and was fortified by abundance of advice.
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To be excluded the council of the prince is to be in utter disgrace. These grand divans produce infinite speculation, and the ramifications which form the opinions are extensive. The council of each chief is, in fact, a miniature representation of the sovereign’s. The greater sub-vassals, his civil pardhan, the mayor of the household, the purohit,² the bard, and two or three of the most intelligent citizens, form the minor councils, and all are separately deliberating while the superior court is in discussion. Thus is collected the wisdom of the magnates of Rajwara.
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² Family priest.
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Military Service.—In Mewar, during the days of her glory and prosperity, fifteen thousand horse, bound by the ties of fidelity and service, followed their prince into the field, all supported by lands held by grant ; from the chief who headed five hundred of his own vassals, to the single horseman.
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Knight’s Fee or Single Horsemen.—A knight’s fee in these States varies. For each thousand rupees of annual rent, never less than two, and generally three horsemen were furnished ; and sometimes three horse and three foot soldiers, according to the exigencies of the times when the grant was conferred. The different grants ¹ appended will show this variety, and furnish additional proof that this, and all similar systems of policy, must be much indebted to chance for the shape they ultimately take. The knight’s fee, when William the Conqueror partitioned England into sixty thousand such portions, from each of which a soldier’s service was due, was fixed at £20. Each portion furnished its soldier or paid escuage. The knight’s fee of Mewar may be said to be two hundred and fifty rupees, or about £30.
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¹ See Appendix, Nos. IV. V. and VI.
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Limitations of Service.—In Europe, service was so restricted that the monarch had but a precarious authority. He could only calculate upon forty days’ annual service from the tenant of a knight’s fee. In Rajasthan it is very different : “ at home and abroad, service shall be performed when demanded ” ; such is the condition of the tenure.
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For state and show, a portion of the greater vassals ² reside at the capital for [148] some months, when they have permission to retire to their estates, and are relieved by another portion. On the grand military festival the whole attend for a given time ; and when the prince took the field, the whole assembled at their own charge ; but if hostilities carried them beyond the frontier they were allowed certain rations.
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² See Appendix, No. XX. art. 6 ; the treaty between the chiefs and his vassals defining service.
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Escuage or Scutage.—Escuage or scutage, the phrase in Europe to denote the amercement ³ for non-attendance, is also known and exemplified in deeds. Failure from disaffection, turbulence, or pride, brought a heavy fine ; the sequestration of the whole or part of the estate.⁴ The princes of these States would willingly desire to see escuage more general. All have made this first attempt towards an approximation to a standing army; but, though the chiefs would make compensation to get rid of some particular service, they are very reluctant to renounce lands, by which alone a fixed force could be maintained. The rapacity of the court would gladly fly to scutages, but in the present impoverished state of the fiefs, such if injudiciously levied would be almost equivalent to resumption; but this measure is so full of difficulty as to be almost impracticable.
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³ Appendix, No. XVI.
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⁴ Both of which I have witnessed.
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Inefficiency of this Form of Government.—Throughout Rājasthan the character and welfare of the States depend on that of the sovereign: he is the mainspring of the system—the active power to set and keep in motion all these discordant materials; if he relax, each part separates, and moves in a narrow sphere of its own. Yet will the impulse of one great mind put the machine in regular movement, which shall endure during two or three imbecile successors, if no fresh exterior force be applied to check it. It is a system full of defects; yet we see them so often balanced by virtues, that we are alternately biassed by these counteracting qualities; loyalty and patriotism, which combine a love of the institutions, religion, and manners of the country, are the counterpoise to systematic evil. In no country has the system ever proved efficient. It has been one of eternal excitement and irregular action; inimical to order, and the repose deemed necessary after conflict for recruiting the national strength. The absence of an external foe was but the signal for disorders within, which increased to a terrific height in the feuds of the two great rival factions of Mewar, the clans of [149] Chondawat¹ and Saktawat,² as the weakness of the prince augmented by the abstraction of his personal domain, and the diminution of the services of the third class of vassals (the Gol), the personal retainers of the crown; but when these feuds broke out, even with the enemy at their gates, it required a prince of great nerve and talent to regulate them. Yet is there a redeeming quality in the system, which, imperfect as it is, could render such perilous circumstances but the impulse to a rivalry of heroism.
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¹ A clan called after Chonda, eldest son of an ancient Rana, who resigned his birthright.
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² Sakta was the son of Rana Udai Singh, founder of Udayapura, or Udaipur. The feuds of these two clans, like those of the Armagnacs and Bourguignons, “qui couvrirent la France d’un crêpe sanglant,” have been the destruction of Mewar. It requires but a change of names and places, while reading the one, to understand perfectly the history of the other.
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Rivalry of the Chondāwat and Saktāwat Sub-clans.—When Jahangir had obtained possession of the palladium of Mewar, the ancient fortress of Chitor, and driven the prince into the wilds and mountains of the west, an opportunity offered to recover some frontier lands in the plains, and the Rana with all his chiefs was assembled for the purpose. But the Saktawats asserted an equal privilege with their rivals to form the vanguard;¹ a right which their indisputable valour (perhaps superior to that of the other party) rendered not invalid. The Chondawats claimed it as an hereditary privilege, and the sword would have decided the matter but for the tact of the prince. “The harawal to the clan which first enters Untala,” was a decision which the Saktawat leader quickly heard; while the other could no longer plead his right, when such a gauntlet was thrown down for its maintenance.
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¹ Harāwal.
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Untala is the frontier fortress in the plains, about eighteen miles east of the capital, and covering the road which leads from it to the more ancient one of Chitor. It is situated on a rising ground, with a stream flowing beneath its walls, which are of solid masonry, lofty, and with round towers at intervals.² In the centre was the governor’s house, also fortified. One gate only gave admission to this castle.
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² It is now in ruins, but the towers and part of the walls are still standing.
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The clans, always rivals in power, now competitors in glory, moved off at the same time, some hours before daybreak—Untala the goal, the harawal the reward! Animated with hope—a barbarous and cruel foe the object of their prowess—their wives and families spectators, on their return, of the meed of enterprise; the bard [150], who sang the praise of each race at their outset, demanding of each materials for a new wreath, supplied every stimulus that a Rajput could have to exertion.
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The Saktawats made directly for the gateway, which they reached as the day broke, and took the foe unprepared; but the walls were soon manned, and the action commenced. The Chondawats, less skilled in topography, had traversed a swamp, which retarded them—but through which they dashed, fortunately meeting a guide in a shepherd of Untala. With more foresight than their opponents, they had brought ladders.
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chief led the escalade, but a ball rolled him back amidst his vassals; it was not his destiny to lead the harawal! Each party was checked. The Saktawat depended on the elephant he rode, to gain admission by forcing the gate; but its projecting spikes deterred the animal from applying its strength. His men were falling thick around him, when a shout from the other party made him dread their success. He descended from his seat, placed his body on the spikes, and commanded the driver, on pain of instant death, to propel the elephant against him. The gates gave way, and over the dead body of their chief his clan rushed to the combat! But even this heroic surrender of his life failed to purchase the honour for his clan. The lifeless corpse of his rival was already in Untala, and this was the event announced by the shout which urged his sacrifice to honour and ambition. When the Chondawat chief fell, the next in rank and kin took the command. He was one of those arrogant, reckless Rajputs, who signalized themselves wherever there was danger, not only against men but tigers, and his common appellation was the Benda Thakur (‘mad chief’) of Deogarh. When his leader fell, he rolled the body in his scarf; then tying it on his back, scaled the wall, and with his lance having cleared the way before him he threw the dead body over the parapet of Untala, shouting, “The vanguard to the Chondawat! we are first in!” The shout was echoed by the clan, and the rampart was in their possession nearly at the moment of the entry of the Saktawats. The Moguls fell under their swords: the standard of Mewar was erected in the castle of Untala, but the leading of the vanguard remained with the Chondawats¹ [151].
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¹ An anecdote appended by my friend Amra (the bard of the Sangawats, a powerful division of the Chondawats, whose head is Deogarh, often alluded to, and who alone used to lead two thousand vassals into the field) was well attested. Two Mogul chiefs of note were deeply engaged in a game of chess when the tumult was reported to them. Feeling confident of success, they continued their game; nor would they desist till the inner castle of this ‘donjon keep’ was taken, and they were surrounded by the Rajputs, when they coolly begged they might be allowed to terminate their game. This the enemy granted; but the loss of their chiefs had steeled their breasts against mercy, and they were afterwards put to death. [Compare the similar case of Ganga, Rāja of Mysore, who was surprised, by the treachery of his ministers, while occupied in a game of chess (L. Rice, Mysore Gazetteer (1897), i. 319.]
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This is not the sole instance of such jealousies being converted into a generous and patriotic rivalry; many others could be adduced throughout the greater principalities, but especially amongst the brave Rathors of Marwar.
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It was a nice point to keep these clans poised against each other; their feuds were not without utility, and the tact of the prince frequently turned them to account. One party was certain to be enlisted on the side of the sovereign, and this alone counterbalanced the evil tendencies before described. To this day it has been a perpetual struggle for supremacy; and the epithets of ‘loyalist’ and ‘traitor’ have been alternating between them for centuries, according to the portion they enjoyed of the prince’s favour, and the talents and disposition of the heads of the clans to maintain their predominance at court. The Saktawats are weaker in numbers, but have the reputation of greater bravery and more genius than their rivals. I am inclined, on the whole, to assent to this opinion; and the very consciousness of this reputation must be a powerful incentive to its preservation.
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When all these governments were founded and maintained on the same principle, a system of feuds, doubtless, answered very well; but it cannot exist with a well-constituted monarchy. Where individual will controls the energies of a nation, it must eventually lose its liberties. To preserve their power, the princes of Rajasthan surrendered a portion of theirs to the emperors of Delhi. They made a nominal surrender to him of their kingdoms receiving them back with a sanad, or grant, renewed on each lapse: thereby acknowledging him as lord paramount. They received, on these occasions, the khilat of honour and investiture, consisting of elephants, horses, arms, and jewels; and to their hereditary title of ‘prince’ was added by the emperor, one of dignity, mansab.¹ Besides this acknowledgment of supremacy, they offered nazarana² and homage, especially on the festival of Nauroz (the new year), engaging to attend the royal presence when required, at the head of a stipulated number of their vassals. The emperor presented them with a royal standard, kettle-drums, and other insignia, which headed the array of each prince. Here we have all the chief incidents of a great feudal sovereignty. Whether the Tatar sovereigns borrowed these customs from their princely vassals, or brought them from the highlands of Asia, from the Oxus [152] and Jaxartes, whence, there is little doubt, many of these Sachha Rajputs originated, shall be elsewhere considered.
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¹ [‘Office, prerogative.’ For a full account of the Mansab system, see Irvine, Army of the Indian Moghuls, 3 ff.]
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² Fine of relief.
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Akbar’s Policy towards the Rājputs.—The splendour of such an array, whether in the field or at the palace, can scarcely be conceived. Though Humayun had gained the services of some of the Rajput princes, their aid was uncertain. It was reserved for his son, the wise and magnanimous Akbar, to induce them to become at once the ornament and support of his throne. The power which he consolidated, and knew so well to wield, was irresistible; while the beneficence of his disposition, and the wisdom of his policy, maintained what his might conquered. He felt that a constant exhibition of authority would not only be ineffectual but dangerous, and that the surest hold on their fealty and esteem would be the giving them a personal interest in the support of the monarchy.
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Alliances between Moguls and Rājputs.—Akbar determined to unite the pure Rajput blood to the scarcely less noble stream which flowed from Aghuz Khan, through Jenghiz, Timur, and Babur, to himself, calculating that they would more readily yield obedience to a prince who claimed kindred with them, than to one purely Tatar; and that, at all events, it would gain the support of their immediate kin, and might in the end become general. In this supposition he did not err. We are less acquainted with the obstacles which opposed his first success than those he subsequently encountered; one of which neither he nor his descendants ever overcame in the family of Mewar, who could never be brought to submit to such alliance.
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Amber, the nearest to Delhi and the most exposed, though more open to temptation than to conquest, in its then contracted sphere, was the first to set the example.¹ Its Raja Bhagwandas gave his daughter to Humayun;² and subsequently this practice became so common, that some of the most celebrated emperors were the offspring of Rajput princesses. Of these, Salim, called after his accession, Jahangir; his ill-fated son, Khusru; Shah Jahan ;¹ Kambakhsh,² the favourite of his father ; Aurangzeb, and his rebellious son Akbar, whom his Rajput kin would have placed on the throne had his genius equalled their power, are the most prominent instances. Farrukhsiyar, when the empire began to totter, furnished the last instance of a Mogul sovereign [153] marrying a Hindu princess,³ the daughter of Raja Ajit Singh, sovereign of Marwar.
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¹ [There were earlier instances of alliances between Muhammadan princes and Hindus. The mother of Firoz Shāh, born A.D. 1309, was a Bhatti lady: Khizr Khān married Deval Devi, a Vāghela lady of Gujarāt (Elliot-Dowson, iii. 271 f., 545; Elphinstone, 395).]
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² [There is no evidence for this statement (Smith, Akbar, 58, 225).]
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¹ The son of the Princess Jodh Bai, whose magnificent tomb still excites admiration at Sikandra, near Agra.
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² ‘Gift of Love.’ [Kāmbakhsh had a Hindu wife, Kalyān Kumāri, daughter of Amar Chand and sister of Sagat Singh, Zamīndār of Manoharpur. Professor Jadunath Sarkar has been unable to trace a Hindu wife of Akbar, son of Aurangzeb.]
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³ To this very marriage we owe the origin of our power. When the nuptials were preparing, the emperor fell ill. A mission was at that time at Delhi from Surat, where we traded, of which Mr. Hamilton was the surgeon. He cured the king, and the marriage was completed. In the oriental style, he desired the doctor to name his reward ; but instead of asking anything for himself, he demanded a grant of land for a factory on the Hoogly for his employers. It was accorded, and this was the origin of the greatness of the British empire in the East. Such an act deserved at least a column ; but neither “storied urn nor animated bust” marks the spot where his remains are laid [C. R. Wilson, Early Annals of the English in Bengal, ii. 235, see p. 468 below].
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These Rajput princes became the guardians of the minority of their imperial nephews, and had a direct stake in the empire, and in the augmentation of their estates.
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Rājputs in the Imperial Service.—Of the four hundred and sixteen Mansabdars, or military commanders of Akbar’s empire, from leaders of two hundred to ten thousand men, forty-seven were Rajputs, and the aggregate of their quotas amounted to fifty-three thousand horse :⁴ exactly one-tenth of the united Mansabdars of the empire, or five hundred and thirty thousand horse.⁵ The forty-seven Rajput leaders, there were seventeen whose mansabs were from one thousand to five thousand horse, and thirty from two hundred to one thousand.
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⁴ Abu-l Fazl [Āīn, i. 308 ff.].
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⁵ The infantry, regulars, and militia, exceeded 4,000,000.
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The princes of Amber, Marwar, Bikaner, Bundi, Jaisalmer, Bundelkhand, and even Shaikhawati, held mansabs of above one thousand ; but Amber only, being allied to the throne, had the dignity of five thousand.
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The Raja Udai Singh of Marwar, surnamed the Fat, chief of the Rathors, held but the mansab of one thousand, while a scion of his house, Rae Singh of Bikaner, had four thousand. This is to be accounted for by the dignity being thrust upon the head of that house. The independent princes of Chanderi, Karauli, Datia, with the tributary feudatories of the larger principalities, and members of the Shaikhawat federation, were enrolled on the other grades, from four to seven hundred. Amongst these we find the founder of the Saktawat clan, who, quarrelling with his brother, Rana Partap of Mewar, gave his services to Akbar. In short it became general, and what originated in force or persuasion, was soon coveted from interested motives; and as nearly all the States submitted in [154] time to give queens to the empire, few were left to stigmatize this dereliction from Hindu principle.
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Akbar thus gained a double victory, securing the good opinions as well as the swords of these princes in his aid. A judicious perseverance would have rendered the throne of Timur immovable, had not the tolerant principles and beneficence of Akbar, Jahangir, and Shah Jahan been lost sight of by the bigoted and bloodthirsty Aurangzeb; who, although while he lived his commanding genius wielded the destinies of this immense empire at pleasure, alienated the affections, by insulting the prejudices, of those who had aided in raising the empire to the height on which it stood. This affection withdrawn, and the weakness of Farrukhsiyar substituted for the strength of Aurangzeb, it fell and went rapidly to pieces. Predatory warfare and spoliation rose on its ruins. The Rajput princes, with a short-sighted policy, at first connived at, and even secretly invited the tumult; not calculating on its affecting their interests. Each looked to the return of ancient independence, and several reckoned on great accession of power. Old jealousies were not lessened by the part which each had played in the hour of ephemeral greatness; and the prince of Mewar, who preserved his blood uncontaminated, though with loss of land, was at once an object of respect and envy to those who had forfeited the first pretensions ¹ of a Rajput. It was the only ovation the Sesodia ² had to boast for centuries of oppression and spoliation, whilst their neighbours were basking in court favour. The great increase of territory of these princes nearly equalled the power of Mewar, and the dignities thus acquired from the sons of Timur, they naturally wished should appear as distinguished as his ancient title. Hence, while one inscribed on his seal “The exalted in dignity, a prince amongst princes, and king of kings,”¹ the prince of Mewar preserved his royal simplicity in “Maharana Bhima Singh, son of Arsi.” But this is digression.
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¹ See, in the Annals of Mewar, the letter of Rae Singh of Bikaner (who had been compelled to submit to this practice), on hearing that Rana Partap’s reverses were likely to cause a similar result. It is a noble production, and gives the character of both.
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² The tribe to which the princes of Mewar belonged.
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¹ Raj Rajeswara, the title of the prince of Marwar: the prince of Amber, Raj Rajindra.
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Results of Feudalism.—It would be difficult to say what would be the happiest form of government for these States without reference to their neighbours. Their own feudal customs would seem to have worked well. The experiment of centuries has secured [155] to them political existence, while successive dynasties of Afghans and Moguls, during eight hundred years, have left but the wreck of splendid names. Were they to become more monarchical, they would have everything to dread from unchecked despotism, over which even the turbulence of their chiefs is a salutary control.
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Were they somewhat more advanced towards prosperity, the crown demesne redeemed from dissipation and sterility, and the chiefs enabled to bring their quotas into play for protection and police, recourse should never be had to bodies of mercenary troops, which practice, if persevered in, will inevitably change their present form of government. This has invariably been the result, in Europe as well as Rajasthan, else why the dread of standing armies?
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Employment of Mercenaries.—Escuage is an approximating step. When Charles VII. of France² raised his companies of ordnance, the basis of the first national standing army ever embodied in Europe, a tax called ‘taille’ was imposed to pay them, and Guienne rebelled. Kotah is a melancholy instance of subversion of the ancient order of society. Mewar made the experiment from necessity sixty years ago, when rebellion and invasion conjoined; and a body of Sindis were employed, which completed their disgust, and they fought with each other till almost mutually exterminated, and till all faith in their prince was lost. Jaipur had adopted this custom to a greater extent; but it was an ill-paid band, neither respected at home nor feared abroad. In Marwar the feudal compact was too strong to tolerate it, till Pathan predatory bands, prowling amidst the ruins of Mogul despotism, were called in to partake in each family broil; the consequence was the weakening of all, and opening the door to a power stronger than any, to be the arbiter of their fate.
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² Hallam, vol. i. p. 117.
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General Duties of the Pattāwat, or Vassal Chief of Rājasthān.—“ The essential principle of a fief was a mutual contract of support and fidelity. Whatever obligations it laid upon the vassal of service to his lord, corresponding duties of protection were imposed by it on the lord towards his vassal. If these were transgressed on either side, the one forfeited his land, the other his signiory or rights over it.”¹ In this is comprehended the very foundation of feudal policy, because in its simplicity we recognize first principles involving mutual preservation. The best [156] commentary on this definition of simple truth will be the sentiments of the Rajputs themselves in two papers: one containing the opinions of the chiefs of Marwar on the reciprocal duties of sovereign and vassal;² the other, those of the sub-vassals of Deogarh, one of the largest fiefs in Rajasthan, of their rights, the infringement of them, and the remedy.³
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¹ Hallam, vol. i. p. 173. ² See Appendix, No. I. ³ See Appendix, Nos. II. and III.
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If, at any former period in the history of Marwar, its prince had thus dared to act, his signiory and rights over it would not have been of great value; his crown and life would both have been endangered by these turbulent and determined vassals. How much is comprehended in that manly, yet respectful sentence: “If he accepts our services, then he is our prince and leader; if not, but our equal, and we again his brothers, claimants of and laying claim to the soil.” In the remonstrance of the sub-vassals of Deogarh, we have the same sentiments on a reduced scale. In both we have the ties of blood and kindred, connected with and strengthening national policy. If a doubt could exist as to the principle of fiefs being similar in Rajasthan and in Europe, it might be set at rest by the important question long agitated by the feodal lawyers in Europe, “whether the vassal is bound to follow the standard of his lord against his own kindred or against his sovereign”: which in these States is illustrated by a simple and universal proof. If the question were put to a Rajput to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or his sovereign, the reply would be, *Raj ka malik wuh, pat*¹ *ka malik yih* : ‘He is the Sovereign of the State, but this is my head’ : an ambiguous phrase, but well understood to imply that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards.
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¹ *Pat* means ‘head,’ ‘chief.’
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This will appear to militate against the right of remonstrance (as in the case of the vassals of Deogarh), for they look to the crown for protection against injustice ; they annihilate other rights by admitting appeal higher than this. Every class looks out for some resource against oppression. The sovereign is the last applied to on such occasions, with whom the sub-vassal has no bond of connexion. He can receive no favour, nor perform any service, but through his own immediate superior ; and presumes not to question (in cases not personal to himself) the propriety of his chief’s actions, adopting implicitly his feelings [157] and resentments. The daily familiar intercourse of life is far too engrossing to allow him to speculate, and with his lord he lives a patriot or dies a traitor. In proof of this, numerous instances could be given of whole clans devoting themselves to the chief against their sovereign ;² not from the ties of kindred, for many were aliens to blood ; but from the ties of duty, gratitude, and all that constitutes clannish attachment, superadded to feudal obligation. The sovereign, as before observed, has nothing to do with those vassals not holding directly from the crown ; and those who wish to stand well with their chiefs would be very slow in receiving any honours or favours from the general fountainhead. The Deogarh chief sent one of his sub-vassals to court on a mission ; his address and deportment gained him favour, and his consequence was increased by a seat in the presence of his sovereign. When he returned, he found this had lost him the favour of his chief, who was offended, and conceived a jealousy both of his prince and his servant. The distinction paid to the latter was, he said, subversive of his proper authority, and the vassal incurred by his vanity the loss of estimation where alone it was of value.
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² The death of the chief of Nimaj, in the Annals of Marwar, and Sheogarh Feud, in the Personal Narrative, Vol. II.
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Obligations of a Vassal.—The attempt to define all the obligations of a vassal would be endless : they involve all the duties of kindred in addition to those of obedience. To attend the court of his chief; never to absent himself without leave; to ride with him a-hunting; to attend him at the court of his sovereign or to war, and even give himself as a hostage for his release; these are some of the duties of a vassal.
Feudal Incidents
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Relief.—The first and most essential mark of a feudal relation exists in all its force and purity here: it is a perpetually recurring mark of the source of the grant, and the solemn renewal of the pledge which originally obtained it. In Mewar it is a virtual and bona fide surrender of the fief and renewal thereof. It is thus defined in European polity: “A relief¹ is a sum of money due from every one of full age taking a fief by descent.” It was arbitrary, and the consequent exactions formed a ground of discontent; nor was the tax fixed till a comparatively recent period.
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¹ “Plusieurs possesseurs de fiefs, ayant voulu en laisser perpétuellement la propriété à leurs descendans, prirent des arrangemens avec leur Seigneur; et, outre ce qu’ils donnèrent pour faire le marché, ils s’engagèrent, eux et leur postérité, à abandonner pendant une année, au Seigneur, la jouissance entière du fief, chaque fois que le dit fief changerait de main. C’est ce qui forma le droit de relief. Quand un gentilhomme avait dérogé, il pouvait effacer cette tache moyennant finances, et ce qu’il payait s’appelait relief, il recevait pour quittance des lettres de relief ou de réhabilitation.” (Art. ‘Relief, Dict. de l’anc. Régime).
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By Magna Charta reliefs were settled at rates proportionate to the dignity of the holder.² In France the relief was fixed by the customary laws at one year’s revenue.³ This last has long been the settled amount of nazarana, or fine of relief, in Mewar.
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² Namely, “the heir or heirs of an earl, for an entire earldom, one hundred pounds; the heir or heirs of a baron, for an entire barony, one hundred marks; the heir or heirs of a knight, for a whole knight’s fee, one hundred shillings at most” (Art. III. Magna Charta).
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³ “Le droit de rachat devoit se payer à chaque mutation d’héritier, et se paya même d’abord en ligne directe.—La coutume la plus générale l’avait fixé à une année du revenue” (*L’Esprit des Loix*, livre xxxi. chap. xxxiii.)
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Fine paid on Succession.—On the demise of a chief, the prince immediately sends a party, termed the zabti (sequestrator), consisting of a civil officer and a few soldiers, who take possession of the State in the prince's name. The heir sends his prayer to court to be installed in the property, offering the proper relief. This paid, the chief is invited to repair to the presence, when he performs homage, and makes protestations of service and fealty; he receives a fresh grant, and the inauguration terminates by the prince girding him with a sword, in the old forms of chivalry. It is an imposing ceremony, performed in a full assembly of the court, and one of the few which has never been relinquished. The fine paid, and the brand buckled to his side, a steed, turban, plume, and dress of honour given to the chief, the investiture ¹ is [159] complete; the sequestrator returns to court, and the chief to his estate, to receive the vows and congratulations of his vassals.²
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¹ That symbolic species of investiture denominated ‘improper investiture,’ the delivery of a turf, stone, and wand, has its analogies amongst the mountaineers of the Aravalli. The old baron of Badnor, when the Mer villages were reduced, was clamorous about his feudal rights over those wild people. It was but the point of honour. From one he had a hare, from another a bullock, and so low as a pair of sticks which they use on the festivals of the Holi. These marks of vassalage come under the head of ‘petite serjanteri’ (petit serjeantry) in the feudal system of Europe (see Art. XLI. of Magna Charta).
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² [“ All Rājput Jāgīrdārs, or holders of assigned lands, pay nazarāna on the accession of a new Mahārāna, and on certain other occasions, while most of them pay a fine called Kaid [‘imprisonment’] on succeeding to these estates. On the death of a Rājput Jāgīrdār, his estates immediately revert to the Darbār, and so remain until his son or successor is recognized by the Mahārāna, when the grant is renewed, and a fresh lease taken ” (Erskine ii. A. 71).]
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In this we plainly perceive the original power (whether exercised or not) of resumption. On this subject more will appear in treating of the duration of grants. The kharg bandhai, or ‘binding of the sword,’ is also performed when a Rajput is fit to bear arms; as amongst the ancient German tribes, when they put into the hands of the aspirant for fame a lance. Such are the substitutes for the toga virilis of the young Roman. The Rana himself is thus ordained a knight by the first of his vassals in dignity, the chief of Salumbar.
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Renunciation of Reliefs.—In the demoralization of all those States, some of the chiefs obtained renunciation of the fine of relief, which was tantamount to making a grant in perpetuity, and annulling the most overt sign of paramount sovereignty. But these and many other important encroachments were made when little remained of the reality, or when it was obscured by a series of oppressions unexampled in any European State.
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It is in Mewar alone, I believe, of all Rajasthan, that these marks of fealty are observable to such an extent. But what is remarked elsewhere upon the fiefs being movable, will support the doctrine of resumption though it might not be practised : a prerogative may exist without its being exercised.
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Fine of Alienation.—Rajasthan never attained this refinement indicative of the dismemberment of the system ; so vicious and self-destructive a notion never had existence in these States. Alienation does not belong to a system of fiefs : the lord would never consent to it, but on very peculiar occasions.
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In Cutch, amongst the Jareja¹ tribes, sub-vassals may alienate their estates ; but this privilege is dependent on the mode of acquisition. Perhaps the only knowledge we have in Rajasthan of alienation requiring the sanction of the lord paramount, is in donations for pious uses : but this is partial. We see in the remonstrance of the Deogarh vassals the opinion they entertained of their lord’s alienation of their sub-fees to strangers, and without the Rana’s consent ; which, with a similar train of conduct, produced sequestration of his fief they were reinducted [160].
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¹ Jareja is the title of the Rajput race in Cutch ; they are descendants of the Yadus, and claim from Krishna. In early ages they inhabited the tracts on the Indus and in Seistan [p. 102 above].
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Tenants of the Crown may Alienate.—The agricultural tenants, proprietors of land held of the crown, may alienate their rights upon a small fine, levied merely to mark the transaction. But the tenures of these non-combatants and the holders of fees are entirely distinct, and cannot here be entered on, further than to say that the agriculturist is, or was, the proprietor of the soil ; the chief, solely of the tax levied thereon. But in Europe the alienation of the *feudum paternum* was not good without the consent of the kindred in the line of succession.² This would involve sub-infeudation and frerage, which I shall touch on distinctly, many of the troubles of these countries arising therefrom.
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² Wright on Tenures, *apud* Hallam, vol. i. p. 185.
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Escheats and Forfeitures.—The fiefs which were only to descend in lineal succession reverted to the crown on failure of heirs, as they could not be bequeathed by will. This answers equally well for England as for Mewar. I have witnessed escheats of this kind, and foresee more, if the pernicious practice of unlimited adoption do not prevent the Rana from regaining lands, alienated by himself at periods of contention. Forfeitures for crimes must, of course, occur, and these are partial or entire, according to the delinquency.
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In Marwar, at this moment, nearly all the representatives of the great fiefs of that country are exiles from their homes : a distant branch of the same family, the prince of Idar, would have adopted a similar line of conduct but for a timely check from the hand of benevolence.¹
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¹ The Hon. Mr. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay. As we prevented the spoliation of Idar by the predatory powers, we are but right in seeing that the head does not become the spoliator himself, and make these brave men “ wish any change but that which we have given them.”
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There is, or rather was, a class of lands in Mewar appended to the crown, of which it bestowed life-rents on men of merit. These were termed Chhorutar, and were given and taken back, as the name implies ; in contradistinction to grants which, though originating in good behaviour, not only continued for life but descended in perpetuity. Such places are still so marked in the rent-roll, but they are seldom applied to the proper purpose.
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Aids.—Aids, implying ‘free gifts,’ or ‘benevolences,’ as they were termed in a European code, are well known. The barar (war-tax) is well understood in Mewar, and is levied on many occasions for the necessities of the prince or the head of a clan. It is a curious fact, that the dasaundh, or ‘tenth,’ in Mewar, as in Europe, was the [161] stated sum to be levied in periods of emergency or danger. On the marriage of the daughters of the prince, a benevolence or contribution was always levied : this varied. A few years ago, when two daughters and a granddaughter were married to the princes of Jaisalmer, Bikaner, and Kishangarh, a schedule of one-sixth, to portion the three, was made out ; but it did not realize above an eighth. In this aid the civil officers of government contribute equally with the others. It is a point of honour with all to see their sovereign’s daughters married, and for once the contribution merited the name of benevolence.
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But it is not levied solely from the coffers of the rich; by the chiefs it is exacted of their tenantry of all classes, who, of course, wish such subjects of rejoicing to be of as rare occurrence as possible.
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" These feudal aids are deserving of our notice as the commencement of taxation, of which they long answered the purpose, till the craving necessities and covetous policy of kings established for them more durable and onerous burthens."¹
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¹ Hallam.
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The great chiefs, it may be assumed, were not backward, on like occasions, to follow such examples, but these gifts were more voluntary. Of the details of aids in France we find enumerated, " paying the relief to the suzerain on taking possession of his lands ";² and by Magna Charta our barons could levy them on the following counts: to make the baron's eldest son a knight, to marry his eldest daughter, or to redeem his person from captivity. The latter is also one occasion for the demand in all these countries. The chief is frequently made prisoner in their predatory invasions, and carried off as a hostage for the payment of a war contribution. Everything disposable is often got rid of on an occasion of this kind. Cœur de Lion would not have remained so long in the dungeons of Austria had his subjects been Rajputs. In Amber the most extensive benevolence, or *barar*,³ is on the marriage of the Rajkumar, or heir apparent.
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² Ducange, *apud* Hallam.
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³ *Barar* is the generic name for taxation.
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Wardship.—This does exist, to foster the infant vassal during minority; but often terminating, as in the system of Europe, in the nefarious act of defrauding a helpless infant, to the pecuniary benefit of some court favourite. It is accordingly [162] here undertaken occasionally by the head of the clan; but two strong recent instances brought the dark ages, and the purchase of wardships for the purpose of spoliation, to mind. The first was in the Deogarh chief obtaining by bribe the entire management of the lands of Sangramgarh, on pretence of improving them for the infant, Nahar Singh, whose father was incapacitated by derangement. Nahar was a junior branch of the clan Sangawat, a subdivision of the Chondawat clan, both Sesodias of the Rana's blood. The object, at the time, was to unite them to Deogarh, though he pleaded duty as head of the clan. His nomination of young Nahar as his own heir gives a colouring of truth to his intentions; and he succeeded, though there were nearer of kin, who were set aside (at the wish of the vassals of Deogarh and with the concurrence of the sovereign) as unfit to head them or serve him.
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Another instance of the danger of permitting wardships, particularly where the guardian is the superior in clanship and kindred, is exemplified in the Kalyanpur estate in Mewar. That property had been derived from the crown only two generations back, and was of the annual value of ten thousand rupees. The mother having little interest at court, the Salumbar chief, by bribery and intrigue, upon paying a fine of about one year’s rent, obtained possession—ostensibly to guard the infant’s rights; but the falsehood of this motive was soon apparent. There were duties to perform on holding it which were not thought of. It was a frontier post, and a place of rendezvous for the quotas to defend that border from the incursions of the wild tribes of the south-west. The Salumbar chief, being always deficient in the quota for his own estate, was not likely to be very zealous in his muster-roll for his ward’s, and complaints were made which threatened a change. The chief of Chawand was talked of as one who would provide for the widow and minor, who could not perform the duties of defence.
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The sovereign himself often assumes the guardianship of minors; but the mother is generally considered the most proper guardian for her infant son. All others may have interests of their own; she can be actuated by his welfare alone. Custom, therefore, constitutes her the guardian; and with the assistance of the elders of the family, she rears and educates the young chief till he is fit to be girded with the sword [163].¹
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¹ The charter of Henry I. promises the custody of heirs to the mother or next of kin (Hallam, vol. ii. p. 429).
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The Faujdar, or military manager, who frequently regulates the household as well as the subdivisions of the estate, is seldom of the kin or clan of the chief: a wise regulation, the omission of which has been known to produce, in these maires du palais on a small scale, the same results as will be described in the larger. This officer, and the civil functionary who transacts all the pecuniary concerns of the estate, with the mother and her family, are always considered to be the proper guardians of the minor. ‘Blood which could not inherit,’ was the requisite for a guardian in Europe,¹ as here; and when neglected, the results are in both cases the same.
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¹ Hallam, vol. i. p. 190.
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Marriage.—Refinement was too strong on the side of the Rajput to admit this incident, which, with that of wardship (both partial in Europe), illustrated the rapacity of the feudal aristocracy. Every chief, before he marries, makes it known to his sovereign. It is a compliment which is expected, and is besides attended with some advantage, as the prince invariably confers presents of honour, according to the station of the individual.
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No Rajput can marry in his own clan; and the incident was originated in the Norman institutes, to prevent the vassal marrying out of his class, or amongst the enemies of his sovereign.²
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² [The rule of tribal exogamy, whatever may be its origin, is much more primitive than the author supposed (Sir J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, i. 54 ff.).]
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Thus, setting aside marriage (which even in Europe was only partial and local) and alienation, four of the six chief incidents marking the feudal system are in force in Rajasthan, viz. relief, escheats, aids, and wardships.
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Duration of Grants.—I shall now endeavour to combine all the knowledge I possess with regard to the objects attained in granting lands, the nature and durability of these grants, whether for life and renewable, or in perpetuity. I speak of the rules as understood in Mewar. We ought not to expect much system in what was devoid of regularity, even according to the old principles of European feudal law, which, though now reduced to some fixed principles, originated in, and was governed by, fortuitous circumstances; and after often changing its character, ended in despotism, oligarchy, or democracy.
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Classes of Landholders.—There are two classes of Rajput landholders in Mewar, though the one greatly exceeds the other in number. One is the Girasia Thakur, or lord; the other the Bhumia. The Girasia chieftain is he who holds (giras) by grant (patta) of the [164] prince, for which he performs service with specified quotas at home and abroad, renewable at every lapse, when all the ceremonies of resumption,³ the fine of relief,⁴ and the investiture take place.
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³ Zabti, ‘sequestration.’
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⁴ Nazarana.
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The Bhumia does not renew his grant, but holds on prescriptive possession. He succeeds without any fine, but pays a small annual quit-rent, and can be called upon for local service in the district which he inhabits for a certain period of time. He is the counterpart of the allodial proprietor of the European system, and the real zamindar of these principalities. Both have the same signification; from *bhum* and *zamin*, ‘land’: the latter is an exotic of Persian origin.
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Girāsia.—Girasia is from *giras*, ‘a subsistence’; literally and familiarly ‘a mouthful.’ Whether it may have a like origin with the Celtic word *gwas*,¹ said to mean ‘a servant,’² and whence the word vassal is derived, I shall leave to etymologists to decide, who may trace the resemblance to the girasia, the vassal chieftain of the Rajputs. All the chartularies or *pattas*³ commence, “To . . . giras has been ordained.”
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