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Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c82: IV. Lollata And Others

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c82

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Contents

IV. Lollata And Others

( The Rasa System )

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( 1 )

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While the orthodox schools of Poetics were elaborating systems of *alaṃkāra* and *rīti*, there flourished several writers who discussed the question of the dramatic *rasa* after Bharata, and formulated explanations of the latter's much discussed *sūtra* on the subject¹. Their exposition, however, concerned the dramatic art, and their theories did not as yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics, which was entirely dominated by the *alaṃkāra*- and *rīti*-systems. The aesthetic importance of the *rasa*, therefore, was never realised, as we shall see, until it was taken up and worked into Poetics by the Dhvanikāra and his followers. The dramaturgic Rasa school, however, had in the meantime elaborated several theories of *rasa* and brought it into prominence as an element of the drama; and in this way it succeeded, to a certain extent, in reacting upon and influencing the orthodox theories of Poetics, which appear to have possessed, even at an early period a limited acquaintance with the *rasa*, and which actually accord it a place, however small, in their general systems of *alaṃkāra* or *rīti*.

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¹ See above pp. 22-24, 27.

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This will be obvious from a reference to the views of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin on this subject. To Bhāmaha, the most important element in poetry is *alaṃkāra* or *vakrokti*. He does not seem to possess any clear notion of the function of *rasa* in poetry, the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure *rasavat*, which, in his opinion, must manifest the *rasas* clearly (*rasavad darśita-spaṣṭa-śṛṅgārādi-rasam*, iii 6). The *rasa* is thus included in the scope of a particular figure only and given a very subordinate place in his system². Bhāmaha seems to have been aware of the existence of the *śṛṅgāra* and other dramatic *rasas*; but the speculations regarding the origin and function of *rasa* do not appear to have started in his time; and, in common with Daṇḍin, he never thought it necessary to use the technical terms *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc., so familiar to later writers on this subject. In Bhāmaha’s opinion, the *rasa* need not be invariably present in poetry, but it may sometimes be delineated in *vakrokti*. In i 21, no doubt, Bhāmaha lays down that a *mahākāvya* must separately depict all the *rasas*; and in v 3, he speaks of the *kāvya-rasa* as mitigating the rigour of the *śāstras*, a sentiment which is endorsed by Rudraṭa (xii 1-2) and which probably inspired the dictum of Abhinavagupta that the śāstra is prabhu-sammita, while the kāvya is jāyā-sammita. The term kāvya-rasa is used here probably to indicate ‘the flavour of poetry’ in an untechnical sense; but even if we read, with Abhinavagupta (*Locana* p. 182), a technical meaning into it, it only shews that the earlier authors were content with assigning a pleasing but extraneous function to rasa³.

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² Commenting of Bhāmaha’s central verse on *vakrokti* (ii 85), *saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktir anayārtho vibhāvyate*, Abhinavagupta attempts to read into it his own idea of the importance of *rasa* and interprets *vibhāvyate* technically as *pramadōdyānair vibhāvatāṃ nīyate, viśeṣeṇa ca bhāvyate, rasamayīkriyata iti*. He apparently makes Bhāmaha mean that by *vakrokti*, the sense of poetry is rendered into a suitable factor of *rasa*, so that by using the word *vibhāvyate* with the technical meaning given to it by Abhinava, Bhāmaha would imply that the *rasa* as well as *alaṃkāra* originates in *vakrokti*.

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³ Such a distinction appears to be implied also in Daṇḍin ii 292; and one can differentiate two meanings of rasa (see below): (1) kāvya-rasa, the flavour of poetry or the aesthetic delight produced by it, and (1) rasa in the technical sense of nāṭya-rasa. It is worthy of note that in the latter sense it is very rarely used in earlier classical poetry (except perhaps in Māgha). This kāvya-rasa in its essence is not very different from Bhāmaha’s vakrokti; for it is possibly a kind of heightened expression inconsistent with commonplace utterance. The word rasa must be taken in this untechnical sense when one meets with it in early classics and in such expressions as rasavat or rasāvaha in Daṇḍin.

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The same remarks with regard to the recognition of rasa apply more or less to Daṇḍin; but Daṇḍin seems to have been more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin allows the rasas to be included in figures like rasavat, which appear to have been the only means by which they could permit the rasa to play even an unimportant role in their systems. It may be contended⁴ that Daṇḍin gives prominence to rasa by including it in one of the essential excellences (*guṇas*) of the diction (*rīti*), viz., in *mādhurya*, which is defined as the establishment of the *rasa* in the word and in the object (*vāci vastunyapi rasa-sthitiḥ*, i 51); but from ii 292 it appears that Daṇḍin means by the term *rasa* in the *mādhurya-guṇa* to connote absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatva*⁵), and does not contemplate the inclusion of *rasa* in the technical sense⁶. The *mādhurya-guṇa*, according to Daṇḍin (i 51-7), may appear in two different aspects, in so far as it creates *vāg-rasa* and *vastu-rasa*, the former consisting of repetition of similar sounds (*śrutyanuprāsa*⁷) and the latter connoting absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatva*). Thus Hemacandra explains (p 198) the *rasa* in Daṇḍin’s *mādhurya*, according as it resides in the *vāk* or *vastu*, in this way : *śruti-varṇānuprāsābhyāṃ vāgrasaḥ...... agrāmyābhidheyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ*⁸. Thus the rasa in Daṇḍin's *mādhurya* has a distinct connotation which separates it from the technical dramatic *rasa* of the Rasa school⁹.

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⁴ Jacobi in *ZDMG* lvi, 1902, p. 401 fn.

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⁵ Strictly speaking, *grāmya* is not ‘vulgar’ in its usual restricted sense, although Daṇḍin seems to bring under its connotation the *aślīla* or the indecent. It means ‘the low’, ‘the rustic’, or ‘the common’, as opposed to the noble or the refined, and probably corresponds to the French word *vulgaire*.

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⁶ This is made clear by the *Hṛdayaṅgama* commentary on this point : *mādhurya-guṇe pradarśitaḥ śabdārthayor agrāmyatayā jāto raso vākyasya bhavati, alaṃkāratayā nirdiṣṭam rasavattvam aṣṭa-rasāyattam* (p. 167), the last part of the passage calling attention to the fact that the only cases where the eight (dramatic) *rasas* are admitted by Daṇḍin occur in connexion with his inclusion of the *rasas* in figures like *rasavat*. In i 64 Daṇḍin speaks of *agrāmya artha* as *rasāvaha*.

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⁷ See above p. 101, fn 8. Daṇḍin speaks of *anuprāsa* as *rasāvaha* in this sense in the same context (i 52).

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⁸ With this explanation Māṇikyacandra agrees : *śruti-*

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⁹ A similar untechnical use of the term *rasa* (which, however, Daṇḍin does not explain, as he does in this case) is to be found in iii 149 (or iv 26, Madras ed.), where the phrase *girāṃ rasaḥ* (=*vāgrasaḥ*) is interpreted by Taruṇavācaspati merely as *sādhutvam*. The modern commentators, misled, no doubt, by their own idea of the importance of *rasa*, read into Daṇḍin their own ideas on the subject. Daṇḍin nowhere speaks of the 'suggestion of *rasa*' (*rasa-dhvani*) as the 'soul' of poetry, but Premacandra, commenting on i 10, reads this into Daṇḍin. The *artha-rasa* in i 62 seems also to have a distinct reference to *agrāmyatā*.

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At the same time it cannot be affirmed that Daṇḍin was entirely ignorant of the concept of *rasa* as elaborated by Bharata and his followers. He declares (i 18) that a *mahākāvya* should invariably depict *rasa* and *bhāva*. His treatment of the figures *rasavat*, *preyas* and *ūrjasvin* (ii 280-87) gives a much clearer indication of his undoubted acquaintance with the eight recognised *rasas*, all of which he enumerates by their respective names, and four of which (viz., *śṛṅgāra*, *raudra*, *vīra* and *karuṇa*) he illustrates as elements of the poetic figures under discussion. If we are to accept Abhinavagupta's statement¹⁰,

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¹⁰ on Bharata vi, partially reproduced by Hemacandra p. 57f. The text of Abhinava's valuable commentary on Bharata's *rasa-sūtra*, so far as it is relevent to the theories on *rasa* discussed below, has been printed by me as an appendix to my article on the *Theory of Rasa* published

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*varṇānuprāsābhyāṃ vāgrasaḥ, agrāmyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ, itthaṃ raso dvedhā* (p. 189, ed. Ānandāśrama.)

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Daṇḍin's conception of *rasa* is similar to that of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (which we shall deal with presently), and he believes therefore in the development of *rasa* as an effect from the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*. Daṇḍin's somewhat meagre treatment hardly justifies us in making a definite statement on this point, but we may assume that Daṇḍin apparently speaks of *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra* or *raudra* being developed as effects from such permanent moods as *rati* or *krodha*. For, speaking of the figure *rasavat* which should possess the characteristic of manifesting the *rasas*, he gives an example of the manifestation of *śṛṅgāra* in such a figure with the remark : *ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṃ gatā / rūpa-bāhulya-yogena* (ii 281). Similarly with reference to the development of *raudra* from *krodha*, he says : *ityāruhya parāṃ koṭiṃ krodho raudrātmatāṃ gataḥ* (ii 283). But the *rasa* in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself of which it serves as a means of embellishment (*alaṃkāratayā smṛtam*); in other words, the *rasa* is developed not for its own sake but as increasing the beauty of expression. It would seem, therefore, that Daṇḍin was, to some extent, cognisant of *rasa* and *bhāva*, but he could not give it a place in his system except as an embellishment of the language or of the sense ; and this objective view of the function of *rasa*, if we may presume it in these early authors, was apparently responsible for this subordinate position given to it by the *alaṃkāra* and *rīti*-systems.

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in *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume* (Orientalia, vol. iii). It is cited below as "Abh. on Bh.", with references to the pages of the article, which I have very largely utilised in writing this chapter.

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Although Vāmana improves upon Daṇḍin's system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further in the treatment of *rasa*. His idea of making all poetic figures an aspect of metaphorical expression precludes him from defining the figure *rasavat* in the same way as Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin do, but he attempts to include the *rasa* in one of the essential (*nitya*) characteristics of poetry, viz., in the *artha-guṇa* *kānti*, which he defines as an 'excellence of sense' in which the *rasas* should be conspicuously present (*dīpta-rasatvam kāntiḥ*, III. 2. 15). The suggestion for this inclusion of the *rasas* in one of the excellences was probably found in Bharata's definition of the *kānti-guṇa*, or more directly in Bharata's peculiar definition of the *udāra-guṇa*; but it is clear that this certainly marks an improvement upon the treatment of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, who include the *rasa* in some of the non-essential figures.

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Udbhaṭa adheres in the main to the views of Bhāmaha and treats of the *rasa* as an element of the some of the figures like *rasavat*. One verse, however, which occurs in the text of Udbhaṭa published by Jacob in *JRAS*, 1897, p. 847,

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*rasādyadhiṣṭhitaṃ kāvyaṃ jīvad-rūpatayā yataḥ*
*kathyate tad rasādīnāṃ kāvyātmatvaṃ vyavasthitam*//

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apparently designates the *rasa* as the essence or 'soul' of poetry, without, however, setting up an aesthetic system on its basis. But the verse is quite out of place in the context in which it occurs¹¹, and in the text published by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, it is wanting, although given as a quotation (with a *tad āhuḥ*) in the accompanying commentary of Pratihārendurāja (p. 77). Misled by Jacob’s text, Jacobi supposed¹² that Udbhaṭa was the first writer to consider the question as to what constitutes the ‘soul’ of poetry and to regard the *rasa* as such. It is clear, however, that the verse in question is not Udbhaṭa’s, and cannot be reconciled either with its immediate context or with Udbhaṭa’s general standpoint, as well as with his definition of *rasavat*. It cannot be denied at the same time that Udbhaṭa betrays a closer acquaintance with some theory of *rasa* and its technicalities, using terms like *vibhāva*, *sthāyin*, *sañcārin* (iv 4) and *anubhāva* (iv 2), and enumerating, after Bharata, the eight orthodox *nāṭya-rasas* with the addition of a ninth *rasa* (viz., *śānta*) in the category. But Udbhaṭa takes all this into account as an embellishment of an expressed figure like *rasavat*; the *rasa* is not considered on its own account, but because it helps to emphasise or constitute the charm of a particular figure. Hence Pratihārendurāja remarks that the question as to the nature of illustration, which is given in the verse vi 18 next after the verse in question. If Col. Jacob’s text is accepted, then the verse *rasûdyadhiṣṭhitam* (vi 17) would be abruptly thrust in between the definition of *kāvyaliṅga* and its illustration. As a matter of fact, it occurs in Pratihārendurāja’s commentary on *kāvyaliṅga* and is erroneously incorporated in Udbhaṭa’s text by the editor.

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¹¹ This verse (vi 17) occurs after the figure *kāvyaliṅga* (vi 16), after the definition of which one should expect its

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¹² ZDMG, 1902, p.396. In a conversation with me (1920) on this point, Prof. Jacobi admitted that he was misled into this supposition by Col. Jacob’s text.

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rasa and bhāva, and as to how far they may stand as the very ‘soul’ of poetry is not discussed by Udbhaṭa at all, partly for fear of prolixity and partly because it is irrelevant¹³.

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¹³ Not much reliance can be placed on the statement of Śārṅgadeva (referred to in Vol.I, p.26, fn) that Udbhaṭa was one of the commentators on Bharata. If it were true, it only shows that Udbhaṭa was conversant with Bharata's text, as his citation of a half-line (iv 5, though it is doubtful if this is at all a kārikā-verse of Udbhaṭa's) from Bharata vi 15 and use of technical terms like vibhāva etc. would indicate. It does not prove that Udbhaṭa belonged to the school of Bharata. On the other hand, evidence is not wanting that Udbhaṭa in his theoretical standpoint was a follower of Bhāmaha.

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Rudraṭa, on the other hand, seems to be the earliest writer who explicitly includes the rasa in his treatment of Poetics, and devotes four chapters to its discussion. At the beginning of his work, he praises the poets who have won eternal fame by composing kāvyas enlivened by rasa. In ch. xii he speaks of ten rasas (adding preyas and śānta to the orthodox eight of Bharata)¹⁴, describing śṛṅgāra (love) and the characteristics of the hero and heroine in that connexion. The next two chapters take up the two kinds of śṛṅgāra (sambhoga and *vipralambha*—love in union and in separation) and questions cognate to each. This treatment is rounded off by a short chapter describing the nature and character of the styles (*rīti*) suitable to each¹⁵. It is not clear, however, as to what significance Rudraṭa attaches to *rasa* as an element of poetry, for he is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspects of the question. Out of the sixteen chapters into which his work is divided, only four chapters deal with *rasa*, not theoretically but descriptively, while the rest of his work is taken up with the details of the poetic figures on which obviously he puts the greater emphasis. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem *sarasa* from the standpoint of the reader, he says (xii 1) that to those, who enjoy the *rasas* but fight shy of the *śāstra*, instruction in the *caturvarga* is easier to impart through the medium of delectable writing; and this is the chief motive, in his opinion, for inspiring the sense of poetry with *rasa*. Rudraṭa starts with *śabda* and *artha* as the two constituents of poetry, and elaborates his views about poetic figures as embellishment of these elements; but he does not discuss how the *rasa* comes in into his system, a fact which may lead one to suspect that these chapters on *rasa* were probably later engraftments extraneous to, if not inconsistent with, his general standpoint. Rudraṭa, in his theoretical tendencies, has no affinity with the Rasa school, but belongs to the Alaṃkāra school, a fact which would distinguish him from Rudrabhaṭṭa, the keynote of whose system is to be found in the idea of *rasa*¹⁶. We have to this effect the testimony of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha. Ruyyaka says¹⁷ that Rudraṭa laid special stress on *alaṃkāra*, in which were comprised the three kinds of suggestion (*dhvani*), including the suggestion of *rasa*, and that in figures like *rasavat*, the *rasa* and *bhāva* implied are taken as elements which heighten the charm of the expressed idea¹⁸.

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¹⁴ If Udbhaṭa iv 5 is a kārikā-verse (and not wrongly incorporated into the text from Pratihārendurāja's commentary), then Udbhaṭa was the first writer to admit śānta into Bharata's category of eight rasas. The preyas of Rudraṭa is probably suggested by the poetic figure preyas admitted by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa. Rudraṭa appears to allude (as Nami-sādhu rightly comments) to Bharata by the term ācārya in xii 4.

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¹⁵ Rudraṭa defines *rīti*, as we have already seen, with reference to the employment of compound words. He recommends the *vaidarbhī* and *pāñcālī* *rītis* in the cases of the four *rasas*, *preyas*, *karuṇa*, *bhayānaka* and *adbhuta*, and the *lāṭiyā* and *gauḍīyā* in the case of *raudra*, there being apparently no fixed rule with regard to the remaining *rasas*. He uses the term *aucitya* in this context, which anticipates the theory of *aucitya* first elaborated by Ānandavardhana in connexion with the delineation of *rasa*.

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¹⁶ See Vol. I, p. 91.

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¹⁷ ed. Kāvyamālā p. 5. Samudrabandha agrees with this view.

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¹⁸ Nami-sādhu, explaining Rudraṭa xii 2, states that in the opinion of his author, *śabda* and *artha* constitute the ‘body’ of poetry, the poetic figures take the place of artificial ornaments, while *rasa* resembles natural qualities like prowess and beauty (*rasās tu saundaryūdaya iva sahajā guṇāḥ*). But there is nothing in Rudraṭa which will support this description of his standpoint, especially as Rudraṭa can scarcely be supposed to look upon poetic figures, which are of great importance in his view of poetry, as mere artificial embellishments of poetry. See above pp. 75-6, 77.

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The older writers on Poetics, therefore, before the advent of the *dhvani*-theorists, content themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression, the ‘body’ of poetry, and hardly trouble themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle, the ‘soul’ of poetry ; nor do they identify, as some later writers do, this ‘soul’ with the subtle psychological factor known as *rasa*. Vāmana, no doubt, starts the question and offers to solve it by declaring that the diction or *rīti* is this ‘soul’; but we have seen that in Vāmana’s view, the *rīti* is not the expression of poetic individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by a definite adjustment of certain fixed literary excellences. The older writers, therefore, lay the greatest emphasis on the *alaṃkāra* (or poetic figure), or on the *rīti* (or diction in the objective sense), the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry ; and, cognisant as they were of that aesthetic delectableness which must be present in all poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of *rasa*, they could not harmonise it well into their theory of externals and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language by including it in poetic figures or by allowing it to form an element of one of the excellences of diction. This was the only way in which they could recognise the *rasa*. It is partly for this reason that the Dhvanikāra (iii 52) condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry, and expounds his own system in which the suggestion of *rasa* (*rasa-dhvani*) plays such an important part.

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The reason why the *rasa* was even thus perfunctorily admitted into the older systems appears to have been the fact that Bharata’s treatment of the *rasa* in the drama had already established itself, having been further elaborated by a number of commentators and writers on the subject, and it naturally influenced, to a limited extent, the enquiry of early thinkers. We have already noted that Bharata’s famous *sūtra* on *rasa* by its ambiguity taxed the ingenuity of his followers and led to a great deal of controversy regarding its true interpretation; and as each writer tried to explain it in his own way, it gave rise to a number of theories on *rasa*.

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Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa appears to have been one of the earliest formulators of such an explanation. His work is unfortunately lost, and very little can be gathered from the brief review of his opinion in Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Bharata¹⁹, which is copied more or less by all subsequent writers who deal with Lollaṭa’s views²⁰. But it is clear even from this summary exposition by an adverse critic that Lollaṭa, in explaining Bharata’s sūtra, took the vibhāva as the direct cause (kāraṇa) of rasa, which therefore is an effect (anukārya or utpādya), and the term niṣpatti of Bharata should be explained as utpatti or puṣṭi. The rasa, found in characters like Rāma, is attributed to the actor, who imitates the characters in form, dress and action, and thereby charms the spectator. Mammaṭa and his followers make this interpretation of Lollaṭa’s view more clear by saying that the permanent mood or sthāyin is directly connected (mukhyatayā vṛttyā = sākṣāt sambandhena) with the hero like Rāma, but it is recognised as existing in the actor through a clever imitation of the original character, this imitation being apparently the source of the charm to the spectator. The rasa, therefore, resides in the hero, but it is not clear how a mental state which belongs to the hero can be transferred to the actor, and how the spectator can be charmed by a feeling which does not exist in him. The spectator’s mere apprehension of the feeling imitated by the actor cannot produce even a semblance of the original feeling and consequent delight in the mind of the spectator; otherwise such a delight would be brought about even on witnessing a love-affair in the ordinary world, as distinguished from the world of poetry²¹. It is

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¹⁹ Abhinava’s review of the opinions of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, which is followed by Mammaṭa and all later writers, is extensively reproduced by Hemacandra (pp. 57-66) and Māṇikyacandra (pp. 40 f, ed. Ānandāśrama). This portion of Abhinava’s commentary will be found in my article on the *Theory of Rasa* (already referred to, see above fn 10), pp. 240 f. Detailed references therefore are not as a rule given here.

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²⁰ See, for instance, Mammaṭa ch. iv, Hemacandra p. 57,

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²¹ Govinda criticises Lollaṭa’s view thus: tad apeśalam, sāmājikeṣu tadabhāve tatra camatkārānubhava-virodhāt, na

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Mallinātha on Vidyādhara p. 85, Govinda on Mammaṭa p. 63 etc.

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also argued that this cause-and-effect theory of Lollaṭa cannot satisfactorily explain the relation of the *vibhāvas* etc. to the *rasa*. An effect may exist even when its efficient cause is destroyed; but as the life of the *rasa* is circumscribed by the exhibition of the *vibhāvas*, it disappears when the latter disappear, a fact which goes to prove that the *rasa* must not be taken as an ordinary *laukika* effect²². Again, the cause and the effect cannot be contemporaneous; if the *rasa* is supposed to be an effect, its relish cannot be, as it actually is, contemporaneous with the appearance of the *vibhāvas*. Hence Viśvanātha remarks (p. 86) that if the *rasa* is an effect, having for its cause the perception of the *vibhāvas*, then at the time of the relish of *rasa* the *vibhāvas* would not be perceived; for we do not find the simultaneous perception of a cause and its effect. The perception of the touch of the sandalwood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously, however rapidly the one may succeed the other.

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²² Govinda p. 69, Mallinātha pp. 87, 93-4.

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Śaṅkuka, the next important writer on this subject mentioned by Abhinavagupta and others²³, therefore rejects this interpretation of the *utpatti-vādins*, who are said to follow, in their peculiar theory, the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophers. Lollaṭa’s view does not treat of *rasa* as a matter of the spectator’s

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²³ The reference to Śaṅkuka’s views is to be found in Mammaṭa and others, as cited above in fn 20.

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*ca tajjñānam eva camatkāra-hetuḥ, laukika-śṛṅgārādi-darśanepi camatkāra-prasaṅgāt* (ed. Kāvyamālā, 1912, p. 63).

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feeling. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, thinks that the *rasa* is not produced as an effect, but inferred by the spectator, and the inferred feeling is relished by him as *rasa*. The permanent mood of the hero is inferred to exist in the actor (though not actually existing in him) by means of the *vibhāvas* etc., cleverly exhibited by him in acting, so as to produce an illusion of identity with the feelings of the hero²⁴; and the mood thus inferred, being sensed by the spectator through its exquisite beauty, adds to itself a peculiar charm²⁵, and thus develops into a relishable condition of his own mind which is called the *rasa*. The realisation of *rasa*, therefore, is a process of logical inference, and the *niṣpatti* of Bharata's *sūtra* is explained as *anumiti*, the *vibhāvas* standing to *rasa* in the relation of *anumāpaka* or *gamaka* to *anumāpya* or *gamya*. But the mood itself, though inferred in this way from the relation of logical major and middle terms, is yet cognised as different from the objects of ordinary inference, being inferred, as it were, by force of its connexion with the *vibhāvas*, which factors, though artificial in themselves, are not recognised as such. This cognition or knowledge is characterised as being based on what is called *citra-turaga-nyāya* (or the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse), and should be differentiated from the true ('he is Rāma’), the false (‘he is Rāma’ with a following negation ‘he is not Rāma’), the doubtful (‘he may or may not be Rāma’) knowledge, as well as from the knowledge of similarity (‘he is like Rāma’)²⁶. The theory, however, has been discredited by later schools on the ground (as Govinda concisely puts it²⁷) that it disregards the well-recognised fact that the inference of a thing can never produce the same charm as direct cognition. It has also been pointed out that the *rasa* is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of a hero like Rāma, being past, cannot be cognised directly by the organs of sense belonging to the present²⁸. The *anumāna*-theory is criticised elaborately in connexion with the theory of ‘suggestion’, coming topically within the province of the suggestion of *rasa* (*rasa-dhvani*). We shall have occasion to deal with this aspect of the theory in its proper place; but the general argument with which it is sought to be discarded is that the *vibhāvas* cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the *sthāyin*, because the former do not stand in the same relation to the latter as the middle term (*sādhana*) does to the major term (*sādhya*), but are simply its suggestors (*vyañjaka*).

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²⁴ *rāmādyabheda-bhāvitena naṭe tat-prakāśitair eva vibhāvādibhir anumitaḥ*, Mallinātha p. 85.

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²⁵ *vastu-saundarya-balād rasanīyatvena sthāyinām anyū-numeya-vailakṣaṇyāt* Govinda p. 65, practically paraphrasing Mammaṭa.

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²⁶ as interpreted by Mammaṭa, and Abhinava p. 241. Hemacandra, expanding Abhinavagupta’s exposition, puts it in this way: *na cātra naṭaka eva sukhīti pratipattiḥ, nūpyayam eva rāma iti, na cāpyayam sukhīti, nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti, na cāpi tatsadṛśam iti, kim tu samyaṅ-mithyā-saṃśaya-sādṛśya-pratitibhyo vilakṣaṇaś citra-turagādi-nyāyena yaḥ sukhī rāma asāvayam iti pratītir asti* (p. 59).

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²⁷ *pratyakṣam eva jñānaṃ sa-camatkāraṃ nānumityādir iti loka-prasiddhim avadhūyānyathā-kalpane mānūbhāvaḥ*, p. 65.

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²⁸ Vidyādhara p. 94.

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The *vibhāvas*, therefore, do not constitute either the efficient cause (*kāraka-hetu*) or the logical cause (*jñāpaka-hetu*) of *rasa*, as held respectively by Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka. Apart from technicalities, Lollaṭa’s view appears to be that the spectator ascribes to the well-trained actor the same mental state as belonged to the hero, and his apprehension of this imparted feeling produces a similar feeling in his mind, causing delight. Śaṅkuka thinks that the well-trained actor so cleverly simulates the action of the hero that the spectator apprehends the actor to be identical with the hero, and infers from this illusion the actual feeling of the hero in his own mind, being moved by the extraordinary beauty of the represented action. In both these theories, however, the difficulty remains viz., that if the *rasa* is an objective entity, produced or inferred, how can it bring about a subjective feeling of relish in the audience in whom these factors (*vibhāvas* etc.) are presumably absent? If, on the other hand, it is supposed that the *rasa* exists in the audience also, the question still remains as to how the particular feeling of a particular hero (like Rāma, who is different from or superior to the spectator himself) can be relished or realised as his own by the spectator? These objections are thus ably set forth by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka²⁹.

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²⁹ Another objector to Śaṅkuka’s view appears to be Bhaṭṭa Tauta, whose opinions are summarised by Abhinava (who refers to him simply as *asmad-upādhyāya* ) in a passage

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as interpreted by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* (pp. 67-8) : "If the *rasa* is perceived as belonging to another person, then it is a case of *tāṭsthya* i. e. one would not himself be personally affected by it. It is also not perceived as belonging to oneself out of poetry dealing with the deeds of heroes like Rāma. If it is perceived as belonging to oneself, then the origin of *rasa* in self is admitted. But this is not reasonable, for there is nothing there which can operate as a *vibhāva* for the audience. If it is objected that the generalised idea of the beloved (*kāntātva*), which lies dormant and awakens in us germs of latent impressions, operates in the capacity of a *vibhāva*, then how can it be applied to the description of a deity and the like? The recollection of one's own beloved does not intervene in one's consciousness. How can *vibhāvas*, like the construction of a bridge over the sea, which form the attributes of an extraordinary hero like Rāma, become generalised (in the mind of an individual spectator)? One does not recollect only Rāma's energy, because it has no resemblance (to one's own energy). The *rasa* is not perceived when one learns it from a verbal composition, because a man would learn it in the same way from the direct observation of a pair of lovers. If it is assumed that *rasa* is produced, then a man would feel disinclined

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which is substantially reproduced by Hemacandra at p. 59 under Bhaṭṭa Tauta's name. See also Mānikyacandra p. 43 who draws also upon Abhinava's exposition of Tauta's view.

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to tragedy, inasmuch as he finds only pain following upon the production of the pathetic mood (*karuṇa*).”³⁰

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³⁰ Raso yadi para-gatatayā pratīyate, tarhi tāṭasthyam eva syāt. Na ca sva-gatatvena rāmādi-caritamayāt kāvyād asau pratīyate. Svātma-gatatvena ca pratītau svātmani rasasyôtpattir evâbhyupagatā syāt, sā cûyuktā, sāmājikam pratyavibhāvatvāt. Kāntatvam sādhāraṇam vāsanā-vikāsa-hetur vibhāvanāyām prayojakam cet, devatā-varṇanādau tad api katham? Na ca sva-kāntā-smaraṇam madhye saṃvedyate. Aloka-sāmānyānām ca rāmādīnām ye samudra-setu-bandhādayo vibhāvās te katham sādhāraṇam bhajeyuḥ? Na côtsāhādi-mātram smaryate, ananurūpatvāt. Śabdād api tat-pratipattau na rasôpajanaḥ, pratyakṣād iva nāyaka-mithuna-pratipattau. Utpatti-pakṣe ca karuṇasyôtpādād duḥkhitve karuṇa-prakṣāsu punar apravṛttiḥ syāt.

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Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, attempts to refute these earlier theories and set up a peculiar doctrine of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) which makes the relish of *rasa* possible. He argues (as interpreted by Mammaṭa and others) that (i) the *rasa* cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes (namely, the *vibhāvas*), being non-realities, cannot bring about a real effect; (ii) it can not be inferred, because the real character (e. g. Rāma), not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (*na tattvato rāmasya smṛtiḥ, anupalabdhatvāt*). Nor is it a case of revelation (*abhivyakti*) of something potentially existing (*śakti-rūpa*); for in that case, the potential emotions, once awakened, would occupy their field of action in diverse degrees, thus contradicting the nature of *rasa* as one; moreover, there would be the same difficulty as to whether the *rasa* is revealed in oneself or in another person. To slove these and other difficulties, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (as interpreted by Abhinavagupta) maintains that the *rasa* is enjoyed in connexion with the *vibhāvas* through the relation of the enjoyer (*bhojaka*) and the enjoyed (*bhojya*). This school³¹ postulates three different functions of a word, namely, *abhidhā* (already admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians), *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva*, and thus ascribes to a poem a threefold potency of its own, namely, the powers of denotation, of generalisation and of enjoyment. The *abhidhā* is not merely the actual Denotation of a word, but is given an extended meaning so as to include *lakṣaṇā* or Indication in its scope (*abhidhā lakṣaṇaiva*), thus embracing the two functions already analysed by previous speculation. It is meant probably that the Denotation (as postulated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) also gives to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of *rasa*. The *bhāvakatva* (or *rasa-bhāvanā*), which, as Abhinavagupta suggests, is apparently derived from Bharata's general definition of *bhāva*, is described as the power of generalisation which makes the *vibhāvas* as well as the *sthāyi-bhāva*, sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties. The *vibhāva*, Sītā, for instance, is understood through this power not as a particular individual but in the general character of a woman, and the *sthāyi-bhāva* (e.g. Rāma's love towards her) is taken as love in general without any reference to the agent or the object. In this way the audience can appropriate the *vibhāvas*, as well as the *sthāyi-bhāva*, as universal. After the *rasa* is thus generalised, comes its enjoyment. By the third function of *bhojakatva*, the *sthāyin* is enjoyed in this general form, accompanied by the *vibhāvas*, sensed also in a general form; and this enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened self-sufficient and blissful knowledge, arising (in the language of the Sāmkhya philosophers, which is borrowed by these theorists) from the prominence of the attribute of goodness (*sattva*) in a man, and different from what is known as worldly happiness, being divested of personal relations or interests. It is differentiated from the two kinds of knowledge, *anubhava* and *smaraṇa*; and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind, it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation (*brahmā-svāda-sacivaḥ*). According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, the *rasa* consists in the *sthāyi-bhāva* or the permanent mood, experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of *abhidhā* and *bhāvakatva*, and enjoyed by a blissful process, known as *bhoga*, till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not worldly (*alaukika*) but disinterested and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

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³¹ Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views are set forth and criticised by Abh. on Bh. p. 244, *Locana* p. 68, Mammaṭa ch. iv, Hemacandra pp. 61 f., Govinda p. 66.

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It will be noticed that these different theories about *rasa*, though applied to drama and poetry, are yet generally tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian philosophy. Lollaṭa, it is clear, is a Mīmāṃsaka who believes in the far-reaching function of the Denotation of a word and thinks that it is capable of expressing all other implied or suggested sense in the shape of the *rasa*. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, is a Naiyāyika or logician who would demonstrate the *rasa* by means of syllogistic reasoning. He believes that the implied *rasa* can be reached by the logical process of inference from the expressed sense, although he has to admit that the inferred mood is cognised differently from the objects of ordinary inference, being sensed by the spectator through the force of its exquisite charm. In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka we mark a further development. In his theory there is not only a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of *rasa*, and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of the spectator's inward experience, but also the fact that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) is substantially following the teachings of the Sāṃkhya philosophers. We need not enter here into the details of Sāṃkhya psychology or metaphysics, but we may indicate briefly the application of its main teachings to the conception of poetry and the artistic delight resulting from it³². The purpose of evolution in Sāṃkhya is the attainment of *bhoga* (experience of pleasure and pain) and *apavarga* (spiritual emancipation through right knowledge). The enjoyer of *rasa* in poetry is like the knower of Brahma, but the aesthetic attitude is different from the philosophic. The aesthetic attitude is indeed one of *saṃvit* (or *cit-svabhāva*), i.e., pure contemplation dissociated from all personal interests, and results in *viśrānti* or composure; but in the philosophical attitude there is complete detachment or aloofness from pleasure and pain and egoistic impulses, for the knower becomes impersonal by transcending his *buddhi*. This comes about through the predominance of the *sāttvika guṇa* in both cases; but in the spiritual attitude the *buddhi*, which contains in it *vāsanās* or acquired impulses, modifying its intrinsic *sāttvika* character, is purged of all its egoistic tendencies, and the true knower, realising the intrinsic disparateness of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, transcends the empirical plane. Such complete detachment is not possible in the aesthetic attitude. The world of poetry, being idealised, is different from the natural world and does not evoke egoistic impulses; for the objects contemplated in poetry have no reference to any one in particular but are entirely impersonal. These impersonalised forms, therefore, afford to the enjoyer of poetry escape from the ills which arise from personal relations, but they are the means only of temporary release from the natural world, for he

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³² Hiriyana, in his article on *Indian Aesthetics*, in the Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference,

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Poona, vol. II, has dealt with the subject at some length. One may think, however, that his note that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was a *mīmāṃsaka* has not been clearly made out.

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cannot, like the ordinary man, transcend his *buddhi* altogether. The three stages in the appreciation of poetry which lead ultimately to the aesthetic experience of *rasa* indicate that the apprehension of the meanings of words (*abhidhā*) is not important in itself but only as a means of apprehending the generalised conceptions which are unrelated to any one in particular, the *bhāvakatva* being the process of such generalising, by which the factors of the feelings, as well as the feeling itself, become impersonalised. These idealised creations of poetry lead to enjoyment or *bhoga*, which implies that the condition produced is one of pleasure, as distinguished from the case of the natural attitude which is not always pleasurable, as well as from the spiritual attitude which is neither pleasurable nor painful.

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If we may judge from the somewhat elaborate criticism levelled against Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory, it seems to have produced a greater impression than earlier theories, and paved the way, no doubt, for the later theory of Abhinavagupta to whom belongs the credit of explaining the new aesthetic system of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana.

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The Dhvanikāra, however, in his exposition of *rasa-dhvani* and *rasa*, seems to have been greatly influenced by the Dramaturgic Rasa school. Bharata, the acknowledged law-giver of this school, declared that the business of the drama was to evolve one or more of the eight *rasas*; and therefore a more or less elaborate psychology of human sentiments had been analysed in the service of the dramatic art even before poetic theories began to be seriously discussed. Bharata's ideas on these psychological processes and on *rasa*, which is the final internal experience consisting in the consciousness of a certain condition of the ego, were elaborated by his commentators and followers, until the Dhvanikāra, followed by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, came into the field. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory, the idea of *rasa* was naturally taken over to poetry and poetic theory; and as the transition from the naive to the sentimental poetry was accomplished, the theorists went a step further and erected the *rasa* into one of its essential foundations. Ānandavardhana is quite explicit on this point when he says (p. 181): *etac ca rasādi-tātparyeṇa kāvya-nibandhanam bharatādāvapi suprasiddham eva*. In other words, what was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others thus found its way into poetry, profoundly modifying, as it did, the entire conception of the *kāvya*³³. From his extensive literary and philosophical studies as well as from his interest in the work of Bharata and his followers, Abhinavagupta goes further and lays down: *nāṭyāt samudayarūpād rasaḥ, kāvye'pi nāṭyāyamāna eva rasaḥ kāvyārthaḥ*. These theorists realised that no system of Poetics, as no system of Dramaturgy, can ever ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments, and must find an important place for *rasa*, the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of the drama. Gradually stress came to be laid on the emotional mood, as well as on the imaginative thought, which the poet succeeds in communicating to us : the outward expression, on which the older writers pinned their faith so much, being regarded only as a means of suggesting or pointing to the implicit significance of such a mood in poetry.

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³³ Rudrabhaṭṭa states (i 5) in the same way that Bharata and others have already discussed *rasa* in connexion with the drama, while his own object is to apply it to the case of poetry. Cf Lindenau, *Rasalchre*, p. 2.

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The insufficiencies of the earlier theories on *rasa* are obvious and are therefore rightly criticised by Abhinavagupta ; but it was a happy idea to elaborate the theory in such a way as not only to supply these deficiencies but also to fit it well into the theory of ‘suggestion’ or *dhvani* formulated by the new school. It is not necessary for us here to enter into the details of the *dhvani*-theory, which will be treated in its proper place ; but we may for convenience and continuity of treatment indicate here generally how the idea of *rasa* was worked up into them. The Dhvani school, in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words ; the other content is not expressed but must be added to it by the imagination of the reader or listener. The unexpressed or suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (*vyañjanā*), is taken to be the ‘soul’ or essence of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers, it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech, in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words, was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegory. But suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical, which Vāmana had already amply recognised and on which the Alaṃkāra and the Rīti schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric, however veiled it may be, is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such; but the suggestive is always unexpressed, and is therefore a source of greater charm by its capacity of concealment. This unexpressed or inexpressible is called into being by a particular function of suggestion, appertaining to words and their meanings, which this school postulates, and by which poetry becomes (in the language of Kant) an expression of the ‘aesthetic idea’

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Now the unexpressed, through the suggestive power of sound or sense, may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*), or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alaṃkāra*), but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani school, therefore, took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of *rasa* with the theory of *dhvani*. It was realised that poetry was not, as Daṇḍin thought, the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language; the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods are in themselves inexpressible. We can give a name to them, but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best, therefore, we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *vibhāvas* etc.; but with the help of these expressed elements which must be generalised and conceived, not as they appear in the natural (*laukika*) world, but as they may be imagined in the world of poetry, the poet can awaken in us, through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular *alaukika* condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as, for instance, Rāma, whom he describes, felt, but he can call up a reflection of it, which is similar in some respects; and the condition of the reader's soul in the enjoyment of such feeling is in poetry and drama the relish of *rasa*, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas.

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Here comes in the new colour given to the *rasa*-theory by the exponents of the Dhvani school. They interpret Bharata's central dictum to mean that the *rasa* is suggested by the union of the *sthāyin* with the *vibhāvas* through the relation of the suggested (*vyaṅgya*) and the suggestor (*vyañjaka*);

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the niṣpatti of Bharata, therefore, should mean abhivyakti.

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The elaboration of the rasa-theory, however, by this school in the direct tradition of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is associated by Mammaṭa and others with the name of Abhinavagupta³⁴. Commenting on Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory, Abhinava points out that there is no need, as there is no authority for assuming the two powers of bhāvakatva and bhogīkaraṇa; for they are implicitly included in the idea of rasa-vyañjanā and its ultimate āsvāda. Bharata’s dictum kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāḥ implies the bhāvakatva to be an inherent capacity of all bhāvas, as the means of bringing into consciousness the sense of poetry, the term sense indicating here the principal sense consisting of the relish of rasa. Hence the sthāyin, together with the vyabhicārin, being bhāvas themselves, bring into existence through this inherent power the extraordinary relishable sense of poetry, cognised in a general or impersonalised form. In this way, the sthāyin may be regarded as the bhāvaka or niṣpādaka of rasa; and this so-called bhavakatva, according to Abhinava, consists in nothing more than a suitable use of guṇa and alaṃkāra (samucita-guṇālaṃkāra-parigrahātmakam) for the ultimate purpose of awakening the rasa through the suggestive power of word and sense. Thus, partially admitting bhāvanā or bhāvakatva but explaining it somewhat differently, Abhinava turns to the other power assumed as *bhoga* or *bhogīkaraṇa* by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He remarks that beyond *pratīti* or perception of *rasa*, he is not aware of any other process called *bhoga*. If it is relish or enjoyment, it is already admitted as the essence of *rasa*, and nothing is gained by giving it a new name. Abhinava thinks that the *bhoga* supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is nothing more than the *āsvāda* or relish of *rasa*, based on permanent moods like *rati* etc., and made possible by the suggestive power of poetry. It falls naturally, therefore, within the domain of suggestion and need not be taken as a separate function (*bhogīkaraṇa-vyāpāraś ca kāvyātmaka-rasa-viṣayo dhvananātmāiva*).

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³⁴ There is some difference in the general theoretical positions of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta which will noticed later.

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This *pratīti* of *rasa*, Abhinavagupta maintains, results from its *abhivyakti* or manifestation by the power of suggestion, and consists of a state of relish known as *rasanā*, *āsvāda* or *carvaṇā*. What is manifested is not the *rasa* itself, but its relish; not the mood itself but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader. This taste or relish partakes, no doubt, of the nature of cognition; it is nevertheless different from the ordinary *laukika* forms of the process, because its means (viz., the *vibhāvas*) are not to be taken as ordinary or *laukika* causes³⁵.

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