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Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c85: VII. Mammata And The New School

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c85

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VII. Mammata And The New School

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The foregoing sketch of the progress of the principal schools and systems, terminating in the dominance of the Dhvani school, will make it clear that the history of Sanskrit Poetics is marked by two or three well-defined stages¹. The dim beginnings of the science are indeed hidden from us, but we enter upon the first historic stage of its formulation, in a more or less developed form, in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. This is followed by a fruitful and creative stage, ending with Abhinavagupta, in which the theories of the different schools or systems were settled in their general outlines, giving rise to four distinct schools of opinion, respectively represented by the rasa-, alaṃkāra-, rīti- and dhvani-systems. It covers more than three centuries, and includes some of the great names in the history of the discipline, like those of Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa, of Loṭṭaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, of the Dhvanikāra, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, of Kuntala, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Bhoja : all of whom helped, in a constructive or destructive way, to shape the different currents of thought which ultimately ran into one stream in the textbook of Mammaṭa.

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¹ See Vol. I, pp. 330 f.

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If we attempt to discriminate between these different schools of thought and roughly indicate the broad steps taken in the progress of the discipline, we can state generally that the Alaṃkāra system proposed to confine itself to a theory of embellishment (alaṃkāra) of expression consistently with what was probably the original tradition of the discipline; the Rasa system, starting with the consideration of the drama, was responsible for introducing into poetic theory the subjective element of rasa, represented in the feelings, moods and sentiments; the Rīti system laid stress on the objective beauty of representation realised by means of diction (rīti) and its constituent excellences (guṇas); while the Dhvani system, admitting the underlying truth of all these doctrines, elaborated a peculiar theory of suggestion in poetry (dhvani), including the suggestion of rasa, to which everything else was correlated. It will be seen from this that a relative emphasis was laid on the elements of alaṃkāra, rasa, rīti (including guṇa and doṣa) and dhvani by each of these systems; and although the soft hand of Indian dialectics drew lines of fantastic ideas, consisting of odd and abstruse schemes, it is on these essential points that the theories centred themselves, and the main currents flowed thereof in different directions. It was, however, realised in the end that all these gleams of thought must be gathered into a focus, and all these currents must be made to flow into one stream. The purely normative character of the discipline began to disappear, and it was understood that, however much importance was attached to the fact of externalisation, to the consideration of embellishment or diction, it was far outbalanced by the most necessary and important principle of higher poetry, viz., the art of suggestion, especially connected with the art of suggesting a peculiar mental condition of enjoyment, technically known as *rasa*, of which the charm lies in a disinterested and impersonal pleasure in the mind, the attitude proper to contemplation of the beautiful².

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² The problem, therefore, does not concern rhetoric merely, and the ideal of beauty (if the expression is allowable) is no longer conceived from the outside, being associated with a peculiar condition of artistic enjoyment, the suggestion of which is taken as the chief function of poetry. As suggested by an able critic of Sanskrit literature (Oldenberg, *Die Literatur des alten Indien*, pp. 207f), the Indian theorists permit intellectual vigour and subtlety, the masculine beauty, to stand behind that of purely feminine enjoyment born of the finest sensibility. Both these traits are found in the literature from the earliest times; the idea of ecstatic rapture side by side with a strong inclination towards sagacity and subtlety. It is true that the dogmatic formalism of a scholastic discipline naturally sank to the level of a cold and monotonously inflated rhetoric; but at the same time it must be admitted that the theorists were not blind to finer issuses, nor were they indifferent to the supreme excellence of real poetry and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it. They always take care to add that despite dogmas

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This period ends with the ultimate standardisation of a more or less complete scheme of Poetics, outlined in the *Dhvanyāloka*, in which an attempt is made to bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation. The period which followed this and with which we are concerned in this and following chapters, is necessarily a stage of critical elaboration, the chief work of which consists in summarising and setting forth, in the concise form of text-books, the results of earlier speculations. The stage is marked by great scholastic acumen, if not by remarkable originality or creative genius, but it denotes also a progressive deterioration of the study itself. It covers the age of numberless commentaries, which may be characterised, like the scholia of European classical literature, as consisting mostly of "comments on comments of annotated annotations". They busy themselves with the explanation, expansion or restriction of the already established rules. We have also the rise of a number of popular writers and textbook-makers who wanted to simplify the science for general enlightenment, the lowest stage being reached when we come to manuals and school-books of comparatively recent times.

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It is difficult to classify some of these writers. Here and there we find isolated and straggling followers of the older schools. Some are frankly uncritical, some merely eclectic; while others are

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the poetic imagination must show itself; and the ultimate test of poetry is the appreciation of the sahr̥daya, the man of taste, whose technical knowledge must be equal to his finer capacity of aesthetic enjoyment, born out of wide culture and identification with the feelings and sentiments of the poet. As this capacity, which is likened to the bliss of divine contemplation, is vouchsafed to the fit and few, the critic as well as the poet is born, and not made.

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characterised by the very modest ambition of producing nothing more than a popular text-book. But the majority of the writers of this period, which covers more than five or six centuries, accepts, with some reservations, the *dhvani*-theory and the scheme of Poetics as finally determined by Mammaṭa. There are small groups of writers who devote themselves to special topics, like *kavi-śikṣā* or the subject of *rasa* (especially *śṛṅgāra-rasa*), but this apparent branching off from the main stem of the finally authoritative Dhvani system, is to be explained as due rather to the following of older traditions, or perhaps to the refining or analytic spirit of the times, than to any real split in the domain of general theory. With regard to matters of general theory and the main problems, the decadent Post-*dhvani* writers as a rule thought that that there was nothing new to set forth; they consequently fell back on matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing speculative passion for fine distinctions and their scholastic bent for controversy. It would be tedious, as well as useless, therefore, to treat them here at any great length, for they repeat more or less the same idea in their own way, sometimes in the same stock manner and phraseology, and differ from each other only in matters of no great theoretic importance. The only subject worth studying in them is their minute analysis and elaboration of numberless poetic figures, which are not treated, as not coming perhaps within the scope of their general exposition, by the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, but which occupy a very considerable position in later literature. Here was room enough to supplement, as Ruyyaka expressly states, the treatment of their predecessors; and this portion of their work is beaten out with such extreme nicety and elaborateness that the Alaṃkāra-śāstra, judging from these works alone, would be, as it often has been, designated as a study of Rhetoric merely. But even from Ruyyaka’s time, the scope and nature of most of the individual figures appear to have been fairly fixed, only to be criticised and improved upon here and there by such later writers as Jagannātha.

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It is important, however, to note that although this new school (navyāḥ, arvācināḥ) accepts in main the general position of the Dhvani school, it is yet not entirely free from the influence of older schools. It betrays a sneaking regard for older writers and brings back, rightly or wrongly, some of the old ideas into the elaboration of its own theory of poetry. It is difficult, for this reason, to take these writers in a lump and affiliate them directly to the Dhvani school. Mammaṭa’s definition of poetry, for instance, is not altogether free from the influence of the views of such older writers as Vāmana; Ruyyaka follows Udbhaṭa and Kuntala extensively in his detailed analysis of poetic figures; Viśvanātha clearly betrays the influence of the Rasa school on his own system; while Jagannātha revives in a new form the old definition of poetry given by Daṇḍin. It is remarkable that most of these writers attempt to arrive at a precise definition of poetry, a task which was wisely left alone by the Dhvanikāra; but in doing so, they probably meant to find out a comprehensive formula to cover the old ideas as well as the new, although it must be said that they succeed less often than they involve themselves in hopeless inconsistencies. This reactionary tendency, however, is interesting as indicating that they were not unconscious of the importance of earlier views as they were not entirely content with the clear-cut scheme of the Dhvanyāloka; a fact which would go to demonstrate, to some extent, that want of originality is a charge which cannot be brought in its entirety against these followers of the finally dominant Dhvani system.

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The first and foremost writer of this group is Mammaṭa, whose *Kāvya-prakāśa* must have helped a great deal, judging from its popularity and influence, in finally establishing the authority of the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana. This work, combining as it does the merit of fulness with that of conciseness, not only summmed up previous speculations in Poetics in the succinct form of a text-book; but it became in its turn the starting point of endless text-books and exegesis.

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Mammaṭa’s general standpoint will be obvious at a glance by examining his well known definition of poetry. Although he adheres in the main to the teachings of the Dhvani school and accepts *rasa* as an important element of poetry, his definition *tad a-doṣau śabdārthau saguṇāvalaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* ("poetry consists in word and sense, devoid of the defects and possessing the excellences, and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures") follows the time-honoured custom of starting with word and sense (*śabda* and *artha*) and mentioning the *guṇa*, *doṣa* and *alaṃkāra*; but it does not expressly include any reference to *dhvani* and *rasa*, which are apparently comprehended by implication. For, following up this definition, Mammaṭa begins with the discussion of the functions of *śabda* and *artha*, incidentally establishing the function of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) and the superiority of the suggested sense (*vyaṅgya artha* or *dhvani*), and divides poetry into three classes (viz., *dhvani*, *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* and *citra*) in relation to the suggested sense. This leads him to enumerate and exemplify the various subdivisions of these three classes of poetry, and in this connexion dilate upon the nature and theory of *rasa*, which is included in the scope of "suggestion of imperceptible process" (*asaṃlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya*). In this context, he examines and rejects the views of Loṭṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and accepts the *vyakti-vāda* which he ascribes to Abhinavagupta. Mention is made of the eight orthodox dramatic *rasas* (*aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ*), but the ninth *rasa*, the *śānta*, is added, apparently as relevant to poetry.

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Mammaṭa then proceeds to discuss the *guṇa* and *doṣa*, not in relation to poetry in general as his definition would imply, but in relation to their subserviency or otherwise to the awakening of *rasa*. The *guṇas* as excellences of composition are interpreted in a new sense (after Ānandavardhana) and brought into effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a work, as qualities which serve to heighten its charm. The verbal form of a work cannot be said to possess the qualities of energy or sweetness (except by way of analogy), unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The guṇas, therefore, are related to the rasa, as virtues like heroism are related to the soul of a man. The verbal form, the mere sound, produces the excellences only as a means or instrument; the real cause is the rasa, even as the soul is the true cause of virtues of like heroism in a man. The same consideration applies also to the case of poetic figures (alaṃkāras), and their place in poetry is justified by their relation to rasa. They are compared to ornaments on a man's body; and as such, they adorn words and meanings which constitute the ‘body’ of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly (through sound and sense) the underlying soul of sentiment, but not invariably. If the rasa is absent, they produce mere variety of expression. It should also be noted that the guṇas are accepted, after Ānandavardhana, as three in number³, and it is maintained that combination of particular letters signify particular guṇas, so that the three vṛttis of Udbhaṭa (and roughly the three rītis of Vāmana)

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³ Mammaṭa demonstrates with some care that it is not necessary to accept the ten guṇas of Vāmana, but that it is quite enough if we postulate three comprehensive excellences, viz., ojas (energy), prasāda (lucidity) and mādhurya (sweetness). If we examine the guṇas of Vāmana critically, we find that some of them can very well be included in these three; some constitute mere absence

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of defects; while others are sometimes positive defects. Thus, Vāmana’s śleṣa, samādhi and udāratā are comprehended by ojas; arthavyakti is merely an aspect of prasāda; samatā, consisting of a certain uniformity of style, is sometimes a fault; while saukumārya and kānti, defined repectively as freedom from harshness (or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity, are simply the reverse of the defects śruti-kaṣṭa and grāmyatva. These considerations simplify the classification of the guṇas and put a limit to their useless multiplication or differentiation (witness, e. g., Bhoja’s elaborate scheme of 24 guṇas). Mammaṭa, therefore, thinks that the distinction between śabda-guṇa and artha-guṇa is meaningless, for the latter need not be separately considered. The mental activity involved in the enjoyment of rasa, is made to justify only three (and not ten) guṇas which are thus brought into effective relation with the principal sentiment of a composition. Thus, the ojas is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion (vistāra) of the mind and resides in the moods of heroism, horror and fury; the prasāda, proper to all the moods, is taken as the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense, extending over the mind at once (vyāpti or vikāsa), like a stream of water over a cloth, or like fire among dry fuel (cf Bharata vii 7); while the mādhurya, residing normally in the erotic mood of love-in-union, but also appropriate to and rising successively in degree in pathos, love-in-separation and calm, is regarded as causing a softening or melting of the heart (druti). The three conditions of the mind, viz., expanding, pervading and melting, which accompany the poetic sentiments, are thus made the basis of the three guṇas: and though these mental states are sometimes mixed up and lead to various other mental conditions, these latter effects are equalised to the three *guṇas* defined by himself ⁴. Mammaṭa admits *doṣas* of *pada*, *vākya* and *artha*, as well as *doṣas* of *rasa*, a mode of treatment which are too many and too indistinct to be taken as the basis of new *guṇas*. This exposition follows and expands *Dhvanyāloka* ii 8-11 (see above pp. 218f); but it is possible that the original hint of associating these effects on the mental condition of the reader with the three *guṇas* was supplied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (*Locana* p. 68) who speaks of the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of *rasa* as being characterised by the mental conditions of expanding (*vistāra*), prevading (*vikāsa*) and melting (*druti*). Viśvanātha substantially agrees with this view of Mammaṭa; but he takes the technical objection that the *ojas* etc. are not the causes of, but identical with, the process of expansion etc.

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⁴ See above p. 130.

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4 See above p. 130. We have seen above that Mammaṭa explains away the so-called excellences of sense (*artha-guṇas*), so that the *guṇas* are confined to the sphere of sound. They are produced by a particular arrangement of letters (*varṇa*), compounds (*samāsa*) and style of composition (*racanā*). Thus the *mādhurya* or sweetness results from the employment of (i) all *sparśa* letters or mutes (from *k* to *m*), excepting the cerebrals (*ṭ, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh*) coming with the last letters (nasals) of their respective class, (ii) *r* and *ṇ* with short vowels; as well as from (iii) complete absence of compounds or presence of short compounds. The *ojas* or energy is produced by (i) compound letters formed by the combination of the first and third letters of a class with the letters immediately following them (i.e., with the second and fourth letters respectively) (ii) conjunct consonants of which *r* forms a part, (iii) cerebrals other than *ṇ* (which letter is indicative of *mādhurya*) (iv) doubled letters, i. e., combinations of the same letters, (v) palatal and cerebral sibilants (*ś, ṣ*), (vi) long compounds, and (vii) a formidable or bombastic style. For obvious is followed by most later writers. Although the the poetic figures are not, in his opinion, always necessary to poetry ⁵, he rounds off his treatise with an elaborate analysis and illustration of figures of sound and sense (including a limited number of figures which are of a mixed kind), enumerating as many as sixty-seven independent figures.

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⁵ From the new standpoint, Vāmana’s view that the *guṇas* produce the beauty of a poem, while the *alaṃkāras* merely heighten the beauty thus produced, is clearly inadequate. If the doctrine is taken to mean that the possession of all the excellences constitutes poetry, the *gauḍī* and the *pāñcālī* which are not marked by all the *guṇas*, would not be poetical; if, however, the presence of a single excellence is enough to dignify a composition to the rank of poetry, then we are driven to accept even a perfectly unpoetical passage as poetry, if it contains, say, the quality of energy.

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From this brief summary of the topics of Mammaṭa’s work, it will be clear that its value consists not in its originality but its orderly and concise discussion of the main isssues (excepting those of Dramaturgy, which Hemacandra, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha attempted to supplement), and his definitions as well as general treatment attempt to cover

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reasons there are no rules for *prasāda*. The letters mentioned here are mostly the same as those given by Udbhaṭa as suggestors of *upanāgarikā*, *paruṣa* and *komalā* (or *grāmyā*) *vṛttis* respectively. Mammaṭa therefore thinks that Udbhaṭa’s three *vṛttis*, which Udbhaṭa himself comprehends under *vṛttyanuprāsa*, are really equivalent to the three *rītis* of Vāmana and to his own three *guṇas*.

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almost all fields of thought traversed by his predecessors. The enormous popularity and authority which the *Kāvya-prakāśa* has always enjoyed and which is indicated by the large number of commentaries on it, must be explained as due not to any remarkable novelty of treatment, but to the clear and lucid (albeit the obscurities due to its brevity of exposition, necessitating commentaries) working out of the already accumulated stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in the *Dhvanyāloka*.

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But from the theoretical point of view, Mammaṭa’s definition of poetry has been subjected to much vigorous criticism. Viśvanātha, for instance, undoubtedly takes Mammaṭa’s work as the basis (*upajīvya*) of his own, but begins his *Sāhitya darpaṇa* with a trenchant attack on his definition. He points out, in the first place, that the *guṇas* being merely properties of the *rasa*, should not have been logically included in the definition of essentials. He shows next that if only faultless compositions be called poetry, some of the best poems will have to be given up, inasmuch as it is almost impossible to keep clear of all blemishes. Nor could it be said that faults mar only those particular words or their meanings in which they occur; for if they are faults at all, bearing relation to the underlying sentiment in the composition, they must mar the whole poem. Lastly, he maintains that no reference to poetic figures ought to have been made in the definition, as they are admittedly non-essential. Jagannātha’s criticism is more fundamental, although he agrees with Viśvanātha as to the impropriety of including a reference to *guṇa*, *doṣa*, and *alaṃkāra* in the definition. He objects that a word and its sense are not what is denoted by the term ‘poetry’; for the universal use of such expressions as ‘a poem is read but its meaning is not understood’ shows clearly that a particular kind of words only is what is meant. If it is said that the essence of poetry lies in its capability of producing a mood (*rasa*), and that inasmuch as a word and its sense have this capability, both constitute poetry, then it may be replied that, according to this too wide view, musical tones and theatrical gestures will have to be called poetry.

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Some of these and other arguments appear, no doubt, fastidious and pedantic, and have been met with equal ingenuity by the commentators and followers of Mammaṭa; but the whole controversy indicates the futility of arriving at a precise logical definition of poetry and the difficulty of combining all the conventional elements in such a definition. The earlier theorists probably realised this and carefully avoided the task, for even the Dhvanikāra contents himself with describing its general nature and its divisions, an omission on which Mahimabhatta ridicules him by saying : *kiṃ ca kāvyasya svarūpaṃ vyutpādayitukāmena matimatā tallakṣaṇam eva sāmānyenākhyātavyam.*

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From the historical point of view, however, the definition is interesting, its apparent inconsistency and obscurity being a curious fact which can reasonably be explained by a reference to the views of the older schools and systems. The term *rasa* does not occur in the definition, and the fact that Mammaṭa accepts the *citra-kāvya*, which is grudgingly admitted by Ānandavardhana as a division of poetry, would indicate, as Viśvanātha points out, that Mammaṭa does not consider *rasa* to be essential. Yet he defines the *guṇas* and *doṣas* in terms of their relation to *rasa*, a procedure which is not justifiable if the essentiality of *rasa* is not admitted. On the other hand, if it is maintained that all reference to *rasa* is omitted in the definition because it is such a well known and established fact in the poetical and critical world, then the prominence of threefold suggestion and the division of poetry on its basis are hardly explicable. The *guṇas* and *doṣas* should in that case be omitted, as done by Jagannātha, from the definition, which corresponds more to the definition of Vāmana (1. 1. 1-3) ; and these two elements must be understood in the sense in which Vāmana takes them, viz., as properties of *śabda* and *artha*³. This and other discrepancies make it probable that Mammaṭa, belonging as he does to the new school, is influenced to a great extent by the views of the older schools. He accepts, no doubt, the general scheme and theory of the Dhvani school, but in trying to reconcile them with those of earlier theorists, he lands himself in hopeless inconsistencies.

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³ This is the modified view of Jagannātha who realises the difficulty and does not agree with Mammaṭa (see *Rasa-gaṅgādhara* pp. 55). Similarly Vidyānātha, though belonging to the new school, would accept (p. 334) Udbhaṭa’s dictum *saṅghaṭana-dharmā guṇāḥ*.

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Even the definition of Viśvanātha, who took upon himself the task of criticising Mammaṭa, is open to similar objections, and has been criticised in its turn by Govinda and Jagannātha. In declaring that poetry consists of a sentence of which the ‘soul’ is rasa (*vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam*), he is indeed betraying the unmistakable influence, of the Rasa school; but he is also putting into a shape, in a way clearer than Abhinavagupta does, the essentiality of *rasa-dhvani*, wisely left unstated but practically meant by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*⁴. In taking up this extreme position, Viśvanātha involves himself, however, in the somewhat clumsy subterfuge of admitting a distant touch of *rasa* in all poetry, even in what is professedly descriptive or ornamental. Even if it is ideally correct to say that a poem ought always to manifest the *rasa* alone, it does not, as a matter of fact, always do so. Jagannātha rightly objects⁵ that Viśvanātha’s definition would exclude poems in which the centre of gravity lies only in the matter (*vastu-dhvani*) or in the imaginative mood (*alaṃkāra-dhvani*). The opponent cannot reply that this is exactly his own opinion, for thereby he goes against the view of ancient authorities, as well as against the established practice of great poets, who have admitted the scope of fact and imagination, and described subjects like a flood or narrated a travel, in which there is is hardly any touch of rasa. It would not do, therefore, to accept the rasa-dhvani alone, for a complete definition must also take into account vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani. Viśvanātha anticipates this objection by saying that in cases other than those admitted expressly by himself there is always a semblance of rasa (rasābhāsa); and the verse given in the Dhvanyāloka as an instance of vastu-dhvani is, in his opinion, admissible only because there is such a touch of the rasa in it, and not because mere vyaṅgya vastu can constitute the essence of poetry. Jagannātha replies that nothing is gained by such a supposition of an indirect reference to rasa, because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like ‘the cow moves’ or ‘the deer leaps’. This cannot be taken as the sole criterion, because thereby any and every content of poetry would be reduced to the position of an excitant, an ensuant or an accessory of the rasa.

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⁴ See above ch. v, p. 210 ch VI, p. 225f.

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⁵ p. 7-8. Cf. *Prabhā* p. 11, ed. N. S. P. 1912.

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Apart from this technicality and the emphasis put on the essentiality of rasa, which however is not reconciled to other elements of poetry, Viśvanātha’s scheme does not substantially differ from that of Mammaṭa, on whose work he also appears to have written a commentary. In one passage, indeed, he pays an elegant tribute to his predecessor’s work by admitting his own indebtedness to it. After defining poetry as a sentence the ‘soul’ of which is rasa, he proceeds in the usual way to analy the 'sentence' (vākya) and the different functions of its constituent word and sense, establishing suggestion or vyañjanā as the function necessary and important for the purpose of conveying the suggested rasa (bodhe rasādīnām). He accepts only two divisions of poetry, viz., dhvani and guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya, and rejects the third, the citra-kāvya (which is suffered by Ānandavardhana and accepted by Mammaṭa) on the ground that it is entirely devoid of rasa and therefore inconsistent with his own definition of poetry. It is curious, however, that Viśvanātha, following Ānandavardhana, partially admits the suggestion of vastu and alaṃkāra under suggestion of perceptible process (kramóddyota-vyaṅgya), based on the power of word or sense or both. The case of poetry of subordinate suggestion (guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya), where the rasa involved is secondary, is justified by holding that the mere circumstance of the rasa being collaterally suggested does not destroy the claim of such poetry; for the relish of rasa alone, whether circumstantial or essential, is the true criterion. It is this partiality to rasa which makes him include a treatment, omitted by most writers on Poetics, of the varieties of dramatic composition, in which the delineation of the rasas, the moods and sentiments, is already established as fundamental by both poets and theorists. Consistently with the same idea, a doṣa or blemish is defined as the detractor of the rasa (rasāpakarṣaka), while a guṇa is explained as a particular mode or quality of the rasa depending on śabda and artha and enhancing the beauty of the *rasa* when the *rasa* is principal. The *guṇas* are really attributes of the *rasa*, but they are figuratively spoken of as belonging to a word and its sense : which figurative use also explains the old distinction between *śabda-guṇa* and *artha-guṇa*. The *guṇas* are accepted as three in number, viz., *mādhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*, depending upon a combination of particular letters and justified by the attributes of expanding, pervading and melting the mind in its enjoyment of *rasa* ; and the ten *guṇas* of older writers are mentioned and criticised after the manner of Mammaṭa. It is curious, however, that Viśvanātha admits the *rītis* separately, instead of comprehending them, as Mammaṭa does, under the *vṛttis* or considering them redundant after the enumeration of the three *guṇas*. He defines the *rīti* as *pada-saṃghaṭanā* or particular arrangement of words (and letters) which helps the *rasas* (*upakartrī rasādīnām*). The *rīti*, however, relates entirely to the external frame-work of poetry, and is likened to the conformation of the body in relation to the soul⁶.

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⁶ Viśvanātha speaks of four *rītis* as follow : (i) *vaidarbhī* or sweet style (marked by letters indicative of *mādhurya*, and by short compounds or absence of compounds). (ii) *gauḍī* or bombastic style (marked by letters indicative of *ojas* and possessing a large number of compounds). (iii) *pāñcālī* (marked by letters other than those mentioned above and containing five or six compound words). (iv) *lāṭī* or the style intermediate between *vaidarbhī* and *pāñcālī*. This is only a variation on the conventional enumeration ; but strictly speaking, Mammaṭa is right in not considering the *rītis* separately, as they are comprehended by the three *vṛttis* or even by the three *guṇas* accepted by the

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Finally, the poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*), which are treated substantially after the manner of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, are defined as those non-permanent attributes of a word and its sense which add to their beauty and thus embellish the *rasa* indirectly. The term ‘non-permanent’ (*asthira*) is explained, after Mammaṭa⁷, by the statement that the presence of the *alaṃkāras* is not necessary but accidental, as compared to the *guṇas* which are necessary attributes.

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⁷ See above pp. 214f, 276.

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The above sketch of Viśvanātha’s general position will sufficiently indicate that he is more or less a compiler and not an original writer, although he shows some constructive genius in elaborating a full and compact system of his own on the basis of *rasa-dhvani*. His borrowings from Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka are very extensive, and sometimes his judgment forsakes him, making him copy his originals rather slavishly. He is not always happy in his innovation, and sometimes (though rarely) he is positively wrong in his interpretation. In spite of these and other defects his work is interesting in the history of Sanskrit Poetics as an attempt at a further development of the *dhvani*-theory out of itself, an attempt to which recognition was not universally accorded by other strict followers of the theory. The *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, written like the *Kāvya-prakāśa* in the form of *kārikā* new school. Viśvanātha alludes to *vṛttis* under *vṛttyanuprāsa* and simply says (after Ruyyaka): *rasa-viṣaya vyāpāravati varṇa-racanā vṛttiḥ, tadanugatātvena prakarṣena nyasanād vṛttyanuprāsaḥ*.

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with *vṛtti*, has also the great merit of being written in a more simple and less controversial style than the treatises of Mammaṭa and Jagannātha respectively; and as a suitable and complete manual of Poetics, including a treatment of the dramatic art, it has always held its popularity as one of the most convenient text-books on the subject as a whole.

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One of the most important writers of this group is Ruyyaka, who comes immediately after Mammaṭa and who also appears to have written a commentary on Mammaṭa’s work. In his treatment of the poetic figures, with which his work (as its name implies) is directly concerned, he shows, however, a remarkable degree of insight and independence of judgment which distinguishes him from his predecessor. The value of his contribution in this respect may be judged from the fact that his *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva* not only helped to define and fix the conception of an *alaṃkāra*, of which the first indication was given by Kuntala but which was left untouched by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, but it had also a great influence in establishing by its careful analysis the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, so that his views on this matter have been accepted as authoritative by such important later writers as Viśvanātha, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Appayya Dīkṣita.

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The plan of Ruyyaka’s work, written in the form *sūtra* with *vṛtti*, is stated by himself in the introductory portion of his *vrtti*. He starts, in common with other followers of the Dhvani school, with the suggested sense (*pratīyamāna artha*) and demonstrates by a rapid survey of the views of older writers that it was directly or indirectly recognised by all. But he thinks that, in the opinion of the authorities who came before the Dhvani school, the chief function of the suggested sense consisted in embellishing the expressed meaning (*vācyópaskāra*), and therefore it was naturally comprehended in the sphere of poetic figures in which the expressed sense prevailed⁸. This is generally the view of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana and Rudraṭa. The Vakroktijīvita-kāra, who came after Ānandavardhana, includes all ideas of *dhvani* in a variety of *vakrokti* based on *upacāra* or metaphorical expression. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains that the suggested sense, established chiefly through the forcible utterance of the poet (*kavi-prauḍhókti*) is only a secondary element in poetry, the essential thing being the relish of *rasa* realised through a function called *bhoga* or enjoyment, which is distinct from and which transcends the denotative or generalising function of words. The Vyakti-viveka-kāra takes the relation of the expressed and the suggested in terms of the logical *liṅga* and *liṅgin*, and regards the process of suggestion as a process of inference. None of these views comes up to that of the Dhvanikāra, which is, therefore, accepted indisputably by Ruyyaka, who lays down sententiously at the end : *asti tāvad vyaṅgya-niṣṭho vyañjanā-vyāpāraḥ*. The three divisions of poetry into *dhvani*, *guṇībhūtā-vyaṅgya* and *citra* are also recognised ; but as the first two are already discussed in the *Alaṃkāra-mañjarī*⁹ and the *Dhvanyāloka* respectively, Ruyyaka proposes in this treatise to take up the remaining *citra-kāvya*, which, including in its scope all poetic figures devoid of suggestion¹⁰, naturally covers an extensive field. As all detailed consideration of this part is omitted in the *Dhvanyāloka* (as coming not properly within the limits of its theory), here was an opportunity of supplementing the work of his predecessors.

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⁸ *vācyópaskārakatvam hyalaṃkārāṇām ātma-bhūtatvam*, Jayaratha p. 3.

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⁹ Presumably this work was composed by himself. But in the Trivandrum edition, the reading is different. It reads *kālidāsādi-prabandheṣu* instead of *alaṃkāramañjaryāṃ darśitaḥ*. The *Alaṃkāra-mañjarī* appears to have dealt particularly with *rasa-dhvani*, apparently laying stress on *śṛṅgāra-rasa*.

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¹⁰ See above ch. v p. 217.

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But the point had already been taken up and discussed in his own way by Kuntala who recognised that the poet's intention need not always be to awaken the *rasa* or anything else unexpressed but may be directed simply to producing a certain strikingness of expression in the form of an expressed poetic figure. He analysed poetic expression and found that the elements which went to make up the being of such a figure consisted of a peculiar turn of expression, which produced a certain charm, called *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti-viśeṣa*, and which ultimately depends on the conception of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā-nirvartitatva*)¹. Both these terms are not new, the *kavi-pratibhā* having been acknowledged as essential in a poetic composition by older theorists, and the *saundarya* of Vāmana reappearing under the name of *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*. The *ukti-vaicitrya* is discussed in another connexion by Ānandavardhana (p. 243); and Mammaṭa (probably under the influence of Kuntala) lays down that the *alaṃkāra* is nothing but *vaicitrya* itself. Abhinavagupta speaks of endless varieties of *upamā-vicchitti* (p. 5), and in another passage (p. 8) uses the term as almost synonymous with *kāmanīyaka* or *cārutva-hetu*.

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¹ See above Ch. VI, p. 240.

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Ruyyaka does not elaborate a doctrine on this point but he accepts Kuntala's analysis implicitly and applies it to the detailed examination of individual poetic figures, a procedure which is followed by Viśvanātha, Appayya Dīkṣita and Jagan-nātha. That he derived this idea from Kuntala is indicated by Jayaratha in a passage in which the commentator, while rejecting on this ground the claim of the *yathāsaṃkhya* to be counted as a poetic figure, says : *etac ca vakroktijīvita-kṛtā saprapañcam uktam ityasmābhir nāyastam* (p. 149). In the *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva* Ruyyaka does not define the term *vicchitti*, but in the commentary on the *Vyakti-viveka* attributed to him, he says (p. 44) : *tathā ca śabdarthayor vicchittir alaṃkāraḥ, vicchittiś ca kavi-pratibhóllāsa-rūpatvāt kavi-pratibhóllāsasya ānantyād anantatvaṃ bhajamāno na paricchettum śakyate* ('Then again, an *alaṃkāra* consists of the charm or *vicchitti* of sound and sense; and it is not possible to define *vicchitti* exactly, inasmuch as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of the poetic imagination, which itself is infinite in its scope¹), the boundlessness or infinite scope of poetic conception having been already admitted by Ānandavardhana himself (ch. iv), as well as by Kuntala.

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¹ The question has been dealt with in some detail by Jacobi in his article *Ueber Begriff und Wesen der poetischen Figuren in der indischen Poetik* in *Nachrichten* der Goettingischen Gesellschaft 1908, and also in my introduction to the *Vakrokti-jīvita*, pp. xxxi-xl.

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Ruyyaka, however, takes this *vicchitti*, brought out by the productive imagination of the poet, to be the test of a poetic figure; or, in other words, a form of expression or a mere speech-figure (if the phrase is allowable) becomes a poetic figure when a certain charm is lent to it by the peculiar conception of the poet. Thus, a form of expression involving the logical *anumāna* would not *prima facie* constitute the figure *anumāna*, unless it involved this special charm; or, the doubt involved in the figure *saṃdeha* must be brought into being by the imagination of the poet, for it should not be an ordinary doubt but a ‘poetic’ doubt. Jayaratha makes this doctrine more explicit than his author in many places in his commentary. He lays down repeatedly that a special charm (*vicchitti-viśeṣa*) depending on the conception of the poet (*kavikarma* or *pratibhā*) is to be taken without question as the essential factor of an *alaṃkāra* (pp. 144, 149-50, 183), and all so-called figures are to be accepted or rejected accordingly¹².

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In later writings this doctrine is admitted as settled beyond question. Appayya Dīkṣita explains it at the beginning of his *Citra-mīmāṃsā* (p. 6), and Jagannātha repeatedly states: *alaṃkārāṇāṃ bhaṇiti-viśeṣa-rūpatvam*. In addition to the terms *bhaṇiti-viśeṣa*, *vaicitrya* and *vicchitti*, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha use the terms *cārutva*, *hṛdyatva*, *camatkāritva* and *saundarya* almost synonymously, while the latter attempts to define it (p. 466, 470) more precisely as the poetic imagination with reference to the power of poetic production; or rather, as the charm which is thereby brought into being, upon which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities.

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Ruyyaka’s work is also important for its acute analysis of the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, of which nearly eighty independent varieties are dealt with. At first sight one would be inclined to classify him as belonging to the Alaṃkāra school. There is no doubt that Ruyyaka was a great admirer of Udbhaṭa, on whose work his father Tilaka (as Jayaratha informs us) wrote a *viveka* or *vicāra*. Ruyyaka himself tells us (and he is borne out by Jayaratha and Samudrabandha) ¹³ that he is a follower of the views of the "ancients" (e. g. *cirantana-matānusṛtiḥ*, p. 205), by which he means apparently the older Alaṃkāra school of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa ; but, of course, he corrects, modifies or expands older authoritative opinions in the light of the progressive study of the subject. Ruyyaka's development of Udbhaṭa's idea of *śleṣa* may be taken as a typical instance. The controversy regarding the divisions of *śleṣa* and its relation to other figures in cases of combination, started, as Ruyyaka himself as well as his commentators point out, from Udbhaṭa's time. Ruyyaka accepts the division of this figure into *śabda-śleṣa* and *artha-śleṣa* (adding *ubhaya-śleṣa*), and holds that the principle of this distinction consists in the dictum *yo'laṃkāro yadāśritaḥ sa tadalaṃkāraḥ*. He rejects Mammaṭa's view that the distinction is based on the ground that the *śabda-śleṣa* is incapable of enduring a change of synonym (*parivṛtti-saha*), while the *artha-śleṣa* is capable of doing so ; for Mammaṭa holds that it is not *āśrayāśrayi-bhāva* (mutual dependence or inherence) but *anvaya* (connexion) and *vyatireka* (contrast) which must be taken as the test for determining whether a figure is of *śabda* or of *artha*. According to Ruyyaka, however, a *śabda-śleṣa* occurs when the expression, being differently split up, yields two different meanings. Here the words are really different, as is indicated by a difference of accent as well as by the effort required in pronouncing them. They present the appearance of sameness or coalescence (*śleṣa*), just in the same way as the lacqured wood appears to be one single object, though really lac is put on the wood. The *artha-śleṣa* occurs where the expression is the same and has the same accent and effort, but possesses two meanings, just as two fruits hang down from a single stem. The *ubhaya-śleṣa* is the case where both these circumstances exist¹⁴. Regarding the implication of *śleṣa* in other poetic figures, the question has been raised whether it should be regarded (i) as stronger than and thus dispelling the notion of the accompanying figure, (ii) as being equally powerful and therefore entering into combination with them, or (ii) as being weaker and therefore not prominent where other figures occur¹⁵. Udbhaṭa takes the first position, and thinks that where the *śleṣa* is present (e. g. along with *upamā*) there is only the appearance (*pratibhā*) of the other figure, the real figure being in such a case the *śleṣa* (and not *upamā*). Ruyyaka demurs to this view, and agrees with Mammaṭa in pointing out that in such cases of conflict the possession of common attributes (*sādharmya*) inherent in *upamā* is alone sufficient to constitute the latter figure; for the unqualified definition of *sādharmya* as community of attributes or circumstances is not exclusive of the verbal sameness conveyed by the accompanying *śleṣa*. The *upamā*, therefore, is predominant and the subordinate *śleṣa* only helps it; for in such cases, the common property is not arrived at without the *śleṣa*, and without the common property there can be no *upamā*. If the two figures are thus found together, one helping the other, we have *saṃkīrnatva* of *śleṣa* and *upamā*.

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¹³ Jayaratha refers to Ruyyaka’s following of *cirantana mata* at pp. 72, 83, 103, 172 etc., and of Udbhaṭa at pp. 10, 20, 34, 87, 93, 97, 98, 125, 126, 150 etc. Samudrabandha’s references are at pp. 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 21, 74, 82, 103 etc. Ruyyaka’s own references to Udbhaṭa’s views will be found in numerous places, at pp. 3, 7, 23, 59, 82, 86, 92, 123, 126, 148, 174, 191 etc.

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¹⁴ Viśvanātha follows Mammaṭa, but Vidyādhara agrees with Ruyyaka's interpretation in this matter.

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¹⁵ Jagannātha, p. 393, sums up the views thus : *ayaṃ cālaṃkāraḥ prāyeṇālaṃkārāntarasya viṣayam abhiniviśate, tatra kim asya bādhakatvaṃ syād ahosvit saṃkīrṇatvam utāho bādhyatvam iti.*

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From these and other instances which we need not multiply here, the influence of the Alaṃkāra school on Ruyyaka will be obvious; but it will be also obvious that the views of the older school never receive unqualified acceptance from him. His following of ancient opinions, a trait which he shares with Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha in their following of Vāmana and the *rasa*-writers respectively, should be explained as an earnest attempt on his part to reconcile the views of later theorists with those of the earlier, of which he was a professed admirer. It is this impulse probably which made him take up the *Vakroktijīvita-kāra’s* conception of a poetic figure, and apply it to his own detailed analysis of individual figures, as this part of Poetics was not sufficiently dealt with in the *Dhvanyāloka*. It can not be said¹⁶, however, that Ruyyaka was a follower of the *Vakroktijīvita-kāra*, for Ruyyaka himself declares his own adherence to the *dhvani*-theory; and, in spite of his borrowing from Udbhaṭa and Kuntala, he cannot by any means be directly affiliated with the Alaṃkāra school.

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¹⁶ as suggested by Haricand Śāstrī p. 108.

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To most of the writers who followed in the footsteps of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, there was hardly any original work that seemed left or unaccomplished. The details of the new system having already been established, there was apparently no occasion for any creative work, and even the task of critical elaboration had well-nigh run its course. Nor did any of the writers possess the genius of making an entirely new departure. This was also the period of the early Muhammadan incursions, and was marked, as was to be expected, by a general decadence of all investigations, reflecting a corresponding ebb in the tide of intellectual, as well as social and political, activity. In the centuries that follow there arose a host of commentators, Mammaṭa alone claiming more than fifty, who busied themselves in interpreting the already established rules and in adding here and there minor points of detail, not clearly made out by their predecessors. The task of remodelling and presenting the new theory in an easier style was also undertaken, giving birth to works like the *Ekāvalī* of Vidyādhara and the *Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhūṣaṇa* of Vidyānātha, the chief merit of which consisted in systematic compilation and arrangement. On the main problems, these treatises and even the later works of Jayadeva and Appayya Dīkṣita, which carry in particular the process of analysing the poetic figures to its utmost limits, throw little valuable light.

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Vidyādhara, for instance, models his text (consisting of kārikā and vrtti) on the Kāvya-prakāśa of Mammaṭa, and in the treatment of poetic figures follows Ruyyaka in the main ¹⁷. After characterising the kāvya as dhvani-pradhāna¹⁸, and setting forth its purpose as well as the qualifications necessary for the poet, he devotes the first chapter to the establishment of the dhvani or suggested sense in poetry. In this connexion, he refutes at some length the views of those schools which maintain the non-existence of dhvani or its inclusion in other processes, drawing mostly on the Dhvanyāloka and the Kāvya-prakāśa. The second chapter deals with the three functions of word and sense, viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, while the third chapter classifies the dhvani-kāvya, in which the suggested sense excels the expressed, explaining incidentally the different theories of rasa, which constitutes the province of one of the eight varieties of the imperceptible process of suggestion (asaṃlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya). The second class of poetry, the guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya, is taken up in the next chapter. The fifth chapter defines the guṇas, distinguishing them from the alaṃkāras, and concluding with the treatment of the rīti, with an incidental attack of older views and general support of Mammaṭa's position. The next chapter is concerned with the doṣas, while the last two chapters deal with the poetic figures, the śabdālaṃkāras and arthālaṃkāras respectively, adhering in general to the treatment of Ruyyaka. This brief enumeration of the contents of Vidyādhara's work will sufficiently indicate the scope and nature of these subsequent treatises, as well as the fact that they embrace the same topics as are dealt with in the Kāvya-prakāśa, even the different chapters sometimes corresponding, in regard to their subject-matter, to the different ullāsas of the latter.

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¹⁷ In this he agrees with Viśvanātha, Vidyānātha and others. See his definition of figures like vicitra, vikalpa or ullekha which are passed over by Mammaṭa.

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