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Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c86: VIII. Later Writers On Rasa

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c86

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VIII. Later Writers On Rasa

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The doctrine of *rasa*, which is advocated, if not first enunciated, by Abhinavagupta, is finally adopted by almost all writers on general Poetics who accept *rasa-dhvani* as an important element of poetry. With the exception of Viśvanātha and Keśava Miśra, they do not indeed go so far as to declare expressly with Abhinavagupta that *rasa* is the essence of poetry, but they accept in reality the suggested sense in the form of *rasa* as essentially the main element. The *rasa* is viewed as a pleasant sentiment belonging to the reader whose dormant emotions, derived from experience or inherited instincts, are evoked by the reading of poems into an ideal and impersonalised form of joy; an appreciation or enjoyment, consisting of a pleasant mental condition in which the reader identifies himself with the feelings of the hero and experiences them in a generic form, the fulness of the enjoyment depending upon the nature and experience of the particular reader. The sentiment thus evoked is essentially universal in character, and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it is not individual (even though enjoyed as an intimately personal feeling), but generic and disinterested, being such as would be common to all trained readers (*samasta-bhāvaka*- svasaṃvedya); it is therefore described as something supernormal (alaukika) and invariably pleasant, not to be compared to the normal pleasures of life which have always a reference to one’s personal relations or interests, and which may be pleasant or painful. Things, which would be called causes of an emotion in the normal sense and which may produce disgust, horror or pity in real life, awaken these feelings indeed in poetry and drama, but convey them in such an ideal and generic form that these emotions, which are far from pleasant in ordinary life, are converted into an impersonal joy, which is ineffable and indivisible. One may be moved by disgust, horror or pity and shed real tears; but the underlying sentiment is always one of exquisite joy, which must be distinguished from an ordinary feeling.

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This is the general position of all later theorists with regard to the nature and function of rasa in poetry. Dhanañjaya, for instance, gives us the same process of transformation of an ordinary emotion, which is dominant in a composition, into a poetic sentiment, as formally laid down by Bharata and interpreted by Abhinavagupta; and in this he is practically in agreement with Mammaṭa, Vidyādhara Viśvanātha and others. The dominant emotion (sthāyi-bhāva), he says, becomes a sentiment (rasa) when it is brought into a relishable condition through the co-operation of the excitants, the ensuants and the accessories (including the sāttvika bhāvas). This statement is further amplified by the assertion that the enjoyer of rasa (rasika) is the audience (sāmājika)

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on whose capacity of enjoyment it depends, and that the dominant feeling becomes a sentiment when it is so enjoyed. The *rasa*, being a mental state, a subjective experience of the reader, in which enjoyment (*āsvāda, carvaṇā, rasanā* or *bhoga*) is essential and in which the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment become identical, the reader receives the represented feeling into his own soul and thereby enjoys it¹. The locus of the *rasa* is not in the represented hero who belongs to the past; nor is it in the poem itself, the task of which is merely to exhibit the excitants etc., by which the dominant emotion is brought into expression, and the *rasa*, on its part, become revealed to the reader. Nor does the *rasa* consist of the reader's mere apprehension (*pratīti*) of the emotions exhibited in the poem or enacted by the actor; for the reader would then apprehend not the *rasa* but a feeling varying in different individuals, just as in real life the spectacle of a pair of lovers in union gives different spectators who witness it the varying emotions, according to their individual nature, of shame, envy, desire or aversion². The *vibhāvas* etc., therefore, bring the *sthāyi-bhāva* to the enjoyment of the *rasika*, the aesthetically receptive reader or spectator, and thereby convert it to *rasa*; but they must be generalised and have no specific relation to a particular individual (*parityakta-viśeṣa*). Thus the *vibhāva* Sītā, Dhanika explains, must refer to woman in general, and not to the particular individual who was the daughter of Janaka. Hence things, which are the exciting, ensuing or accessory circumstances in ordinary life, act as *vibhāvas* etc., in poetry, and generalise the dominant feeling into *rasa*. The spectator, say, of the deeds of Arjuna on the stage may be compared, therefore, to the child who, in playing with clay elephants, experiences the sensation of its own energy as pleasant. The enjoyment in the spectator’s mind is a manifestation of that joy which is innate as the blissful nature of self, a circumstance which gives us the frequent comparison of *rasāsvāda* with *brahmāsvāda*.

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¹ Cf Jacobi in *GgA*, 1913, pp. 308f.

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² These circumstances, Dhanika thinks, disprove the *vyaṅgyatva* of *rasa*. It seems that Dhanika does not accept the *vyaṅgya-vyañjaka* relation of *rasa* to poetry, but holds some views similar to the *bhāvya-bhāvaka* theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (see ed. Parab, 1917, p. 96).

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The mental activity involved in this enjoyment has got four aspects taken in connexion with the four primary sentiments of the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), the heroic (*vīra*), the horrible (*bībhatsa*) and the furious (*raudra*) admitted by Bharata ³, and consists respectively of the conditions of unfolding (*vikāsa*) expansion (*vistāra*), agitation (*kṣobha*) and distraction (*vikṣepa*). We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (along with Abhinavagupta) ⁴ speaks of the *bhoga* (or *āsvāda*) of *rasa* as involving only three mental conditions, named *vikāsa* (pervasion), *vistāra* (expansion) and *druti* (melting), which later theorists have taken⁵ as the basis and justification of the three *guṇas* of *prasāda*, *ojas* and *mādhurya* respectively. With regard to the ninth *rasa*, the quietistic, which is not mentioned by Bharata but which is acknowledged by some theorists, Dhanañjaya forbids its delineation in the drama (iv 35); for the sentiment of absolute peace is in its own nature undefinable, and consists of four states mentioned by philosophers⁶, viz., *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekṣā*, which are not realisable by the *sahṛdaya*. If it exists at all as *rasa*, it must comprehend the fourfold mental activity enunciated above, as corresponding to the fourfold states recognised by philosophers in *śama*⁷.

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³ See above p. 29. The fourfold division is probably adopted as an ostensible rationale for the doctrine of four primary and four secondary *rasa* recognised by Bharata.

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⁴ See above p. 278 fn 3.

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⁵ See above pp. 218f, 276 fn 3.

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⁶ e. g. *Yoga-sūtra* i 33.

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⁷ *na ca tathābhūtasya śānta-rasasya sahṛdayāḥ svādayitāraḥ santi, atha tad-upāyabhūto muditā-maitrī-karuṇôpekṣādi-lakṣaṇas tasya ca vikāsa-vistara-kṣobha-vikṣepa-rūpataivéti.*

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It is not necessary in this connexion to take up in detail the views of Mammaṭa, Vidyādhara and other writers, for it would be repeating substantially what has already been said regarding the final doctrine of *rasa*. Viśvanātha is the only important writer, among later theorists, who boldly accepts Abhinavagupta’s extreme view that the *rasa-dhvani* alone is the essence of poetry and builds up a system of Poetics on its basis⁸.

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⁸ See above pp. 283f. Bhānudatta, who substantially follows the doctrine of *rasa* detailed here, is however singular in his classification of some aspects of *rasa*. He speaks of *rasa* as *laukika* and *alaukika*, subdividing the latter

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Following up his own definition of poetry as "a sentence of which the soul is the *rasa*", Viśvanātha gives us an elaborate analysis of *rasa* in almost all its aspects. He sums up at the outset the characteristics of *rasa* in two verses thus : "The *rasa*, arising from an exaltation of the quality of *sattva* or goodness, indivisible, self-manifested, made up of joy and thought in their identity, free from the contact of aught else perceived, akin to the realisation of Brahma, and having for its essence supernormal wonder (*camatkāra*), is enjoyed by those competent in its inseparableness (as an object of knowledge) from the knowledge of itself". He explains *camatkāra* as consisting of an expansion of the mind and as synonymous with *vismaya*. In this connexion, Viśvanātha quotes with approval an opinion of his ancestor Nārāyaṇa who put a premium on the sentiment of the marvellous (*adbhuta rasa*) and maintained that it was essential in all *rasas*.

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into *svāpnika* (enjoyed in a dream), *mānorathika* (fanciful like a castle in the air) and *aupanāyika* (as depicted in poetry). He again gives us (ch. viii, p. 65, ed. Regnaud) a three-fold arrangement of *rasa* with reference to its manner of manifestation : (i) *abhimuka*, when it is manifested by means of the *bhāva*, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* (ii) *vimukha*, when these elements are not directly expressed; and so called because it is comprehensible with difficulty, (iii) *paramukha*, which has again two aspects according as it is (a) *alaṃkāra-mukha*, i. e. where the *alaṃkāra* is principal and the *rasa* is secondary. This includes probably the cases of figures like *rasavat*, which are included in *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya* by the *dhvani*-theorists, (b) *bhāva-mukha* where the *bhāva* is in the same way principal.

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It is also explained clearly that the *rasa* is identical with the enjoyment of itself, or, in other words, there is no distinction between the object and the operation in the apprehension of *rasa*; so that when we say ‘the *rasa* is enjoyed’, we only use a figurative expression. It follows from this that the enjoyment of *rasa* is different in its nature from the ordinary processes of knowledge.

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Viśvanātha insists very strongly on the necessity of *vāsanā* in the spectator, which consists of experience (*idānīntanī*) or instincts acquired from previous births (*prāktanī*). If one is not endowed with these germs of the capacity of appreciation, one may develop them by study of poetry and experience of life. In the case of the grammarian, the philosopher or one well-versed in the sacred lore, these susceptibilities are deadened. If it is sometimes found that an eager student of poetry is still deficient in the capacity of relishing *rasa*, we must assume that it is the result of his accumulated demerit of a previous birth. Thus Viśvanātha is anxious to show that experience and cultivation of the power of imagination are essential in one who seeks to enjoy *rasa*.

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Viśvanātha also insists that the *vibhāvas* etc., as well as the dominant feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*) must be felt as generic or impersonalised. The reader must not take the feeling as his own individual emotion; for it would then remain as his feeling (and never become *rasa*) and would sometimes (e. g., in the case of the pathetic sentiment) cause pain, and not joy. Nor should the feeling be taken as pertaining solely to the hero; for then it can not, as the feeling of another person, affect the reader and become *rasa*. It is necessary, therefore, that the excitants etc., as well as the dominant feeling, should be generalised by a generic action (*sādhāraṇī kṛti*) inherent in themselves, which corresponds to the generic power (*bhāvakatva*) postulated for poetry by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. This universalisation of the factors and the feelings enables the reader to identify himself with the personages depicted, and this conceit of community removes all difficulty about accepting extraordinary episodes of exalted personages who may be superior in virtue or prowess to the average reader. The excitants etc. are indeed normally called causes, but in reality the *rasa* is not an effect in the ordinary sense; for in the case of *rasa* there is the simultaneous presence of itself and its excitants, which is not true of an ordinary cause and effect. It is also pointed out that all the factors (*vibhāvas* etc.,) need not be present at once, for the presence of one would revive the others by the law of association of ideas. In other words, what might seem wanting in the utterance of poetry is supplied, from the suggestive character of poetry itself, by force of association of ideas. It also follows from the character of *rasa* described above that it is not necessarily found in the actor, who in assuming the rôle of the hero performs his part only mechanically by rule and rote⁹; he ranks as a spectator (and therefore as a recipient of *rasa*) in so far as he is himself a man of taste and actually experiences the feelings he enacts.

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⁹ This follows Dhanañjaya's dictum that the enjoyment of *rasa* is not precluded in the actor, if he realises in himself the feelings depicted.

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In spite of the unquestioned dominance of the Dhvani School, which no doubt recognised the importance of *rasa* but regarded it as one of the phases of the unexpressed only, one class of writers, who still adhered to *rasa* as the only element worth considering in poetry, continued to devote exclusive attention to it and build up a system, so to say, on the basis of the *rasa* alone. Of all the *rasas*, however, as *śṛṅgāra* (or love) forms the absorbing theme of Sanskrit poetry and drama in general, and as this particular poetic sentiment has an almost universal appeal, these writers naturally work out this important *rasa* in all its phases; and we have in consequence a series of erotico-rhetorical treatises, of which the earliest known and the most remarkable is Rudrabhaṭṭa’s *Śṛṅgāra-tilaka*¹⁰. Rudra states distinctly at the beginning of his work that although Bharata and others have spoken of *rasa* in the drama, his object is to apply it to the case of poetry, and that a *kāvya*, in his opinion, must possess *rasa* as its constant theme. Following upon this we have Bhoja’s *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* ¹¹, which (following the tradition of the *Agni-purāṇa*) deals with the subject in the usual elaborate cyclopaedic manner of its author, with profuse illustrations of every phase of the erotic sentiment in no less than twenty chapters. After this come innumerable works of a similar nature ¹², which take *rasa*, especially *śṛṅgāra*, as their principal theme and which were composed apparently with the object of guiding the poet in the composition of erotic pieces so popular and profuse in Sanskrit poetry. Of these, the *Bhāva-prakāśa* ¹³ of Śāradātanaya, which reproduces the substance of most of the chapters of Bhoja’s work, and the exhaustive *Rasārṇava* of Siṅga Bhūpāla, ¹⁴ a Tanjore prince of the 17th century, as well as the two well-known works of Bhānudatta ¹⁵, deserve mention. But none of these later treatises adds anything new or original to a subject already thrashed out to its utmost.

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¹⁰ The topics dealt with in its three chapters are: I. The *rasas*, the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, the *bhāvas*, the dramatic *vṛttis*, *śṛṅgāra* and its division, the Nāyaka his classification with illustrations, the assistants, the classification of the Nāyikā, II. Characteristics of love-in-separation, of *pūrvarāga*, the ten stages of love, the *upāyas*, etc. III. The other *rasas*, viz., *hāsya*, *karuṇa*, *raudra*, *vīra*, *bhayānaka*, *bībhatsa*, *adbhuta*, and *śānta*: the four *vṛttis*, appropriate to the *rasas*.

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¹¹ See Vol I, pp. 147-8.

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¹² See Vol. I, pp. 241f, and chapter on Minor Writers.

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¹³ See Vol. I, p. 242.

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¹⁴ See Vol. I. p. 243f. The three *vilāsas* of this extensive work deals with the following topics : I. The hero, his qualities, his classification, his adjuncts ; the heroine, her classification and qualities, her *sāttvika* excellences ; the *uddīpana-vibhāvas* ; the *rīti* and the *guṇas* ; the dramatic *vṛttis* ; the *sāttvika bhāvas*. II. The *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, the *anubhāvas*, the eight *sthāyi-bhāvas*, the eight *rasas*. III. The drama and its varieties, characteristics etc.

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¹⁵ The eight *taraṅgas* of *Rasa-taraṅgiṇī* are : I. Definition of *bhāva* and subdivisions thereof ; the *sthāyi-bhāvas*.

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A new turn was given to the theory by Rūpa Gosvāmin's *Ujjvala-nīla-maṇi*, which attempted to deal with *rasa* in terms of the Vaiṣṇava idea of *ujjvala* or *madhura rasa*, by which was meant the *śṛṅgāra rasa*, the term *ujjvala* having been apparently suggested by Bharata's description of that *rasa* ¹⁶. The *madhura rasa*, however, is represented not in its secular aspect but primarily as a phase of *bhakti-rasa* (*madhurākhyo bhakti-rasaḥ*, i 3); for according to Vaiṣṇava theology, there are five *rasas* forming roughly the five degrees of the realisation of *bhakti* or faith, viz., *śānta* (tranquility), *dāsya* (servitude or humility, also called *prīti*), *sakhya* (friendship or equality, also called *preyas*), *vātsalya* (parental affection) and *mādhurya* (sweetness). The last, also called the *ujjvala rasa*, being the principal, is termed *bhakti-rasa-rāṭ* ¹⁷ and constitutes the subject-matter of the present treatise.

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¹⁶ *yat kiñcil loke śuci medhyam ujjvalam darśanīyam vā tac chṛṅgāreṇopamīyate*, ed. Grosset, pp. 89-90.

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¹⁷ i 2, explained by Viśvanātha Cakravartin as *śānta*-

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II. The *vibhāvas*. III. The *anubhāvas*. IV. The eight *sāttvika bhāvas*. V. The *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* VI. The *rasas* and detailed treatment of *śṛṅgāra*. VII. The other *rasas*. VIII. The *sthāyi-bhāvajā* and *rasajā dṛṣṭi*. The *Rasa-mañjarī*, a much smaller work, devotes more than half of itself to the *nāyikā* and her companions, and applies the rest to the *śṛṅgāra-nāyaka*, his assistants, the eight *sāttvika guṇas*, the two aspects of *śṛṅgāra* and the ten stages of *vipralambha-śṛṅgāra*.

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The *kṛṣṇa-rati* or the love of Kṛṣṇa forms the dominant feeling or *sthāyi-bhāva* of this sentiment, and the recipient here is not the literary *sahṛdaya* but the *bhakta*, or the faithful¹⁸. This *sthāyi-bhāva*, known as *madhurā rati*, which is the source of the particular *rasa*, is defined in terms of the love of Kṛṣṇa¹⁹; and the nature of *nāyaka* and the *nāyikā* is defined in the same manner and their feelings and emotions illustrated by adducing examples from poems dealing with the love-stories of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. The work is, therefore, essentially a Vaiṣṇava religious treatise presented in a literary garb, taking Kṛṣṇa as the ideal hero, with the caution, however, that what is true of Kṛṣṇa as the hero does not apply to the ordinary secular hero (i 18-21)²⁰

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¹⁸ *svādyatvam hṛdi bhaktānām ūnītā śravaṇādibhiḥ | eṣā kṛṣṇa-ratiḥ sthāyī bhāvo bhakti-raso bhavet*, cited by Viśvanātha Cakravartin, p. 4.

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¹⁹ *madhurâkhyāyā rater lakṣaṇam côktam—mitho harer mṛgākṣvāś ca saṃbhogasyûdi-kāraṇam | madhurâpara-paryāyā priyatûkhyôditā ratiḥ*, ibid, loc. cit.

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²⁰ The orthodox theorists (cf Jagannātha pp. 45 f) would regard *bhakti* (which being based on *anurāga* or attachment cannot be comprehended by *śānta rasa*) as included in *bhāva*, being *devādi-viṣayā rati*, and as inadmissible as fully developed *rasa*. Cf Bhānudatta, *Rasa-taraṅgiṇī* ch. vi.

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With the exception of the *Ujjvala-nīla-maṇi*, which attempts to bring erotico-religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of *rasa*, these special-

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*prīti-preyo-vātsalyôjjvala-nāmasu mukhyeṣu.........sa evôjjvalâ-para-paryāyo bhakti-rasānāṃ rōjū madhurâkhyo rasaḥ.*

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ised treatises have, however, very little importance from the speculative point of view; and as they belong properly to the province of Erotics rather than Poetics, a treatment of them should be sought elsewhere. The simple idea, elaborated more or less in all these works, is that the awakening of *rasa* is all-important in poetry, and that the fundamental *rasa* is *śṛṅgāra* or the erotic, which is consequently treated in its various phases with copious illustrations. This is clearly expressed in the attitude of the author of *Agni-purāṇa* and of Bhoja, who accept only one poetic *rasa*, the erotic²¹. In the same way, Rudrabhaṭṭa declares *śṛṅgāro nāyako rasaḥ*, (i 20), and Bhānudatta appears to take it for granted that *śṛṅgāra* occupies an honoured place among all the *rasas* (*tatra raseṣu śṛṅgārasyābhyarhitatvena* etc, ed. Benares, p. 21).

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²¹ See Vol. I, p. 148. Cf also *Mandāra-maranda-campū* ix p. 107 (ed. Kāvyamālā).

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It is unnecessary, as it is unprofitable, in the discussion of general principles, to enter here into the elaborate definitions, distinctions and classifications of the amorous sentiment with all its varying emotional moods and situations, which these treatises industriously discuss and which have always possessed such attraction to mediaeval scholastic minds. The theorists delight in arranging into divisions and subdivisions, according to rank, character, circumstances and the like, all conceivable types of the hero, the heroine and their adjuncts, together with the different shades of their gestures and feelings, in conformity with the tradition which already obtained in the cognate sphere of dramaturgy²². Thus Rudrabhaṭṭa, after a preliminary enumeration and definition of the *rasas* and the *bhāvas*, proceeds to speak of two aspects of *śṛṅgāra* viz., *sambhoga* (love in union) and *vipralambha* (love in separation)²³, and classify the hero (*nāyaka*) into the faithful (*anukūla*), the gallant whose attention is equally divided among many (*dakṣiṇa*), the sly (*śaṭha*) and the saucy (*dhṛṣṭa*), according to his character as a lover. Later writers, however, subdivide each of these, again, into the best (*uttama*), the middling (*madhyama*) and the lowest (*adhama*), and arrange the whole classification under the fourfold division of the genus hero into four useful types (i) the brave and the high-spirited (dhīró-dātta) (ii) the brave and haughty (dhīróddhata) (iii) the brave and sportive (dhīra-lalita) and (iv) the brave and serene (dhīra-praśānta), thus giving us altogether forty-eight subdivisions of the hero²⁴. Then follows a brief description of the assistants of the hero²⁵ in matters of love (narma-saciva), viz., the Comrade (pīṭha-marda), the Companion (viṭa) and the Buffoon (vidūṣaka), some adding ceṭa (or the servant) in the enumeration.

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²² See Bharata chs. xxii-xxiv : *Daśarūpaka* iv 50f and iii.

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²³ This statement follows Bharata and is accepted by most theorists : but Dhanañjaya distinguishes three cases, privation (*ayoga*), sundering (*viprayoga*) and union (*sambhoga*) : the first denoting the inability of lovers, through obstacles, to secure union, and the second arising from absence or resentment. The first case of love may pass through the well-known ten stages (longing, anxiety, recollection, praise of the beloved, distress, raving, insanity, fever, stupor and death ; Cf *Śiṅgabhūpāla* ii 178-201) ; while the second condition may be caused by a quarrel, due to discovery or inference of unfaithfulness (which may be counteracted by six *upāyas*, viz., conciliation, winning over her friends, gifts, humility, indifference or distracting her attention) or by absence arising from business, accident or a curse.

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²⁴ The good qualities of the hero are innumerable. For his characteristics, see Dhanañjaya ii 1f; Viśvanātha iii 30f; Siṅgabhūpāla i 61f; also see Keith, Sanskrit Drama, pp. 305f.

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²⁵ The Pratināyaka or the enemy of the hero is dhīróddhata, haughtiness being his essential characteristic; but he is described also as stubborn and vicious (Daśa° ii 9; Sāhityadarpaṇa iii 130, p. 136). The pīṭhamarda of the hero possesses, in a lesser degree, the qualities of the hero (e.g. Makaranda in the Mālatī-mādhava). The term pīṭhamardikā in the feminine occurs in the Mālavikāgnimitra in the sense of a trusty go-between, applied to the nun Kauśikī. The viṭa, usually neglected in the serious drama, except in Cārudatta and Mṛcchakaṭika, appears in all his glory in the Bhāṇa, for which he is prescribed as the hero.

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In the same way, the heroine is taken broadly in threefold aspects in her relation to the hero as his wife (svīyā), or belonging to another, (parakīyā) and as common to all (sāmānyā). The svīyā is subdivided again into the adolescent and artless (mugdhā), the youthful (madhyā), and the mature and audacious (pragalbhā), i.e., the inexperienced, the partly experienced and the fully experienced. The later authors introduce greater fineness by subdividing each of these according to her temper, into the self-possessed (*dhīrā*), the not-selfpossessed (*adhīrā*), and the partially self-possessed (*dhīrādhīrā*), or according to the rank, higher (*jyeṣṭhā*) or lower (*kaniṣṭhā*), each holds in the affection of the hero. The *parakīyā* or *anyadīyā*, which, according to Vaiṣṇava ideas, is the highest type of the heroine²⁶, is twofold, according as she is maiden (*kanyā*) or married (*ūḍhā*); while the *sāmānyā* heroine, who is sometimes extolled (Rudrabhaṭṭa) and sometimes deprecated (Rudraṭa), is only of one kind, the *veśyā* or courtesan²⁷. The sixteen types of heroine thus obtained are further arranged according to an eightfold diversity in their condition or situation in relation to her lover, viz., the heroine who has the lover under absolute control (*svādhīna-patikā*), the heroine disappointed in her assignation through misadventure or involuntary absence (*utkā*), the heroine in full dress expectant of her lover (*vāsaka-sajjikā*), the heroine deceived (*vipra- *labdhā*), the heroine separated by a quarrel (*kala-hānataritā*, also called *abhisandhitā*), the heroine outraged by the discovery of marks of unfaithfulness in the lover (*khaṇḍitā*), the heroine who meets her lover in assignation²⁸ (*abhisārikā*) and the heroine pining for the absence of her lover gone abroad (*proṣita-patikā*). We arrive in this way at an elaborate classification of the heroine into three hundred and eighty-four types; and one of the later writers states characteristically that there are other types also, but they cannot be specified for fear of prolixity (Viśvanātha, iii 88, p. 120).

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²⁶ An amour with a married woman cannot, according to Rudraṭa and Rudrabhaṭṭa form the subject of dominant *rasa* in a play or poem : but this is the central theme of Vaiṣṇava lyrics.

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²⁷ Bharata xxii 197-206 : Dhanañjaya ii 21f : Viśvanātha iii 67-70 : Śiṅgabhūpāla i 121-51. Rarely a heroine, she must be represented as in love when she is a heroine : but she cannot be so when the hero is divine or royal. The exception occurs in a *prahasana* or farce (and incidentally in a *bhāṇa* or the erotic monologue) where she can be represented in her low and avaricious character for comic effect.

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²⁸ The usual meeting places are given as a ruined temple, a garden, the house of a go-between, a cemetery, the bank of a stream, or any dark place generally.

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But here the theorists do not stop. The hero is endowed further by a set of eight special excellences, as springing from his character (*sāttvika*): e.g. brilliance (*śobhā*) including heroism; cleverness, truthfulness, emulation with superiors and compassion to inferiors; vivacity (*vilāsa*) indicated by his glance, step and laughing voice; grace (*mādhurya*) displayed in placid demeanour even in trying circumstances; equanimity (*gambhīrya*) consisting in superiority to emotions; steadfastness (*sthairya*) in obtaining one's object; sense of honour (*tejas*) manifested in his impatience of insult; gallantry (*lalita*) in his word, dress or deportment; magnanimity (*audārya*) exhibited in generosity, agreeable words and equal treatment to friend or foe. The heroine is allowed a more generous set of qualities. First we have the three physical characteristics : *bhāva* or first indication of emotion in a nature previously exempt, *hāva* or movement of eyes and brows indicating the awakening of emotion, *helā* or the decided manifestation of feeling. Then we have seven inherent qualities : e. g. brilliance of youth, beauty and passion, the touch of loveliness given by love, sweetness, courage, meekness, radiance and self-control. Then are enumerated her ten graces, to which Viśvanātha adds eight more. All her gestures, moods or different shades of emotion, e g. giggling, trepidation, hysterical fluster of delight, involuntary expression of affection, self-suppression through bashfulness, affected repulse of endearments, as well as the deepest and tenderest display of sentiments, are minutely analysed and classified. To this is added a detailed description of the modes in which the different types of heroines display their affection, the maidenly modest demeanour of the *mugdhā* or the shameless boldness of the more experienced heroine. We cannot refuse to recognise the subtle power of analysis and insight which these attempts indicate ; but speaking generally, the analysis is more of the form than of the spirit, based on what we should consider accidents rather than essentials. At the same time, marked as it is by much of scholastic formalism, there is an unmistakable attempt to do justice to facts, not only as they appeared to the experience of these theorists but to the observation of general poetic usage ; and in the elaborate working out of the general thesis that the *rasa* is evolved on the basis of one or other of what they call the permanent mental moods, with the help of the various emotional adjuncts, the writers on Poetics have proceeded a long way in the careful analysis of poetic emotions, the psychology of which bears an intimate relation to their theory and in itself deserves a separate study.

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The discussion of this extensive topic of the nāyaka and nāyikā comes in topically under the theory of vibhāva and anubhāva, which act as factors of rasa. The mood, which is at the root of sentiment, is held to be the sthāyi-bhāva, the dominant feeling, the main theme of the composition in question. These feelings, according to Bharata, who is accepted on this point by all writers, can be classified into eight categories, viz., Love (rati), Mirth (hāsa), Sorrow (śoka), Anger (krodha), Energy (utsāha). Fear (bhaya), Disgust (jugupsā) and Astonishment (vismaya), though some later writers add, as we shall see, Tranquillity (śama or nirveda) to the number. These dominant feelings are worked up into a corresponding number of sentiments or rasas through the means of the vibhāvas etc²⁹. The vibhāvas or Excitants are said to be of two kinds³⁰, viz., (1) the Substantial or Essential (*ālambana*), which consists of such material

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²⁹ Theoretically the rasa is one, a single ineffable and impersonal joy, but it can be subdivided, not according to its own nature, but according to the emotions which form its basis. Bharata (ch. vi) and other theorists give a full description of the sthāyi-bhāvas, vibhāvas etc. in the

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³⁰ These two divisions of *vibhāva* are not maintained by

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case of each *rasa*, into which space forbids us to enter. A summary of it will be found in Lindenau, *Rasalehre* Leipzig 1913, pp. 18f. Thus, in the case of the heroic sentiment (*vīra*), the dominant feeling is energy (*utsāha*): the excitants (*vibhāvas*) are coolness (*asaṃmoha*), resolve (*adhyavasāya*), circumspection (*naya*), strength (*bala*) etc. ; the ensuants (*anubhāvas*) are firmness (*sthairya*), heroism (*śaurya*), sacrifice (*tyāga*) etc ; the *vyabhicārins* or accessory feelings are those of assurance, arrogance etc. Viśvanātha gives them somewhat differently. The essential excitant (*ālambana-vibhāva*) of the heroic sentiment, according to him, consists of those to be vanquished, and their acts and gestures form the enhancing excitants (*uddīpana-vibhāvas*): the ensuants comprehend the desire or seeking for assistants and adherents: while the accessory feelings are patience, intelligence, remembrance, cogitation etc. The sentiment may take three forms of courage (Bharata vi 79 = ed. Regnaud vi 80), viz., in battle (*yuddha-vīra*), in virtuous deeds (*dharma-vīra*) and in liberality (*dāna-vīra*), to which later writers (e.g. Viśvanātha) add *dayā-vīra*. It should also be noted that a special colour and a presiding deity is attributed to each *rasa*. Thus, red, black, white, dark, (*śyāma*) and grey are associated, not unreasonably, with the furious, terrible, comic, erotic and pathetic sentiments, although it is difficult to explain why horror is dark blue (*nīla*), wonder is orange, and heroism is yellow. The respective deities are Viṣṇu (erotic), Yama (pathetic), Pramatha (comic), Rudra (furious), Indra (heroic), Kāla (terrible), Mahākāla (disgustful), Brahmā (the marvellous). Viśvanātha adds that Nārāyaṇa is the presiding deity of *śānta rasa* and the colour associated is that of jasmin (*kunda*).

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and indispensable ingredients as the hero, the heroine, the rival hero and their adjuncts, and (2) the Enhancing (*uddīpana*), viz., such conditions of time, place and circumstance as serve to foster the *rasa*, e.g. the rising of the moon, the cry of the cuckoo etc. in the case of the erotic sentiment. The *anubhāvas* or the Ensuants, which follow and strengthen a mood, comprise such outward manifestations of feeling as side-long glances, a smile, a movement of the body, or such involuntary action of sympathetic realisation of the persons depicted (*sāttvika*)³¹ as fainting (*pralaya*), change of colour (*vaivarnya*), trembling (*vepathu*) etc., which are, again dogmatically classified into eight varieties. There are other feelings of a more or less transitory nature, which accompany or interrupt the permanent mood without, however, supplanting it; and these are known, as we have noted, by the name of Accessories or *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*. These are likened to the servants following a king or to the waves of the sea, whereby the dominant mood is understood as the king and the sea respectively, and classified elaborately into thirty-three categories, first mentioned by Bharata³² and implicitly accepted by his followers.

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³¹ See above p. 31, fn 53. The *sāttvika bhāvas* in later works form a special class of *anubhāvas*.

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³² See above p. 30.

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All these elements contribute towards developing the eight or nine *sthāyi-bhāvas* into eight or nine different types of *rasa*. We have the earliest and Bharata but distinguished by Dhanañjaya (iv 2) and traditionally handed down by Viśvanātha.

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the most orthodox mention in Bharata of eight *sthāyi-bhāvas* and the resulting eight *rasas* corresponding to them, of which the Erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), the Heroic (*vīra*), the Furious (*raudra*) and the Disgustful (*bībhatsa*) are the main, leading to four others, the Comic (*hāsya*), the Marvellous (*adbhuta*) the Pathetic (*karuṇa*) and the Terrible (*bhayānaka*). Daṇḍin accepts this classification (ii 280-87), but Udbhaṭa (iv 49) adds ³³ the Quietistic (*śānta*) as the ninth *rasa*, although Bharata neither defines it nor mentions its corresponding *vibhāvas*. Rudraṭa is singular in postulating a tenth *rasa*, called the Agreeable (*preyas*), which is accepted by Bhoja and others. Rudrabhaṭṭa admits nine *rasas* in poetry; so do Hemacandra and the two Vāgbhaṭas. The *Agni-purāṇa* in the same way mentions nine *rasas*, (and eight *sthāyi-bhāvas*), but follows Bharata in regarding four as principal and lays special stress on the *śṛṅgāra*. Those later authors who accept the ninth *rasa*, the Quietistic, necessarily postulate *nirveda* or self-disparagement, arising out of the knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna*), as its *sthāyi-bhāva*, which is called by some authorities *śama*, or repose resulting from freedom from mental excitement³⁴.

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³³ if the verse is genuinely Udbhaṭa's. See above p. 143, fn 13.

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³⁴ This sentiment is also closely related to the sentiment of disgust; for it arises from an aversion to worldly things.

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The author of the *Daśarūpaka*, however, contends that there can be no such *sthāyi-bhāva* as *nirveda* or *śama*, for the development of that state (if it is at all possible to destroy utterly love, hatred and other human feelings) would tend to the absence of all moods; and in the drama, the object of which is to delineate and inspire passion, it is inadmissible. Others, again, hold that the Quietistic *rasa* does exist, as it is experienced by those who have attained that blissful state, but it has no *sthāyi-bhāva* in dramatic composition; for *nirveda*, being the cessation of all worldly activity, or *śama* being freedom from all mental excitement, it is not fit to be represented. Hence Mammaṭa takes eight *rasas* in the drama (p. 98) and nine in poetry (p. 117). Bhoja, in accordance with the views of the school which lays special emphasis on the *śṛṅgāra*, accepts only one *rasa*, the Erotic, in his *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*; and although he mentions as many as ten *rasas* in his cyclopaedic *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, including the *śānta* and the *preyas*, he appears to devote almost exclusive attention to the *śṛṅgāra* in his treatment of the *rasas* in this work. The views about the admissibility of the *śānta* are discussed by the author of the *Ekāvalī* (pp. 96-7) who maintains that Bharata has mentioned *nirveda* as a *vyabhicāri-bhāva* immediately in context after the enumeration of the *sthāyi-bhāvas* and at the beginning of the list of the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*; and this fact is interpreted as indicating that the sage meant it both as a *sthāyi-bhāva* and as a *vyabhicāri-bhāva*; but Hemacandra (p. 81) anticipates and rejects this quibble of verbal interpretation, though agreeing with him in the general proposition as to the admissibility of *śānta* as the ninth *rasa*.

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Viśvanātha primarily admits eight orthodox *rasas* (iii. p. 160) but adds the ninth *śānta* in deference to the views of these authorities, and a tenth *rasa*, called *vatsala* or parental affection, subscribing apparently to Vaiṣṇava ideas (pp. 185-6)³⁵. He quotes a verse to explain that the mood, called by the great sages the Quietistic, which has, among all sentiments, tranquillity (*śama*) as its basis, is that state in which there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor hatred, nor affection, nor any desire³⁶. But the question arises how can the Quietistic, being of the nature described, arising only in a state of emancipation wherein there is an absence of all feelings like the Accessories etc., be *rasa*, which implies a state of relishable enjoyment³⁷. To this objection he replies that the Quietistic is a *rasa* because in that state the soul is only about to be emancipated (*yukta-viyukta-daśā*) and is not completely absorbed in the Divine, so that the presence of feelings, like the Accessories etc. in it, is not incompatible. As for the statement that there is an absence of even pleasure in it, it is not contradictory, for it refers only to worldly pleasure³⁸. Jagannātha, the latest authority on the subject, advocates nine rasas and maintains (pp. 29-30) that like all other rasas, the śānta is capable of being represented and appreciated by the audience. Since the clever performance of the actor, representing such a state of mind, free from disturbance and not affected by passions or desire, is found in actual experience to produce an impression on the mind of the audience, it is their state of mind, exhibited by their silent and rapt attention, which ought to settle the question. The representation of absolute indifference or the actor's power of representing it is not the point in issue : it is the capacity of the spectator who actually feels the sentiment. Jagannātha also adds that even those, who do not admit this rasa in the drama, should accept it in poetry from the fact that poems like the Mahābhārata have for principal theme the delineation of śānta rasa, which is thus established by universal experience (akhila-lokānubhava-siddhatvāt). Nāgeśa remarks on this that the śānta rasa should also be admitted in the drama on this ground, inasmuch as the Prabodha-candródaya is universally acknowledged as a drama (p. 30).

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³⁵ Bhānudatta counts (*Rasa-taraṅgiṇī*) *māyā* under the *rasas*. Rudraṭa mentioned *preyas* (friendship), which *rasa* is accepted by Bhoja. Some writers add *śraddhā*, along with *bhakti*. See Bhānudatta, *op. cit.* p. 56, ll. 25f (ed. Regnaud). Śiṅgabhūpāla admits only eight *rasas*, but his treatment is from the standpoint of dramaturgy.

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³⁶ *na yatra duḥkham na sukham na cintā, na dveṣa-rāgau na ca kācid icchā | rasaḥ sa śāntaḥ kathito munīndraiḥ, sarveṣu bhāveṣu śama-pradhānaḥ ||*, cited also in *Daśa°* iv 49 (comm).

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³⁷ *ityevam-rūpasya śāntasya mokṣūvasthāyām evātma-svarūpāpatti-lakṣaṇāyām prādurbhūtatvāt tatra sañcāry-ādīnām abhāvāt katham rasatvam.*

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³⁸ yaś cāsmin sukhābhāvo'pyuktas tasya vaiṣayika-sukha-paratvān na virodhaḥ.

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Coming to the essential basis of rasa, viz. the bhāva, we have seen that Bharata defines it in general terms as that which manifests the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, *vācika*, *āngika* and *sāttvika*³⁹; it is the emotion which ultimately becomes a sentiment, if it is dominant, and therefore, serves as the basis of *rasa*. But later authorities arrive at a greater precision and apply the term technically to those cases where there is no proper or complete development of *rasa*. Both Dhanañjaya and Bhānudatta expand the definition of Bharata, the latter defining it as a deviation from the natural mental state (*vikāra*) which is favourable to the development of *rasa* (*rasānukūla*) and which may be either physical (*śārīra*) or mental (*āntara*); but Mammaṭa fixes the conception as *ratir devādi-viṣayā vyabhicārī tathāñjitaḥ* (‘love having for its object a deity or the like, and also the suggested Accessory’), on which he adds the gloss *ādi-śabdān muni-guru-nṛpa-putrādi-viṣayaḥ, kāntā-viṣayā tu vyaktā śṛṅgāraḥ* (‘by the term the like are meant sages, preceptor, the king, son etc., the one having a beloved woman for its object becomes the erotic’). Govinda explains that the word *rati* here implies the *sthāyi-bhāva* which has not attained to the state of *rasa*⁴⁰. What is meant is that when the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, like *rati*, have for their objects God, king, son and the like, or when the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* are manifested as the principal sentiment in a composition, there is no *rasa* but *bhāva*; and this definition is accepted by all writers after him.

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³⁹ A fourth kind of *abhinaya* is sometimes added, viz., *āhārya* (extraneous) i.e. derived from dress, decoration etc.

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⁴⁰ *ratir iti sthāyi-bhāvōpalakṣaṇam, devādi-viṣayēty-apy-aprāpta-rasāvasthōpalakṣaṇam*, p. 206.

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Thus Viśvanātha explains the *bhāva* as follows : *sañcāriṇaḥ pradhānāni, devādi-viṣayā ratiḥ |* *udbuddha-mātraḥ sthāyī ca, bhāva ity-abhidhīyate ||* In other words, when the Accessories are principal, or when love etc., has a deity or the like for its object, or when a dominant feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*) is merely awakened, we have *bhāva*. His own gloss upon the above verse explains it in this way. Although they are always concomitants of *rasa* in which they finally rest, such Accessories as are for the time being principally developed, like a servant for the time being followed by his king in his marriage procession ; or love etc. having a deity, a sage, a spiritual guide, a king and the like for its object ; or such *sthāyi-bhāvas* as are merely awakened or have not attained the state of a *rasa* from their not being fully developed, are denoted by the term *bhāva*. In all these cases apparently there is no complete or proper development of *rasa*; and a *bhāva*, therefore, in later terminology, may be generally described as an incomplete *rasa*. But this must be distinguished from the *rasābhāsa* or semblance of *rasa* and the analogous *bhāvābhāsa*, which occur when the poetic sentiments and emotions are falsely attributed (e.g. sentiment in animals such as described in *Kumāra-sambhava*, III. 36-7), or when they are brought out improperly, i.e. when there is a lack of entireness in them as regards their ingredients ⁴¹. The cases occur, according to Bhoja (v 20), when the mood or emotion is developed in an inferior character (*hīna-pātru*), in animals (*tiryak*), in the rival hero (*nāyaka-pratiyogin*) or in any other subordinate object (*gauṇa padārtha*) 42, but Viśvanātha elaborately summarises various other cases (iii 263-66), especially noting improprieties in connexion with particular *rasas*. Thus there is an impropriety if the Terrible (*bhayānaka*) is made to reside in a noble personage, or the Comic (*hāsya*) in a spiritual guide. It must be noted, as Jagan-nātha explains, that if a mood or feeling is developed by impropriety, the impropriety, unless it acts as a bar, does not constitute a fault 43.

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⁴¹ *anaucitya-pravṛttatve ābhāso rasa-bhāvayoḥ*, explained as *anaucityam cātra rasānām bharatādi-praṇīta-lakṣaṇānām sāmagrī-rahitatve tveka-deśa-yogitvôpalakṣaṇa-param bodhyam*.

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In the same way, (1) when there is an excitement only of sentiments, (2) when two opposing sentiments, striving for mastery, are represented as being relished in one and the same place and at the same time, or (3) when a number of sentiments, of which each succeeding one puts down the preceding, they constitute respectively *bhāvōdaya*, *bhāva-saṃdhi* and *bhāva-śabalatā*. Now, all these phases of the sentiments are taken as *rasa* topically, inasmuch as they are capable of being tasted (*sarve'pi rasanād rasāḥ*). These cases do not seem to have been formally recognised by Bharata, though hinted at by him in vi 40, as we learn from Abhinava's commentary on ch. vi, which is partially

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42 Śiṅgabhūpāla (pp. 141-2) distinguishes two cases (i) where *rasa* is ascribed to an inanimate object and (ii) where it is developed in an inferior character or in animals.

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43 *yāvatā tvanaucityena rasasya puṣṭis tāvat tu na vāryate, rasa-pratikūlasyaiva tasya niṣedhatvāt.*

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reproduced also in his *Locana*, p. 66. They are first met with in Udbhaṭa, who includes them under *ūrjasvin* (iv 6); but in Rudraṭa (xii 4) and the Dhvanikāra (ii 3) we find them definitely established.

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This incomplete development of *rasa* and its subordination must be distinguished from the cases of the opposition (*virodha*) of simultaneously existing sentiments in the same theme. It is laid down formally that some *rasas* are intrinsically inconsistent with one another, e.g., the Erotic is opposed to the Disgustful, the Heroic to the Quietistic, and so forth⁴⁴. The incongruity or opposition results in three ways, viz., (1) from identity of the exciting cause (*ālambana-vibhāva*) (2) from the identity of the subject of emotion and (3) from immediacy of succession. The incongruity in the first two cases may be removed by representing the sentiments as having different exciting causes respectively, or as existing in different subjects (e.g. in the hero and the rival hero). The last case of conflict may be removed by placing, between the two immediately succeeding sentiments, a sentiment which is not opposed to them. These are cases where two or more *rasas* stand in the relation of principal and subordinate; the term ‘subordinate’ being misleading, it is sometimes called a concomitant *rasa* (*sañcārin*), which implies that it cannot terminate absolutely in itself and at the same time is distinct from a fully developed *rasa*, as well as from a mere undeveloped *bhāva*⁴⁵. There is also no incongruity where a conflicting *rasa* is recalled or described under a comparison. All these questions properly come under the theory of propriety or *aucitya* in relation to *rasa*, elaborated by Ānandavardhana and his followers, and is ultimately based on the dictum attributed to the *Dhvanikāra* (p. 145, cf *Locana* p. 138), which lays down in general terms that the secret of *rasa* lies in conforming to the established rules of propriety.

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⁴⁴ Some *rasas* again are mutually consistent, e.g. *karuṇa* and *bībhatsa* go with *vīra*; *śṛṅgāra* goes with *hāsya* (cf Bharata vi 40) etc. On this question see Lindenau, *Rasalehre* (pp. 71f.) According to Viśvanātha, the *rasas* hostile (i) to *śṛṅgāra* are *karuṇa*, *bībhatsa*, *raudra*, *vīra* and *bhayānaka* (ii) to *hāsya*—*bhayānaka* and *karuṇa* (iii) to *karuṇa*—*hāsya*, and *śṛṅgāra* (iv) to *raudra*—*hāsya*, *śṛṅgāra* and *bhayānaka* (v) to *vīra*—*bhayānaka* and *śānta* (vi) to *bhayānaka*—*śṛṅgāra*, *vīra*, *raudra*, *hāsya* and *śānta* (vii) to *śānta*—*vīra*, *śṛṅgāra*, *raudra*, *hāsya*, and *bhayānaka* (viii) to *bībhatsa*—*śṛṅgāra*. Bhānudatta gives the antagonistic *rasas* as follow: *śṛṅgāra*→*bībhatsa*; *vīra*→*bhayānaka*; *raudra*→*adbhuta*; *hāsya*→*karuṇa*.

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⁴⁵ *ata evātra pradhānētareṣu raseṣu svātantrya-viśrāma-rāhityāt, pūrṇarasa-bhāva-mātrāc ca vilakṣaṇatayā, sañcāri-rasa-nāmnā vyapadeśaḥ prācyānām*, Viśvanātha. p. 420.

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The doctrine of the *Dhvanyāloka* that in a composition in which the sentiment is awakened, proprieties of various kinds (e.g. with reference to the speaker, the theme, the employment of the *vibhāvas* etc., the use of the *alaṃkāras* and other elements, pp. 134f, 144f ) should be observed, and that certain items of conflict (*virodha*) with the dominant sentiment should be avoided, gave rise to a theory of propriety, which is generally comprehended by later writers under the discussion of the *doṣas* of *rasa*. Thus, in later treatises, the *rasa-doṣas* occupy a separate and important place, in addition to the conventional doṣas of pada-, padārtha-, vākya-, vākyārtha-doṣas recognised since Vāmana’s time. It is Kṣemendra alone who emphasises the importance of the subject by making it the theme of his well known Aucitya-vicāra-carcā which will be noticed in its proper place. Mahimabhatta, in the second chapter of his work, considers the question of anaucitya in some detail. According to him, impropriety or incongruity has two aspects, according as it refers to śabda or to artha respectively. Then he speaks of propriety as external (bahiraṅga) or internal (antaraṅga), apparently as it is śabda-viṣaya or artha-viṣaya. The cases of internal propriety, which consists in the proper employment of the vibhāvas etc., have already been explained by previous writers (e.g. the Dhvanyāloka pp. 144f); Mahimabhatta, therefore, takes up the question of external propriety, which he thinks falls under five faults of composition, viz., vidheyā-vimarśa (non-discrimination of the predicate), prakrama-bheda (violation of uniformity in the expression), krama-bheda (syntactical irregularity), paunaruktya (tautology) and vācyāvacana (omission of what must be expressed), to the explanation and exemplification of which he devotes, amidst several digressions, the rest of the chapter. It is difficult to say why these faults of expression alone are singled out as defects resulting in a violation of rasa (rasa-bhaṅga). Later writers would include them under general defects, reserving the cases of virodha or opposition of rasas as specific instances of rasa-doṣas.

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