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A History of Sanskrit Literature c33: XXV. Philosophy

A History of Sanskrit Literature c33

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English

Contents

XXV. Philosophy

1. The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy

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THE religious and philosophical spirit of India which appears already in marked development in the *Ṛgveda* found its most brilliant literary exposition in the Upaniṣads, but with them we are still distinctly before the time of formal systematization. On the other hand, we find at an unknown date Indian philosophy, so far as it is orthodox, framed in a number of Sūtras for which great antiquity is asserted by the schools, while the Jains and Buddhists alike assert the same of their texts, and even the materialists ascribe their doctrines to a mythical Bṛhaspati. These claims to antiquity we may justly dismiss, and assume that after the period of the Upaniṣads dates the time when ideas of earlier thinkers were gradually taken up and made into a definite system, Darçana,¹ taught in a philosophic school in the sense of a series of teachers who developed or at least expounded one definite body of doctrine. After this development had been in existence for some time, there ultimately came the desire to fix in definitive form the doctrines of the school, and this led to the composition of the Sūtras. These texts are based on the principle of short catchwords which must from the first have been accompanied by verbal expositions. These are naturally lost, and it appears clear that it was only in each case at some considerable distance after the Sūtra had been produced that the need of writing down a comment was devised. Our oldest surviving commentaries contain abundant signs that they do not represent an unbroken tradition, sure of itself, from the first teacher. Later we find independent works of the several schools, but these recognize the authority of the Sūtras, and make it clear that it was held that in them lay the essential doctrines of the school, which might be expanded and expounded but were not to be contradicted.

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¹ The term occurs in *Vaiçeṣika Sūtra*, ix. 2. 13 and the late epic.

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The Sūtras themselves were redacted at a time when the schools had been in contact, and for that reason we have no real chance of determining their dates even relatively, for it seems as if those of the Pūrvamīmāṅsā, the Vedānta, the Nyāya, and Vaiçeṣika cannot have been composed as they stand at any very great distance of time from one another. The investigations of Jacobi¹ resulted in the belief that the *Nyāya* and *Brahma Sūtras* were composed after the nihilistic school of Buddhism but before the appearance of the Vijñānavādin idealism, say between A. D. 200 and 450, while the *Pūrvamīmāṅsā* and *Vaiçeṣika* might be a little older. The *Yoga Sūtra*, on the other hand, he assigned to the period after the Vijñānavāda school and the *Sāṁkhya* to a late date. The last result is clearly sound, but the Vijñānavāda is dated too late, and must fall in the fourth century at latest, while the nihilistic school is also probably postdated by a century. Jacobi² also deduces from the mention in the *Arthaçāstra* under the style of Ānvīkṣikī of Lokāyata, Sāṁkhya and Yoga only, that these three branches of philosophy had definitely developed by 300 B. C., but not the others. This view, however, must be wrong, since the *Arthaçāstra*, as we have seen, is much later than the period proposed, and its groupings of philosophy must be explained by the tenets of that school. We must content ourselves with the belief that between the dates of the chief Upaniṣads and the third or fourth century A. D. there proceeded an active stream of investigation which we have only in its final form.

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¹ JAOS. xxxi. 1 ff.; DLZ. 1922, p. 270. Dasgupta (*Indian Phil.* i. 370, 418 f., 280) puts the dates far too high, as does V. G. Paranjpe, *Le Vârtika du Kâtyâyana*, pp. 76 ff., who argues on the basis of styles, which involves the assumption that style in grammatical and philosophic texts is strictly comparable. The dates of the early forms of the Sūtras is another question which is unanswerable.

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² SBA. 1911, pp. 732 ff.

2. The Pūrvamīmāṅsā

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Among the schools, Darçanas, the Pūrvamīmāṅsā can claim on the score of its character considerable age. Performers of Vedic rites found themselves in need of rules of interpretation, Nyāyas, to guide them through the maze of texts, and the *Āpastambīya Dharmasūtra*³ already refers to those who know Nyāyas. The Sūtra of the school essentially aims at laying down principles regarding interpretation of texts in their connexion with carrying out the sacrificial ritual; man's duty is the performance of sacrifice in due manner, and the Veda is the one authority. The relation of sound and meaning is thus a relevant problem, as is that of the personal existence of gods, but deeper philosophic issues were introduced only by the commentators who developed true systems of philosophy. The Sūtra, however, develops a method which is common to Indian science generally, and which was adopted by the writers on law; the subject is posed, the doubt is raised; the prima facie view is set out; then the correct decision is developed, and the matter brought into connexion with other relevant doctrines. From Medhātithi onwards use is made of Mīmāṅsā principles in deciding legal difficulties, such as arose from the recognition in the law schools of many conflicting texts as all having authority, just as the Vedic texts before the compilers of the Mīmāṅsā presented innumerable incongruities.

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³ ii. 4. 8. 13; 6. 14. 3.

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The twelve books of Sūtras¹ give often the impression of not very effective compilation. They were commented on by Upavarṣa and later by Çabarasvāmin, both of whom wrote also on the *Brahma Sūtra* of the Vedānta. Jacobi holds that from the first the Pūrvamīmāṅsā and the Vedānta, or Uttaramīmāṅsā were one school, and that it was only later through Kumārila and Çaṅkara that they were differentiated. This, of course, would give the Pūrvamīmāṅsā a very different aspect, as merely a part of a philosophy, not the whole, but the contention seems dubious, and the syncretism of the systems seems rather to be due to the commentators. Çabarasvāmin seems to have known the nihilistic school of Buddhism, perhaps also the idealistic, and he has a definite theory² of the soul which seems to regard it as produced from the absolute Brahman, but as thereafter existing independently for ever, a view which recurs in Rāmānuja; that this is really the doctrine of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* ascribed to Yājnavalkya must be emphatically denied.

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¹ Ed. BI. 1873 ff.; trans. by Gaṅgānāth Jhā, SBH. 10, 1910. See Keith, *The Karma-Mīmāṁsā* (1921); K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, IA. l. 211 ff., 340 ff.

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² Jacobi, *Festschrift Windisch*, pp. 153 ff.

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On the Bhāṣya of Çabarasvāmin we have two different systems founded, one by Prabhākara (*c.* 600) in his *Bṛhatī*,³ great (commentary), the other by Kumārila who wrote perhaps about 700. His comment¹ falls into three parts, the *Çlokavārttika* on i. i, of the Sūtra, *Tantravārttika* on i. 2–iii, and *Ṭupṭīkā* on iv–xii. Kumārila is traditionally made out to have instigated persecution of the Buddhists, but the justification for this view seems merely to have been his bitterness against them as the chief enemies of the Veda. He derides the doctrine of the Buddha as omniscient, which none of his contemporaries was competent to know, derides also the followers of the Buddha, and declares empirical means of knowledge worthless; if right be judged by causing pleasure to others, then the violation of the chastity of the wife of the teacher as giving her pleasure would be right instead of a heinous crime. Kumārila was a native of southern India, who reveals his knowledge of Dravidian languages, and recommends that borrowed words should be given Sanskrit terminations; he refers both to literature and to current practices, and his ingenuity is very considerable. His differences in philosophy from Prabhākara are considerable, but both agree with Çabarasvāmin in holding that the individual soul in some sense is immortal; both again do not accept the doctrine of illusion. A pupil of Kumārila, on one theory, of Çaṅkara on another, was Maṇḍana Miçra who wrote a *Mīmāṅsānukramaṇī* and a *Vidhiviveka*;² on the latter Vācaspati Miçra (*c.* 850) writes a comment, the *Nyāyakaṇikā*; he also set forth Kumārila’s views in his *Tattvabindu*.³ Of late works the *Nyāyamālāvistara*⁴ of Mādhava (14th cent.), the *Mīmāṅsānyāyaprakāça*⁵ of Āpadeva, and the *Arthasaṁgraha*⁶ of Laugākṣi Bhāskara are best known, but of more philosophic interest is Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa’s *Mānameyodaya*⁷ (*c.* 1600) in which Kumārila’s epistemology and metaphysics are interestingly summarized.

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³ Trans. G. Jhā, IT. ii and iii.

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¹ Ed. ChSS. 1898–9; BenSS. 1890, 1903; trans. G. Jhā, BI. 1900 ff.

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² Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. xxv–xxviii. His identity with Sureçvara is traditional, and is not disproved by Hiriyanna, JRAS. 1924, p. 96.

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³ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. xiv.

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⁴ Ed. London, 1878.

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⁵ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. xxvi, xxvii.

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⁶ Ed. BenSS. 1882.

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⁷ Ed. TSS. 19, 1912.

3. The Vedānta

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While the Pūrvamīmāṅsā represents a very primitive need involving no great philosophical skill, the Uttaramīmāṅsā or Vedānta school represents a definite gathering up of the philosophical doctrines of the Upaniṣads in an attempt to frame a system which will embrace them all. The contemporaneity of redaction of the Sūtras is suggested by the fact that while the *Pūrvamīmāṅsā* mentions Ātreya, Bādari, and Bādarāyaṇa, the *Brahma*,¹ also called *Vedānta*, *Uttaramīmāṅsā*, or *Çārīraka-mīmāṅsā*, *Sūtra* cites frequently Jaimini, as well as Ātreya, Āçmarathya, Auḍulomi, Kāçakṛtsna, Kārṣṇājini, and Bādarāyaṇa himself, an indication, as in the case of the *Pūrvamīmāṅsā Sūtra*, that the works were produced not by Bādarāyaṇa or Jaimini² themselves, but by schools expressing their views. The *Brahma Sūtra* deliberately leaves out points on which the Pūrvamīmāṅsā has sufficient matter, and it may be the case that the school regarded themselves as entitled to adopt what they wished of the Pūrvamīmāṅsa, while carrying the philosophical doctrine much further, and rejecting those views of Jaimini which they disliked.

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¹ The apparent reference in the *Bhagavadgītā* (xiii. 4) is doubtless an interpolation.

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² K. A. Nilakantha's effort (IA. l. 167 ff.) to distinguish various Jaimini's and Bādarāyaṇa's, is thus rather misplaced.

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The doctrine of Bādarāyaṇa evidently directed itself strongly against the Sāṁkhya system and the atomism of the Vaiçeṣikas, but its miserable presentation in catchwords leaves us guessing at its meaning. What does seem clear is that Bādarāyaṇa was not a believer in the illusion doctrine of Çaṅkara's school, that he held that individual souls, if derived from the absolute, remained distinct from it and real, and that matter derived also from the absolute had a distinct reality of its own. But this, though probable, cannot be proved because we cannot now recover the verbal explanations which originally accompanied the text, but which were never written down, and so permitted the rise of different interpretations.

(a) The Doctrine of Nonduality and Illusion

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Of these interpretations the most interesting is that which holds that all reality, as we know it, is a mere illusion. This view is preserved for us in a definite shape in the *Gauḍapādīya Kārikās*,³ 215 memorial verses written by Gauḍapāda, whom tradition makes out to be the teacher of Govinda, teacher of Çaṅkara, and therefore of *c.* 700 A.D. There is no doubt that this work, of which the first part deals with the short *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, is strongly influenced by the nihilistic school of Buddhism. It shares with it a rich store of metaphors and similes, designed to make plausible the doctrine of illusion, such as the phenomena of dreams, the Fata Morgana, the rope mistaken in the dark for a stick, nacre mistaken for silver, the reflection in the mirror. In its last section, the Alātaçānti, it adds the brilliant picture of the circle of sparks which a boy makes when he swings a torch without altering the glowing end of the torch, giving a parallel to the manifestation of unreal phenomena from the real absolute. The idea is found in the Buddhist *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad*, but we need not accept the theory that in this doctrine of illusion we have a borrowing from the Buddhists. The idea is suggested strongly in certain passages of the Upaniṣads; it was probably developed by an Aupaniṣada school, affected the growth of Buddhism, and in turn was affected by the brilliant if rather wasted dialectic of Nāgārjuna. Gauḍapāda's existence has indeed been questioned and his Kārikās made out to be those of north-west Bengal (Gauḍapāda), the work being placed before the Sūtra, but this is clearly untenable.¹

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³ Ed. ĀnSS. 10, 1911; trans. P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, pp. 537ff. Cp. Vidhusekhara Bhattacarya, IHQ. i. 119 ff., 295 ff., who contends that the *Upaniṣad is based on the Kārikās*. For the school see M. Sarkar, *System of Vedantic Thought and Culture*; Hiriyanna, POCM. 1924, pp. 439 ff., on Bhartṛ-Prapañca.

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¹ M. Walleser, *Der ältere Vedānta* (1910).

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The full defence and exposition of the illusion theory with its insistence on Advaita, absence of any duality, is due to Çaṅkara, who may have been born in 788 and may have died or become a Sannyāsin in 820, and who, at any rate, worked *c.* A. D. 800. The biographies alleged, absurdly, to be by Ānandagiri, his pupil, the *Çaṅkaravijaya*,² and Mādhava's *Çaṅkaradigvijaya*³ are worthless, and many works attributed to him are probably not his. But many commentaries on the Upaniṣads, one on the *Bhagavadgītā*,⁴ and the *Bhāṣya*⁵ on the *Brahma Sūtra* are genuine, nor need we doubt the ascription of the *Upadeçasāhasrī*,⁶ three chapters in prose and nineteen in verse, or various shorter works, including lyrics of considerable power and the *Ātmabodha*⁷ in sixty-seven stanzas with commentary. Philosophically, Çañkara is remarkably ingenious in his key to the Upaniṣads, the finding of a higher and a lower knowledge, which similarly allows him to conform to the whole apparatus of Hindu belief on the lower plane, while on the higher he finds no true reality in anything; his logic, it has well been said, starts by denying the truth of the proposition A is either B or not B. His dialectical skill is very great, and, though he doubtless misrepresents Bādarāyaṇa, he does more justice to the Upaniṣads in so far at least as they seem to consider that at death the soul when released is merged in the absolute and does not continue to be distinct from it. In style Çañkara's *Bhāṣya* is unquestionably far advanced from the dialogue tone of the *Mahābhāṣya* or the *Bhāṣyas* of Vātsyāyana or Çabarasvāmin. It has taken on the style of a lecture, with longer sentences, longer and more compounds, more involved constructions, fewer verbal and more nominal forms. But it is still far removed from the formalism of the later philosophical texts, and the author is not unwilling to show his command over the more difficult and unusual grammatical usages.

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² Ed. BI. 1864-8.

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³ Ed. ĀnSS. 22.

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⁴ B. Faddegon, *Çamkara's Gītābhāṣya* (1906).

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⁵ Ed. ĀnSS. 21; trans. G. Thibaut, SBE. xxxiv and xxxviii; cf. Kokileswar Sastri, *Advaita Philosophy* (1924); ii. 1 and 2 ed. and trans. Belvalkar, Poona, 1923.

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⁶ Ed. *Pandit*, iii-v.

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⁷ Ed. Hall, Mirzapore, 1852.

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Çañkara is credited with the authorship of the text or a comment on the *Hastāmalaka*¹ which in fourteen verses plays on the refrain which asserts that the self as the form of eternal apprehension is all in all. To pupils of his are attributed expositions of his system; thus Padmapāda wrote the *Pañcapādikā*² on the first five books, and was commented on by Prakāçātman; Sureçvara wrote in prose and memorial verses the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*³ to prove that knowledge alone achieves release, and a paraphrase, the *Mānasollāsa*,⁴ of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* of his master. His pupil Sarvajñātman wrote the *Saṁkṣepaçārīraka*,⁵ a summary of the *Bhāṣya*, while *c.* 850 Vācaspati Miçra wrote the *Bhāmatī*,⁶ which is invaluable for its knowledge of Buddhist views *inter alia*. Mādhava again in his *Pañcadaçī*,⁷ written in part with Bhāratītīrtha, and *Jīvanmuktiviveka*⁸ definitely supports Çaṅkara's views. From a different standpoint Çrīharṣa, the poet, in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*,¹ sought, by proving all other views to be contradictory, to establish that all knowledge is vain and that the doctrine of Çaṅkara is therefore unassailable. Other treatises are innumerable, especially in the later Middle Ages, but the *Vedāntasāra*² of Sadānanda (*c.* 1500) is of importance because it shows the elaborate confusion of Sāṁkhya tenets with the Vedānta to form a complex and ingenious but quite unphilosophical whole. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*³ of Dharmarāja is well known as a manual of the modern school.

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¹ Ed. and trans. IA. ix. 25 ff.

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² Ed. VizSS. 2, 1891–2.

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³ Ed. BSS. 38, 1891; 2nd ed. by Hiriyanna, 1925.

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⁴ Cf. JPASB. 1908, pp. 97 f.

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⁵ Bhandarkar, *Report*, 1882–3, pp. 14 f., 202.

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⁶ Ed. BI. 1876–80.

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⁷ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. v, vi, and viii.

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⁸ Ed. ĀnSS. 20, 1889.

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¹ Trans. IT. i-v.

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² Trans. G. A. Jacob, London, 1904.

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³ Ed. and trans. A. Venis, *Pandit*, N.S. iv-vii.

(b) Rāmānuja

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A very different view of the Upaniṣads and Sūtra is presented by Rāmānuja, who died about 1137. Son of Keçava and Kāntimatī, he studied at Kāñcī under the Advaita philosopher Yādavaprakāça, but abandoned his teaching for that of Yāmuna whom he succeeded as head of a Vaiṣṇava sect, and at whose request he wrote his *Çrībhāṣya*⁴ on the *Brahma Sūtra*. Among other works he wrote a *Gītābhāṣya*,⁵ attacked in the *Vedārthasaṁgraha*⁶ the illusion theory, summarized his *Bhāṣya* in the *Vedāntadīpa*⁷ and gave a convenient summary of his doctrine in the *Vedāntasāra*. His views were defended against those of Çaṅkara in the *Vedāntatattvasāra*⁸ of Sudarçana Sūri, and expounded in the *Yatīndramatadīpikā*⁹ of Çrīnivāsa. Rāmānuja claims to represent a long tradition, citing the Vākyakāra, the Vṛttikāra Bodhāyana, and Dramiḍācārya, who was known to Çaṅkara, and he relies on the *Çāṇḍilya Sūtra* as revealing the true doctrine of the Sūtra. In essentials he differs from Çaṅkara; if in a sense there is an absolute whence all is derived, the individual souls and matter still have a reality of their own, and the end of life is not merger in the absolute but continued blissful existence. This state is to be won by Bhakti, faith in and devotion to God. His view of matter permits him to adopt largely the Sāṁkhya principles.¹

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⁴ Ed. BI. 1888 ff.; trans. G. Thibaut, SBE. xlviii; cf. xxxiv.

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⁵ Ed. Bombay, 1893.

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⁶ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. xv-xvii.

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⁷ Ed. BenSS. 69-71.

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⁸ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. ix-xii.

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⁹ Ed. ĀnSS. 50; trans. R. Otto, Tübingen, 1916.

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¹ Cf. Keith, *ERE.* x. 572 ff.

(c) Other Commentators

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No other comment can be compared in importance with those of Çaṅkara and Rāmānuja, the former representing the most sustained intellectual effort of Indian thought, the latter presenting a theory of the world which has many similarities to popular Christian belief, and which may through the Nestorians actually have been affected by Christian thought. Nimbārka, who is reputed a pupil of Rāmānuja, wrote a *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*, commenting on the Sūtra and a *Siddhāntaratna* in ten Çlokas summing up his system. Viṣṇusvāmin, in the thirteenth century, developed a new aspect of theory which was used by Vallabha (1376-1430) when he wrote his *Aṇubhāṣya*² on the Sūtra and propounded a doctrine of Bhakti in which the teacher on earth is regarded as divine and receives divine honours. More distinctive is the dualism of Madhva³ or Ānandatīrtha, who commented on seven of the important Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, while a number of independent tracts, including the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna*,⁴ set out his principles briefly. What he insists on is the existence of five fundamental dualisms, Dvaita, whence his system derives its name, as opposed to the Advaita of Çaṅkara and the Viçiṣṭādvaita, qualified nondualism or the nonduality of that which is qualified, of Rāmānuja. A summary of the views of Rāmānuja, Viṣṇusvāmin, Nimbārka, and Madhva is given in the *Sakalācāryamatasaṁgraha*⁵ of Çrīnivāsa.

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² Ed. *BI.* 1888-97.

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³ Date perhaps 1197-1276; but cf. *EI.* vi. 260 (1238-1317). His works are ed. Kumbhakonam, 1911.

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⁴ Ed. and trans. H. von Glasenapp, *Festschrift Kuhn*, pp. 326 ff.; *Madhva's Philosophie* (1923).

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⁵ See R. Otto, *Visnu-Nārāyana*, pp. 57 ff.

4. Theology and Mysticism

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Often closely allied with Vedānta ideas, but, like the developments of that system, powerfully affected by the Sāṁkhya and with strong affinities to the conceptions of which the Yoga philosophy is an ordered exposition, there exists a large mass of theological and mystical speculation. A comparatively early specimen not much distinguished from the Vedānta is the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*,¹ which is reputed an appendix to the *Rāmāyaṇa* and deals with all manner of topics, including final release; it is moderately old, as it was summarized in the ninth century by the Gauḍa Abhinanda in the *Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra*. An imitation of the *Mahābhārata*, the *Jaimini Bhārata*,² of which Book xiv, the *Āçvamedhikaparvan*, alone has come down to us, is intended rather as a text-book of a Vaiṣṇava sect.

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¹ Ed. Bombay, 1911; trans. Calcutta, 1909.

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² Cf. Weber, *Monatsber. BA.* 1869, pp. 10 ff., 369 ff.

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The sectarian literature of the Pañcarātra school of Vaiṣṇavas, long best known from the late *Nārada Pāñcarātra*³ (perhaps 16th cent.), is better represented by a large number of Saṁhitās which may be of considerable age; the *Ahirbudhnya*,⁴ which has been claimed to belong to the period of the later epic, gives no very favourable impression of the literature which mixes Vedānta and Sāṁkhya ideas in a curious way. The *Īçvara Saṁhitā* is quoted in the tenth century, but others are at least worked over if they are really ancient in substance, the *Bṛhad Brahma Saṁhitā* alluding to doctrines of Rāmānuja. The *Bhaktiçāstra*, ascribed to Nārada, is a late production, and so are the *Bhaktisūtras*,⁵ alleged to be by Çāṇḍilya, who appears as an authority on the Pañcarātra both in Çaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Quite modern is the Hindi *Bhaktamāla*⁶ which is interesting, apart from its technical explanations of the doctrine of faith, for its legends. The effect of Christian influence in it may be readily admitted in view of the prolonged existence in India of a Christian church.⁷

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³ Ed. *BI.* 1865.

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⁴ Ed. Madras, 1916. See F. O. Schrader, *Intr. to the Pāñcarātra* (1916); Govindācārya, *JRAS.* 1911, pp. 951 ff.

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⁵ Ed. *BI.* 1861; trans. *BI.* 1878.

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⁶ Grierson, *JRAS.* 1910, pp. 87 ff., 269 ff.

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⁷ Grierson, *JRAS.* 1907, pp. 314 ff.; cf. *ERE.* ii. 548 ff.

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The doctrine of Rāmānuja gave rise to divergent schools of thought, whose differences turned largely on minor points such as the position of Lakṣmī, wife of Viṣṇu, or the necessity or otherwise of activity by the soul which sought salvation. The literature induced by this split, partly local between north and south, is in part only in Sanskrit and is not of the highest importance for religion or philosophy.

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On the other hand, in Kashmir, where Çaivism was predominant, there developed two schools with close affinity in many regards to the Vedānta. The first and less important is represented in the ninth century by the *Çiva Sūtra*¹ of Vasugupta, on which in the eleventh century Kṣemarāja, pupil of Abhinavagupta, commented, and by Kallaṭa's *Spandakārikā*. God here appears as creator without material cause or the influence of past action, Karman; he creates by the mere effort of his will. The Pratyabhijñāçāstra owes its fame to Somānanda's *Çivadṛṣṭi* (*c.* 900), the *Īçvarapratyabhijñāsūtra* of Utpaladeva, his pupil, son of Udayākara, and to Abhinavagupta's comment² on that text (*c.* 1000), and his *Paramārthasāra*,³ in 100 Āryā verses, in which he adapts to his peculiar view some popular Kārikās ascribed to Ādi Çeṣa or Patañjali. The special point of this system, which is also briefly summarized in the *Virūpākṣapañcāçikā*⁴ of Virūpākṣanātha, is the insistence on the necessity, in order to enjoy the delight of identity with God, for man to realize that he has within him the perfections of God, just as a maiden can only enjoy her lover if she realizes that he possesses the perfections of which she has been told.

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¹ Trans. IT. iii and iv.

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² Ed. *Pandit*, ii and iii.

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³ Ed. Barnett, JRAS. 1910, pp. 707 ff.; 1912, p. 474; Sovani, pp. 257 ff.; Winternitz, GIL. iii. 446.

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⁴ Ed. TSS. 9, 1910. A *Tattvaprakāça* by Bhoja is ed. TSS. 68, 1920.

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Other Çaiva systems existed; Çrīkaṇṭha Çivācārya, who wrote a *Çaivabhāṣya*⁵ on the *Brahma Sūtra*, belonged to the Vīraçaiva or Liṅgāyat school of southern India in which Bhakti towards Çiva is specially inculcated, and Appayya Dīkṣita, the polymath of the sixteenth century, was of the same persuasion.

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⁵ Ed. *Pandit*, vi and vii. On all the sects, see Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, &c.*; Carpenter, *Theism in Mediaeval India*.

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Of no philosophical importance, but of great interest to the history of superstition, are the Tantras, the essence of which is to clothe in the garments of mysticism, the union of the soul with God or the absolute, the tenets of eroticism. That the Tantra literature is reasonably old is proved in all probability by the existence of manuscripts from 609 onwards, but the exact dates of the extant texts are hard in each case to determine; they include the *Kulacūḍāmaṇi Tantra*, the *Kulārṇava*, *Jñānārṇava*, *Tantrarāja*, *Mahānirvāṇa*, and so on. The Liṅgāyats of the south have a *Vīramaheçvara Tantra*. High claims have been raised for the cultural interest of these works, but there remains the essential fact that, so far as they contain philosophy, that is better given in other texts, and, so far as they are original, in addition to inculcating all sorts of magic practices they teach the doctrine of the eating of meat, the drinking of spirits, and promiscuous sexual intercourse, the deity being supposed to be present in the shape of the female devotee, as a means to the end of union with the highest principle of the system. In form also they lack attraction; the original texts seem to have been composed in rather barbarous Sanskrit, while the later are compilations badly arranged and collected. It is, however, true that the Tantric cult has had, and still possesses, an enormous power over the minds of Indians even in high ranks of society and of superior culture.¹

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¹ See ‘A. Avalon’, *Principles of Tantra* (1914–16); *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra* (1913), and many other texts. Cf. Das Gupta, *AMSJV.* III. i. 253 ff.

5. Logic and Atomism

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We may fairly find the impulse to logic² as given by the investigation of the Mīmāṅsā school; the term Nyāya suggests this conclusion, and it is entirely in accord with common sense, though of course it was a distinct act to advance to what may fairly be deemed logical science. Of the antiquity of logic we have no real knowledge; efforts to find it early in Buddhism are ruined by the lateness of Buddhist texts, and the attempts to ascribe the beginnings of the *Nyāya Sūtra*³ to a Gotama (*c.* 500 B. C.), while the true Nyāya is ascribed to Akṣapāda (*c.* A. D. 150) rest on no adequate ground. Nor can we reach any result by the argument⁴ that the commentator Vātsyāyana preceded the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, and it the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* of the Jains, for, apart from the fact that the Jain Sūtra is only as it stands authority for the fifth century at best, the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*, as we have it, is not an early text.¹ All that we really know is that the *Nyāya Sūtra* as it stands, a compilation no doubt representing earlier thought, takes cognizance of the nihilistic school of Buddhism, probably as it developed in the first century A. D. And even that result is uncertain. The *Vaiçeṣika Sūtra* is likewise of wholly uncertain date, though probably more or less contemporaneous with the *Nyāya*. If the *Nyāya* essentially gives us a logic, the *Vaiçeṣika* represents a naturalistic view which finds in atoms the basis of the material world, but both Sūtras accept in some measure the view of the other. Kaṇāda, the alleged author of the *Vaiçeṣika Sūtra*, is a mere nickname, and the Sūtra shows much unevenness of composition. The rise of the Vaiçeṣika has been ascribed to the second century B. C. on the score that it is attacked by Açvaghoṣa, and that it agrees in many points with the Jain philosophical views; thus it believes in the real activity of the soul, denied by the Vedānta of Çaṅkara, holds the effect to be different from the cause, the qualities from the substance, and accepts atoms. But this is quite inconclusive, and we cannot say even that the Vaiçeṣika ever was materialistic in the Lokāyata sense of deriving the soul from matter. The question of the original view of the two Sūtras as to God is disputed, but at least both say very little on the topic, and that little may be due to working over at the time when they had become definitely theistic schools.

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² Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* (1921); S. C. Vidyabhusana, *History of Indian Logic* (1921); B. Faddegon, *The Vaiçeṣika System* (1918); G. Jhā in *Indian Thought* and *POCP.* 1919, ii. 281–5 (on original atheism of the Nyāya).

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³ Vidyabhusana, p. 47.

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⁴ A. B. Dhruva, *POCP.* 1919, ii. 264 ff. His argument is vitiated by reliance on the Jain texts as evidence for 300 B. C.

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¹ See Keith, *BSOS.* iii. 551 ff.

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The *Nyāya Sūtra* found an expositor in Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, who wrote the *Nyāyabhāṣya*² before the Buddhist logical Dignāga. His work resembles in style the *Mahābhāṣya*, and he propounds modifications of the Sūtra in short sentences comparable to Vārttikas, but this is far from sufficient to justify us in assigning him to the second century B. C. The fourth century is more plausible, though a rather earlier date is not excluded. Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja, a fervent sectarian of the Pāçupata belief, in his *Nyāyavārttika*³ defended Vātsyāyana and explained the Sūtra and Bhāṣya; his date falls *c.* A. D. 620. A further comment on this work was written by Vācaspati Miçra (*c.* 850) in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*,¹ on which Udayana in the tenth century wrote the *Tātparyapariçuddhi*.² Udayana, as a convinced theist, in his *Kusumāñjali*³ in Kārikās with a prose explanation proved the existence of God, and in the *Bauddhadhikkāra*⁴ assailed the Buddhists, who had developed an important school of thought which manifestly greatly influenced the Nyāya itself.

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² E. Windisch, *Über das Nyāyabhâshya* (1888).

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³ Ed. *BI.* 1907.

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¹ Ed. VizSS. 12, 1898.

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² Ed. BI. 1911–24.

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³ Ed. BI. 1888–95.

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⁴ Ed. Calcutta, 1849 and 1873, as *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

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Dignāga, the chief of the early Buddhist logicians, lived probably before a. d. 400; writing the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, *Nyāyapraveça*, and other texts, most of which are preserved only in translations.⁵ Dharmakīrti attacked Uddyotakara in vindication of Dignāga in the seventh century, and his *Nyāyabindu*⁶ has fortunately been preserved, with the comment of Dharmottara (*c.* 800) and the super-comment, *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippanī*,⁷ of Mallavādin, probably written shortly afterwards. Much less important are the Jain works, of which Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra*⁸ is assigned dubiously to a. d. 533, while Māṇikya Nandin's *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*,⁹ on which Anantavīrya commented in the eleventh century, may be dated *c.* 800. Hemacandra (1088–1172) wrote a *Pramāṇamīmāṅsā* in Sūtra style. Polemical matter against these Buddhist, and in a minor degree Jain, comments is to be found in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*¹⁰ (9th cent.), which comments on the Sūtras; Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra*¹¹ (*c.* 900), which shows a marked Çaiva tendency and embodies Vaiçeṣika doctrines; and Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā*,¹² which knows Kumārila and was used in the *Sarvadarçanasaṁgraha* (*c.* 1350).

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⁵ S. C. Vidyabhusana, *Indian Logic*, pp. 27 ff. *Nyāyapraveça* is ed. Baroda, 1927.

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⁶ Ed. BI. 1889. On Dharmottara's date, Hultzsch, ZDMG. lxix. 278 f.

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⁷ Ed. BB. xi. 1909.

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⁸ Ed. Calcutta, 1908.

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⁹ Ed. BI. 1909.

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¹⁰ Ed. VizSS. 1895.

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¹¹ Ed. BI. 1910.

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¹² Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. xxi–xxv.

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A definite step in the history of the Nyāya was marked by the appearance of Gaṅgeça's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*¹³ (*c.* 1200) in four books, which expounds with much subtlety the means of proof permitted in the Nyāya, incidentally expounding the metaphysics of the school at the same time. Gaṅgeça was no mean philosopher, though it seems difficult to call his prose clear and simple, though it is both compared to the diction of his commentators. These include his own son Vardhamāna, the dramatist Jayadeva, and, most famous of all, Raghunātha Çiromaṇi¹ (*c.* 1500), on whom Gadādhara commented (*c.* 1700), and Mathurānātha. This is scholasticism of the worst description, in which definitions alone were of interest, and it is regrettable that in the sixteenth century the Sanskrit schools of Navadvīpa formed the centre of intellectual life in the country, since but for their overloading of his doctrine Gaṅgeça's real merits might have been recognized more widely. In point of fact, from a rough system of argument from examples Indian logic rose to a developed and able scheme of inference based on universals, and the formation of universals it explained by a well-thought-out metaphysical theory. Buddhist logic, again, in the hands of Dignāga developed a doctrine of knowledge which certainly deserves careful study and which in certain aspects shows close affinity to the views of Kant, though the likeness has sometimes been exaggerated.

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¹³ Ed. BI. 1888–1901.

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¹ *Dīdhiti* ed. with the *Gādādharī*, ChSS. nos. 186, 187. For a specimen of scholasticism see S. Sen, *A Study on Mathurānātha's Tattvacintāmaṇirahasya* (1924).

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The *Vaiçeṣika Sūtra*² was far less fortunate; it was taken up and given new life by Praçastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*,³ which is not a comment on the Sūtra but a completely new exposition of the same subject-matter, with additions of importance. The date of the author depends on his relation to Dignāga, who seems to have influenced his logical views, so that he may be assigned to the fifth century A. D. A commentary on his work, the *Nyāyakandalī* of Çrīdhara, belongs to 991. We find in him the same view of theism and the addition of non-existence as a seventh to the six Vaiçeṣika categories—substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, Viçeṣa—whence the name of the system is usually derived, and inseparable relation. Udayana also wrote a comment, *Kiraṇāvalī*⁴ on Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya, and an independent text, the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*.⁵ It is clear that the Sūtra contains matter which was not before the commentators, and that they knew Sūtras which it does not notice. A formal comment on the Sūtra is that of Çaṅkara Miçra, the *Upaskāra*,¹ which dates from *c.* 1600 and is far from adequate.

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² Ed. Candrakānta Tarkālaṁkāra, Calcutta, 1887; also BI. 1861; BenSS. 1885 ff.

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³ Ed. VizSS. 1895; trans. G. Jha, *Pandit*, N.S. xxv–xxxiv.

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⁴ Ed. in part BenSS.

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⁵ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. xxi and xxii.

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¹ Ed. BI. 1861.

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As practical guides to the two schools serve a number of short handbooks which deal with the doctrines of both as a whole and present a fusion of the two traditions. One of the earliest of these is Çivāditya's *Saptapadārthī*,² which is earlier than Gañgeça; Keçava Miçra's *Tarkabhāṣā*³ is variously assigned to the thirteenth or fourteenth century; Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Tarkakaumudī*⁴ is by the author of the *Arthasaṁgraha* on the *Mīmāṁsā*, and may be after 1400; Annam Bhaṭṭa, a native of southern India, wrote his *Tarkasaṁgraha*⁵ with an important commentary before 1585, and the *Tarkāmṛta*⁶ of Jagadīça falls *c.* 1700. The *Bhāṣāpariccheda*⁷ of Viçvanātha is approximately dated by the fact that its author commented on the *Nyāya Sūtra* in 1634; the text is in 166 memorial verses, some of which are borrowed from older sources, as is seen from the fact that they are given also in Sureçvara's *Mānasollāsa*, where they doubtless represent borrowing from a contemporary text. In this period divergences of view between Vaiçeṣika and Nyāya had reduced themselves to very minor, not to say scholastic, points. The schools were now fully theistic, as had individual adherents been for a long time; Udayana, like Uddyotakara, was a Çaiva and identified God with Çiva, and the Buddhist writers Guṇaratna and Rājaçekhara report on the Çaiva affiliations of Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika sects in their time.

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² Ed. A. Winter, Leipzig, 1893; trans. ZDMG. liii. 328 ff.

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³ Ed. S. M. Paranjape, Poona, 1909; trans. G. Jhā, IT. ii.

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⁴ Ed. M. N. Dvivedī, BSS. 32, 1886; trans. E. Hultzsch, ZDMG. lxi. 763 ff.

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⁵ Ed. BSS. 55, 1918; trans. E. Hultzsch, AGGW. ix. 5, 1907.

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⁶ Ed. Calcutta, 1880.

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⁷ Ed. BI. 1850; trans. E. Hultzsch, ZDMG. lxxiv. 145 ff.

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The interpretation of the physics of the Vaiçeṣika presents great difficulties, and it is extremely dubious if we are justified with modern scholars,⁸ Indian and Western, in seeking to read recent results into the simple and rather rude concepts of the ancient text which the commentators did little to refine. Their interest was metaphysical, and it is not usual for science and philosophy to be effectively combined. The effort to show that the Vaiçeṣika system is at the base of Caraka's system of medicine, dating that system *c.* A. D. 80 and thence deducing the early date of the Vaiśeṣika, appears quite invalid, resting as it does on two errors, the belief that the system is vital to Caraka, and the assumption that the text of Caraka dates from the first century A. D. Still more absurd is the attempt to make out the school to be pre-Buddhist and to be derived from the Pūrvamīmāṅsā.

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⁸ R. Stübe, *Ann. d. Naturphil.*, viii. 483 ff.

6. The Sāṁkhya and Yoga Schools

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While the Vedānta is a direct descendant of the Upaniṣad discussions, and the systems of logic and atomism at least do not go out of their way to challenge orthodoxy, and ultimately adopt more and more the authority of scripture, the Sāṁkhya system in its original form unquestionably marks a break with tradition. But this is a very different thing from claiming that the philosophy is not derived by legitimate process of development from ideas found in the Upaniṣads. The issue eventually turns on the interpretation to be given to the fact that a number of Upaniṣads, in special the *Kaṭha*, present features which may either be regarded as a preliminary stage in the development to the Sāṁkhya or as the influence of an already existing Sāṁkhya on the Upaniṣads. The idea of an independent creation of thought, that of warriors as opposed to priests, is really fantastic, and there can be little doubt that the Sāṁkhya follows legitimately from certain Upaniṣad positions when they are fully developed. The absolute of the Upaniṣads tends to become meaningless, and the Sāṁkhya gets rid of it by postulating only an infinite number of spirits, while matter it similarly divorces from the absolute, ascribing to it the power of evolution; consciousness is explained by some form of contact between spirit and matter, and release is attained when the unreality of any connexion between the two is appreciated. This is undoubtedly an illogical and confused system, for in it spirit is meaningless, and its connexion with nature, being non-existent, cannot serve as the motive for bondage. Such confusion accords best with a derivative theory, not with original thought. The most important contribution to Indian thought made by the Sāṁkhya is the conception of three Guṇas, constituents rather than qualities, as pervading nature and man alike. Even for this view, however, we find a basis in the Upaniṣads, where water, fire, and earth appear as the three fundamental elements derived from the creator or pervaded by him.¹

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¹ Keith, *The Sāṁkhya System* (2nd ed. 1924); *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda* (1925).

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The date of the Sāṁkhya has been fixed by arguments based on the derivation of Buddhism from it, but we have rather to do with the derivation of Buddhism from the early doctrine of the Upaniṣads which ultimately gave also the Sāṁkhya, but in the case of Buddhism with far more conscious rejection of Vedic views. In any case, however, the date of the development of Buddhist doctrine is far too obscure to be of any real aid in fixing the date and the claim² that the Sāṁkhya represents a philosophy of 800–550 B. C. seems quite inadmissible.

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² Cf. Winternitz, GIL. iii. 450. The use of Caraka as an early Sāṁkhya source is quite unwarranted.

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All the early teachers of the Sāṁkhya appear in legendary guise; the reality of Kapila, the alleged founder of the system, has been abandoned by Jacobi; Āsuri is a mere name, and Pañcaçikha, of whom we have views, is quite uncertain in date. The epic presents us with some information as to the Sāṁkhya, though usually it gives a composite philosophy, but our first definite text is the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*³ of Īçvarakṛṣṇa. From Buddhist sources we hear of an older contemporary of Vasubandhu (*c.* 320),⁴ Vārṣagaṇya, who wrote a *Ṣaṣṭitantra* on the Sāṁkhya; his pupil Vindhyavāsa corrected his master’s views in a set of seventy verses known as the Golden Seventy verses, which Vasubandhu criticized in his *Paramārthasaptati*. It is natural to identify Vindhyavāsa with Īçvarakṛṣṇa, and, though the identity is unproven, it is not improbable. Otherwise the only certain fact is that the Kārikā with a commentary was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha in A. D. 557–69, and therefore must have existed earlier. The view that the original of this comment exists in the recently discovered *Māṭhara Vṛtti* is certainly wrong.⁵ We have, however, a derived version of this comment by Gauḍapāda, whose date is uncertain, as is his identity with the author of the *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā* on the Vedānta, who seems a man of much higher calibre. Of greater importance is Vācaspati Miçra's *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, in which he displays his usual impartiality and capacity of exposition. He cites a *Rājavārttika* of Raṇaraṅgamalla or Bhoja. The Kārikā itself is doubtless indebted to older works for its substance which is expressed in dry Āryā verses which exhibit, however, traces of the distinctive feature of Sāṁkhya exposition, the choice of happy illustrative examples, such as the similitude drawn between nature and the modest maiden who retires once she has been seen by spirit.

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³ Ed. BenSS. 1883; trans. J. Davies, London, 1881; P. Deussen, *Gesch. d. Phil.*, I. iii. 413 ff.

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⁴ N. Péri, BEFEO. xi. 311 ff.

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⁵ Keith, BSOS. iii. 551 f.

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The *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*¹ is a late text; it is not used in the *Sarvadarçanasaṁgraha* and is commented on by Aniruddha (*c.* 1450). It may contain older matter, but the Sūtras given by Siddharṣi in the *Upamitibhavaprapañcā kathā* are not in it, and we do not know if he did not invent them, though that is not very likely. The system here is fully developed and scripture is invoked in support of it. Interesting is book iv in which we find brief references to illustrative stories; the comment explains these allusions; recognition of the distinction between spirit and matter comes by instruction as in the case of the king's son who, brought up by a Çabara, has the truth of his origin revealed to him and at once assumes the princely bearing and mien. So the forgetting of truth brings sorrow as in the case of the frog-maiden, who was married by a king on his promise never to let her see water; one day, unluckily, he forgot and let her have some when tired, with the result that he had to bear the pain of her return to her frog shape. In addition to Aniruddha's comment,² we have the curious work of Vijñānabhikṣu³ in which, anticipating much modern opinion, he seeks to deal with the Sāṁkhya not as opposed to the Vedānta but as representing one aspect of the truth of that system. He also wrote the *Sāṁkhyasāra*,⁴ a brief introduction to the topic, and his date is *c.* 1650. Before 1600 was written the catechism *Tattvasamāsa*,⁵ which has been held to be an old text, but which at any rate is not of much philosophic importance.

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¹ Ed. BI. 1865; trans. SHB. 11, 1912.

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² Ed. and trans. R. Garbe, BI. 1888-92.

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³ Ed. R. Garbe, HOS. 2, 1895; trans. AKM. ix. 3, 1889.

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⁴ Ed. BI. 1865.

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⁵ Max Müller, *Six Systems*, pp. 224 ff.

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Closely allied as a philosophy with the Sāṁkhya is the Yoga. In itself Yoga is merely the application of the will on the concentration of the mind, whence it denotes concentration, and, if the concentration aims at union with a deity as it may often have done, the sense may have come to be that of unity, the result being put for the effort. But primitively the object of Yoga was doubtless often to secure by practices of repression of the breath, sitting in certain postures and deep concentration, magic powers such as are believed throughout Indian thought to be the fruit of such exercises, for we find the same doctrine in Buddhism and Jainism. Yoga, therefore, in a sense can figure in all philosophies, but as a system it has been developed under Sāṁkhya influence, the only real difference being that the Yoga, as a result of the early connexion with the desire of finding union with a god, insists on finding a place for the deity as the twenty-sixth principle in addition to the twenty-five of the Sāṁkhya. This spirit is in constant connexion with subtle matter and possesses power, wisdom, and goodness. The Yoga thus figures as the theistic Sāṁkhya, while the Sāṁkhya appears as atheistic. Both systems in fusion with Vedānta ideas appear largely in the epic philosophy and again in the Purāṇas and the law-book of Manu.¹

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¹ P. Tuxen, *Yoga* (1911); J. W. Hauer, *Die Anfänge der Yogapraxis* (1922); Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda* (1925).

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The *Yoga Sūtra*² is ascribed to Patañjali, and the similarity of name has led to the foolish identification of the philosopher with the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. The Sūtra has been accused of being a mere patchwork of different treatises, and, though this is exaggerated, it is a confused text, which is only intelligible by the aid of the *Yogabhāṣya* ascribed to Vyāsa, who may or may not have accurately rendered the original sense, very probably moulding it to his own views. His date is probably before Māgha, but nothing certain can be said, save that the Bhāṣya is commented on by Vācaspati Miçra (*c.* 850) as well as by Vijñānabhikṣu,³ while again the Bhāṣya mentions the mysterious Vārṣagaṇya. Bhoja is credited with the *Rājamārtaṇḍa*,¹ an important comment on the Sūtras. The work falls into four parts, dealing with the nature of concentration, the means towards it, the winning by it of supernormal powers, and the state of Kaivalya which results from complete concentration. The relation of the individual spirit to God is treated as part of the ethic of Yoga or Kriyāyoga. For information in detail regarding the practices followed to induce the trance condition desired we must refer to late works such as Svātmārāma Yogīndra's *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*² in which we find with some surprise the author, despite his style, indulging in *double entendres* of somewhat dubious character. Other texts are the *Gorakṣaśataka* and the *Gheraṇḍasaṁhitā*, of dubious age and authorship.

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² Ed. with Vyāsa and Vācaspati, BSS. 46, 1892; trans. J. H. Woods, HOS. 17, 1914; Rāmaprasāda, SBH. 1910.

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³ Ed. *Pandit*, N.S. v and vi. His *Yogasārasaṁgraha* is ed. and trans. G. Jhā, Bombay, 1894.

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¹ Ed. and trans. R. Mitra, BI. 1883.

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² Ed. and trans. Bombay, 1893.

7. Buddhism

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The use of Sanskrit in lieu of Prākrits or Pāli for texts defending Buddhist principles is of uncertain age. What is fairly clear is that the Mūlasarvāstivādins from the first period of their activity adopted Sanskrit as the language of the school, and we have fragments of their canon, from the *Udānavarga*, *Dharmapada*, *Ekottarāgama*, and *Madhyamāgama*, as well as the *Vinaya*, which point to derivation in some degree from texts similar to those represented in the Pāli canon. But the date of these Buddhist Sanskrit texts as extant is wholly uncertain, and has been placed as late as the third century A. D., which is probably too low.³

c33.s7.2

³ Cf. Oldenberg, ZDMG. lii. 654 ff.; and see Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy* (1923). Przyluski (*La légende de l'empereur Açoka*, pp. 166 ff.) holds that the literature began *c.* 150 B. C. contemporary with Menander and Patañjali in Mathurā.

c33.s7.3

Much more important is the *Mahāvastu*,⁴ a Vinaya text of the Lokottaravādin school of the Mahāsāṅghikas, which presents us with a partial Buddha biography, combined with much miscellaneous matter, including many Jātaka stories of the Buddha in previous births. It reveals a new attitude in its account of the ten stages through which a Bodhisattva must move to achieve Buddhahood, in its insistence on the miraculous birth of Bodhisattvas without parental intervention and on the great number of Buddhas, and in such episodes as the Buddhānusmṛti which is a panegyric of the Buddha in the usual Stotra form of the Kāvya literature. Its date is utterly uncertain, for its structure is complex, as is revealed by style and language; references to such late matters as Chinese speech and writing, a Horāpāṭhaka, and the Huns show that the final redaction need not have been before the fourth century A. D. The language is mixed Sanskrit, both in prose and verse, for verse frequently alternates with prose, versions of the same matter being given sometimes side by side in two accounts. The less good the Sanskrit, the older in many cases the passage, but no absolute criterion is possible. From the point of view of doctrine the work yields all but nothing of importance.

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⁴ Ed E. Senart, Paris, 1882-97. See Oldenberg, GN. 1912, pp. 113 ff.

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The *Lalitavistara*,¹ which also was originally of the Sarvāstivāda school, gives a biography of the Buddha which has been altered in the sense of the Mahāyāna development of Buddhism. The book is full of miracles, including the tales which have been asserted to have spread to the west of the falling down of the statues before the young child when he visited the temple, and of his explaining to the teacher the sixty-four kinds of writing, including those of the Chinese and the Huns. In style the work is as much of a patchwork as in substance. It is written in prose in Sanskrit with verse portions in mixed Sanskrit; these normally do not carry on the prose account, but run parallel with it, giving it in brief form. The ballads of this sort are often clearly old, as shown by comparison with the Pāli tradition as in the case of the Asita legend (vii), the Bimbisāra story (xvi), the dialogue between the Buddha and Māra (xviii), but the prose also is sometimes used in old matter, as in the version of the sermon at Benares (xxvi), while among the verse portions occur later work, where such elaborate metres as Çārdūlavikrīḍita and Vasantatilaka are used. The date of the text is quite uncertain; it was rendered into Tibetan in the ninth century and was well known to the artists of Boro Bodur in Java (850–900). Its spirit of reverence of the Buddha corresponds to the artistic revolution of the Gandhāran art which reveals the portrait of the Buddha, whereas the older tradition of Sānchi and Bharhut showed symbols only of the blessed one, and the work may in the main belong to the period from the second century A. D.

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