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State and Government in Ancient India c21: Chapter XIV: Interstate Relations

State and Government in Ancient India c21

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Chapter XIV: Interstate Relations

c21.2

In a work primarily intended to describe the state and government organisation, problems connected with the interstate relations can be described only in their broad outlines. The subject divides itself into two parts : interstate relations in war and the same in peace. Further, we shall have to discuss separately the relations between sovereign states and their numerous feudatories.

c21.3

We possess very little information about interstate relations of the Vedic period. States were still to a great extent tribal and for a long time they were engaged in subjugating the non-Aryans. Their mutual relations were therefore generally peaceful. Aryans, however began to become envious of one another owing to the difference in success achieved by the different tribes to which they belonged. We therefore sometimes find them fighting among themselves, often taking the help of non-Aryan chiefs. Such occasions, however, were few.

c21.4

In the later Vedic period small Aryan tribes became fused into bigger territorial states. Their normal size, however, was still not very large. Most of the states, for instance, included in the 16 Janapadas of the early Buddhist works were not bigger than a Commissioner's Division of the modern time.

c21.5

The status and prestige of the different states differed according to their resources and the leadership of their rulers. Titles like *svarāṭ*, *ekarāṭ*, *samrāṭ* and *adhirāṭ*, that were taken by the different rulers, indicate clearly a difference in status, but what exactly its nature was it is difficult to determine at present. Some of these rulers, e.g. *samrāṭs*, were probably enjoying a much higher status than the rest, but whether they were ruling as emperors over feudatories, we do not know. It is likely that the weaker states might have paid a tribute to the stronger ones.

c21.6

The religion and culture of the later Vedic period placed the ideal of the emperorship before the Aryan king. The *aśvamedha* sacrifice was to be performed by one who wished to be the king of kings, and the *vājapeya* by one who wanted to become an emperor. This naturally introduced a principle of instability in the interstate relations. A *vijigīshu* or ambitious king could at any time launch a campaign of conquest. We should further note that there were no natural boundaries to separate a state, for instance, like Kauśāmbī from another like Kāśī or Kośala ; when one of them became strong , it was natural for it to seek expansion at the cost of its neighbours.

c21.7

Smṛitis also declare that when a king feels that his army is strong and kingdom prosperous, and notices that the case is reverse with his opponents, he is at liberty to declare a war against them.¹ Surprise is often expressed that Smṛitis should have thus countenanced a war of unprovoked aggression. If, however, we look to the realities of the situation, we shall have to admit that all over the world states which have grown strong and powerful have been attacking their weaker neighbours in all ages, primarily because the latter were weak, though often they used to put forth spacious and philanthropic motives for their action. Why did Akbar, Shahjahan and Aurangzeb attack the Sultans of the Deccan though they were their co-religionists ? Why did the British declare war against the Marāthās in 1802 ? Simply because they felt that they were stronger than their opponents and could grab their territories. Why did the last two world wars break out ? Simply because the different combatants felt that the time had come for the realisation of their visions of the world domination or for the defence of their empires. It is, therefore, no use to blame the Smṛiti writers for countenancing a course of conduct which is the order of the day in the international world even to-day.

c21.8

¹ *E. g.*, *Manu*, VII. 171

c21.9

Of course it is possible to argue that the Smṛitis and Nīti-writers should have been ahead of their age and advocated like Aśoka a total cessation of interstatal wars, at least for aggressive purposes. It is not, however, always easy to ascertain which state is the aggressor ; each party to the strife can put forth a plausible defence for its action. The ideal of total abandonment of war was too high to be realised, as we know from the efforts unsuccessfully made by Aśoka. The prevailing insecurity rendered it absolutely necessary that there should be a class in society powerful enough to defend it against aggression. The Kshatriya community supplied the band of fighters necessary for this purpose, which regarded it a disgrace to die on the bed.¹ War was its natural profession ; to taboo it would have left it without a calling. It was, therefore, but natural that Smṛitis should have felt themselves powerless to recommend an ideal inconsistent with Kshatriya life and too difficult of realisation, not only in ancient India but also in the modern world.

c21.10

¹ अधर्मः क्षत्रियस्यैष यच्छय्यामरणं भवेत् । *Śukra*, IV. 7. 305

c21.11

It would be, however, wrong to suppose that ancient Indian thinkers, while striving for harmony within the states, were indifferent for its realisation among the comity of nations. Almost all of them point out to the ambitious king that the appeal to the arms should be avoided as far as possbile;² an unrighteous war brings disgrace in this life and procures hell thereafter.³ The protracted negotiations between the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas and the readiness of the latter to be content even with five villages, will show that wars were not declared in hot haste in ancient India.

c21.12

² साम्ना दानेन भेदेन समस्तैरथवा पृथक् । विजेतुं प्रयतेतारीन्न युध्येत कदाचन ॥ Manu, VII. 198 नाशो भवति युद्धेन कदाचिदुभयोरपि ॥ *Kāmandaka*, IX. 11. वर्जनीयं सदा युद्धं राज्यकामेन धीमता । *Mbh.* XII, 69. 23 जघन्यमाहुर्विजयं युद्धेन च नराधिप ॥ *Mbh.* XII. 94. 1

c21.13

³ नाधर्मेण महीं जेतुं लिप्सेत पृथिवीपतिः । अधर्मविजयं लब्ध्वा को नु मन्येत भूमिपः ॥ अधर्मयुक्तो विजयो ह्यध्रुवोऽस्वर्ग्य एव च ॥ *Mbh.*, XII. 96. 1-3

c21.14

The ancient Indian thinkers knew that war could not be altogether tabooed ; they therefore tried to minimise its chances by advocating a judicious balance of power among the different states with which the country was studded. The well-known *maṇḍala* theory of the Smṛiti and Nīti writers is based upon this principle.¹

c21.15

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. VI. Chap. 2 ; *Kāmandaka*, VIII. 45 ff.

c21.16

The *maṇḍala* theory presupposes the division of the country into a number of small states and the presence of an ambitious conqueror, anxious to establish his hegemony over them. Both these assumptions were true of ancient Indian polity and they have not become antiquated even in the modern world, in spite of the presence of the United Nations Organisation. The theory lays down that the immediate neighbouring state in front should be assumed to be enemical. The enmity between France and Germany, between Poland and Russia, between China and Japan was largely due to their contiguity, which often caused conflicts of interests. The state which is the neighbour of one’s neighbour is assumed to be a friendly ally. The temporary alliance between Germany and Russia in 1939 and between England and Poland in 1937 show the general truth of this assumption. Next to *ari* (enemy) and *mitra* (ally), *arimitra* (enemy’s ally) *mitramitra* (one’s ally’s ally) and *arimitramitra* (enemy’s ally’s ally) will figure in the *maṇḍala*. All this follows the natural assumption of the probable enmity between neighbours. The kings in the front enumerated above are five in number.

c21.17

The kings in the rear of the conqueror are given different names by the political writers, but their presumed relationship is similar. The immediate neighbour in the rear is called *pārshṇigrāha*, one who attacks in the rear, and the next one is called *ākranda* (ally in the rear) ; then come *pārshṇigrāhāsāra* (ally of the rearward enemy) and *ākarandāsāra* (an ally of the rearward ally). The kings in the rear are thus four in number.

c21.18

There were however some kings who were not interested in these rivalries going on around them. A king who was contiguous to both the conqueror and his enemy and capable of helping both the kings whether united or disunited or of resisting either of them individually was called *madhyama* or indifferent. A king with similar potentialities, but not contiguous to the conqueror, his enemy or *madhyama*, was called *udāsīna*. The 12th member of the *maṇḍala* was the *vijigīshu* himself.

c21.19

The twelve kings mentioned above were regarded as constituting the *maṇḍala* of kings. A monarch was advised to be watchful about their motives and movements in order to secure peace and safety for his dominion and if possible, its expansion, by a system of judicious alliances. The emphasis laid upon proper alliance brings to our mind the development in the contemporary world politics since the second world war, when each of the two blocks is seeking to strengthen its position by roping as many states as possible within its own sphere of influence.

c21.20

Aśvamedha and Vājapeya sacrifices being prescribed by the Vedic religion, even the idealistic school of the political thinkers could not disapprove of an expedition of conquest; it, however, tried to humanise it as much as possible. The king, who was out for a *dharmavijaya*, was to remain content with the formal recognition of his suzerainty and the payment of a tribute by the conquered king;¹ he was not to annex his kingdom or disturb its administration. If the defeated king died in war, or if he was living but unwilling to continue on the throne, a suitable successor was to be installed in his place. If annexation became inevitable, the established laws and customs were to be respected and the new subjects were to be treated as kindly as the old ones.²

c21.21

¹ गृहीतप्रतिमुक्तस्य स धर्मविजयी नृपः। श्रियं महेन्द्रनाथस्य जहार न तु मेदिनीम् ॥ *Raghu*, IV. 43 Kauṭilya however disapproves even the exaction of tribute in धर्मविजय ; cf. तेषामभ्यवपत्त्या धर्मविजयी तुष्यति । ...भूमिद्रव्यहरणेन लोभविजयी । पुत्रदारप्राणहरणेन असुरविजयी । XII. 1

c21.22

² स्थापयेत्तत्र तद्वंश्यं कुर्याच्च समयक्रियाम् । Manu, VII. 202 See also *Vishṇu*, III. 30 ; *Śukra*, IV. 7. 373 ; 397-98

c21.23

There is sufficient evidence to show that this policy was generally followed. In their expeditions of conquest, the Pāṇḍava heroes were content with submission and tribute; there was no annexation. The Jātakas hardly know of any wars of annexations. When the king of Kośala invaded Kāśi, the minister of the latter kingdom said to his king, "Sir, you need not be afraid; there will be no molestation; your kingdom will continue to be yours; only you will have to submit to the suzerainty of the invader." The Muslim travellers of the 8th and 9th centuries were also struck by this peculiarly human method of conquest that they saw in the Deccan. "When a king subdues a neighbouring state," says Sulaiman, "he places over it a prince belonging to the family of the fallen king, who carries on the government in the name of the conqueror. The inhabitants will not suffer it to be otherwise."

c21.24

The advice to refrain from annexation after conquest is easy to give but difficult to follow; a survey of the ancient Indian history, however, shows that it was more frequently followed than disregarded. We have very little authentic information about the internal condition of the Mauryan empire, but it is not unlikely that it left untouched the autonomy of the powerful republics of the Punjab and Rajputana. In the Gupta empire, there flourished a number of feudatories even in Magadha itself. The Nāga rulers, who were overthrown by Samudragupta, continued to serve as imperial officers of the government in the Doab. Samudragupta annexed the kingdoms of some kings, but their number was smaller than the number of those who were restored and allowed to rule in the feudatory capacity. The empire of Harsha also contained a number of feudatory states. The same was the case with the Pratīhāra empire of northern India. The Deccan kingdoms of the Sātavāhanas, the Chālukyas, the Rāshtrakūṭas and the Yādavas had a large number of feudatories, who enjoyed considerable autonomy. *Digvijaya* being inevitable, it was possible only to strive for the preservation of the local autonomy and culture of the conquered states. It cannot be denied that ancient India did succeed in doing this to a great extent. This success was partly due to the uniformity of culture and religion that prevailed in the states, temporarily at war with each other. Normally in peace time their relations were not embittered by religious or cultural divergences or animosities, and so the war did not spur the combatants to bring about the utter destruction of each other. Internal autonomy was easily conceded.

c21.25

¹ मा भायि महाराज नात्थि ते परिपन्थो तव रज्जं तवेव भविस्सति केवलं मनोरंजो वसवती होहि। *Jātakas*, V. p. 316; cf also p.-391

c21.26

² Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, Vol. I, p. 7; see also *Account of China and India*, p 33

c21.27

The usual causes for which states went to war with each other were:— (1) the desire to attain the imperial status, (2) the necessity of self-preservation, (3) the acquisition of more territories or tributes, (4) the restoration of the balance of power, (5) the retaliation for raids and (6) the rescue of oppressed populations. It will be seen that these are the normal cause of war in all times and climes. It is unnecessary to illustrate how these motives were at the bottom of the different wars in ancient India.

c21.28

Interstate war being found inevitable in actual practice, ancient India thinkers tried further to mitigate its evils by recommending a high code of honour on the battlefield. It is doubtful whether this code governed the warfare of the Aryans with the *dasyus* in the Vedic period. Indra is represented as trampling them under his feet in the caves and the Vedic Aryans might have done the same. The Vedic literature also refers to the use of poisoned arrows in warfare.¹ The Smṛitis, however, are emphatic in condemning their use. They further lay down² that the enemy should not be struck unawares or when he is not properly armed and ready, or when he is at a disadvantage. Quarter must be given when asked; prisoners were to be treated well and given medical treatment if necessary.³

c21.29

¹ *R. V.*, I. 117. 16; VI. 75. 15; *A. V.* VI. 6. 7

c21.30

² *Eg., Manu*, VII. 90 ff.

c21.31

³ भग्नशस्त्रो विपन्नश्च कृतज्ञो हतवाहनः । चिकित्स्यः स्यात्स्वविषये प्राप्यो वा स्वगृहं भवेत् । निर्व्रणश्च स मोक्तव्य एष धर्मः सनातनः । *Mbh.*, XII. 95. 13-14

c21.32

We may well assume that these rules were actually followed in practice as long as the opposing states were evenly matched and annexation did not follow the defeat. Megasthenes was surprised to notice that warfare in India did usually not interfere with the agricultural operations; combatants on either side waging the conflict made carnage of each other, but allowed those engaged in agriculture to remain quite unmolested. Yuan Chwang was also struck by the fact that wars, though not infrequent, produced little harm to the country.

c21.33

It seems that as long as annexations were rare, these humane rules of warfare were followed as a general rule. When, however, empires became the order of the day, and the feudal yoke became more and more oppressive, the desire for self-preservation naturally got the upper hand; and all means began to be regarded as fair, which were likely to ensure self-preservation or victory. Kauṭilya gives the commonsense advice; if a state has immense superiority over its opponent, it should follow the chivalrous code (*dharmayuddha*); otherwise it should have recourse to all methods of warfare, whether fair or foul.¹ The view of Bhīshma (*Mbh.* XII. 140) is the same. Śukra concurs with his two predecessors.² In the epic we find both Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas violating the rules of righteous warfare, when hard-pressed. In 1945, America used the atom bomb to ensure speedy victory and save the lives of half a million of her soldiers.

c21.34

¹ बलविशिष्टः प्रकाशयुद्धमुपेयात् । विपर्यये कूटयुद्धम् । Bk. X. Chap. 3

c21.35

² धर्मयुद्धैः कूटयुद्धैर्हन्यादेव रिपुं सदा । I. 350

c21.36

The rules of *kūṭayuddha* permitted attack at any time and under all circumstances; the enemy country was to be devastated, trees were to be cut, and crops and stores were to be burnt down; civilians were to be taken into captivity. Many of these calamities occurred when Aśoka conquered and annexed Kaliṅga and we may well assume that they were to some extent inseparable from all warfare in the post-Christian period. Scores of medieval inscriptions from Karnāṭak refer to the practice of Kūṭayuddha at the time. *Mānasollāsa*, written in *c.* 1140 A. D., refers to several varities of the Kūṭayuddha. In Deśanāśaka warfare villages were burnt down; in Janāṅgachhedaka warfare enemy subjects were mutilated; in Gograha warfare cattle were carried away; in Dhānyaharaṇa warfare, corn was plundered; in Bandigrāha warfare traders and wealthy men were imprisoned; in Sthānadāha warfare houses and palaces were burnt (II. 1038-82). There can, however, be no doubt that there was a constant effort made to follow the higher ideal as far as possbile; otherwise the high Rajput code of chivalry could not have survived till the medieval times.

c21.37

It would not be out of place to point out that even the rules of *kūṭayuddha*, referred to above, will appear as humane when compared to the atrocities that disfigured the warfare in the Ancient Middle East. No ancient Indian king is known to have boasted of having built a wall with human skulls or having flayed the enemies and covered the city gates or fort-walls with their skins, as Thutmoses III and Asurnazerpal are known to have done.

c21.38

There were definite rules about quarters to be given to the enemy. One who laid down arms and threw himself on the mercy of the conqueror was not to be slain, so also one who was wounded or fleeing away from the battlefield. Prisoners of war, if wounded, were to be treated by the army doctors. Among the Aryans they were usually not sold into slavery¹, but allowed to return home at the end of the war.²

c21.39

¹ म्लेच्छानामदोषः प्रजां विक्रेतुमाधातुं वा। *Arthaśāstra*, III. 13 The slave captured on the battlefield is, however, referred to by Nārada; he was, however, permitted to secure his release by offering a substitute.

c21.40

² *Agnipurāṇa*, Chap. 240

c21.41

There were also regular rules about the booty. Treasures, valuables, weapons, provisions, etc., belonging to the defeated king could be seized by the victor.³ All immovable property belonging to private persons could be temporarily occupied and utilised.

c21.42

³ *Manu*, VII. 96-7; *Śukra*, IV. 7. 380

c21.43

We have very little information as to the intercourse between the two countries waging war with each other. Since we find passports necessary for foreigners entering the country in normal times, it is quite likely that all communications might have been stopped with the declaration of war. States must have naturally taken care to see that merchandise and provisions of their own country did not pass into the possession of the opponent to strengthen his fighting power. When, however, frontiers were extensive and administration inefficient, some amount of trade might have continued stealthily. There was blockade by sea and enemy ships were seized, as happened at Kalyan in the Śaka-Sātavāhana war.

c21.44

Let us now pass on to consider the relations between sovereign states in time of peace. It is doubtful whether there were permanent resident embassies in vogue in ancient times. Megasthenes resided at the court of Chandragupta Maurya and Deimachos at that of Bindusāra. It is quite likely that the Mauryas might have sent their own ambassadors at the Seleukidan court, especially because the Buddhist missionaries had been dispatched there to preach *dharma*. We, however, do not know whether the Greek ambassadors lived for a few months or whether their embassies were permanent. Heliodorus was residing at Vidiśā, the capital of Mālwā, as the ambassador of Antialkidas, the Greek ruler of Taxila, but it is not unlikely that he might have stayed only for a few months and for a particular mission. The embassies were received at the court of Samudragupta form the king of Ceylon and at the court of Chālukya ruler Pulakeśin II (*c.* 630) from the king of Persia ; but they were for specific purposes only. The Indian embassies that went to China or Rome were also something like the modern missions of good will, making some presents to the kings concerned and requesting some commercial concessions. In Europe too regular permanent embassies started only late in the medieval period. The Sanskrit word for ambassador, *dūta*, literally means a messenger and suggests that he visited the foreign court for a particular purpose or mission. The instructions given to the *dūta* in the *Arthaśāstra* (Bk. I, chap. 16) show that he was to reside in the foreign court only till he felt that there was still a possibility of his mission succeeding ; otherwise he was to return.

c21.45

Heads of the missions sent to foreign countries were classified into three categories. *Nisṛishṭārtha* ambassador was one who had the full powers of negotiations and *parimitārtha* was one who could not deviate from his instructions. *Śāsanahara-dūta* was merely to deliver the message and take back the reply ; he could not negotiate at all.¹ In ancient as in modern times, the ambassador was a licensed and open spy ; during his stay at the foreign court, he was to cultivate friendly relations with the officials with a view to get a clue to the real policy of the government. He was also to see that the terms of earlier treaties were observed by the king to whose court he was accrediated and also to impress upon him how his own king was very strong and had rich resources. He was to guage the general situation, estimate the state's resources in men and money and get a first hand information from his own spies about the condition of the defences and forts of the country. He was to send his reports home in a cipher code (*gūḍhalekha*).²

c21.46

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. I. Chap. 16

c21.47

² *Ibid.*

c21.48

The person of the ambassador was regarded as inviolable in ancient as in modern times. *Dūta* is a mere messenger, says the *Rāmāyaṇa*, delivering his master's message, and so he should not be punished even if he is provoking.³ The *Mahābhārata* declars that a king who kills an ambassador will go to hell along with all his ministers.⁴ Even when hostilities start, the *dūta* and his entourage are not to be touched.⁵ If, however, he misbehaved, he could be branded or disfigured, as was done by Rāvaṇa in the case of Māruti.

c21.49

³ ब्रुवन्परार्थं परवान्न दूतो वधमर्हति ।

c21.50

⁴ दूतस्य हंता निरयमाविशेत्ससचिवैः सह ॥ X. 85. 26

c21.51

⁵ *Nītiprakāśa*, VII. 64

c21.52

Even when occasional embassies were not on visit in a neighbouring state, spies were always at work to fish out useful information. Some of them lived in the guise of students and others in that of ascetics or merchants. Prostitutes and dancing girls were also extensively employed; many of them used to manage to get service as betel-bearers or umbrella bearers in the court and so manage to be nearest to the king with a view to find out what was passing in the innermost circles of government.

c21.53

There was free intercourse between neighbouring states in time of peace. Passports were of course necessary for entry, but when they were procured, further movements were unrestricted. Foreign merchants visiting the country regularly were not required to procure a passport for every visit. Suspicious looking persons were arrested at ports and were not allowed to proceed.¹ The state kept a watchful eye over the foreigners and noted their movements and actions carefullty with a view to find out whether they were functioning as spies. There was no restriction on the imports and exports of goods ; of course the necessary customs duties had to be paid.

c21.54

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. II. Chap. 28

c21.55

Ships that touched the harbours on their way elsewhere had to pay port dues. If they were weather-beaten or damaged, all facilities were offered to them for repairs and re-equipment.² Sometimes some states used to confiscate all articles on such ships, if they touched at places other than regular ports ; but this practice was not usually approved. Kākatīya king Rudradeva claims the credit of having stamped out this practice.-

c21.56

² *Ibid*.

Relations with Feudatories

c21.s1.1

Feudatory or semi-independent states existed in large numbers in ancient India. We have seen already how the conqueror was expected not to annex the territories of a king defeated by him, but to allow his state an autonomous existence under his overlordship. This gave rise to a large number of feudatory states. Their number was further increased when the senior posts of Divisional or Provincial governors began to become hereditary and their incumbants began to be invested with the feudatory titles like *mahārāja*, *sāmanta*, *mahāsāmanta* or *maṇḍaleśvara*. Under the Deccan administrations like those of the Yādavas or the Chālukyas, it becomes very difficult to state whether a particular *mahāmaṇḍaleśvara* was a real feudatory or a provincial viceroy with the feudatory’s titles. The confusion becomes more confounded by the practice prevailing in several localities of appointing defeated feudatories as provincial officers in the empire of the conqueror.

c21.s1.2

³ *E. I.* XII. p. 16

c21.s1.3

Till recently some of the larger Indian feudatory states like those of Hyderabad, Baroda and Kolhapur had their own feudatories; the same was the case in ancient India. Thus king Mātṛivishṇu of Eran (*c.* 480 A. D.) was a subordinate of king Suraśmichandra, who in his turn was a feudatory of the emperor Budhagupta.¹ In 813 A. D. Govinda III was the Rāshtrakūṭa emperor; his nephew Karkka was his feudatory, ruling over southern Gujarat and Sri-Budhavarsha of Salukika family was governing Siharikā 12 as a sub-feudatory, to which position he was raised by the younger brother of Karkka.² It will be thus seen that the feudatories could create their own subfeudatories, probably with the previous permission of the emperor.

c21.s1.4

¹ *C. I. I.*, III. p. 89

c21.s1.5

² *E. I.*, III. p. 53

c21.s1.6

Naturally, therefore, the status and powers of the feudatories were not the same, a circumstance which reminds us of the Indian polity under the British rule in which the different Indian princes enjoyed different privileges. The important feudatories were entitled to the use of feudal throne, fly whisk, palanquin and elephants. They were also authorised to the use of five musical instruments, *śriṅga* (horn), *śaṅkha* (conch), *bherī* (drum) *jayaghaṇṭā* (bell of victory) and *tamaṭa* (?), a privilege that was guardedly conferred by the imperial power. They were usually styled as *mahārājas*, *sāmantas*, *mahāsāmantas*, or *maṇḍasleśvaras*.

c21.s1.7

Śukra (I. 183 ff.) gives an interesting account of the grades and incomes of the different feudatories. Lowest in the rung of the ladder, Sāmanta, had a revenue of a lakh of silver Karshas, roughly equal to Rs. 40,000 of modern days. Then came Māṇḍalika with a revenue of 10 lakhs, Rājā with a revenue of 20 lakhs, Mahārāja with a revenue of 50 lakhs, Samrāṭ with a revenue of a crore, Virāṭ with a revenue of 10 crores and Sārvabhauma with a revenue of 50 crores. The scheme seems to be a theoretical and ideal one; it seems to be based more on the decimal calculations than on the realities of life. When terms like Virāṭ were in use, terms like Sāmanta and Māṇḍalika were non-existent, as also the currency in silver. Śukra's account however would give us sufficient evidence to show that several grades of feudatories existed with varying powers and incomes.

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A representative of the imperial power stayed at the court of feudatory rulers to watch its interests. He exercised power of general control and supervision, similar to those of the Residents or Political Agents under the British rule. They were received, as merchant Sulaiman informs us, with profound respect due to the representatives of the imperial power. They had a large number of spies under them to detect whether the feudatory kings were contemplating sedition or revolt against the imperial power. The feudatories, on the other hand, used to appoint a representative of their own at the imperial court to keep themselves in touch with its latest trends and developments. Thus Bankeya, the feudatory governor of Banavāsi, had a representative of his named Gaṇapati at the court of the Rāshtrakūṭa emperor Amoghavarsha I (*c.* 850 A. D.).¹

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¹ *E. I.*, VI. p. 33

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The control, which the paramount power exercised, naturally varied with the status of the feudatory and its own capacity to check him. General obedience to imperial orders was expected and exacted. The feudatories were usually required to acknowledge their subordinate position in the official charters they issued by mentioning the name of the emperor first. They could not issue their coinage. Attendance at the imperial court was required not only on ceremonial occasions, but also at periodical intervals; epigraphs and literary works usually describe the imperial courts as teaming with feudatories come to pay personal homage to the emperor. A regular tribute had to be paid; sometimes it was sent to the imperial capital; sometimes emperors used to collect it during their tours.² Special presents were also expected on the occasions of festivity in the imperial household like marriage or the birth of a son. The feudatories were also expected to offer their daughters in marriage, in case the emepror was inclined to wed them.

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² *I. A.*, XI. p. 126

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Under the Gupta administration kings, who had been reduced to the feudatory status after a conquest, used to be granted imperial charters regranting them their territories under such conditions as were agreed upon.¹ Whether such a procedure was followed under other administrations, we do not know.

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¹ Allahabad Pillar Inscription of Samudragupta

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As in medieval Europe, the feudatories had to supply a certain number of troops to their feudal lord to participate in his imperial campaigns. Kalachūri prince Soḍhadeva (*c.* 850 A.D.) participated in the Bengal campaign of his suzerain Mihira Bhoja;² Narasimha Chālukya (*c.* 910 A. D.) of southern Karnāṭak is seen fighting in U. P. against the Pratīhāra emperor Mahīpāla on behal of his overlord, the Rāshtrakūṭa emperor Indra III.³ The Chālukyas of Veṅgī had to supply forces to the Rāshtrakūṭas in their wars against the Gaṅgas of Mysore during the 9th century. Nāgarasa, a feudatory of the Gaṅgas, had, at the bidding of his sovereign, to participate with his own forces in a feud between Ayyapadeva and Vīramahendra, wherein he lost his life.⁴ Many such instances are known; the above are mere typical ones.

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² *E. I.*, XII. p. 101

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³ *Rāshtrakūṭas*, p. 265

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⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-4

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The measure of internal autonomy varied according to circumstances. Bigger feudatories like the Uchchakalpas, the Parivrājakas and the Varmans under the Guptas, the Gujarat branch rulers under the Rāshtrakūṭas, and the Śilāhāra kings under the Chālukyas and the Yādavas enjoyed large amount of internal autonomy. Some of them like the Uchchakalpas do not even refer to the Imperial power in their land-grants; but this procedure was rather exceptional. Subject to the payment of a certain amount of tribute, they enjoyed full internal autonomy. They could create their own sub-feudatories and appoint their own officers. They could assign taxes, alienate villages and even sell them without any reference to the imperial power.⁵

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⁵ *I. A.*, XIII. p. 136; *E. I.*, III. p. 310 The Uchchakalpa, Parivrājaka and Gujarat Rāshtrakūṭa charters were usually issued without the sanction of the imperial power

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How slender was the control which the proud feudatories were generally disposed to tolerate can be judged from the following extract from a letter of Akkham, the Lohana chief of Brahmanabad, to Chacha, who called upon him to recognise his sovereignty; 'I have never shown you opposition or quarrelled with you. Your letter of friendship was received and I was much exalted by it. Our friendship shall remain and no animosity shall arise. I will comply with your orders. You are at liberty to reside at any place within the territory of Brahmanabad. If you have resolved to go in any other direction, there is nobody to prevent you or molest you. I possess such power and influence that I can render you aid.¹

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¹ Elliot and Dowson, I. p. 146

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Smaller feudatories naturally enjoyed far less freedom. Nārāyaṇa Mahārāja and Śatrughna Mahārāja, who were Vākāṭaka feudatories, Rudraṭa who was a feudatory of Vainya-gupta, Paramagula, a subordinate ruler of Gaṅga king Śivamāra and Bhānuśakti, who owed allegiance to the Kadambas,—all felt the necessity of securing imperial sanction for alienating the revenues of some villages in their own states.² When Budhavarsha, a feudatory of the Rāshṭrakūṭa emperor Govinda III, desired to grant a village to counteract the evil influence of Saturn, he had to supplicate for the permission of his feudal lord.³ Śaṅkaragaṇa, a feudatory of the Rāshṭrakūṭa emperor Dhruva, is seen to take the imperial permission when making a village grant.⁴ The Kadambas also exercised a similar control over their feudatories. In the Gurjara Pratīhāra empire feudatories even in the distant provinces like Kathiawar had to take imperial permission for the alienation of land or land revenues, which was usually given through the resident Political Agents, who are often seen signing the copperplate charters on behalf of the imperial power.⁵ The same practice prevailed also under the Paramāras⁶ and was followed in the 7th century in Kashmir.⁷

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² *C. I. I.*, III. p. 236; *I. H. Q.*, VI, p. 53; *E.C.*, X, Gd. 47; *I.A.*, VI, pp. 31-2

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³ *I. A.*, XII. p. 15

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⁴ *E. I.*, IX, p. 195

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⁵ *E. I.*, IX. 9

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⁶ *J. A. S. B.*, VII. pp. 736-9

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⁷ *I. A.*, XIII. p. 98

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Third rate feudatories were subjected to still greater control and interference. Their feudal overlords and even the latter's premiers are often seen granting away villages in their kingdoms. Thus the Rāshṭrakūṭa emperor Kṛishṇa II gave a village in the jurisdiction of a Gujarat feudatory of his, king Chandragupta.¹ The Paramāra king Naravarmā gave twenty ‘ploughs’ of land in a village of his feudatory Rājyadeva.² A feudatory of the Chālukya emperor Someśvara is seen agreeing to pay five gold coins for a certain charity, because he was commanded to do so by the prime-minister of the Emperor.³ Gaṅgadeva, a feudatory of the Paramāra king Jayavarman, is seen making a land grant at the dictate of his sovereign.⁴

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¹ *E. I.*, I. p. 89

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² *P. R. A. S. I. W. C.*, 1920-1, p. 54 ; *Bhandarkar's List*, No. 180

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³ *I. A.*, I. p. 141

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⁴ *E. I.*, IX. pp. 120-3

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Feudatories, who had rebelled and were defeated in war, were subjected to a number of indignities. Kumārapāla (*c.* 1150 A. D.) defeated and dethroned Vikramasiṁha, a feudatory of his, and put the former’s nephew upon the throne.⁵ Sometimes greater humiliations were in store for them ; they were often compelled to sweep the stables of the conqueror.⁶ They had to surrender their treasures, horses and elephants as a punishment for their disloyalty. Often their states were taken over or annexed, usually for a short period.

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⁵ *Kumārapālaprabandha*, p. 42

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⁶ *E. I.*, XVIII. p. 248

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If the Central Governement became weak, the feudatories used to become practically independent. During the decline of the Gurjara Pratīhāra empire, a number of its feudatories quietly assumed the imperial title *mahārājāhdirāja-parameśvara*.⁷ They would discontinue mentioning the emperor’s name in their charter, or refer to it only in a casual manner. Their tributes would become more and more irregular. The imperial power, having become weak, would require their military support, and they could dictate their own terms when giving it. Thus Rāmapāla of Bengal had to pay a heavy price for getting the support of his feudatories to win the throne. If there was a war of succession, their position would be still stronger; they could then take sides and try to put their own nominee on the throne, thus playing the role of the king-makers. On such occasions they could pay off their old scores by imposing their own terms on the new successors ; the latter could hardly get or expect the same obedience to his orders from the feudatories who were his erst-while benefactors. If the emperor was very weak, a war would start among the feudatories for succeeding to the imperial position. At the decline of the Chālukya power, the Yādavas , the Kalachūris and the Hoysalas started a race for the hegemony of the Deccan, in which the first mentioned power eventually succeeded. Such a phenomenon occurred towards the end of almost all the empires.

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⁷ *E. I.*, II. p. 193 ; III. pp. 261 7

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The policy to permit defeated kings to rule as feudatories no doubt protected vested interests and favoured local autonomy. But it also introduced a permanent element of instability in the body politic. Naturally the feudatories were always cherishing the hope of throwing the imperial yoke one day, and the imperial power had to keep a vigilant watch over their actions and intentions. It could not disarm them, because it needed their forces for its own purposes also. Very often the feudatory and the imperial power were in a state of armed neutrality ; the imperial power could maintain its position as long as it managed to keep a balance of power among its feudatories and its own effective hold over all of them. The consequences of this permanent condition of instability will be discussed in the course of the last chapter.

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