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Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan (1200–1550 A.D.) c5: Part I: Political Condition

Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan (1200–1550 A.D.) c5

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English

Contents

Part I: Political Condition

The ‘Sultanate’ and Its Reactions on Muslim Society

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It is still somewhat obscure exactly how and when the title of ‘Sultan’ originated. It was first used by the rulers who set up as independent kings in the former provinces of the Caliph of Baghdad.¹ The terms ‘Sultan’ and ‘Sultanate’ are derived from a common root meaning ‘power, authority’, and are generally applied to that form of State which began to prevail in the Islamic world soon after the first four successors of Muhammad, but which was not originally contemplated by the Qur’an.² A study of the theory of sovereignty under the Sultans of Delhi is full of interest, as it discloses not only the political ideas of the Muslims, but in a wider sense their whole outlook on life. This great change from the theoretic ‘Khilafat’ of the Qur’an to the despotic rule of the Sultans of Islam requires a word of illustration.

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¹ Compare J.R.A.S., 1929, 228 for a Buwaihid ruler called Sultan-ud-daula who died in 415 A.H. Mahmud of Ghazni invaded the Buwaihid territory in 419 A.H.—compare Arnold, 202, for the assumption of the title by the Saljuqs.

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² Compare Holy Qur’an 20 : 30 and the translator’s note on pp. 23-24. The Qur’an wanted to set up a ‘Kingdom of God’ in which the Caliph ‘judges among or rules the creatures of Allah by His Command’. In contrast to this the Sultanat is a purely secular institution signifying the dominion of man over man and not a theocracy.

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The teachings of the Qur’an appear to have worked more or less satisfactorily in the tribal surroundings and the strong democratic traditions of Madina. But as soon as Islam began to expand beyond the limits of a city-state, the ‘Inspired word of God’ failed to be elaborated for the working of a more extensive political structure, and the meagre doctrine of ‘Mashwara’ (counsel) never shaped itself into a workable political institution.³ The political and territorial expansion of Islam, however, continued with great rapidity; it was soon felt necessary to organize the loose fragments of the Arabian tribes under a strong and stable government ruling over a large and ever-growing territory. Injunctions of the Qur'an and the precedents of Madina and its first Caliphs were now subordinated to the need for a strong and compact political structure. It is a singular fact that the Arab thinkers, who deal philosophically with the rise of kingship, point to it as a necessary institution for the maintenance of social order. According to their exposition of the case, kingship was an indispensable condition precedent to civilization. They did not indeed hesitate to declare that even an unjust and oppressive monarchy is better than an unlicensed freedom.¹ In short, the Muslims were faced with a choice between monarchy and anarchy, and they wisely chose the former. Meanwhile the ‘Ulama’ or the learned doctors of Muslim theology, who were confined to Madina, were elaborating a system of Muslim law which had very little to do with the conditions of the Muslim State. This breach of sentiment between Madina, the centre of Muslim orthodoxy, and Damascus, the capital of the Arab Empire, explains why, from the very beginning, so much of Muslim law became purely theoretic in character and began to lay down so many principles that have hardly ever been put into practice.²

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³ Compare Qur’an 42 : 38, ‘Their rule is to take counsel among them-

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¹ Compare Kremer, 25 for a quotation of Tartushi, ‘an unjust kingship is better than an hour of anarchy’. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Ahkam-us-Sultaniya of Al-Mawardi brings no argument from the Qur'an or the Muslim law to condemn the existing institution of the Sultanat.

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² Arnold, 25.

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Muslim society was on the eve of still greater changes. With the fall of Mada’in, the ancient capital (Ctesiphon) of Chosroes, and the transfer of the seat of the Caliph to Baghdad, Persian ideas began to flow in, changing the face of Islam in course of time. On coming into contact with the Persians, the Arabs discovered the political traditions of an ancient people, their extremely practical nature as contrasted with the traditions of Arabia which led to many civil wars in a short time and caused so much trouble, and the facility with which the world they had conquered was ready to assimilate them. It is intelligible how the Muslims came to assimilate the old doctrine of Persian imperialism and fell an easy prey to the culture of their conquered people.¹ In their eager fascination, they did not stop to pick and choose from Persian ideas : they adopted them wholesale in every sphere of life. In political administration, they took over the principles, the organization of various departments, the personality of the Persian monarch—the seraglio, the eunuchs, the slaves and attendants, the State ceremonials, the dresses and royal symbols—the principles of military organization and equipment, the tactics of war, in fact every administrative detail of value ; in social manners they borrowed all the Persian ideas of social pleasures and amusements namely the chase, the games of polo and chess, wine, music, songs and the spring-festival of Nau-ruz ; in mental culture, they assimilated all the Persian ideas not excluding the science of the interpretation of dreams (Ta'bir) and the divination of the Magi.² Of all these ideas the most significant was the theory of divine right of the Persian Kings. From the centre of Baghdad these ideas spread to Ghazni, as to other parts of the Muslim world and made their way from there onto the Indian plains. At Ghazni—to which we may look for the source of the political ideas of the Sultans of Delhi—even the official titles of some of the heads of departments were the same as those at the ancient Persian Court.³ The crown which Sultan Mas'ud wore was only a replica of that of the Chosroes in Ctesiphon⁴; in fact, the whole outlook of the Ghazanawid monarchs and their character and function was in no way very different from that of the ancient Persian Sassanians. In other respects this national Persian tradition found its best poetical expression in the celebrated epic of the Shah-nama which was composed under the patronage of the Ghazanawid court. Herein the legendary heroes of ancient Persia live for ever in the immortal pages of a follower of Muhammad.

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¹ Compare a modern comment on India, Iqbal 176 : ‘Admire my power of working miracles’ exclaimed a Brahman to Mahmud of Ghazni, ‘Thou who didst break all other idols, endeth by enslaving thyself to the charms of Ayaz’.

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² Compare Rawlinson, Seventh Monarchy, Ch. XXVIII.

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³ Compare Rawlinson, Seventh Monarchy, 641-642, e.g., Dabir, Akhurbeg.

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⁴ Compare ibid., 640 and T.F.I., 72.

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Now, the distinctive feature of the Persian monarchy, as has been mentioned, was its claim to divine origin. In relation to his subjects, the Sassanian monarch was ‘their lord and master, absolute disposer of their lives, liberties, and property; the sole foundation of law and right, incapable himself of doing wrong, irresponsible, irresistible—a sort of God upon earth; one whose favour was happiness, at whose frown men trembled, before whom all bowed themselves down, with the lowest and humblest obeisance’.¹ Islam could not easily be reconciled to this bare-faced exposition of despotism, least of all to the divinity of a person on which the whole theory of despotism rested. This difficulty was solved by associating the virtue of divinity with the office of the Sultanate rather than with the person of the Sultan. He was designated as ‘Zill-ullah’ the shadow of the Divine Being.² This, however, did not stop divine honours from being paid to a Sultan, or a monarch from ruling over people ‘as a God in human form’.³ In Hindustan especially, no attempt was made to conceal the position. People had to prostrate themselves before the Sultan of Delhi when he was present, and to stand up even when his name was mentioned as a mark of solemn reverence; when at a distance from Delhi, they bowed towards the seat of the Sultanate.⁴ Salutations were offered to the vacant royal throne whenever a person passed by it, even to the wooden sandals and quiver put on the throne as the symbol of monarchy.⁵ It is related of the Mughal Emperor Humayun, that on the occasion of a public audience, a curtain was drawn before him; and when it was drawn, the whole gathering exclaimed: ‘Behold the illumination of the Divine Being.’ The same monarch was similarly credited with possessing super-human powers.⁶ Under these circumstances, it is to be forgiven if the fancy of a chronicler compared the officers of a Sultan to Gabriel and other angels attending on Allah.¹ Abu’l Fazl was encouraged to advance a step further. He elaborated the mystic theory of ‘The Perfect Man’ (*Insan-i-kamil*), to prove that Akbar had realized the mysteries of human life and was absorbed into the Reality like a Yogi.² An appropriate ceremonial was therefore devised for the public audience of the Mughal emperor : one man cried ‘*Allah-o-Akbar*’ (‘God is Great or *Akbar*’ implying that Akbar the emperor was an incarnation of God); and the other responded by saying ‘*Jalla-Jalalo-hu*’ (literally ‘May his glory increase’. The phrase however mingles the name of Akbar, ‘*Jalal*’).³

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¹ Rawlinson, Five great monarchies III, 202.

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² Compare an early reference, T.F.M., 12.

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³ Compare an interesting reference in F.J., 160.

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⁴ Compare K.K., 221; K.R., II, 74; ibid., I, 62.

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⁵ Compare K.R., II and for sandal, worship, M.T.I., 384-5; the latter may have been borrowed from the ancient Hindu practice referred to in the story of Ramayana.

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⁶ For the curtain ceremony, compare M.T.I., 446 which is supported by other evidence. This ancient custom of the Sassanians is referred to later in a quotation from Huart. For super-human claims, T.W., 57.

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¹ Compare B., 578.

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² Compare A.N.I., 5.

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³ Compare a description in A.A.I., 160. For a parallel, see S.I., 313, 326-327 for ‘the image of God on earth’ in the ‘Policraticus’ of John of Salisbury; also Shastri, Preface, XIII.

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This was obviously a very difficult position for the followers of Muhammad to reconcile with the Qur’an. Reference will be made later to the position of the theologians who compromised with the monarchy, and the puritans and Sufis who broke away from the monarchy, in fact from the whole Muslim of society. It suffices for the moment to say that the position was so safe that ‘Ala-ud-din Khilji contemplated founding a religion; Muhammad Tughlaq was credited with similar intentions; and Akbar actually founded a new faith.⁴

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⁴ For ‘Ala-ud-din see B., 262-264.

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Under such circumstances, the Sultan of Delhi was in theory an unlimited despot, bound by no law, subject to no ministerial check, and guided by no will except his own. The people had no rights, only obligations; they only lived to carry out his commands.⁵

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⁵ Compare the doctrine of expediency vs. the teachings of the Qur’an in B. 400-1. Compare the gift of his sovereignty by Humayun to a water-carrier and slave and Kamran’s criticism of the act, T.W., 25b and A.N.I., 160. Compare the amusing story of a Sultan of Bengal signing away Isfahan to a visiting merchant and how his councillors, who dared not remind him that Isfahan was not included in his dominions, met the situation, Raverty 579. See remarks of Barani in B(MS.) 114—compare as a parallel advice of Occleve to Prince Henry in S. III, 500 : that ‘Lawe is both lookke and key of suerte’. Compare also T.W., 106 where Humayun reminds his followers of the magnificent example of sacrifice shown by the 12,000 guards of the Safavi monarch Isma’il who jumped into a ravine to fetch his falling handkerchief and thus perished to a man.

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The position of the Sultans was made easier in the Indian environment by the submissiveness of the masses of the people, and by Hindu institutions and political traditions. In ancient times tyrants as well as benevolent monarchs had ruled India, but all this depended on the personal attributes of a monarch; the system did not recognize the right of the people to active participation in the State.¹ It is somewhat difficult to see how the Hindus of Hindustan could resist the development of despotic rule in view of the existence of village communities and the system of caste. I will add a word to explain the political significance of these two factors in Hindu social life.

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¹ Compare Tod, I, 376; where he explains how the virtues of a Rajput monarch will exalt a kingdom to the summit of prosperity as the vice of a successor will plunge it into the abyss of degradation : again in II, 939 where he speaks of the permanent exclusion of the people from all share in the State under Rajput rule.

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The Indian village communities, once familiarized by Sir Henry Maine, have found a host of enthusiastic but somewhat uncritical admirers, who have not hesitated to compare them with any self-sufficient and self-governing political community, even with those of the Greek city-states. For a time they were believed to be a peculiar racial gift of the Aryans. However, it is being slowly realized now, that instead of being a peculiarity of a race or a country, the village communities only represent a distinct phase in the social development of mankind. The right of the commune appears in the indivisibility of the common waste and forest lands and the regulation of vacant shares. It was probably suffered to be independent in certain matters of internal concern, in making certain rules, in the choosing of the elders, in distributing among its members the direct taxes which the Government imposed.² If the available records of Indian village communities in the past can be any guide in the matter, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that their existence has helped rather than checked the despotic tendencies of Indian monarchs. The life of an Indian village community is too insular, its groups too isolated, and the whole of its outlook too occupational, to form a useful asset to the political life of the country. In times of exceptional danger, a commune organized some sort of defence and guarded the village from the inroads of an invader.¹ But such instances of concerted action are more or less on the same footing as their measures for protecting their crops from a pest of locusts, or their homes from a band of robbers. It does not show any wider political consciousness than what was absolutely necessary to preserve themselves and their home-lands. Even in such cases, the attitude of propertyless and segregated low castes dwelling on the skirts of the village may have been uncertain. For our immediate purpose, it may safely be concluded that the village communities of Hindustan, which comprised the vast majority of the population, did not present any serious administrative problem to the Sultans of Delhi.² We are not concerned here with their economic and social aspects.

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² Compare Mill, I, 313-14; for a report of the Committee of the House of Commons on the village communities of India ; compare Kovalevsky for Russian village communities, pp. 72, 82-3, 92; compare Tod, I, 574, where he makes it plain that the legislation of the village commune in minor matters only shows the neglect of the State, which extracted heavy taxes from the people without providing them with laws for guidance or police for protection.

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¹ Compare K.R., II, 92-94 for an instance of resistance. Many other instances are found in the accounts of Timur's invasions.

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² Compare the opinion of Moreland, Agrarian system, etc., 64.

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The second factor is the caste system with its necessary corollary, the theory of *Dharma*. It has been rightly held that caste and the Hindu theory of *Dharma* encourage a feeling of charity and consideration towards both men and animals and lead to a general contentment among the people.³ It may be further conceded that the institution of caste has greatly contributed towards the preservation of Hindu society. All these considerations, though very strong, are hardly sufficient to justify the system. Politically, it means the permanent domination of the higher classes over the lower, which results in the decay of both. Among the main features of the caste system : it leads to the creation of a leisured class composed of the learned and the strong, with supposed inborn attributes and inherited privileges, and another class composed of labourers to whom it assigns a degraded social status ; finally, it gives to these ingenious arrangements the most sacred and positive sanctions. The spiritual basis for this doctrine was supplied by the doctrine of *Karma* or the Law of the Deed. So that the argument is purely scriptural and places the inequalities of the caste system on a moral order of which God's will is the guardian and embodiment, and the created beings have only to thank themselves for their ill plight.¹ From these follows the theory of *Dharma* or the respective duties of various castes, though the term is difficult to render in a foreign language.

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³ For instance, by F.W. Thomas.

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¹ Compare Carpenter, 321. For an illustration of ‘Dharma,’ see PP. 110-111.

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The reaction of these theories was bound to be far-reaching on Hindu political thought. Hindu religious ideas began to predominate in both the State and the Church, in fact the State began to represent only an agency to enforce a part of the religious ordinances. To every part of the State religion assigned its proper function, to transgress which was not only a crime against the State but also a sin against the Divine Being. According to this conception of the State, the king was held to rule by divine right and to be in a sense a God himself, being only tied to the advice of a Brahman. Provisions were made to secure a sort of benevolent and paternal monarch, without, however, any right of rebellion on the part of the subjects if he turned out otherwise. The appeal was limited to his conscience, and if he violated the *Dharma*, consolation, if any, could be drawn from the belief that the outraged law would avenge itself on a tyrant in a second and inevitable birth.² The Hindu monarchs who arose, especially during our period when the possible check of Brahman hierarchy had ceased to operate, approximated to the Muslim ideal of a Sultan.³ In one prominent instance, when Maharaja Sanga was once wounded and disfigured in a battle against the Lodi Sultan Ibrahim, he hesitated to mount the throne, as it was an ‘ancient and well-established rule in India that when an idol was injured and a part of it knocked off, it ceased to be a fit object of worship and another was installed in its place. Similarly, the royal throne being a place of worship for the people, its occupant should also be a person who is entire and who is able to render full service to the State’.¹ This is not the proper place to discuss the merits of the theory of divine monarchy, but one observation may be made to explain the political situation on the eve of Muslim conquest. When a king aspires to the position of a divine being, he deprives himself of the privilege of suffering misfortunes and miseries like other human mortals, while maintaining his position in spite of them. He rules only so long as he succeeds ; one little disaster, one chance defeat, and the whole fabric of the State breaks down. Under such a scheme of government, the masses of people, already living in intellectual isolation, become ever more indifferent to the fortunes of their monarch and the political destiny of their kingdom. It may be questioned under these circumstances if a feeling of patriotism ever extends to the people as a whole outside the ruling classes.² The political situation in India was still more aggravated by the inborn incapacity of the Rajputs to form a strong and united government, and consequently their willing or unwilling assent to the existence of the supremacy of an outside power.³

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² Compare F.W. Thomas, 9-10; compare Vidyapati for plotting as a sin in PP. 115.

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³ Compare Vidyapati for the popular conception of an ideal Hindu monarch : he who is well versed in the science of punishment, enjoys pleasures, conquers the four quarters, kills all his foes in battle, offers oblations to the fire and sacrifices to the deities and distributes gold among the supplicants. *Vide* PP. 164, 166. Curiously enough both the Muslim and the Hindu terms for politics (*Siyasat* and *Danda-niti*) are identical in meaning and significance. It may be suggested, though there is little evidence at present to support the suggestion, that perhaps ancient Persia was the common source of both Hindu and Muslim political ideas from which both of them borrowed independently at different intervals.

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¹ Compare Sarda, Sanga, 58-59.

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² Compare the sentiments of Lalla, Temple, 207 ; compare Macauliffe, 1, 109, 117 for Nanak.

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³ Compare Z.W., II, 807 for an interesting case where the mother of Hamira Deva of Ranthambhor herself stops the Rajput chief from shooting his enemy, the Sultan ‘Ala-ud-din Khalji of Delhi, and supports the moral right of the Sultan to rule over the Rajputs ; compare Tod’s estimate of the Rajputs, Vol. I, 483 : compare the theoretical appreciation of a united government in a story of J.H., 86.

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Under the accumulated force of all these principal political factors, the Hindu political structure gave way at the first approach of a powerful foreign invader. The masses of the people had seen the Huns, the Scythians, the Kushans, the Greeks, the Persians, and the Rajputs ruling over them. There was nothing particularly repulsive in an Arab, a Turk, or any other Muslim for that matter. No sooner did the Arab set foot on the soil of Sind than the Hindu Jat offered to help him, and the other outcasts welcomed him ; the great majority of people watched the fight of the ruling classes and the foreign invader with indifference, and the defeat of the former with a feeling relief. The approach of the Turkish invader witnessed a similar spectacle.

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After this digression, let us revert to the Sultan and examine how his powers though absolute and unlimited in theory had to submit to certain well-marked modifications in actual practice. In the circumstances so far dwelt upon, the Sultans (as their Hindu predecessors before them) were faced with an irresistible temptation to confine the main functions of government to what were usually termed the two royal duties of *Jahangiri* and *Jahandari*, or the conquest and consolidation of new territories. Small, prosperous, and well-managed kingdoms were outside the scheme of their political ideas. Hardly a true Sultan but was haunted by the ambition of territorial expansion, until at last the invasions of the Deccan were looked upon as a ‘necessary departmental section of the administration of Empire’.¹ To begin with, before the possessions of Iltutmish were consolidated, dreams of conquest began to overpower the imagination of Sultan Balban who worked out his ideas almost with the precision of mathematical formulae. He was extremely sorry that the state of affairs in his kingdom did not permit him to put them into practice against the distant kingdoms of Hindu rulers.² It was a most miserable situation indeed for a Sultan to find himself occupied with the prosaic problems of every-day administration, when another adventurous and fortunate leader of men was leading his armies into the field or besieging a fortress.³ Distance and physical barriers were no impediment to this ambition for conquest. Bakhtyar Khalji had very early pointed the way in the direction of Tibet.⁴ At a later date Muhammad Tughluq was making plans to conquer Khurasan to the west and other lands beyond. In this respect, however, ‘Ala-ud-din Khalji leads them all, for he dreamt of going about the world as the second Alexander, and ruling the kingdom of Delhi, as so many others, through a deputy.⁵ When the monarch condescended to confine himself to the conquest of the Deccan, for practical reasons, this position was only too mortifying to the ambitious monarch and to his rich imagination. Briefly speaking, the Sultans went on conquering one country after another until the kingdom became too unwieldy for administrative purposes and sank under its own weight. However, the growth of the Sultanat symbolized continuous territorial expansion and warfare. This conspicuous feature of the Sultanate imperceptibly set certain limits to the unbounded powers of the monarch. No foreign conquest was possible without peace within the kingdom. Before making war on the enemy, it was necessary for the Sultan to make peace with his own subjects.¹

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¹ E. Thomas, 187.

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² Compare B., 51; for this formulation : Balban believed he could conquer and consolidate a new territory with 1,00,000 combatants and 12,000 persons willing to settle down and colonize ; compare Tod, II, 594 for a similar view of Rajputs : ‘with two thousand men you may eat *khichri* ; with one thousand *dal-bhat* ; with 5 hundred *juti* (the shoe) *i.e.*, indelible disgrace’.

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³ Compare the sentiments of Sher Shah in T.S.S., 51 ; another characteristic expression in Q.S., 48-49.

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⁴ Compare Raverty, 560.

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⁵ Compare the feelings of ‘Ala-ud-din on the subject in Barani B., (MS.), 137.

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¹ Compare the wise remarks of ‘Afif in a verse in A., 471: ‘Make peace with thy subjects and then brave thy enemy’ for the army of a just Sultan is composed of all those people over whom he rules.

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Again, the necessity of organizing the administration of the country made it incumbent upon the Sultans to acknowledge at least some elementary principles of civilized government, strict adherence to some standards of justice between various classes being one of them. For the collection of taxes and Government dues, it was similarly essential to give security and protection to the vast masses of peasants and craftsmen, even against the members of the ruling classes, which further implied an outward respect for and tolerance of their deep-rooted sentiments. Hindustan, like other agricultural countries, is a land of deep-seated custom and tradition; although the Muslim Sultan and his nobles may smile at the fanciful laws and the ludicrous practices of the Hindus, or even attempt to reform their ways where they appear to be palpably monstrous, they may not ridicule Hindu manners in public, much less supplant them. As a matter of fact, the iconoclastic Muslims soon learned to admire and to assimilate Hinduism and Indian customs to such a degree that the pious Muslim invader Timur made it an excuse for attacking the territory of the Muslim kingdom of Delhi.²

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² Compare Z.N.K., 123; Z.N., 422.

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Another limitation was put on the powers of the Sultan by the requirements of a faith which he professed in common with other members of the ruling classes. The Sultan may not have been a believing Muslim in his private life nor cared seriously for the welfare of the faith, but he had to maintain an outward show of respect for the rituals and the symbols of Islam; in the case of the early Sultans of Delhi, their faith was about the only principle of union and cohesion in the conquering tribe. A show of respect to Islam further enhanced the prestige of the ruler.¹

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¹ Compare an examination of the religious nature of the Muslim invasions in Muhammad Habib’s ‘Mahmud of Ghazni’.

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The exalted nature of the office of the Sultan, surrounded as it was by a halo of divinity, compelled the monarch to conform to a standard of benevolence and generosity far above other people. In this respect a long and hallowed tradition of magnanimity, chivalry, forgiveness, generosity, benevolence, and of other noble virtues was built around the person of the Sultan, which made the rule of a despot not only possible but also attractive. Both the Persian and the Indian tradition were rich in this direction.²

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² For the treatment of these virtues, see chapter on ‘Manners’—compare Tod I, 366-7 for illustration from Rajput history.

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For practical and administrative reasons, the monarch had to follow a definite course of policy. In the beginning he did not go very far beyond paying his soldiers and his nobles handsome emoluments and showing a general indulgence and benevolence to the people under his rule. In course of time, however, when the militant fury of the invader cooled down, and the warrior learned to turn his sword into a ploughshare, the Sultanate added other normal functions of peaceful administration. The Sultan now began to be looked upon as a public protector and undertook to guard the security of high-ways, to provide facilities for trade and commerce, to give his subjects relief in famines and other calamities and to give even-handed justice and redress for every wrong committed against anyone. These paternal features of the Sultanate come into prominence as we proceed towards the close of the period.³

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³ Compare I.K.I., 18, 19-26, 37-38, where Amir Khusrau estimates the achievements of Sultan, ‘Ala-ud-din Khalji not only by his conquests in the Deccan but also by the measures with which he attempted to secure the administration of justice, the prosperity of the people and the security of the empire.

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In short, though theoretically there were no conceivable limits to the power of a Sultan, the facts of the case and practical necessities set many limitations to the sovereignty of a monarch to adapt it to the Indian environment and make a healthy development of society possible.¹

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¹ Compare Lybyer, 19, for the view of one of the earliest Muslim political philosophers of Central Asia which he summarises in a few verses :—

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We come now to the next phase of our enquiry, how and to what extent the religious ideals of Islam were affected by the purely secular nature of the Muslim State. We have noted in the beginning how the practical politics of Islam were divorced from the theory of the Qur'an with the transfer of governmental machinery from Madina to Damascus. This transfer of power to Syria also synchronised with a deeper change of outlook among the rulers of Islam, hardly contemplated by the Prophet. Muhammad had lived in want and poverty all his life. He was proud of being poor, and is even credited with insisting that his genuine followers should follow him in this respect and should not amass wealth and property.² His ‘Companions’ and immediate successors observed these traditions of simple and poor living. With the fall of the rich cities of the neighbouring empires and especially of Mada’in, when wealth began to pour into the capital of Islam and the followers of Muhammad began to grow fond of the good things of this world, pious and far-seeing Muslims began to feel disturbed at the prospect of material advancement and spiritual impoverishment. However, nothing could stem the tide and the consequent change in the spiritual outlook for the worse. As early as the reign of the third Caliph, ‘Usman, Abu Zar Ghifari, a pious and well-known ‘Companion’ of the Prophet, was exiled to the desert for no greater crime against Islam than that of condemning the growing wealth and the materialistic outlook of the Muslim community in uncompromising terms.³ When the Muslim power moved to Baghdad, these decaying relics of early Islam were left far behind, and, as has been pointed out, the Mulsim Caliphs and the Sultans came out as the exact copy

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² Compare some traditions in Wensick, 188.

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³ For details of this instructive story, see Muir, 225.

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‘In order to hold a land, one needs troops and men ;
In order to keep troops, one must divide out property ;
In order to have property, one needs a rich people ;
Only laws create the riches of a people :
If one of these be lacking, all four are lacking ;
When all four are lacking, the dominion goes to pieces.’

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and true successors of the old Persian emperors. Religion and spiritual acquirements were more or less out of place in the new atmosphere.¹ On the other hand the demands of the flesh and the devil began to be cultivated with a fervour and enthusiasm worthy of a better cause.² When the Muslims established themselves in Hindustan, the rich plains and the resources of the country opened up greater opportunities of indulgence than were at the command of the Ghaznawid monarchs in their mountainous country, or elsewhere in the Muslim world. When the Muslim State developed, it incorporated many non-Islamic features apart from the powers and the nature of monarchy. For instance, the Sultanate was based purely on force ; tyranny was essential for its working ; the State treasury was the personal property of the Sultan ; extravagant and wasteful expenditure was the rule ; an indiscriminate shedding of blood irrespective of the distinction of Muslim and non-Muslim was dictated by the policy of the State.³ Even considerations of kinship had no place in the theory of monarchy ;

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the murder and assassination of kinsmen, however, repugnant to the sense of religion or humanity, were committed without much sense of shame or fear of public opinion.⁴ In other respects, the working of the Sultanate super-imposed upon Muslim law quite novel features, hard to reconcile with the dictates of the *Shari'at*, but essential for the ‘exigencies of better government’.¹ Similarly, the Sultanate violated many well-known laws of Islam, for instance, the principle of electing a monarch, the law of inheritance defining the shares of inherited property and the principles of apportioning them, the strict distinction between what is permitted (*halal*) and what is forbidden (*haram*). In fact, as a shrewd statesman of the age observed, the Sultanate had formulated its own laws, which were on a different footing from those of Islam. The laws of the Sultanate could be summarised in one phrase—the will of the Sultan.² Any, even the loosest interpretation of political ideals of the Qur’an, could not be reconciled with this glaring and bare-faced absolutism. However, there was no power in the hands of religious people to compel the Sultanate to modify its political ideals. The division between practical politics and the religious ideals of Islam became as clear as can be imagined. There were only two courses left for religious-minded people to follow : either to leave the Sultan severely alone in his undisputed possession, or to come to terms with him.

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The extreme *Sufis* and the ascetics adopted one course, the *Ulama* or the theologians the other. It was as unwise as it was unpractical in a country where the Muslims were surrounded by ‘infidels’ on all sides, to drag matters to extremes. The orthodox theologians had associated too long with the secular government to care for a doubtful martyrdom in a fierce civil war. The orthodox and puritanical section of the *Sufis* and the ascetics as a whole, preferred to retire from the world to devote themselves to the care of the spirit, which after all was all that mattered to them.³ We have already pointed out that, short of interference in state matters, the Sultans were willing to safeguard the honour and observances of Islam irrespective of their personal attitude towards religion. In these circumstances it was comparatively easy to come to an understanding with at least one class of religious persons, the orthodox *Ulama*. Just at the commencement of the Muslim rule in Hindustan, we find a statesman and scholar summarizing the position as follows. According to him, the religious functions of a Sultan were confined to the following specified duties ; namely, the reading of the *Khutba* for the Friday and *‘Id* prayers ; the fixing of the extent and the limits of religious prohibitions ; the collecting of taxes for charitable purposes ; the waging of wars in defence of the faith ; the adjudication of disputes when the parties were Muslim, and the hearing of complaints ;

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the enforcement of measures for the defence of the kingdom and the extermination of rebels and disturbers of the peace ; finally, the suppression of innovations in religion and religious practices which militated against the spirit of Islam.¹ The Sultan further set apart certain funds from his treasury for religious and charitable purposes, as a matter of grace, though it was no part of his religious duties towards Islam.² At a later date Ziya-ud-din Barani relates what Sultan Iltutmish thought of the relations between Islam and the Sultanate. The monarch did not hesitate to admit the pagan extraction and the essentially secular nature of the Sultanate. He also frankly confessed that there was absolutely no room within the state for a monarch to take up the role of a ‘defender of the faith’ (*Din-panah*) except in four specific matters: first, in maintaining the purity of the Muslim creed, which implied the suppression of aggressive heathenism and a general support for the observance of Muslim doctrines ; secondly, in punishing glaring and open lapses from the approved orthodox conduct, within the limits of his kingdom ; thirdly, in appointing genuinely religious and God-fearing Muslims to the religious offices in the government ; and lastly, in administering justice to everybody without distinction.³ This statement of position does not differ in any substantial degree from the earlier exposition.

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For practical purposes the only tangible result was as follows : the Sultan appointed a few religious-minded and influential Muslims to certain judicial posts, and thereby disarmed the opposition by snatching from them all potentially dangerous and capable leaders. He further undertook to defend Islam in a general way which, as has been pointed out, was in any case necessary to maintain the identity of the Sultans and even their existence in what one might call the vast ocean of Hindu population.

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¹ Compare an amusing story of Mahmud of Ghazni in T.F.I., 61 : how a rich merchant of Nishapur was accused of Carmatian heresy and brought before the Sultan for trial. The 'just' monarch, on the merchant's surrendering his wealth to him, gave the accused a certificate bearing witness to his orthodox and correct beliefs and acquitted him. Similarly, the story of Mahmud's plan of occupying Gujrat and exploiting the gold mines of Pegu and Serendip and his violent grief on parting with his treasure on his death-bed.

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² Compare T.B., 135; for Prince Mas'ud's residential quarters in Herat, their sensuous surroundings and the concealed gallery of nude female paintings. See numerous stories of drinking in the same book.

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³ Compare T.D., 6 for the basis of the State; B. 188-189 for a discussion on tyranny and extravagance, and pp. 292-293 on the position of the State treasury. Compare the question of shedding Muslim blood in relation to the Sultanate in Barani, B. 235-36 ; and B (MS.) 100. According to the clear injunctions of the Qur'an, shedding of Muslim blood is one of the capital offences against Islam (vide 4 : 93). Compare also, Barani's estimate of Balban, who, religious in other respects, had no scruples in shedding blood—in B. 47-48.

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⁴ Compare Khusrau's remarks in D.R., 241. Compare as a paralle the interesting enactment of Sultan Muhammad II of Turkey authorizing the heir-apparent to execute his brothers. Lybyer, 9.

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¹ Compare Barani’s exposition of the seven recognized cases of capital punishment, out of which four cases were unknown to Muslim law—B. 511.

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² Compare B. (MS.) 96-7; for an instructive discussion of the wohle question between Sultan Jalal-ud-din and his nephew Ahmad Chap.

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³ Compare the sentiment of Khusrau in D.R., 21-2 ; also compare Hafiz—Brown II, 279 Princes (alone) know the secrets of their kingdom. O Hafiz, thou art a beggarly recluse ; hold thy peace.

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¹ Compare Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah in T.F.M., 13-14.

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² For example compare T.F.M., 35.

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³ Compare B., 41-4.

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To give a form to their religious functions, the Sultans of Delhi instituted a number of fictitious ceremonials. They created a few religious offices like that of the *Shaikh-ul-Islam* and the *Sadr-us-sudur* with which we are not concerned here. Among the ceremonials : the form of the religious *Bai'at* (oath of fealty to the *Imam* or the religious head of Islam) was maintained ; the reign of the monarch opened with a consequential change in the bidding prayer (*khutba*) which was solemnly read from the pulpit of the principal mosque, and an appropriate legend was inscribed on the new coinage.¹ The Sultan usually appointed a *Mashaf-bardar* (Qur'an-bearer) who carried about the Holy Book with solemnity and becoming dignity.² Handsome endowments were made for religious institutions and the study of Muslim theology, and several mosques were constructed. The Sultan attended the Friday prayers, and in any case, joined the congregation in the *Idgah* for the two annual prayers with great pomp and ceremony.³ In other respects, he avoided giving provocation and offence to the susceptibilities of the people by an open breach of the Muslim law. For instance, the excessive number of his wives and concubines was confined to the closed Haram, and the drinking of wine was done in private except on very exceptional occasions.

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The occasions of political wars against the Hindu rulers were especially reserved for the display of aggressive religious fervour, and the spirit of (*Jihad*) militant zeal ; though no indiscreet effusions were tolerated against the Hindu subjects of the state as a rule. Mysticism and deeply religious platitudes were frequently discussed in royal circles. In one case, a provincial Sultan even scrupulously enquired regarding ‘the supply of lawful vegetables for his table’, though the farce was a little over-done, since the Sultan was, at the same time, carrying on war against a brother Muslim with all the fervour of religious *jihad*.¹ The Ulama, for their part, undertook to forge or find religious and moral support for the Sultanate, thereby strengthening the position of the Sultans of Delhi. The Qur'anic injunction 'Obey Allah and obey the Apostle, and those in authority from among you' was discovered to be full of great possibilities of ingenious interpretation. The reigning Sultans of Delhi were identified with the persone meant in the text 'those in authority from among you' (*Ulul-amr-i-min-kum*). Suitable supporting Traditions of the Prophet were similarly discovered purporting to mean that obedience to the commands of an *Imam* (in this case, the Sultan) was similar to obedience rendered to the injunctions of Muhammad or the commands of Allah. Thus by simple logic, the status of a Sultan was raised to that of a Divine being, in matters of obedience.

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Every breach of a royal command, grievous sin as it was, involved a dire punishment in the next world. It was not open to the Muslims to exercise the right of choosing an *Imam*. They had simply to carry out his orders, even if the Sultan was 'a slave and a negro and mutilated of form'.² In other respects, the Ulama preached the new doctrine that the secular state was a twin sister of the faith, only different in the nature of its functions. From this standpoint, the functions of a Sultan were hardly inferior to those of the Prophets of the Lord; in fact, just as the prophets guide the world in spiritual matters, so the Sultans also conduct secular matters which is only a counterpart of the same function.³ They gave their support to the doctrine that every resistance to royal commands was a criminal act on the part of the person so resisting, even if the monarch was a tyrant, and absolutely and palpably in the wrong, and the person so resisting was avowedly striving to restore equity and justice in the dominions.¹ In this case, the person accused of resisting the royal commands was not only a dangerous criminal in the eyes of the state, but also a heinous sinner in the eyes of the sacred law of Islam : so that, if he happened to be killed, a decent burial was not his share : he was doomed to die unmourned and unsung.

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The theologians, similarly, authorized the state to expropriate from people any property or money it deemed fit in cases of military exigencies, and to distribute it ‘among the soldiers of Islam’.² In short, the ‘Ulama subscribed to the proposition : ‘He who obeys the Sultan, obeys the Lord Merciful’.³ When the Mughul Emperor Akbar laid claims to the exclusive religious and secular leadership of the Indian Muslims and the whole country agreed to this position without much protest, it was only a natural consummation of these developments. Under this dispensation, the *Imam-i-‘Adil* (‘the just Imam,’ otherwise the Sultan) acquired the right of superseding the consensus of the most approved theological opinion on any point at issue, and of giving his own interpretation to the injunctions of the Qur’an guided by very general provisions : nor was his decision to be disputed by anybody in the kingdom. This was the pinnacle of secular power : Islam became not only subordinate, but actually and definitely subservient to the state. The state in its turn assumed a divine character, both the benevolence and the persecutions of a monarch being divine attributes.⁴ We do not deny that many orthodox theologians like Bada’uni did not submit to this position, or only submitted with extreme reluctance, and that some earlier monarchs like Jalal-ud-din Khalji tried to be sincerely religious. But such isolated examples were not strong enough to influence the irresistible course of events.

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¹ For Bai'at compare instances in Raverty 649 and 246 : T.M.S., 459.

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² Amir Khusrau occupied the post of a Qur'an-bearer. Compare B., 198.

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³ For a description of a royal procession of ‘Id, see chapter on ‘Amusements.’

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¹ Compare C.H. I, III, 361 for the anecdote. For the position of the Hindus in the State, see an article of Professor Muhammad Habib in the Hindustan Review, 1924, 'The empire of Delhi, etc. etc.' Compare the remarks of Abu'l Fazl in A.A., II, 2 how Akbar attempted to 'convert the thorny field of enmity into a garden of amity and friendship'. His efforts in cementing the two communities of Hindus and Muslims are well known though it is often forgotten that his measures would have been almost fruitless without the groundwork of his predecessors in this direction.

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² Compare for a discussion of the question T.F.M., 12-13; for the verse of the Qur'an, Holy Qur'an, 4 : 59.

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³ Compare T.M.S., 331 for the position of the State in relation to religion, also a shrewd interpretation of Mahmud Gawan on the verse of the Qur'an 21 : 105 'the pious alone inherit the earth'—R.I., 36.

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¹ Compare the reflections of Barani, Khvandmir and Firishta in B. 27, K. 122 and in the preface of T.F. respectively. It became quite popular later to commence a book by emphasizing the essentially divine and spiritual nature of monarchy. Compare for instance, Abu’l Fazl.

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² Compare for fuller discussion F.F., 191-2.

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³ Compare Thomas E., 249-250 for this inscription on the coin of Muhammad Tughluq and the clever use he wanted to make of this popular though fabricated Tradition, in passing his brass coins for silver : compare also Burn, 8. It is wrong, however, to suppose that it is an injunction of the Qur’an. The fact that this saying cannot be traced in any authentic book of Traditions, lends the strongest support to the view that it was a fabrication.

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⁴ For a discussion of Akbar’s Infallibility decree, see M.I., II, 210-. See another interpretation in J.R.A.S., 1924 ; for persecution as a divine attribute of the Sultan, T.A.I. I.

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In this connection, it may not be without some interest to note the reactions of these political conditions on some philosophic thought concerning the origins of political society and principles of political obligations, which was formulated on lines not very different from those taken by Hobbes, though much earlier in time.¹ Almost from the very beginning of the establishment of the Sultanate in Delhi, a tradition attributed to the Prophet, like so many others, came to be widely popular. The Prophet was reported to have said ‘If there be no Sultan, the people will devour one another’. Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah mentions this in both of his books as a perfectly valid Tradition without examining its source.² Like other Traditions purporting to support the institution of Sultanate, probably this was also coined outside India and came to Hindustan with the invaders to serve a similar purpose. However, it soon became so popular that such careful chroniclers as Amir Khusrau and ‘Afif accepted it as an article of faith and in any case as a sound moral and political doctrine.³ Finally, Muhammad Tughluq inscribed it as a legend on his coin, which removed any suspicion as to its validity.⁴ When the governors and deputies of the Sultan succeeded in establishing independent kingdoms for themselves, they borrowed political theories like other royal equipment from Delhi, and this doctrine became equally popular in the provinces.⁵ The facts of contemporary social and political life fully vindicated the wisdom of this enunciation. The state appeared to be the only guarantee of peace, security and order. Curious as it may sound, the Hindu reformers pass over the question of Muslim domination in gloomy silence as the inevitable fruit of *Karma* without ever making suggestions for its overthrow or demanding the delegation of powers to the common people. They appear to have a supreme and deep suspicion of the incapacity of people to govern themselves.¹ The death, or even long absence or protracted illness of a monarch, was a source of universal anxiety. The sudden death of a monarch sometimes spelt dire confusion. In such eventualities clever ministers used to fabricate bulletins of the Sultan's perfect health, of his movements and even of his victories against his enemies, which only betrays the extreme sense of insecurity among the people in the absence of a visible head of the state, and consequently, the universal conviction that the Sultanate was indispensable, for it was the only agency that secured peace, order and security.² The prospect was not very cheerful of reverting to the pre-Muslim centuries of Rajput domination, with its constant civil wars and the repeated incursions of the chiefs into each other's territories, and finally the approach of a foreign invader.

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