Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Hindu Administrative Institutions c9.s1: Sec. i. Sources of Revenue

Hindu Administrative Institutions c9.s1

Language
English

Sec. i. Sources of Revenue

c9.s1.1

(Revenue in ancient India was derived partly from taxation and partly from sources other than taxation. An appreciable proportion of revenue came from the land, the principle governing this being that a fixed share of the produce of the land should be given to the state either in cash or in kind, preferably the latter. It was generally one-sixth of the produce.) This seems to have been a *fixed* legal tax for the same rate is repeated in the epics, in law-books, the *Arthaśāstras* and even in miscellaneous literature including *kāvya* and the dramatic works.¹ On this account one of the king's names was the sixth-taker (*ṣaḍbhāgabhak*). In later times he was called *ṣadaṃśavṛtti*, one who depended for this living on the sixth part.² The classical Tamil work *Kural* mentions the same rate.³

c9.s1.2

¹ *Śānti Parvan*, xxiv. 16 ; lxviii. 27 ; *Viṣṇu*, iii. 10.

c9.s1.3

² See *History of India*, part 1, p. 27, by P. T. Srinivasa Aiyangar, (Third Edition.)

c9.s1.4

³ "தென்புலத்தார் தெய்வம் விருந்தொக்கலென்றாங் கைம்புலத்தாறோம்பல்." 43. This indicates how tradition has been a potent force in India from very early times.

c9.s1.5

But this rate was but the maximum allowable; for Gautama speaks of three different rates, one-tenth, one-eighth, and one-sixth, to be taken from the land. Manu's rates are one-twelfth, one-eighth, and one-sixth.⁴ Sukra shows himself a sound economist and practical statesman when he recommends one-half from one-third of the produce from the fields irrigated by tanks and wells (irrigation being undertaken by the state), one-fourth from lands which depend for water mainly on rainfall,¹ those richly fed by rivers and streams, and one-sixth from other soils—a sort of graduated taxation according to the nature of the soil and the cost of water-supply. Kauṭalya recommends one-third, or one-fourth, only in cases of financial stringency, but this impost was not to affect the middling, or the inferior qualities of land, and again the field-labourers and forest tribes. In order to realize more revenue it is said that the revenue-officer commonly prevailed upon the labourers to raise summer crops also and thus to increase the produce, so that the one-sixth part to the king might increase in amount.²

c9.s1.6

⁴ Manu, vii. 130

c9.s1.7

¹ Śukra, iv. 2. 113-15.

c9.s1.8

² कोशमकोशः प्रत्युत्पन्नार्थकृच्छ्रः संङ्गृह्णीयात् । जनपदं महान्तं अल्पप्रमाणं वा देवमातृकं प्रभूतधान्यं धान्यस्यांशं तृतीयं चतुर्थं वा याचेत । यथासारं मध्यमवरं वा..........अल्पप्राणं वा न याचेत । . . . . . समाहर्तृपुरुषाः ग्रीष्मे कर्षकाणां उद्वापं कारयेयुः । (Arthaśāstra, Bk. v, Sec. 2.)

c9.s1.9

In the opinion of modern Western writers like Sir John Strachey and John Stuart Mill, the land-revenue of ancient Hindu administration did not enter into the sphere of taxation so-called. Evidence, literary and epigraphical, points to the fact that the king was not regarded as the proprietor of the land. The idea that the state owned all land was the feudal conception of the land-law prevalent in western Europe in the middle ages. Ancient Indian literature speaks eloquently of the rights of private property in land. There are a number of texts in favour of this statement—Nīlakaṇṭha, Mādhava, Kātyāyana and Miṭramiśra.³

c9.s1.10

³ See Jayaswal, Hindu Polity, part ii, pp. 17 ff.

c9.s1.11

Granting then that the institution of private property in land existed, it is necessary to examine the position of the state in relation to these lands. The king had nothing more than protective control over the practice of *dharma* both in his state and the subject-states as well.¹ This means the central state had the right to punish the misbehaved in their kingdom including the tributary states. On the strength of this Rāma argued that he was right in killing the unrighteous Vāli.²

c9.s1.12

¹ *Śānti Parvan*, lvi. 42.

c9.s1.13

² > इक्ष्वाकूनां इयं भूमिः सशैलवनकानना ।

c9.s1.14

There is also the fact of the existence of crown lands, (स्वभूमि:) that is, lands owned by the state and cultivated under the direct superintendence of the state³ (*sītādhyakṣa*). From the existence of this office certain writers have wrongly inferred that the state was the owner of all land. Such inference confuses the real issue involved. We must make a distinction between crown lands and private lands. If this were made, the other question is automatically solved. That the right of lordship to the private lands was confined only to protective control is further obvious from a statement of the *Kauṭalīya*.⁴ This means that if a king has received wages in the shape of taxes and does not afford protection, then, that king might be abandoned, and another might be chosen in his stead.⁵

c9.s1.15

³ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 24.

c9.s1.16

⁴ ‘राजानं अनुग्रहं याचामहे । निरनुग्रहाः परत्र गच्छाम इति ’ । (Bk. xiii. 1.)

c9.s1.17

⁵ The *Mahābhārata* mentions six persons that are to be abandoned : 1. A teacher who does not teach. 2. A Brahman not versed in the Veda. 3. A king who affords no protection. 4. A wife who is not a loving partner. 5. A cowherd who desires to live in the village. 6. A barber who wants to live in the woods.—(*Śānti Parvan*, lvi. 43-5.)

c9.s1.18

मृगपक्षिमनुष्याणां निग्रहप्रग्रहौअपि ॥ (*Kiṣkindā Kāṇḍa*, 18. 6 ff.)

c9.s1.19

From this it would appear that the king was only a servant of the people and his duty was to keep law and order for which he was paid wages in the shape of taxes. A similar idea is expressed in a stanza of the *Purapporul Veṇbāmālai*.¹ There it is said that the king who is expected to receive one-sixth of the produce must afford protection by following the path pursued by his forefathers. If he should misbehave, two courses were open to the people. First they might join in an open revolt and have the king deposed and substitute another on the throne. Or the allegiance which the people owed to this unrighteous monarch might be transferred to another, wellknown for the practice of *dharma*. These further confirm the fact that the king held no proprietary right over the soil of the land. The Government was then a contract of service entered between the subjects of the state and the sovereign power, for they had the right to terminate the contract at any period or time.

c9.s1.20

¹ ஊர்தி னுகையுள் வைகவுயிரோம்பி பாதிவொன்றணா தவித்துவண்டு-மாறின்றி வான்காவல் கொண்டான் வழின்று வைகலுந் தான்காவல் கொண்டறம். 179.

c9.s1.21

This is borne out by a whole chapter of the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*. To Manu, the first king, people agreed to give as wages of protection, one cow for every fifty cows bought or sold, one-fiftieth of gold, one-tenth of grains, besides other favourable terms.² Bhīṣma on the authority of Bṛhaspati and others characterizes this idea as very important and equalizes protection with the *rājadharma* itself.³ The means towards the end of protection are then narrated; policemen and servants, gifts intime and place, reasonable demands, valour, skill and truth on the part of the king, dissension among the enemies, proper justice, protecting the good, collecting the grains, serving the learned, increasing the treasury, enthusiasm among the soldiers, good means of defence, diplomacy, self-confidence, in a word, pursuit of *nīti* and *dharma*.¹

c9.s1.22

² Chap. lxvi. 23-29.

c9.s1.23

³ Chap. lvii. 1 and 4.

c9.s1.24

¹ Chap. lvii. 5-12.

c9.s1.25

It was realized that the spring of all action is wealth. It is the perennial source of all *dharma*,² and in the *Rāmāyaṇa* the importance of *artha* to *dharma* is well brought out by the speech of Lakṣmaṇa addressed to his brother Rāma in the field of Laṅka.³ Friends, relatives, manhood, learning, strength of will, wisdom, greatness and goodness, are all said to be the natural

c9.s1.26

² *Vana Parvan*, xxxiii, 48.

c9.s1.27

³ > अर्थेभ्यो हि विवृद्धेभ्यः संवृत्तेभ्यस्ततस्ततः ।

c9.s1.28

क्रियाः सर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते पर्वतेभ्य इवापगाः ॥
अर्थेन हि विमुक्तस्य पुरुषस्याल्पतेजसः ।
व्युच्छिद्यन्ते क्रियाः सर्वा ग्रीष्मे कुसरितो यथा ॥
सोयमर्थं परित्यज्य सुखकामः सुखैधितः ।
पापमारभते कर्तुं ततो दोषः प्रवर्तते ॥
यस्यार्थास्तस्य मित्राणि यस्यार्थाः तस्य बान्धवाः ।
यस्यार्थाः स पुमान् लोके यस्यार्थाः स च पण्डितः ॥
यस्यार्थाः स च विक्रान्तो यस्यार्थाः स च बुद्धिमान् ।
यस्यार्थाः स महाभागो यस्यार्थाः स महागुणः ॥
अर्थस्यैते परित्यागे दोषाः प्रख्याहता मया ।
राज्यमुत्सृजता वीर येन बुद्धिस्त्वया कृता ॥
यस्यार्था धर्मकामार्थास्तस्य सर्वं प्रदक्षिणम् ।
अधनेनार्थकामेन नार्थः शक्यो विचिन्वता ॥

c9.s1.29

corollary of wealth (artha). To a man whose wealth is on the increase, work undertaken goes on as a rivulet from the hills. To a man of no wealth, however, works undertaken prove impossible as water in a summer river.

c9.s1.30

It is then clear that artha is useful, nay, indispensable for the moral and the material progress of the land. What are the sources from which the king generally enriched his treasury? Mention has already been made of the traditional land revenue which contributed the major portion of the income to the state. Inscriptional evidence proves mild rates of land-assessment (kānikka-ḍan), about the commencement of the eleventh century in the Chola kingdom of South India. It was roughly 100 kalams per veli (about 6½ acres), equal to about 80 kalams of the present day,¹ in kind from good lands, and fifty to eighty from less fertile ones. In cash it varied from four to nine kalañju of gold. The revenue assessed was invariably in proportion to the produce: dry-lands one-fifth, and wet-lands one-third.² Those who were in charge of the land revenue are called the dhruvādhikaraṇas (No. 38 of Fleet). The tax-collectors were generally known as the Utkhetavita in an inscription of Bhāskaravarman.³ Other sources of revenue to the state were from commerce, forts, transports, mines, salt, śulka, ferry dues, fines and the produce of forests. Added to these heads of income are the voluntary contributions, tributes from the subject states, and unclaimed property.⁴

c9.s1.31

¹ S. K. Aiyangar, Ancient India, pp. 176 and 182.

c9.s1.32

² Epigraphica Carnaṭaca, No. 492 of Mulbagal of Kulottunga I.

c9.s1.33

³ Epigraphica Indica, xii. 75.

c9.s1.34

⁴ Cf. Śānti Parvan, lxxi. 10.

c9.s1.35

हर्ष:कामश्च दर्पश्च धर्म:क्रोध: शमो दम: ।
अर्थादेतानि सर्वाणि प्रवर्तन्ते नराधिप ॥ (Yuddh. lxxxiii. 32-39.)

c9.s1.36

*Commerce.*—Commerce came in for the largest contribution only next to that of the land revenue. Taxes on commerce were not imposed indiscriminately but on the strength of the difficulty or otherwise, of purchase and sale of goods by merchants, their standard of life and family expenses besides the incidental charges on intermediaries and labour.¹ It varied from one-tenth to one-fiftieth. But one-tenth seems to have been the general rule like the one-sixth for the land tax.² Among others which contributed towards the material advancement of the state are mentioned ample means of commerce (प्रचारसमृद्धिः), increased production of grains and gold, and diminution of remissions.³ According to the *Kauṭalīya* there was a superintendent of commerce (पण्यध्यक्षः) who would ascertain the demand for various articles and also the rise or fall in their prices.⁴ Such of those merchants who dealt in

c9.s1.37

¹ > विक्रय्यं क्रयमध्वानं भक्तं च सपरिष्ययम् ।

c9.s1.38

² > पञ्चाशद्भाग आदेयो राज्ञा पशुहिरण्ययोः।

c9.s1.39

³ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. viii.

c9.s1.40

⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. ii. 16.

c9.s1.41

योगक्षेमं च संप्रेक्ष्य वणिजां कारयेत्करान् ॥
उत्पत्तिं दानवृत्तिं च शिल्पं संप्रेक्ष्य चासकृत् ।
शिल्पं प्रति करानेवं शिल्पिनः प्रति कारयेत् ॥
(Śānti Parvan, lxxxvii. 13, 14.)

c9.s1.42

धान्यानामष्टमोभागः षष्ठो द्वादश एव वा ।
आददीताथ षड्भागं द्रुमांसमधुसर्पिषां ।
गन्धौषधिरसानांच पुष्पमूलफलस्य च ॥
पत्रशाकतृणानां च चर्मणां वैदलस्य च ।
मृन्मयानां च भाण्डानां सर्वस्याश्ममयस्य च ॥
Manu, vii. 130-32; cf. Gautama, 24-27; Vasiṣṭha, ix. 26-27; Āpastamba, xi. 10. 26. 9, etc.

c9.s1.43

foreign merchandise were generally favoured by remission of taxes on those commodities. The state itself undertook some of the manufactures and there was both a selling and purchasing department which submitted daily accounts to the superintendent in charge. There were trade associations and partnership firms.¹ Distinction was made between the transactions by these companies and by individuals. Favourable concessions were always shown to the latter. The weights and measures in use were to bear the stamp of the state.²

c9.s1.44

¹ *Ibid.*

c9.s1.45

² *Ibid.*, Sec. 19.

c9.s1.46

The regulation of tolls bears testimony to the prevalence of an excellent code of commercial morality. Wholesale markets are known as the ‘ध्वज.’ The state had the wholesale prices fixed and any merchant getting an enhanced sum would be deprived of that amount which would go to replenish the treasury. There were toll-houses situated at the entrances to the city or fortress. Toll-keepers were to examine the goods, their destination and the seal-marks, and impose dues according to their value. Consideration was also shown for useless articles. Again there were no tolls for commodities intended for marriages, ceremonies, gifts or sacrifices. Forbidden articles if imported would be forfeited and the dealers punished.³ Tolls varied according as the articles were necessaries or luxuries. Fruits, flowers, meat, etc., came under the category of luxuries. Commonly the toll levied was one-sixth, while necessaries like clothes and metals were assessed at one-twentieth or one-twenty-fifth. Besides the tolls there was another due *dvāradeya*, literally the gate-dues. (Another regulation of the department of commerce was the prohibition of retail sale at manufacturing places.¹) This would, in the course of nature, affect prejudicially the proper distribution of trade as well as the revenues to the state. This reminds us of the practice in vogue to-day of wholesale manufacturers not dealing directly with individual traders but with established distributing firms and houses.

c9.s1.47

³ शस्त्रवर्मकवचलोहरथरत्नानिपशूनामन्त्यतमानिर्वाह्यं निर्वाहयतो यथा-वधुषितो दण्डः पण्यनाशश्च। (*Arthaśāstra*, ii, 21.)

c9.s1.48

¹ जातिभूमिषु च पुण्यानामविक्रयः। (*Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 22.)

c9.s1.49

Under this department of commerce there was another tax, the road-cess.² The collector of these dues was known as the *antapāla*. He was perhaps a little away from the toll-house. He received one-fourth *paṇa* for every load of merchandise, one *paṇa* for each head of cattle and other animals. He would examine foreign commodities, and if found useful, would send them to the toll-officer. Useless and harmful articles were shut out by him. The really useful things such as valuable seeds were let in free of charge.³ Another feature of this useful department was the weaving home. The proverb ‘let the women spin and not preach’ found a practical illustration in the economics of Kauṭalya. Women of various grades from young to the aged took to spinning and weaving of cotton, wool, hemp and flax. This was one aspect of the ancient cottage industries. Women could spin in their homes. There were special arrangements for taking raw materials to them, and taking back finished goods from them.⁴ The state paid them both time and piece wages. There were special days which were observed as holidays and those who worked in the holidays were also entitled to special allowances.¹ On the one hand this system found employment for the weaker sex and on the other hand the profits which accrued from these manufactures went to swell the treasury.

c9.s1.50

² *Ibid.*

c9.s1.51

³ सारं ततो ग्राह्यं अपास्य फल्गुः। (*Ibid.*, Sec. 21.)

c9.s1.52

⁴ याश्चानिष्टासिन्यः प्रोषितविधवा न्यङ्गाः कन्यका वाऽऽत्मानं विभ्रत्यस्ताः खदासोभिरनुसार्थ सोपग्रहं कर्म कारयितव्याः। (*Ibid.*, Bk. ii, Sec. 23.)

c9.s1.53

¹ तिथishu प्रतिपादनमानैश्च कर्मकारयितव्याः। (Ibid.)

c9.s1.54

Under the control of this department was again the ocean and river traffic. Fishermen were allowed to go fishing in these waters, and for this they were required to furnish a licensing fee which amounted to one-sixth of the value of their haul. Customs were collected in port-towns from ships touching their shores, though favour was shown in the case of weather-beaten ships. Again there were boats and other accessories in both navigable and small rivers. Fording these, or taking goods through them was only by previous permission. Śrotriyas, ascetics, children, the aged, royal messengers and pregnant women were allowed to cross free. This is one of the numerous references to show that the Kauṭalīya is often swayed by humane considerations. Others were to ford with passes previously obtained.² To obtain them perhaps a small fee was paid. The ferry-men were to remit their daily incomes to the superintendent. There were both water-routes and land-routes as well as routes for coastal traffic (कूलपथ). There is again evidence of commercial intercourse with China and Ceylon.³ Baudhāyana lays down a duty of ten per cent. in general on all goods imported by sea.

c9.s1.55

² बद्धतोर्थश्चैताः कार्याः राजद्विष्टकारिणां तरणभयात्। (Arthaśāstra, Bk. ii, Sec. 28.)

c9.s1.56

³ N. N. Law, Ancient Indian Polity, p. 87.

c9.s1.57

Bühler translates it as ‘*ad valorem* duty’. And again just duties are recommended on other marketable goods.¹ The recommendation of Viṣṇu is more moderate: one-tenth of profits on indigenous articles, and one-twentieth on imported ones.² Śukrāchārya’s rates vary from one-sixteenth to one-thirty-second.³ It would thus appear that state regulation of commerce was progressive in character and prevented much of the economic distress which would otherwise have disturbed the even course of ancient Hindu administration.

c9.s1.58

¹ i. 10, 14 and 15.

c9.s1.59

² iii. 16.

c9.s1.60

³ द्वात्रिंशांशं हरेद्राजा विक्रेतुः क्रेतुरेव वा । विंशांशं वा षोडशांशं शुल्कं मूल्याविरोधकम् । (Śukra, iv. 2. 108.)

c9.s1.61

*Mines.*—There were both land and ocean mines (खन्य). The state had the monopoly in mining and in metals.⁴ Mines were granted to corporations or individuals for fixed terms of lease and mining operations should be carried on by previous licenses obtained. In that case the Government need not spend on their outlay. Besides there were other mines worked by the state itself. There was an officer in charge of these mines. He collected conch-shells, diamonds, corals, salt and so on from the ocean mines. One branch of this department was the office of the mint. Coins of gold, silver and copper, were minted here under the direction of the superintendent of the mint (लक्षणध्यक्षः). There was, besides, the examiner of coins (रूपदर्शकः) who regulated the currency as a medium of exchange (व्यावहारिकों). It was for him to fix legal tender (कोशप्रवेश्यां).⁵ Brahmans guilty of offences were to work in mines as a punishment.¹ Thus these mines added considerably to the state treasury.

c9.s1.62

⁴ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 12.

c9.s1.63

⁵ रूपदर्शकः पणयाज्ञां व्यावहारिको कोशप्रवेश्यां च स्थापयेत् । (*Ibid.*)

c9.s1.64

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk iv, Sec. 8; cf. Viṣṇu, v. 2-8.

c9.s1.65

Excise.—The superintendent of the excise department (सुराध्यक्षः) was to centralize or decentralize the sale of manufactured liquor. These spirits were manufactured in the ports, country-parts and camps set apart for the purpose. Six varieties of liquor are mentioned; *medaka* from rice, *prasannā* from spices and fruits, *āsava* from sugar and honey, *ariṣṭa* (perhaps a special medicinal preparation), *maireya* from jaggery, pepper, and barks, *madhu* from grapes. Besides these there is the *sahakārasurā* extracted from the juice of mango fruits. The daily sales of each variety were examined by special officials. The manufacture of liquor was a royal monopoly denied to private people. Toddy or juice of palms does not find mention, but only the fermented juice of grapes and other syrups.²

c9.s1.66

² *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 25.

c9.s1.67

The regulations of this department were severe. Sukrāchārya lays down that liquor houses must be fixed outside the limits of the village so as not to be a public nuisance. Again drinking was not allowed in day-time.³ It was also forbidden to take the stock outside the limits of the village. It was sold to men of character and that too in small quantities, a *prastha* or half in each case, ‘lest workmen should spoil the work on hand, *āryas*

c9.s1.68

³ (Sukra, iv. 4. 44-45.)

c9.s1.69

ब्राह्मगं पापकर्मणमुद्दुष्याङ्क कृतव्रणम् ।
कुर्यान्निर्विषयं राजा वासयेदाकरेषु वा ॥

c9.s1.70

चौराणां पितृभूतास्ते स्वर्णकारादयस्त्वतः ।
गत्वागृहं पृथग्रामात्तस्मिन् रक्षेत्तु मद्यपान् ॥

c9.s1.71

न दिवा मद्यपानंहि राष्ट्रे कुर्याद्धि कर्हिचित् ॥

c9.s1.72

stray from virtue, and the wicked do indiscreet acts by over-indulgence.’ Another healthy regulation was that all were allowed to drink in the houses established and were not permitted to go out immediately after. Only good liquor was sold and the spoilt one was given to draught animals and hogs. Further if anybody under the influence of drink got himself robbed of his property in the premises, it was for the dealer in charge to make good the loss.¹ Brahmans were forbidden from drinking. Only a limited number of people were allowed to take part in liquor traffic. These regulations show unmistakably that temperance was the aim of the state in ancient India.

c9.s1.73

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 25.

c9.s1.74

*Gambling.*—Kauṭalya like Yājñavalkya recommends centralization of gambling.² Betting and challenging are also included in this category.³ There was an officer in charge who supplied dice for hire. Other receipts under this head were a share of 5 per cent on what was won by every respective winner, fees for license and fees for supplying water and accommodation. Besides these there were fines levied upon false players, deceitful winners and the use of artifice in games.⁴ That the state centralized this play is evident from Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra where it is said that in a portion of the assembly house only could the players play at this game.⁵ According to Haradatta this was confined to the first three castes who took fixed contracts, daily, monthly, or yearly. These swelled the exchequer.⁶

c9.s1.75

² द्यूतमेकंमुखं कार्यं तस्करज्ञानकारणात् । एष एव विधिज्ञेयः प्राणिद्यूते समाज्ञये ॥ (Yāj., ii. 203; *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. iii, Sec. 20.)

c9.s1.76

³ Yāj., ii. 199-202.

c9.s1.77

⁴ *Ibid.*

c9.s1.78

⁵ ii. 10. 25.

c9.s1.79

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii. 12-13.

c9.s1.80

*Duty on Salt.*—This occupies much of the attention at present of the members of the Indian Legislative Assembly. The unanimous public opinion in India is that salt so essential for life must not be taxed heavily. It will be interesting to examine the amount of revenue charged by the ancient Indian state on this necessary article of life. There was both rock salt and that manufactured from the waters of the ocean. Besides the salt manufactured in the state manufactories, it was imported also from the neighbouring states. The Government was entitled to a fixed share of the former, while one-sixth portion of the imported quantity of salt went to the king. Private individuals and firms were allowed to manufacture only with the previous and express sanction of the Government. Persons proceeding without license, and persons adulterating salt were to have the highest amercement as punishment. Dealers in salt were to pay the toll charge in addition to other fees. Those who took salt for private use were allowed toll free. Even here *śrotriyas*, penance-performers and labourers were exempted from toll dues.¹ It is justifiable if from these we infer that the Kauṭalīyan recommendation of taxes was in no way unscrupulous.

c9.s1.81

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 12.

c9.s1.82

*Miscellaneous.*—The other sources of income to the state were from the office of state-goldsmith, the institution of prostitutes, building-sites, guilds of artisans, handicrafts, religious and charitable endowments, water-tax, income-tax, flower, fruits and vegetable gardens (here it was one-sixth), game-forests, timber and elephant forests, heads of cattle, asses, camels, horses, hides and

c9.s1.83

श्रोत्रियास्तपस्विनो विष्टयश्च भक्तलवणं हरेयुः । अतोऽन्यो लवणक्षार-वर्गः शुल्कं दद्यात् ।

c9.s1.84

skins, etc. There were no absolute and fixed rates for all time as one could easily gather from the several texts of the extant treatises on the Arthaśāstra.¹ Levies were also accepted in kind even in the case of clothes and heads of cattle. Artists and artisans who would not pay in cash were expected to work a day in a fortnight for the king, and thus commute their payment by labour.² That the artisans were also subject to certain kind of taxes is evident from the Mahābhārata.³ In taxing them the nature of their work of art, their difficulty, and their skill⁴ were taken into consideration.

c9.s1.85

¹ Arthaśāstra, Bk. iv, Sec. 2; Yāj. i. 132; Viṣṇu, iii. 19-12; Śukra, iv. 2. 236-41.

c9.s1.86

² Arthaśāstra, Bk. ii, Sec. 2.

c9.s1.87

³ Śanti Parvan, lxxxvii. 14.

c9.s1.88

⁴ Ibid.

c9.s1.89

There were other sources of income which could not be classified under the regular head of revenue but which nevertheless enriched the treasury. These were spoils of war, tributes, and voluntary contributions. The last were raised when financial embarrassments occurred so as to replenish the treasury, the first line of defence for the kingdom. Willing contributors were entitled to special honours and presents at the hands of the monarch.⁵ Unclaimed property was another source of income to the state.⁶ Sukra's sources of revenue include the amount recovered from thieves (तस्कराहृत) also.

c9.s1.90

उत्पत्तिं दानवृत्तिंच शिल्पं संप्रेक्ष्य चासकृत् ।
शिल्पं प्रतिकरानेवं शिल्पिनः प्रतिकारयेत् ॥

c9.s1.91

यथोपकारं वा खवशा वा यदुपहरेयुस्थान-
छत्रवेष्टनविभूषाक्षैषां हिरण्येन प्रयच्छेत । (Arthaśāstra, Bk. v, Sec. ii.)

c9.s1.92

अस्वामिकं कति प्राप्तं नाष्टिकं तस्कराहृतं ।
संचितं तु विनिश्चित्यामात्यो राज्ञे निवेदयेत् ॥
(Śukra, ii. 107; Agni, ccxxiii. 16 ff.)

c9.s1.93

More or less the same sources of revenue are found in the inscriptions, dated A.D. 571 and 766.¹ The inscription (38) mentions *udranga* or land tax, *uparikara* or ‘a tax levied on cultivators who have no proprietory rights on soil,’ *vātabhūta*? (a tax levied on fruit and flower gardens), *dhānya* (grains), *hiraṇya* (gold), *ādeya* (windfall?), *viṣṭika* (of workmen who were fed by the state). To these, No. 39, adds *daśāparādhaḥ* (fines from ten kinds of offences, three of body, four of speech, three of mind), *bhoga* (usufruct) and *bhāga* (one-sixth of land revenue).²

c9.s1.94

¹ Nos. 38 and 39 of *F. G. I.*

c9.s1.95

² Some of these terms have been left untranslated by Fleet. Most of them occur in Bk. ii, chap. viii of the *Arthaśāstra* as sources of revenue. According to the *Śrīmūlam* commentary ‘*vāta*’ includes the fruit and flower gardens from which revenue went to the king’s exchequer. The interpretation of the term *bhūta* is a little difficult as it does not occur in the technical literature so far to our knowledge. It may mean ‘a tax that has been given up and revised now’. But the other question is on what it was assessed. Hence it is advisable to treat *vūta-bhūta* as a compound term, *bhūta* meaning—‘produced or obtained from’. The term *ādeya* Kauṭalya explains सुप्राप्यानुपाल्यः परेषा मप्रत्यादेय इति आदेयः । (Bk. ix. 4) and भोगः is interpreted as ‘राजभागः’ (Bk. xii. 5 ; Trivandrum edition, vol. iii, p. 210). भागः = धान्यषड्भागः (Ibid., vol. i, p. 136 ; Bk. ii, 6).

c9.s1.96

South Indian inscriptions throw much light on the sources of income of the ancient kingdoms like those of the Pallavas, the Cholas, the Pāṇḍyas and others. The Taṇḍantōṭṭam plates refer to a number of taxes such as those on oil-presses, looms, stalls, grains, areca-nuts, animals like bulls, toddy-drawers and shepherds. The Kāsākuḍi plates mention irrigation tax, professional tax

c9.s1.97

Jīvananda Vidyāsagar in the commentary writes अस्वामिकं = स्वामिहीनं उत्तराधिकारिरहितं च द्रव्यं ॥ (p. 111).

c9.s1.98

and trading licenses. Also a share of the cloth woven of cotton thread and of corn ears, are mentioned as dues to the state. There is a long list of subsidiary taxes (kaḍamai) given in the Chola inscriptions attributed to Tribhuvan Chakravartin Kōnerimaikon; Fees (kāśukaḍamai); oḍukku paḍi: uṟaināḷi: pāḍi kāval (village watch); share of the karaṇam (measurer); dues on looms (taryirai); oil-presses (śekkiṇai), on profits (śeṭṭirai): taṭṭoli on goldsmith (taṭṭarpaṭṭam): animals (māvaḍai), tanks (kuḷavaḍai), water-courses (oḷukkunīrpaṭṭam), fees (vāri-āyam), caste dues (inavari): weights (iḍaivari), fine for bad articles (aḷugaḷśarakku): shops and stalls (aṅgāḍipaṭṭam), salt-tax (uppāyam): dues from potters (kuśakāṇam), marriage (kaṇṇāiakkāṇam), washing places (vaṇṇārapārai), ferry-keepers, cattle-sheds, ānaikkūḍam, kudiraip-pandi, or temporary stables to the state elaphants and horses when the king was on tour. There are others that could not be identified.¹

c9.s1.99

¹ S. I. I., vol. iii, part i, pp. 112-17.

c9.s1.100

Besides these generally accepted heads of revenue for the state there were others which are seemingly immoral but nevertheless dharmic (moral) from the view point of rāja-dharma whose keynote is protection which depends entirely on a well-furnished treasury. To this end the following methods among others could be adopted according to the Arthaśāstra: (1) contribution from wealthy persons could be requested under the false plea of executing this work, or that. Such of those whose donations were handsome enough were to be honoured with titles and special gifts. (2) Again spies in the disguise of sorcerers could deprive the heretics and even temples of their funds provided the latter are not enjoyed by the śrotriyas. (3) The secretary in charge of religious endowments could collect funds under various items and send them on to the exchequer. (4) The image of a god or an altar might be secretly set up in some place, or an evil-omen might be pointed out and sums may be collected therefrom; also by celebrating festivals or festivities. (5) By pointing to untimely fruits and flowers in the sacred trees of the palace-garden, the king might cite it as an evil omen, to avert which he might raise enormous wealth by big processions in honour of gods. (6) He might again set up a man in secret in the hidden portion of a tree, and announce the arrival of an evil spirit, to propitiate which he could gather wealth from the public. (7) He could collect a number of precious and rare beings such as a serpent with several heads, and set them up for public exhibition and thus realize some wealth. (8) Special spies might offer a drink of anæsthetic ingredients, make people temporarily insensate and, offer remedial measures for which money could be collected. (9) Spies might deprive merchants, goldsmiths, of their illegetimate earnings in the disguise of partners. (10) If a quarrel arose among two seditionists, prostitute spies or poisoners could administer poison to one, accuse the other of the guilt, and deprive both of their property.¹

c9.s1.101

¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec 2.

c9.s1.102

Some of these have been referred to by Dr. Jolly in his introduction to the scholarly edition of the *Arthaśāstra*² in favour of his theory that the *Kauṭalīya* mentions immoral and unscrupulous ways of taxation, thus departing from the *Dharmaśāstras*.³ These taxes, though raised by practice of fraud, need not be regarded unscrupulous for the following reasons:—

c9.s1.103

² Punjab Sanskrit Series.

c9.s1.104

³ रक्षणार्थवृत्तानां कण्टकानां च शोधनात् । नरेन्द्रान्दिवं यान्ति प्रजापालनतत्पराः । (Manu, ix. 253.)

c9.s1.105

1. Kauṭalya’s treatise is a practical manual on statecraft. Practical application of administration could not be effected without treasure to fall back upon. To this end expediency dictated recourse to certain ways of raising revenue, unscrupulous under normal circumstances but justifiable as measures of desperate necessity.

c9.s1.106

2. Even here, taking benevolences, ill-spent funds of charitable institutions, holding of public shows, punishing the seditious, could not be characterized as unscrupulous. These are to be resorted to only in extreme danger.

c9.s1.107

3. Setting up altars, announcing evil spirits, administering ingredients, are some of the ways by which the masses could be humoured. These are the means again by which such of those landless or occupationless, who would otherwise escape the burdens of taxation, could be made to contribute their quota to the state in some way or other. People were then swayed by supernatural ideas, and the practical statesman touched their weak spots to achieve this end. In this respect the state endeavoured to equalize the taxation.

c9.s1.108

4. Goldsmiths and similar professionists would naturally earn by illegitimate and dishonest means. Manu characterizes them as ‘प्रकाशवञ्चकाः’ ¹ ‘deceivers in open daylight.’ With ability to pay, the members of these classes would try to ‘shift’ the burdens of taxation on to the others. Kauṭalya could not tolerate this and hence recommended the use of partner-informants to deprive them of their illegitimate earnings.

c9.s1.109

¹ Chap. ix. 257.

c9.s1.110

5. The condition and circumstances of Kauṭalya’s days were such that unless the ever-growing class of the seditionists were put an end to with rigorous and capital punishment, the king could not reign in peace and people could not live in safety. Manu speaks of them as thorns in the way of the state, and to be removed at all costs.¹ Kauṭalya ends this section with the following :

c9.s1.111

¹ ix. 253.

c9.s1.112

एवं दूष्येषु अधार्मिकेषु च वर्तेत । नेतरेषु ।

c9.s1.113

This means these various methods were to be directed against people of evil life and not law-abiding citizens of the state.² It would thus appear that these methods were not the rule but the exception. They were applied only in the case of the unrighteous, i.e., the enemies of the state. In a word the exigencies of the Mauryan administration perhaps found in their application valuable instruments to gain the end, namely, protection and peace.

c9.s1.114

² *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec. 2.

Linked texts (16)