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War in Ancient India c11.t1: Sandhi or the Treaty System

War in Ancient India c11.t1

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Sandhi or the Treaty System

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This is a frank and open procedure in diplomacy. To seek war would be ruinous to both the contending parties. To undertake an operation against a superior is like a foot-soldier opposing an elephant, and to make war against an equal is but the collision of unbaked mud vessels against each other causing mutual destruction.⁴² But the inferior must be attacked and made to submit if the differences cannot be amicably settled. There are also cases where an inferior king may sue for alliance with a superior by offering himself to help the latter with army, wealth, or land. This is called the Hīna-sandhi.⁴³

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⁴² *Ar. Śās.* VIII. 3; Cp. Mallinātha on *Raghu.* 17-56.

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⁴³ Bk. VII. 3, p. 253. Vol. II. (Triv. Sans. Series).

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The following is a list of *entente* methods under the category of *daṇḍa*.⁴⁴ When the inferior king delivers himself to a superior that *entente* is called *ātmamiṣa*, and when he offers as a hostage his general or commander-in-chief or Crown Prince, it is *puruṣāntara*. If he is allowed to withdraw with his army, it is *adṛṣṭa-puruṣa*. In case the treasury is offered, the *entente* is *pārikraya* (dependent on money), *upagraha* (dependent on heavy charges), *ātyaya* (harmful in space and time), *suvarṇa* (dependent on indemnity), with their opposite *kapāla* (involving heavy indemnities). In case land is surrendered, the *entente* is *adiṣṭa* (by cession), *ucchinna* (all land except the capital), *apakraya* (liberation of the territory by imposts), and *paribhūṣaṇa* (by homage). These are the different kinds of alliances entered into by inferior powers.

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⁴⁴ Cp. *S.T.R.* 5. 11. 40-45.

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Alliances may be temporary (calasandhi) or permanent (sthāvarasandhi).⁴⁵ In other words, the latter is stable and the former is only a time marking device. The following is the list of alliances which may be made. (1) Mitrasandhi (agreement with an ally on definite terms), (2) Hiraṇyasandhi (for gold), (3) Bhūmisandhi (by acquisition of territory), (4) Karmasandhi (use of army and treasury for common enterprises), (5) Anavasitasandhi (help in colonising an unsettled tract). These are elaborately explained by Kauṭalya.⁴⁶

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⁴⁵ Ar. Śās. VII. ch. 17.

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⁴⁶ Ibid., VII, chh. 9 to 12.

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Dr. Nag takes mitra and hiraṇyasandhis as one and hence he considers paripaṇitāparipaṇitāpasṛṣṭisandhi as the fourth. But we take mitra and hiraṇyasandhi as two different agreements. The term paripaṇitāparipaṇitāpasṛṣṭisandhi is thus explained. An agreement entered into in mutual faith is definite (paripaṇita), and the others are indefinite (aparipaṇita). We need not enter into the details of each of these. It is enough to say that they were deemed mutually advantageous and profitable in the long run. But it is a deceitful alliance (atisandhi) when one has the opportunity to overreach the other, whether equal (sama) or unequal (viṣama).

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The Kauṭalīya proceeds to trace the four different stages in the evolution of a sandhi.⁴⁷ The first is termed akṛtacikīrṣa or peace with no specific end. Here the arts of conciliation and other modes of diplomacy are employed, and the rights of respective powers, equal, inferior and superior, are clearly defined. The second is kṛtāśleṣaṇam or peace with specific terms. In this case the agreement made continues intact, and its provisions are strictly observed, through the medium of common friends. The third is kṛtāvidūṣaṇam or violating the peace terms. If it is seen that one party is treacherous and violates the terms of agreement through the agency of traitors and spies, that agreement is broken. The last is avaśīrṇa kriyā or the restoration of peace when broken. On a promise to observe the provisions of the treaty strictly, a reconciliation is effected. The restoration of the original compact depends on the peculiar circumstances of the case. For there can be no true reconciliation with those who break the entente and then express a wish to join, offering no satisfactory explanation of their previous action. The same holds good with persons of outrageous conduct and those who are unsteady. In formulating these principles, a critical study of the relevant portions of the Arthaśāstra shows that its author is lenient to a fault. For he lays down the rule that “ whoever annoys the enemy should be accepted and he who does equal harm to both should be politically examined ”.

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⁴⁷ Ar. Śās. VII, ch. 6.

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Particular care is to be taken in making political compacts. Kauṭalya condemns in unequivocal terms indiscriminate alliances. It is said that a king should not make peace with a minor, an old man, an invalid, one deserted by his kith and kin, a coward, a greedy man, an unbeliever in God, and other fourteen kinds of disqualified men. But these must be fought and conquered.

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Vigraha: Though seemingly utilitarian in his attitude, Kauṭalya attaches more value to a diplomatic struggle than to an armed contest which goes by the name of saṅgrāmika.⁴⁸ Vigraha is a diplomatic contest, and is but a means to the end, viz., to avoid regular warfare.⁴⁹ There can be no clearer indication of the fact that laws of war and peace had already reached a sufficiently high level in our land in those times. This second line of action or the method of hostilities is, according to the Śivatattvaratnākara, of eight kinds.⁵⁰ This indicates the progress of military science in the diplomatic sphere. Kāma Vigraha (a war where love of woman is the cause), Lopaja (a strife born of greed), Bhū-vigraha (a struggle about some piece of territory), Mānasambhava (one due to the wounded sense of honour), Abhaya (fighting for friends and relatives), Icchāja (born of ambition), Madotthita (due to sheer haughtiness and folly), and Ekadravyabhilāṣa (aiming at a particular object). Though various causes contributed to the outbreak of hostilities and though thirst for military renown fired the zeal of the parties, yet proof is not lacking to demonstrate that wars of aggression were few and far between. It is further laid down that a king must avoid sixteen different kinds of war⁵¹ such as those where the result is uncertain, where it is a violation of the existing treaty rights, where it affects the law of international relations, where the strength of the enemy cannot be calculated, where it would result in a tedious and protracted war, and where adverse consequences are certain.

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⁴⁸ Ibid. Bk. X.

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⁴⁹ Cp. Manu. VII, 107-8, 198-9.

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⁵⁰ Though a late work it is valuable as it transmits the Indian tradition faithfully (5.11.46 f.)

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⁵¹ S.T.R. 5.12.7 ff; Śukra IV, 7.250.

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In this connexion it is interesting to read a section in the Kauṭalīya entitled ‘Yātavyavṛtti.’⁵² Here the discussion centres around the conduct of an assailable power. Here Kauṭalya gives a description of diplomatic struggles carried on between attacking and attackable powers, every one of them trying to get an advantage over the other.⁵³ In the concept of Vigrahaka, there is postponement of actual fighting even after war is declared.⁵⁴ A bargain is effected with little or even no profit, with an eye always to the future permanent gain. This diplomatic war generally came to an end by ceding soldiers, money, or an ally. It was realised that this method was more profitable than that obtained by regular wars.

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⁵² VII. 8.

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⁵³ See Nag: *op. cit.* ch. iv.

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⁵⁴ Cp. *Manu*, VII, 161.

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Āsana: The third method of āsana is loosely interpreted by some scholars as ‘neutrality’; but it may mean ‘holding a post against an enemy’. It is of ten kinds. These are Svasthāna (to hold one’s own place), Upekṣā (indifference), Mārgarodha (blocking canals and channels), Durgasādhya (possession of a fort), Rāṣṭravikaraṇa (bringing the enemy under control), Ramaṇīya (to maintain a post pleasantly), Nikaṭāsana (defeating the enemy at a place near his own), Dūramārga (selecting choice sites and owning them), Pralopāsana (stabilising his power in the conquered country) and Parādhīna (by taking refuge with a superior king).

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Some aspects of neutrality are implied by this term āsana. This opens the discussion on neutrality in general. Wheaton has remarked: “According to the laws of war, observed even by the most civilised nations of antiquity, the right of one nation to remain at peace, while other neighbouring nations were engaged in war, was not admitted to exist.”⁵⁵ Surely, the political theorist had not in mind the principles of ancient Indian polity, however it may be true of ancient Greece and Rome.⁵⁶ According to Henry Wheaton, a State was either an ally or an enemy. There was no intermediate relation. But a careful study of the working of the Hindu circle of States reveals a number of intermediary relationships. Both the terms, Madhyama and Udāsīna, of which mention has been made, corresponded to what we to-day understand by the neutral king. The Udāsīna’s territory was the neutral zone, and here prevailed the laws of peace in actual practice.

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⁵⁵ *Elements of International Law*, p. 564 (London, 1904).

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⁵⁶ See in this connexion S. V. Viswanatha: *International Law in Ancient India*, ch. X.

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Kautalya defines the Madhyama thus: ‘He is the king who occupied a territory close to both the conqueror and his immediate enemy in front and who is capable of helping both the kings, whether united or disunited, or of resisting either of them individually.’ The Udāsīna is that king ‘who is situated beyond the territory of any of the above kings and who is very powerful and capable of helping the enemy, the conqueror, and the Madhyama king together or individually.’⁵⁷ Thus both the Madhyama and the Udāsīna occupied interior zones, apart from diplomatic zones. It is not quite possible to draw a clear line of distinction between them. But still it has been said by some scholars that the Madhyama is more a mediator than a pronounced neutral. In certain cases it is true that the conqueror entered the Madhyama territory, but there is no precedent for the invasion of the Udāsīna kingdom.⁵⁸ The Udāsīna pursued the policy of non-intervention accepted by the diplomatic code of the maṇḍala.⁵⁹

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⁵⁷ Bk. VI, ch. ii, Shama Sastri’s translation.

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⁵⁸ Ar. Śās. Bk. VII, ch. 18.

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⁵⁹ Op. Śukra IV, 7.237.

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To return to the term āsana with which we are at present concerned, it occurs in the Tālgunda pillar inscription.⁶⁰ According to this epigraph the Kadamba king Kākusthavarman observed the state of āsana, and was yet a terror to sāmantas and other chieftains. For he possessed the three śaktis (prabhu, utsāha and mantra), and hence he had gained a spirit of mastery. In the case of Kākusthavarman, it was a question of armed neutrality. It is reasonable to conjecture that Kauṭalya also envisages a condition of armed neutrality, though these kings strictly remained neutral.⁶¹

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⁶⁰ Ep. Ind. VII, No. 5, l. 13.

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⁶¹ See Viswanatha: op. cit., p. 196.

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Yāna: The next method is yāna. Kauṭalya explains abhyuncayo yānam and Ganapati Sastri comments śaktideśakāla.⁶² It means preparedness to march, having due regard to army, place and time. Different kinds of this yāna are distinguished. The chief are Sandhānaja (marching with ally), Pārṣṇirodha (attacking from the rear), Mitravigrahini (causing dissension between his ally and the enemy), Dvandvaja (taking the offensive without the crumbling of the defences), Nirvyāja (marching with an invincible army), Kulya (helped by his enemy's vassals) and Śigragāmini (to pretend to march against one enemy, but suddenly turn towards another).⁶³ An invading king could embark on a march after properly safeguarding his own State, if he felt confident that he would be able to destroy the enemy's works.⁶⁴ In a later section of the Kauṭalīya the diplomatic utility of the yāna is furnished.⁶⁵ If the conqueror finds his enemy beset by troubles, and his subjects disaffected and disunited, and his kingdom ravaged by pestilence and other ills, then he may attack (vigraha yānam). He could again resort to yāna if he found his allies in front and in the rear of his enemy; also he must get heavily backed by his own subjects. There was the Sandhaya yānam which was to lead an expedition against the enemy in front after making a peace with the rear enemy. The third was the sambhūya-prayānam or preparedness for march by a confederation of States of different resources, fixing the ratio of the spoils to be taken by them.

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⁶² Vol. II, p. 238 (T. S. S. Series).

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⁶³ S.T.R., 5.11.57 ff. 64 Ar. Śās. VII, 1. 65 Ibid., VII, 4. 66 Cp. S.T.R., 5.12. 24-29.

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Samśraya:⁶⁶ Samśraya was the fifth policy under the category of ṣāḍgunyam. It literally means ‘support’ and in its broader sense means the seeking of the support of allies. This state of affairs emerges when a king feels that he has not the wherewithal to defend his kingdom against a possible attack of the enemy and also feels his inability to weaken otherwise the resources of his enemy. It is the firmness of the prospect and of deterioration moving on to well conceived strategy through vigorous efforts.⁶⁷ This was provided for by an alliance with a ruler of superior power. There is in the succeeding section an interesting discussion which centres round the nature of alliance. Any alliance with a great power may be tolerated as a stopgap. Permanent arrangements stand condemned; perhaps there was the fear and consequent gravity of strategic setbacks. A weak king should wait for some opportunity by watching the movements of his enemy, and if any such occasion should occur, he must seize it promptly and remove him from his path completely. If he, again, finds himself situated between two strong powers, he must enter into a compact with both of them and slowly set one of them against the other, causing a dissension or division in their ranks. At that time he may put each down separately by secret or covert means. Since no risk can be taken, an alliance must be entered into with him in whom the king has complete confidence and whose friendship is sincere and genuine.

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⁶⁷ *Ar. Śās.* VII, 1.

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*Dvaidībhāva*: The sixth method of state policy in respect of foreign relations is Dvaidībhāva, which means practising duplicity against one's enemies invariably through fear of them. Dr. Shama Sastri’s interpretation, ‘making peace with one and waging war with another’, is thus subject to correction. Underneath this policy lies an attitude of duplicity.⁶⁸ The *Śrīmūlam* commentary⁶⁹ explains the term as meaning the ‘policy of inducing in two enemies confidence by mere speech but behaving inimically in secret.” This policy is to be adopted only when help is not possible from any other source. Kāmandaka compares the behaviour of such a conquering monarch to the eyes of a cow.⁷⁰

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⁶⁸ *Ar. Śās.* VII, 1; *Kāma.* Ch. 11, 23 ff.

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⁶⁹ Vol. II, p. 238.

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⁷⁰ Kāma. XI, 23-6; Cf. Manu, VII, 160, Comm. Bār. Sūtra, V, 5-7; Pañcatantra Reconstructed, p. 360.

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This policy is set forth thus: "The conquering king invokes the aid of his potential enemy. Having combined with a neighbouring king, the conqueror may march against another neighbouring king. Or, if he thinks that 'my enemy will neither capture my rear nor make an alliance with my assailable enemy against whom I am going to march: I shall have double the strength possessed by him, i.e., the enemy suing peace; (my ally) will not only facilitate the collection of my revenue and supplies and put down the internal enemies who are causing me immense trouble, but also punish wild tribes and their followers entrenched in their strongholds, reduce my assailable enemy to a precarious condition or compel him to accept the proffered peace, and having received as much profit as he desires, he will endeavour to reconcile other enemies to me'"; then the conqueror may proclaim war against one and make peace with another, and endeavour to get an army for money or money for the supply of an army from among his neighbouring kings.⁷¹ It is rather difficult to make out the exact recommendation in pursuance of the policy of *dvaidhībhāva*.

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⁷¹ Bk. VII. ch. vii.

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Five kinds of this policy are distinguished in later literature.⁷² These are Mithyacitta (to dislike one in his heart of hearts but pretend to be friendly towards him), Mithya-vacanasaṃjña (to speak out one thing while having in mind just the opposite), Mithyakaraṇa (doing things as if for his good, but to subvert him in the end), Ubhayavetana (to secretly accept illicit emoluments from the enemy while continuing in his master’s service), and Yugmaprābhṛtaka (to pretend to collect men and money for another’s expedition, but on the other hand to serve his own purposes).⁷³

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⁷² S.T.R., 5.12.30-41.

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⁷³ S.T.R., 5.12. 31 f.

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INSTRUMENTS OF DIPLOMACY OR THE SEVEN EXPEDIENTS

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The application of the six methods of foreign policy was through the four means of sāma, dāna, bheda, and daṇḍa, either severally or jointly. According to the Arthaśāstra and the epics these are the recognized traditional expedients, which are found only in germ in Vedic literature. The Purāṇa literature and later nīti works like the Kāmandakīya add three more to this fourfold classification.⁷⁴ These are upekṣa, māyā, and indrajāla. This shows unmistakably the slow but sure advance in the art of war and peace, for the influence of diplomacy is felt in both.

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⁷⁴ See Matsya P. ch. 222.2-3. Kāma. ch. 18.

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Let us now proceed to examine each of these several modes of diplomacy, with regard to their nature and application. The Matsya Purāṇa rules that one and the same policy cannot be pursued at all times and towards all persons. In fact, the Purāṇa sets forth the theory that in the world the people are either righteous or unrighteous, and therefore the application of the policy should differ from person to person. For instance, it speaks of a twofold classification of the first diplomatic mode or sāma. Sāma literally means conciliation, and according to the Purāṇa there is the division into satya sāma and asatya sāma. While the first or satya sāma was applied to righteous beings, the asatya sāma was used towards the unrighteous. The righteous king was easily reconciled when an earnest appeal was made to his ancient family traditions, and when his action in other spheres was approved. If the same policy was pursued towards the unrighteous, surely it would endanger the conqueror's position. For the wicked king would be led to think of the conqueror's weakness and indulge in more mischief. Towards him is therefore recommended asatya sāma which was seemingly a reconciliation but in reality insincere. For in the case of an unrighteous monarch no amount of appeal to family traditions or appreciation of his actions would move him even an inch from his policy.⁷⁵

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⁷⁵ See also Kāma. ch. 18, 19 f.

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The implications of this diplomatic means of sāma are found buried in the texts of the Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra. The conquering king is asked to observe this policy of conciliation by the promise of protection of villages and forests, of sheep and cattle, of roads and traffic, of the restoration of the banished and of the runaway.⁷⁶ Kauṭalya recommends the application of this policy towards the conquered king so that the latter may remain loyal.⁷⁷ The sāma was again a method to bring weaker kings under one's control. If the weak king could not be brought down by a policy of conciliation alone, the other means of dāna or gift might be employed. With the passage of time, five kinds of sāma were distinguished, as is seen in the Śivatattva-ratnākara.⁷⁸ Surely in diplomacy it was not a question of stagnation but of progress of ideas.

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⁷⁶ Bk. VII, ch. 16.

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⁷⁷ Ibid.

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⁷⁸ S.T.R., 5, 12, 50 ff.

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Dāna: The next policy of diplomatic utility was dāna or gift. As we have already seen, Kauṭalya recommends the policy of conciliation and of gifts to inferior kings. The policy of gifts was put into operation if the straight method of conciliation did not produce the intended effect. It is said in the Matsya Purāṇa that even the gods are brought round through gifts of wealth and other presents.⁷⁹ Gifts were often the temptation—this is true largely to-day also—to win over the recalcitrant and the rebellious.

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⁷⁹ Cp. Kāma. ch. 18, 21 f.

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This policy also met another situation. It may be that sometimes the local chiefs or leaders joined hands with foreigners and rose against the king. In such cases Kauṭalya recommends the policy of sāma and dāna towards the discontented subjects, so that they might give up their unholy alliance with the aliens. After ensuring peace at home, the conqueror is asked to apply the policy of bheda and daṇḍa towards the foreigner. In this recommendation and the equally statesmanlike principle that the internal danger must be suppressed first before the external danger should be met, Kauṭalya shows himself a keen politician, and anticipates many of our modern statesmen. This recommendation of a practical statesman is supported by the views of law-givers like Manu.⁸⁰ But Manu does not attach much value either to the policy of gifts or the other diplomatic means like bheda. For does he not say that Paṇḍits or those who are versed in such technical literature, hold the opinion that from the point of view of progress of the kingdom only sāma and daṇḍa are the best?⁸¹ Thus the policy of gifts, though effective in several cases, is assigned a secondary place in the Mānavadharmaśāstra. The Śivatattvaratnākara mentions as many as sixteen kinds of dāna or gift,⁸² thus improving on the few kinds of gifts mentioned by the Arthaśāstra. Under the category come political marriage alliances. To cite an instance, Vaugandharāyaṇa, the minister of Udayana, arranged a matrimonial alliance between his king and the sister of the Magadha king Darśaka, which prevented Darśaka’s support to the Vatsa country and strengthened Udayana’s hands.⁸³ Instances of such marriages can be multiplied.⁸⁴ To mention only a few, we have the marriage alliance of Vākāṭakas and Guptas, of the Cholas and Cheras, the Cholas and Chālukyas, of the Licchavis and the Guptas. In his discussion on gifts, Kauṭalya uses the term abhava which is explained in the Śrīmūlam commentary as अर्थाद् दानं शत्रुभ्यो भयप्रसङ्ग meaning the gift awarded in the shape of wealth to avert the fear caused by the enemy. Otherthe Roman world, and the most important events of the reign of Constantine are thus represented as the immediate consequences of his conversion. But the historian, who must be content with the evidence of the times, will not be easily persuaded that the zeal of Constantine was not stimulated by the hope of political advantage, or that the conversion of the empire was not the result of a long and gradual process of change.

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⁸⁰ VII. 107.

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⁸¹ Ibid. 109.

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⁸² S.T.R., 5.12.59 ff.

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⁸³ Note Rājarāja’s and Rājendra’s marriage alliances with the Eastern Chālukya princes, so as to secure their alliance and turn the flank against their hereditary enemies, the Western Chālukyas of Kalyāni. See also Bhāsa—a study by A. D. Pusalkar, pp. 278-86.

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⁸⁴ See Kāma. ch. 18, 24-41.

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The conversion of Constantine is a subject which has been discussed with great warmth by the historians of the church, and it is not surprising that their opinions should be divided. The panegyrists of the emperor, who were eager to celebrate his piety and his zeal, have represented his conversion as a miraculous event, which was confirmed by the appearance of a cross in the sky, and by the victory which he obtained over his rival Maxentius. The critics, on the other hand, who are less disposed to believe in the supernatural, have sought to explain the conversion of Constantine by the influence of his mother Helena, or by the political necessity of securing the support of the Christians, who were already a powerful and influential body in the empire.

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It is probable that the truth lies between these two extremes, and that the conversion of Constantine was the result of a combination of motives, in which the influence of his mother, the political advantages of the Christian religion, and the genuine conviction of his own mind, all played a part. The character of Constantine was complex and contradictory, and it is not easy to determine the precise nature of his religious beliefs. He was a man of great ambition and of great ability, and he was always ready to adapt his conduct to the circumstances of the time.

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The conversion of Constantine was a turning point in the history of the Roman empire, and it had a profound influence on the development of the Christian church. The emperor, who had once been the persecutor of the Christians, became their protector and their patron, and he used his power to promote the interests of the church and to suppress the pagan religion. The conversion of Constantine was the beginning of a new era in the history of the world, and it is a subject which will continue to be discussed by historians for many years to come.

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ratnākara refers to six kinds of bheda, and shows, as in others, a distinct advance over the Kauṭalyan tradition. These are Prāṇahāni (involving life and death), Mānabhanga (where honour is at stake), Dhanahāni (appealing to a rich enemy's avariciousness), Bandhaka (creating fear of imprisonment in the enemy's ally), Dārābhilāṣa (the enemy coveting his ally's wife), and Arigabhanga (the enemy's covetousness of his ally's kingdom).⁸⁷

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⁸⁷ S.T.R., 5.12.60 ff.

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Daṇḍa: We now pass on to Daṇḍa, the last mode of policy according to the epic tradition. Daṇḍa is not actual punishment or opening of hostilities. It is a diplomatic war, not an armed contest. It is a threat of war, generally applied as a last resort before the actual commencement of fighting. Recourse was had to this policy if the three, sāma, dāna and bheda, had been applied separately or conjointly, and had been found ineffective to achieve the purpose. According to Kauṭalya this policy of daṇḍa should be followed in the case of stronger powers. Sometimes a threat of war might lead to open battle.⁸⁸ This is the use of diplomacy in war. Different modes of daṇḍa are mentioned.⁸⁹ One was to capture the enemy in open fight. The second was to subdue him by resorting to treacherous warfare. The third was to strike him by planning a secret conspiracy. The last was to besiege his fortress to create panic and to capture him during the tumult and confusion caused by the fall of the fortress. If the conquered king behaves better, he should be reinstated.

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⁸⁸ See Kāma. ch. 18, 41 f.

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⁸⁹ Ar. Śās. Bk. VII. 16.

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*Upekṣā*: It has been well realised that the application of *daṇḍa* cannot be resorted to by all monarchs. How could an inferior power meet a stronger power in open warfare? Even the use of treachery or duplicity on his part would not give him success. In that case what should be the policy to be adopted by the weaker State? The *Matsya Purāṇa* envisages a similar situation and recommends the diplomatic policy of *upekṣā*. In the midst of superior powers a lesser power should pursue *upekṣā* or indifference. Already in the Kauṭalīya, this *upekṣā* is mentioned, not as a separate policy but as an aspect of the Udāsīna attitude. In other words, Kauṭalya asks a neutral power to cultivate the virtue of indifference towards his neighbours, whether they be his allies or foes. The ethics of international law, as the ancient Hindus conceived it, respected this neutral power, and no belligerent was prepared to take notice of this ruler of indifferent attitude.⁹⁰ From the Kauṭalyan sense of *upekṣā*, it is a distinct advance in the science of diplomacy to regard *upekṣā* as one of the expedients, which was the privilege of the weaker power to adopt. Either this power should ever remain in that neutral or indifferent attitude, or it should pursue that until the time when it would feel strong enough to meet the adversary in the open field. There seems to be the further implication that even in case the more powerful State should give trouble unprovoked, it was for the small power to endure it for the time being, and not to retaliate. In such cases patience has its own reward.⁹¹ In another section Kāmandaka speaks of a threefold *upekṣā* and cites the classical examples of the Virāṭa king leaving alone the wicked Kicaka, and Bhīmasēna leaving uninjured Hiḍimba’s brother.⁹²

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⁹⁰ *Ar. Śās.* VII, 18.

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⁹¹ See *Kāma.* ch. 11, 21 f.

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⁹² *Ibid.* ch. 18. 57-9.

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Māyā: To the above-mentioned diplomatic attitudes, which are accepted by the orthodox Arthaśāstra literature, are added māyā and indrajāla. These two partake, as we shall see, of the character of base diplomacy. For the conquering king would discard the straight path, and try his best to hoodwink the enemy by a recourse to the expedient māyā. Māyā means illusion and therefore in that sense the invader would put to use all illusory powers to deceive the enemy, and strike him at his weak point. This expedient must be considered as a baser kind of diplomacy. There are different uses of this policy. But there is no reason to doubt that the application of the policy of māyā consisted of cunning and intrigue. Surely, this was one of the methods of daṇḍa as prescribed by Kauṭalya. Except for the opinion that treacherous warfare could be indulged in, there is no more detail given by him. In invoking the aid of this expedient, it can be noticed that no actual war is implied here, and the success over an adversary was to be achieved by a network of intrigue and counter-intrigue. Some interesting details can, however, be gathered from the Kāmandakīya Nītisāra. The conqueror is asked to get himself dressed as a god, or a pillar, and when the enemy comes to worship, to slay him. Other cases of disguise are mentioned. The use of parachutes in the present war perhaps approximates to this principle. The king might visit the enemy in the disguise of a woman,⁹³ of a devil, or an evil spirit, and slay him when at close quarters. The māyā was twofold, mānuṣi and amānuṣi or daiva. The Mahābhārata cites the instance of Kīcaka’s death by Bhīmasēna in Draupadī’s disguise.⁹⁴

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⁹³ *Devicandraguptam.* See Dr. V. Raghavan, *Journal of the Benares Hindu University*, Vol. II. No. 1. p. 24.

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⁹⁴ Ch. 18, 53-6. 95 For instance, see Bk. X, 5.

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This method and the next, namely Indrajāla, must go to demonstrate a noticeable deterioration in the concept of international morality. If it ever existed in actual politics, it must have come into being after the Mauryan epoch, for it is not among the accepted principles of the Kauṭalyan diplomacy.

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Indrajāla: The last of the expedients which had the acceptance of the later Nīti writers, in whose works we find traces of deviation of religious principles from things purely secular, was indrajāla. A close and careful examination of the uses for which this policy was followed indicates that it partook of the nature and character of māyā. This is, in other words, the use of stratagem to win over the enemy. It may also be the use of stratagem in war. It seems to us that these two expedients were the outcome of the growing popularity of the Atharva Veda Samhitā and its tenets.⁹⁵ Here we have a number of spells and charms, surely of baser kinds, to achieve one’s end. These were by slow degrees increasingly used in wars and in the subjugation of the recalcitrant and the rebellious. Even the Buddhist canonical books, which are supposed to breathe an air of higher ethical atmosphere, countenance these intriguing and superstitious methods. For example, we read several of these things in the section Brahmajālasutta of the Dīgha- Nikāya.⁹⁶ It reads something like a summary of the important Atharva rites and recommendations.⁹⁷ The following details of this device of indrajāla are mentioned in the Kāmandakīya.⁹⁸ ‘Alluring the troops of the enemy out of their camps, villages and castles into pastures, a cool-headed king should slay them. Concealing the inefficient portion of the army and with the rest of it supported by the allies, a king should crush the foe, falling upon him even like a lion.’⁹⁹

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⁹⁶ Vol. I, pp. 1-46; See also B. C. Law: *A History of Pali Literature*, pp. 81 f; Cp. Winternitz: *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 36.

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⁹⁷ Cp. *A.V.* Bk. X, 5.

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⁹⁸ *Kāma.* Ch. 18. 60-61.

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⁹⁹ Dutt’s trans.

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These last three methods, upekṣā, māyā, indrajāla, were perhaps recognised, to use modern phraseology, as safeguards for minorities against the unscrupulous aggression of superior powers. According to Kāmandaka, these three expedients are only aspects of the four main upāyas: sāma, dāna, bheda and daṇḍa. He says māyā is an aspect of daṇḍa. So also upekṣā and indrajāla are included as aspects of bheda.¹⁰⁰ As these different kinds of expedients have different objectives in view, each must be applied according to circumstances. If some cases require a combination of one or two methods, that must be also resorted to. In the course of the application of dāna, sāma may also be used. In the course of sāma and bheda, dāna may be used. The section of the Kāmandakīya dealing with this subject is concluded thus:

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¹⁰⁰ See the Commentary of Śankarārya on st. 61.

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‘That diplomat who uses these different modes of policy, with due regard to place, time and resources, against the enemy and his own force, will attain success, and he who does not make use of them in his domestic and foreign policy will be but like a blind man.’¹⁰¹ By employing these seven expedients based on the sixfold policy, a conquering king, it is said, earns the much coveted title of Sārvabhauma.¹⁰²

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¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 65.

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¹⁰² *S.T.R.*, 5.12.123.

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